by Jasmin Ramsey
Geneva – On the eve of their resumed negotiations, Iran and the 6-world power P5+1 have expressed a tone differing from that shown in talks before Iran’s June presidential election.
“I am not pessimistic about this round of talks,” Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told Iranian press upon [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Geneva – On the eve of their resumed negotiations, Iran and the 6-world power P5+1 have expressed a tone differing from that shown in talks before Iran’s June presidential election.
“I am not pessimistic about this round of talks,” Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told Iranian press upon arriving in Geneva earlier this Monday evening according to the Islamic Republic News Agency.
“This meeting in Geneva is an opportunity to examine Western seriousness in these negotiations,” said the head of the Iranian delegation.
Meanwhile a senior administration official told reporters here today that while the P5+1 was “encouraged” and “hopeful” after the “change in tone” expressed by the Iranian delegation in New York during last month’s UN General Assembly (UNGA), it needs to be “tested with verifiable, concrete actions.”
Though President Obama announced last month that Secretary of State of John Kerry will now be directly involved in the negotiation process, Kerry was not scheduled to appear alongside his Iranian counterpart during this session.
“It’s appropriate for the foreign ministers to come together when it makes sense,” said the US official.
“We’ve passed the bilateral Rubicon,” they added, referring to the historic 30-minute private dinner meeting between Kerry and Zarif on the sidelines of the UNGA last month.
While Kerry was flying back home to Washington from London this evening, Zarif met privately with EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton at the residence of Iran’s envoy in Geneva.
On Tuesday morning Zarif is scheduled to present Iran’s new 3-step proposal to the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany), after which point the Iranian team will be led by Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
“I think some people had hoped they would have given me a proposal in advance…but that has not occurred and we expect they will give us a detailed proposal of what they have in mind tomorrow, but how detailed, I don’t know,” said the senior administration official.
“We are open to Iran’s ideas about how to proceed forward,” they added.
“Until today the nuclear talks were a lose-lose and we should change the game to a win-win,” said Zarif today while reasserting the restricted timeline the Iranians seem to be operating on, according to the Iranian Student News Agency.
“I think it is possible to take preliminary steps — in 6 months to 1 year we can change Iran’s nuclear file to a normal case in the [International Atomic Energy Agency] IAEA,” he said.
The senior administration official also told reporters that though the last proposal presented by the P5+1 in Almaty earlier this year — which they described as “balanced and reasonable” — was still on the table, they were open to Iran’s new plan.
But if the Iranians “want more, they should give more,” said the official.
While Iran has continued to stress that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes, it is also set on getting relief from the rounds of sanctions that have been imposed on it over the years, especially those affecting its banking sector.
When asked what Iran “needs” from the US by ABC News last month, Zarif called for the dismantling “of illegal sanctions against Iran that are targeting ordinary Iranians.”
“It’s important to make clear that any sanctions relief…be targeted proportionally to what Iran puts on the table,” said the senior administration official today.
“I’m sure they will disagree about what is proportionate, but we are quite clear about the what the menu of options are and what will match what,” said the official.
Photo: Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif arrives in Geneva, Switzerland for talks scheduled with the P5+1 for Oct. 15-16. Credit: Sina Shiri/Fars News
]]>by Shawn Amoei
In the latest sign of increasing press freedom and Iranian receptivity towards a thaw in relations with the United States, one of Iran’s leading dailies published on Monday an interview with the State Department’s Persian-language spokesman, Alan Eyre. With his photograph emblazoned on the front page [...]]]>
by Shawn Amoei
In the latest sign of increasing press freedom and Iranian receptivity towards a thaw in relations with the United States, one of Iran’s leading dailies published on Monday an interview with the State Department’s Persian-language spokesman, Alan Eyre. With his photograph emblazoned on the front page of Shargh, Eyre’s interview represents the first instance in which a US official has been given such a platform in the Iranian press since the Islamic Republic’s founding 34 years ago.
The unprecedented move appears to be part of a shift in Iran’s political atmosphere, which saw heavy media restrictions during the term of President Hassan Rouhani’s predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While Eyre presented the official US line on Iran, the feature was clearly depicted in a positive light with the headline, “Alan Eyre: We Seek the Lifting of Sanctions” alongside a rather sympathetic image of the spokesman. This could be representative of a broader attempt by Iranian media, sanctioned by Iranian officials, to warm up the political mood in Iran toward the possibility of a detente with the United States.
Following is an excerpt from the interview as translated by the Washington Post’s Tehran bureau:
]]>Shargh: How can closer ties between Iran and the U.S. help to resolve the nuclear issue?
Alan Eyre: As Obama and Rouhani remarked, the opposite is correct, that it is solving the nuclear issue that can be an important solution to mending the relations between two countries.
Shargh: What is the U.S. view on the diplomatic approach of the new president?
Alan Eyre: Both the president and Secretary of State strongly believe that there is an opportunity for diplomacy and we hope that the Iranian government uses it. We welcome the change in tone, but as always we say there is a big difference between words and action.
Shargh: To what extent is the U.S. side ready to take trust building steps?
Alan Eyre: The U.S. and P5+1 are ready to answer Iran’s trust-building actions with the same actions. Our suggestions in Almaty, which were not answered, had the same features and we hope that the new government gives a conceptual reply to it.
by Jasmin Ramsey
The Jun. 14 election of Hassan Rouhani, nicknamed the “diplomatic sheik” during his service as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005, to Iran’s presidency was met with hopeful celebrations within the country. But reactions from key world leaders have been much cooler.
While a Jul. 13 Wall [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
The Jun. 14 election of Hassan Rouhani, nicknamed the “diplomatic sheik” during his service as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005, to Iran’s presidency was met with hopeful celebrations within the country. But reactions from key world leaders have been much cooler.
While a Jul. 13 Wall Street Journal report claimed that the Obama administration would seek direct talks with its long-time adversary, it remains to be seen how far the United States will go to bring about a mutually acceptable agreement and whether or not Iran would accept it.
Israel’s prime minister, who has been warning that Iran is getting dangerously close to building a nuclear bomb for more than two decades, wants the United States to increase pressure on Iran while ramping up the military threat.
“What is important is to convey to them, especially after the election, that that policy will not change. And that it’ll it be backed up by increasingly forceful sanctions and military action,” Netanyahu said Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation”.
But Washington has reportedly already assured the Netanyahu government that it will not decrease pressure on Iran following Rouhani’s win.
“We have told the Israelis we intend to judge the Iranians according to their actions and not according to their words,” an American official told the Israeli daily, Haaretz, on Jul. 14.
According to Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiators and who worked closely with Mr. Rouhani, absent substantial modifications in Washington’s negotiating posture, little will change on the Iranian side.
IPS spoke with Mousavian, currently a research scholar at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, about prospects for change in the Iranian nuclear issue.
* IPS News published a version of this article on July 15.
Q: Your article for the Cairo Review, which was written more than a month before Mr. Rouhani’s election, has generated a lot of discussion over the suggestion that one of Iran’s options is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Is Iran seriously considering this?
A: As I reiterated in the article published by the Cairo Review, the first and most favorable option for Iran is to continue seeking a peaceful resolution to the standoff. I explained the five major demands the P5+1 [U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany] made in recent nuclear talks to prevent Iran’s breakout capability and to ensure a maximum level of transparency. Iran, in return, had two major demands: lifting sanctions and recognizing Iran’s rights under the NPT. I have also proposed that the world powers and Iran place their demands within a package, to be implemented in a step-by-step manner with proportionate reciprocation.
Withdrawing from the NPT has never been Iran’s intention. The US and Israel have initiated “all options on the table”, leaving open the possibility of a military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. This policy goes against the UN charter, the NPT, and non-proliferation, where nuclear-armed states — the U.S. and Israel — are threatening to attack Iran, a non-nuclear weapon state. Therefore, as long as the U.S. policy of “all options on the table” remains valid, Iran as a sovereign state is forced to also have “all options on the table”.
Q: The Obama administration claims that Iran has not responded formally to the confidence-building offer made in Almaty, Kazakhstan in February. In your opinion, why haven’t they, and do you expect a formal reply after Mr. Rouhani’s inauguration?
A: The P5+1 proposal in Almaty sought maximum demands and provided the minimum in return. Rouhani’s administration would be ready for a fair and balanced deal, comprising all the major demands of both parties based on the NPT, placed within a package and implemented in a step-by-step plan with proportionate reciprocation.
Q: Is recognizing Iran’s right to enrich uranium a precondition to a negotiated solution?
A: It would be part of the package deal explained above.
Q: There are forces in Congress that would like to implement more sanctions on Iran before Mr. Rouhani is inaugurated. What effect can this have on prospects for the negotiations?
A: Iran would never take calls for direct talks and engagement serious as long as the U.S. continues its sanction and pressure policy. If Washington is genuinely seeking rapprochement, it needs to demonstrate that through an act of goodwill instead of through increased hostilities and animosity. Iranians place importance in U.S. actions, not just words.
Q: What’s the balance of forces as you see them in Iran with respect to those who want to take a hardline on the nuclear issue and those who are in favor of a greater flexibility, and what is the effect of sanctions on this internal debate?
A: There are two schools of thought in Iran with respect to the nuclear approach, but there is no dispute on Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology, which includes enrichment. The P5+1 and Western approach toward Iran’s nuclear dossier does however play an important role in the balance of these two schools of thought.
During the nuclear talks from 2003 to 2005 with the three European powers [UK, France and Germany], when I was a member of the negotiating team, Iran demonstrated far-reaching overtures to resolve the nuclear dispute. Iran implemented the maximum level of transparency a member-state of the NPT can commit to by accepting the Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangement. We also demonstrated Iran’s readiness to commit to all confidence building measures, assuring the peaceful nature of the nuclear program—forever. Regrettably, Iran and its European counterparts failed to reach a final agreement because the US continued to deny the legitimate rights of Iran under the NPT. The US inflexibility and position altered the balance of forces in Iran toward those in favor of radicalism. Therefore, if the West seeks cooperation and flexibility from Iran, it has to respond proportionally and appropriately.
The sanctions policy is only good for a lose-lose game. The Iranian nation has suffered from the sanctions, while the West has suffered from the dramatic increase of Iran’s enrichment-capacity and level. Once sanctions were implemented, Iran increased the number of centrifuges from 3,000 to 12,000, the level of enrichment from 3.5% to 20%, the stockpile of enriched uranium increased approximately 800% and so on.
Q: Mr. Rouhani referred to Israel as Israel rather than by any other name in his first press conference as president-elect. In your opinion, do you think this portends a new approach by Mr. Rouhani? What could it look like?
A: Dr. Rouhani is not a man of radical rhetoric. He is courteous and logical and respects international norms and regulations. The key to resolving the dispute with Iran depends on whether the traditional Western policies of pressure, sanctions, threats and humiliating Iran will change to those based on respect, mutual interests and cooperation with Rouhani’s administration.
Q: In your view, what caused the Iranian government to reject the TRR fuel swap proposal in 2009 and subsequently accept it when Turkey and Brazil came forward as intermediaries in 2010?
A: Iran never rejected the TRR fuel swap proposal of October 2009. Iran was asking for the simultaneous exchange of fuel for enriched uranium. The West was instead demanding the immediate delivery of Iranian enriched uranium with the fuel only provided to Iran after 2 years. However, in December 2009, through Mohammad ElBaradei, Iran offered a direct deal between Tehran and Washington, where Iran would deliver the enriched stockpile immediately and receive the fuel rods after two years. This concession from Iran was to open a door for direct talks and make a deal with the U.S. The U.S declined the offer. After that Iran signed the deal with Turkey and Brazil because the U.S. president encouraged the Turkish Prime Minister and Brazilian president to reach an agreement. Yet again, the U.S. declined to support the deal and instead pressed ahead with sanctions on Iran.
Q: Why should the world have confidence in Iran now when it is believed that for many years Iran pursued “a policy of concealment” as Mr. ElBaradei once put it?
A: In 1975, Germany signed a contract to build a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran, and was paid approximately 7.8 billion DM. The project was 90% completed at the time of the 1979 Revolution. Soon after the revolution, the West’s policy toward Iran was aimed at denying Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear power plant — a clear violation of NPT.
In 1976, France signed a contract with Iran worth $1.2 billion to produce the fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant on French soil. Once again, following the revolution, the West transgressed Iran’s right to access the international fuel market, in clear violation of the NPT. Such Western policies pushed Iran toward self-sufficiency. Moreover, during Iraq’s invasion of Iran (1980-88), the US and European powers provided the materials and technology for Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, killing and injuring about 100,000 Iranians. With such a history, can Iran have confidence in the West?
]]>via IPS News
Since Barack Obama became president of the United States, messages marking the Iranian New Year – Norouz – celebrated at the onset of spring have become yearly affairs. So have responses given by Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei from the city of Mashhad where he makes a [...]]]>
via IPS News
Since Barack Obama became president of the United States, messages marking the Iranian New Year – Norouz – celebrated at the onset of spring have become yearly affairs. So have responses given by Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei from the city of Mashhad where he makes a yearly pilgrimage to visit the shrine of Shi’i Islam’s eighth imam, Imam Reza.
This year, like the first year of Obama’s presidency, the two leaders’ public messages had added significance because of the positive signals broadcast by both sides after Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany met in Almaty, Kazakhstan in March. The second meeting is slotted to occur Apr. 5-6.
Considering that the exchanged messages came in the midst of ongoing talks, a degree of softened language and the abandonment of threats was expected. In his first Norouz speech in 2009, when both sides were getting ready to embark on serious talks, Obama said that his administration was committed to diplomacy and a process that “will not be advanced by threats” and is “honest and grounded in mutual respect”.
This time, however, his message was laced with threats and promises of rewards if Iranian leaders behaved well, eliciting Khamenei’s disdainful response, and revealing yet again how intractable – and dangerous – the conflict between Iran and the United States has become.
The dueling exchanges also revealed the rhetorical game both sides are playing for the hearts and minds of the Iranian people, who are caught in the crossfire of policies in which they have very little input despite the very serious impact these policies have had on their economic well-being.
Reciting Persian poetry and touting the greatness of Iran’s civilisation and culture, President Obama once again suggested that the United States is ready to reach a solution that gives “Iran access to peaceful nuclear energy while resolving once and for all the serious questions that the world has about the true nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.”
But this general offer – which remained unclear on the key question of whether the United States is willing to formally recognise Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its soil – was also framed within an explicit threat that if the “Iranian government continues down its current path, it will further isolate Iran.”
In other words, the Iranian leaders can choose “a better path” which Obama insisted was for the sake of the Iranian people for whom there is no good reason “to be denied the opportunities enjoyed by people in other countries, just as Iranians deserve the same freedoms and rights as people everywhere.”
Although Iran’s isolation was acknowledged, President Obama’s words were carefully chosen not to mention the fact that it is the United States that has endeavored to impose a ferocious sanctions regime on Iran which, in his words, “deny opportunity enjoyed by people of other countries.”
In the Norouz greeting that came after a tough year of hardship, highlighted by a 40-percent drop in Iran’s oil exports, Obama’s implicit message was that the Iranian people should not blame the United States as the source of their economic difficulties but rather their own government’s choice in refusing the demands of the “international community”.
Viewed through the eyes of the Iranian leadership, the aggressiveness of such a posture was obvious, particularly since two days later, standing next to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, the U.S. president set aside his soft language and once again reiterated that as far as Iran is concerned “all options are on the table.”
In other words, if the Iranian leaders do not abandon their current path, the people of Iran will not only continue to be collectively punished through broad-based sanctions and denial of opportunities, they may also be subject to military attacks.
Not surprisingly, the response from Ayatollah Khamenei was calibrated to counter President Obama’s threats hidden in the language of respect for Iranian culture and people. Khamenei also showed his conciliatory side by stating that he does not oppose even bilateral talks with the United States, but added the caveat that he is not optimistic about their results. Why?
“Because our past experiences show that in the logic of the American gentlemen, negotiation does not mean sitting down together to try to reach a rational solution,” Khamenei said. “This is not what they mean by negotiation. What they mean is that we should sit down together and talk so that Iran accepts their views. The goal has been announced in advance: Iran must accept their view.”
Highlighting a clear disconnect between what Obama says to different audiences, Ayatollah Khamenei went to the heart of the problem President Obama has in convincing the Iranian people that he has their interest in mind when talking to them. Khamenei reminded his Iranian audience that “in his official addresses, the American president speaks about Iran’s economic problems as if he is speaking about his victories.”
He pointed to the announced intent of sanctions to “cripple” Iran by “the incompetent lady who was responsible for America’s foreign policy”, an apparent reference to former secretary of state Hillary Clinton.
Khamenei’s response also singled out the United States as Iran’s number one enemy and “main centre of conspiracies against the Iranian nation”. He did acknowledge the help the U.S. gets from other Western countries and Israel but dismissed the latter as “too small to be considered among the frontline enemies of the Iranian nation”.
Along the same lines, Khamenei was also dismissive of Obama’s claim to speak for the international community. “The international community is no way interested in enmity with Iranian or Islamic Iran,” Khamenei said.
Despite differences, however, Khamenei speech had one key point in common with Obama’s message. Both leaders were ready to heap praise on the Iranian people; one did so for their “great and celebrated culture” and the other for their resistance and “high capacity and power to turn threats into opportunities”.
Heaping praise, however, cannot hide the fact that the most likely victims of the conflict between the governments of the two countries are the ones that have no input in the decisions made in either country. Both speeches made clear that, caught in the rhetorical crossfire, the people of Iran are subjects to be wooed and courted but whose economic welfare is not of much concern.
Photo Credit: “Kamshots” Flickr.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
Ahead of the technical-level nuclear talks that will take place in Istanbul on March 18 and the top-level talks that will be held in early April, Farideh Farhi, an Independent Scholar at the University of Hawaii and Lobe Log contributor, offers context and insight [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Ahead of the technical-level nuclear talks that will take place in Istanbul on March 18 and the top-level talks that will be held in early April, Farideh Farhi, an Independent Scholar at the University of Hawaii and Lobe Log contributor, offers context and insight into what can reasonably be expected in terms of results.
Q): Considering the cautious optimism that was expressed by the Iranians after the Almaty talks (February 26-27), is there a better chance for a breakthrough during the March/April meetings?
Farideh Farhi: It is too soon to think of breakthrough at this point. But the decision on the part of Iran’s negotiating team to portray the slight move on the part of the United States [to offer slight sanctions relief] as a turning point, has given the leadership in Tehran room to sell an initial confidence-building measure in the next couple of months as a “win-win situation,” something the Iranians have always claimed to be interested in. Having room to maneuver domestically, however, does not necessarily mean that it will happen. In the next couple of months we just have to wait and see the extent to which opponents of any kind of deal in both Tehran and Washington will be able to prevent the optimism that’s been expressed from turning into a process of give and take.
At this point, though, it is noteworthy that the first signs of opposition to what happened in Almaty occurred in Washington and not Tehran (see this Washington Post editorial.) In Iran, the questioning that has since emerged is about whether the positive portrayal of a US shift, for example by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, is justified by an actual shift in Almaty, which some deem as not sufficient to warrant an agreement; at least not yet.
Q): CNN reported on March 2 that Iran was open to direct talks, but Iran has made similar statements before and you’ve pointed out that direct talks have already taken place back in October 2009. What happened during that meeting?
Farideh Farhi: I have written about what happened then here, but in short, during the October 2009 Geneva meeting, which occurred while Iran was in the midst of post-election turmoil, hopes were raised by the Saeed Jalili-led nuclear team, after he met with US negotiator William Burns, that a breakthrough had happened and the US had accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium in exchange for the transfer of uranium out of Iran (later to be returned to Iran in the transformed form of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor). But Iran’s tumultuous post-election environment, combined with a lack of transparency regarding the agreement’s details, led to opposition across the political spectrum. Rightly or wrongly, there was a sense in the public that the hard-line power leaders were making a behind-the-scenes-deal with outside powers in order to continue repression at home. Eventually the inability of both Jalili and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to convince others in Iran that the agreement included an explicit acceptance of Iran’s enrichment program led to Leader Ali Khamenei’s withdrawal of support for the agreement.
Q: Why do you think the administration is so focused on direct talks right now while Congress seems to be operating on a completely different beat, and what needs to happen for direct talks to happen again.
Farideh Farhi: The insistence on direct talks, I assume, is about receiving a signal from the Leader that he is interested in resolving the nuclear issue. The problem is that there is also a lack of trust on his side and he needs to be assured that the United States is interested in a process of give and take. He, along with quite a few others in Iran, need to be convinced that bilateral talks are not a trap intended to reignite the international consensus for the further squeezing of Iran, which the Obama Administration has been unable to sustain due to Russian and Chinese refusal to buy in at the United Nations.
In addition, many in Iran, rightly or wrongly, have come to believe that the US interest in direct talks is only about exacting concessions from Iran or serving its own interests without any attention to Iran’s needs and interests. Experiences such as Iran’s engagement with the US over Afghanistan in 2001, and the three rounds of talk over Iraq in 2006-07, have given the impression that there is no equivalency between what the US demands and what it’s willing to offer. In Iraq, for instance, the US wanted Iran’s help for the resolution of everyday security challenges that the US was facing without acknowledging that Iran also has interests in shaping the political direction of Iraq. There are other examples but the end result has always been Tehran’s increased caution regarding direct dealings with the US.
As of now, the two countries are still far from finding a common language to talk to each other with. Washington is still focused on the resolution of immediate issues of concern, be it Iran’s nuclear program or figuring out a way of getting Iran’s help — or at least reducing Iran’s incentive to create trouble — as it tries to untangle itself from Afghanistan. Tehran, on the other hand, is focused on longer-term strategic issues and the consolidation of its role in the region. For Tehran to enter into a direct conversation with the US, it has to be convinced that it will also get something tangible out of it.
Q: What needs to happen on both sides to increase the chances for progress during the March/April talks, and if you believe that nothing will happen on the Iranian side before the election, what needs to happen generally.
I fall into the category of people who think that something can happen before the election. The fact that the Iranians agreed to have technical talks so soon confirms my belief. The unambiguous signal from Tehran is that the nuclear issue is a systemic matter and will not be affected by the result of the election. Meanwhile, the decision by the United States to shift a bit before the election also signals to Iran’s leadership that it’s not betting on or hoping for the victory of any particular candidate in the election. If it’s sustained, this move, unlike the dynamics we saw during the 2009 election, will take the question of potential talks with the US out of the Iranian electoral equation because some form of them are already taking place.
What needs to happen in the next few months is a demonstration on the part of Tehran that it’s willing to suspend part of its enrichment program in exchange for the suspension of some sanctions on the part of the United States and Europe. Neither of these suspensions need to be consequential or major in terms of broader demands that both sides have on each other. But the acceptance of a mini-step as a first step is by itself a sign that a process — based on a more realistic understanding and expectation of what can be given and taken from both sides — has begun. If this happens — given the contentious dynamics in both countries and ferocious opposition by a number of regional players to any kind of talks between Iran and the United States — it’s a very big deal, even it it continues to occur within the P5+1 frame.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
Mohammad Javad Larijani, a top adviser to Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, seems like a reasonable fellow with respect to Iran’s nuclear stance in this March 12th interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour.
On the West’s issue with Iranian enrichment of uranium to 20%, Mr. Larijani says we simply need [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Mohammad Javad Larijani, a top adviser to Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, seems like a reasonable fellow with respect to Iran’s nuclear stance in this March 12th interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour.
On the West’s issue with Iranian enrichment of uranium to 20%, Mr. Larijani says we simply need to go back to the era when Iran was able to buy the fuel it needs for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). “The minute they sell it to us, the amount we need for the Tehran reactor, there is definitely no need to produce it,” he said.
On the issue of Iran’s slow but steady advancement of is nuclear program, Mr. Larijani argues that Iran’s enrichment of uranium is an “honest to God right” that’s also covered by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and “we are a moving nation, we are going to capture higher levels of scientific achievement” regardless of Western demands. Then the reasonable part kicks in full-swing: however, if concerns about Iran’s nuclear program are related to the issue of nuclear armament, Iran understands and shares that concern, claims Mr. Larijani, adding that Iran is “willing to accept all mechanisms under the NPT” to safeguard against such development.
And with respect to the possibility of bilateral talks between Iran and the US (which already occurred back in October 2009), Mr. Larijani is less direct. He doesn’t confirm or reject the possibility, but does offer a “recommendation” that a “new model” be designed for relations between Iran and the United States which acknowledges that Iran does not want to be more than “what we are” and ends US hostility toward Iran.
Excluding Mr. Larijani’s comments about the political battle between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran’s ruling elite, which Mr. Larijani describes as part of Iran’s “democratic structure”, all this raises the question of why Iran isn’t perceived as reasonable during negotiations or can’t be as reasonable as Mr. Larijani seems to be here with Amanpour on CNN, and why progress on the diplomatic front remains slow at best or simply nil. Deep mutual mistrust, acknowledged by the most knowledgeable US-Iran analysts, is perhaps the main reason for the lack of substantial results, as are those pesky details that need to be agreed upon by both sides before a deal can be reached.
Then there’s that lingering issue of whether progress can even be hoped for before Iran’s 2013 Presidential election, and for that I turn to the experts. I’ll have an interview that touches on that issue and the nuclear negotiations as a whole with Farideh Farhi up next week.
]]>by Peter Jenkins
Divining the Obama administration’s foreign policy intentions can be intellectually challenging.
At the beginning of February the US Vice President appeared to be offering Iran an opportunity to enter into bilateral talks on the nuclear dispute.
Three weeks ago the US was encouraging its European allies to review [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
Divining the Obama administration’s foreign policy intentions can be intellectually challenging.
At the beginning of February the US Vice President appeared to be offering Iran an opportunity to enter into bilateral talks on the nuclear dispute.
Three weeks ago the US was encouraging its European allies to review their opening position for the upcoming Almaty talks and be open to demanding a bit less of Iran while offering a little more.
Two weeks ago the Secretary of State was hailing the outcome of the Almaty meeting as useful and expressing hope that serious engagement could lead to a comprehensive agreement.
Yet last week in New York, addressing a UN Security Council committee, Ambassador Susan Rice, a member of President Obama’s cabinet, was speaking of Iran as though nothing had changed since the end of January.
There are many clever people working for the Obama administration. So I suppose we must assume that this apparent incoherence is in fact part of a highly sophisticated stratagem, which will deliver what most — though not all — of us want: peace in our time.
Any, though, who are less inclined to think more of US officials than former British diplomats do, should be forgiven for feeling perplexed — perhaps even a little worried — by Ambassador Rice’s remarks.
Let me try to illustrate that by reviewing a few of her points from the position of a Non-Aligned (NAM) member of the UN. Of course, a former British diplomat cannot hope to imagine the thoughts of NAM counterparts with pin-point accuracy. But I have rubbed shoulders with NAM diplomats for a sufficient number of years, and listened to enough of their intergovernmental interventions, to have a rough idea of what impression Ambassador Rice will have made.
“The Iranian nuclear issue remains one of the gravest threats to international security” she intoned. Really? I, as a NAM diplomat, am not sure Iran has ever violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and am certain Iran has not violated that treaty’s most important provisions. Surely North Korea, which has just conducted its third nuclear test, is a greater threat? And what about Israel, which possesses hundreds of dangerous weapons of mass destruction, as well as sophisticated long-range delivery systems? What about India and Pakistan, which came close to nuclear blows in 2002? What about Israel’s refusal to withdraw from territories it has occupied for over 45 years, a standing affront to Arab self-respect? What about the potential consequences of Western-sponsored civil war in Syria, civil unrest in Iraq, and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan?
“We meet at a time of growing risks.” Is that so? Surely the latest International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) report suggests that Iran is being careful to deny Israel’s Prime Minister a pretext to draw the US into a war of aggression?
“[Iran is] obstruct[ing] the IAEA’s investigation into the program’s possible military dimension by refusing to grant access to the Parchin site.” Well, yes. But surely the question of access to Parchin is legally more open to dispute than this implies? And hasn’t the US intelligence community concluded that Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program ten years ago? Don’t the IAEA’s suspicions relate to experiments that may have taken place more than ten years ago and that would have involved only a few grams of nuclear material? Why all the fuss?
“More alarming still…Iran is now….installing hundreds of second-generation centrifuges”. Why is this so alarming? Surely Iran has declared this installation to the IAEA, will submit the machines’ operations to frequent IAEA inspection and intends to use them to produce low-enriched uranium for which Iran will account? Developing centrifuge technology under IAEA safeguards is not a treaty violation.
“These actions are unnecessary and thus provocative.” Since when have states been entitled to dictate what is necessary to one another? Some states certainly don’t see these actions as provocative.
“[Iran’s missile launches] allow Iran to develop a technology that [could] constitute an intolerable threat to peace and security.” Iran has no treaty obligation to refrain from developing missile technology. Many other states have done so. And, didn’t I (NAM diplomat) read recently on the US Congressional Research Service that Iran is unlikely to have an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015?
“Working together, we can continue to clarify for Iran the consequences of its actions and show Iran the benefits of choosing cooperation over provocation.” My, that sounds patronising, even a little threatening! Will it encourage Iranians to believe that the latest US offer of engagement is sincere?
So what, US readers may feel. The US can say what it likes; it’s a Great Power. Yes, but a power that has the misfortune to be great in an age when greatness confers responsibility for nurturing a law-based international system.
It doesn’t do much good to that system for US ambassadors to sound unreasonable, alarmist, bereft of a sense of proportion and perhaps a little inclined to double standards. Good leaders lead from the middle, not one of the extremities.
And could it be the case that the US is a Great Power that needs a diplomatic solution to an intractable dispute? Neither the Pentagon nor the US public wants another war at this stage. Sanctions have been hurting innocent Iranians but benefitting Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and conservative elite, who feel confident of their ability to contain popular discontent.
When one is running out of options, negotiating theorists suggest that building trust in one’s good faith is a better tactic than dishing out hyperbole and half-truths.
Photo Credit: US Embassy New Delhi/Flickr
]]>A new report released by the International Crisis Group this week examines the efficacy and unintended consequences of sanctions on Iran and suggests steps that can be taken during the diplomatic process to unwind them and mitigate their humanitarian consequences while addressing the nuclear issue more effectively. “The [...]]]>
A new
report released by the International Crisis Group this week examines the efficacy and unintended consequences of sanctions on Iran and suggests steps that can be taken during the diplomatic process to unwind them and mitigate their humanitarian consequences while addressing the nuclear issue more effectively. “The Iranian case is a study in the irresistible appeal of sanctions, and of how, over time, means tend to morph into ends”, says Ali Vaez, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Iran. “In the absence of any visible shift in Tehran’s political calculus, it is difficult to measure their impact through any metric other than the quantity and severity of the sanctions themselves”.I’m still making my way through it, but it’s already clear that this is one of those don’t-miss reports for Iran-watchers and those who are interested in US-Iran relations. I’ve reproduced the recommendations from the executive summary below, beginning with the most important issue related to the sanctions regime — the healthcare crisis in Iran — which Lobe Log contributor Siamak Namazi wrote about today in the New York Times:
RECOMMENDATIONS
To address the healthcare crisis in Iran
To the government of Iran:
1. Streamline currency allocation, licensing and customs procedures for medical imports.
To the government of the United States and the European Union:
2. Provide clear guidelines to financial institutions indicating that humanitarian trade is permissible and will not be punished.
3. Consider allowing an international agency to play the role of intermediary for procuring specialised medicine for Iran.
To sustain nuclear diplomacy and bolster chances of success
To the P5+1 [permanent UN Security Council members and Germany] and the government of Iran:
4. Agree to hold intensive, continuous, technical-level negotiations to achieve a step-by-step agreement and, to that end, consider establishing a Vienna- or Istanbul-based contact group for regular interaction.
5. Recognise both Iran’s right in principle to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes on its soil and its obligation to provide strong guarantees that the program will remain peaceful.
To the governments of Iran and the United States:
6. Conduct bilateral negotiations on the margins of the P5+1 meetings or parallel to them.
To address the immediate issue of 20 per cent uranium enrichment
To the P5+1 and the government of Iran:
7. Seek agreement on a package pursuant to which:
a) Iran would suspend its uranium enrichment at 20 per cent level for an initial period of 180 days and convert its existing stockpile of 20 per cent enriched uranium to nuclear fuel rods; and
b) P5+1 members would provide Iran with medical isotopes; freeze the imposition of any new sanctions; waive or suspend some existing sanctions for an initial period of 180 days (eg, the ban on the sale of precious and semi-finished metals to Iran or the prohibition on repatriating revenues from Iranian oil sales); and release some of Iran’s frozen assets.
To address the issue of Fordow
To the P5+1 and the government of Iran:
8. Seek agreement on a package pursuant to which:
a) Iran would refrain from installing more sophisticated Centrifuges at Fordow and implement additional transparency measures, such as using the facility exclusively for research and development purposes and allowing in-house International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resident inspectors or installing live-stream remote camera surveillance; and
b) P5+1 members would suspend sanctions affecting Iran’s petro-chemical sector or permit Iran’s oil customers to maintain existing levels of petroleum imports.
To reach a longer-term agreement
To the P5+1 and the government of Iran:
9. Seek agreement on a package pursuant to which:
a) Iran would limit the volume of stockpiled 5 per cent enriched uranium, with any amount in excess to be converted into fuel rods; ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol and implement Code 3.1; and resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA; and
b) P5+1 members would provide Iran with modern nuclear fuel manufacturing technologies; roll back financial restrictions; and lift sanctions imposed on oil exports; the P5 would submit and sponsor a new UN Security Council resolution removing international sanctions once issues with the IAEA have been resolved.
To rationalise future resort to sanctions on third countries
To the U.S. and European Union:
10. Consider setting up an independent mechanism to closely assess, monitor and re-evaluate the social and economic consequences of sanctions both before and during implementation to avoid unintended effects, harming the general public or being trapped in a dynamic of escalatory punitive measures.
11. Avoid where possible imposition of multi-purpose sanctions lacking a single strategic objective and exit strategy.
]]>by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay
After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily [...]]]>
by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay
After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily given up nuclear weapons, and no doubt Western negotiators hope for a similar outcome with Iran’s controversial nuclear activities. Previous negotiations with Iran fell apart in the summer of 2012, and the question on everyone’s mind is: will this time be different?
There’s reason to hope that it will. Certainly, some circumstances have shifted in ways that could be favorable to a deal. Most obviously, the squeeze of sanctions has made it much more difficult for Iran to defy the international community. The depletion of Iran’s currency reserves is testing the regime’s ability to sidestep sanctions, and leaders are worried about public discontent with the state of the economy. Iran has also been downgrading some of its enriched uranium to a level that can’t easily be converted to weapons-grade, which may be a small indication that the government is willing to moderate its stance. Key Iranian figures from the foreign minister to the intelligence ministry have also expressed a measure of willingness to cooperate with Western diplomatic efforts.
On the other hand, the path to negotiations has seen a number of stumbling blocks. Signals from Iran have been mixed at best. Supreme Leader Ali Khameini recently rejected the idea of negotiating with the United States, saying that Iran “would not be intimidated” by US pressure. Iran also just revealed plans to install thousands of new centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear facility. Finally, it’ll soon be election season in Iran, which means officials will be anxious not to be seen as caving under Western pressure.
Ultimately, though, all of this may not tell us much, because what lies behind us is far less important than what lies ahead. The hopeful or ominous developments of the past few months only matter insofar as they signal what negotiators will or won’t be willing to put on the table. To that end, it’s worth speculating not just about what this new centrifuge and that new statement might mean, but also about what compromises could be made to make this round the one that matters.
The crucial issue to resolve is Iran’s production of 20% enriched uranium, and Iran has been relatively more flexible on this than other matters. A workable deal might require Iran to deposit its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium abroad, stop enriching at the Fordow facility, and agree to limit future enrichment to a low level suitable for civilian power reactors. Under such a deal, Iran would also need to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, to facilitate future inspections. In exchange, the P5+1 could offer sanctions relief and a freeze on new sanctions.
That’s how a deal might ideally resolve the thorniest issues in Iran’s standoff with the West. But the talks could bring progress even if we don’t make it that far. An alternative strategy could focus on confidence-building measures, or “baby steps” that ease the two sides out of the straitjacket of mistrust that has constrained previous efforts. For instance, Iran could agree to temporarily halt uranium enrichment or to downgrade its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to the less potent form needed for civilian reactors. In exchange, the P5+1 could agree to temporarily suspend some key sanctions, which would open the door for further sanctions relief once other issues (the Fordow facility, the Additional Protocol, enrichment levels in the future) are resolved.
Negotiators might also take a big-picture approach that brings in other, more long-standing concerns, such as Iran’s alleged links to terrorist groups, suspicions of previous weapons development, and the question of gradually normalizing diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and the West.
In sum, although some forecasts for the talks have been gloomy, there actually is no dearth of options available — that is, if negotiators want to take them. It’s almost a truism to say, but a rehash of last year’s negotiations will only bring a rehash of last year’s dismal outcome. As Einstein famously said, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.
So this time in Almaty, let’s try a new approach, one oriented around mutual concessions rather than stubborn digging into unworkable positions. If we do that, with any luck, this time really can be different.
- Laicie Heeley is the senior policy analyst and Usha Sahay a Hurbert J. Scoville Peace Fellow, both at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a Washington-based non-profit think tank.
Photo: The 19 September 2012 meeting of EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Dr. Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in Istambul, Turkey. (Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS)
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