Speaking to Democracy Now! Gershon Baskin — the Israeli peace activist who assisted the process that led to Hamas’ release of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit — offers his thoughts on the permanent truce deal he was working on with military leader Ahmed Jabari (who Aluf Benn writes was a [...]]]>
Speaking to Democracy Now! Gershon Baskin — the Israeli peace activist who assisted the process that led to Hamas’ release of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit — offers his thoughts on the permanent truce deal he was working on with military leader Ahmed Jabari (who Aluf Benn writes was a “subcontractor, in charge of maintaining Israel’s security in Gaza”) before he was assassinated by the Israelis:
]]>Now, my perspective on this was that Israel had to secure quiet. It is unacceptable for the civilian population in the south of Israel to be constantly under the threat of rocket fire from Gaza. There are several ways to achieve that quiet. One is to do what Israel is doing now: to assassinate people, to put two-and-a-half million people in—1.6 million people in Gaza under rocket fire, to put another million people in Israel under rocket fire. To kill a lot of people, to do a lot of damage, in the end will create some kind of deterrence and have quiet for a period of time. Or we could try what we’ve never tried before, and that’s engagement, dialogue and trying to reach some longer-term understandings. I don’t know if it would have worked. Honestly, I don’t know if Jabari would have held to the terms of the agreements or if the other factions would have given into that. My point was: Let’s try it. We’ve never done it before. Let’s try it. Maybe will have a dynamic of its own, which, instead of leading to more escalation, will actually bring about de-escalation and a possibility of having a new kind of relationship with Gaza.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pulled an “October surprise” out of his hat when he announced his Likud party would form a joint list in the upcoming election with Avigdor Lieberman’s fascist Yisrael Beiteinu party. This is more of a partnership than a merger, but it has profound implications.
In [...]]]>
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pulled an “October surprise” out of his hat when he announced his Likud party would form a joint list in the upcoming election with Avigdor Lieberman’s fascist Yisrael Beiteinu party. This is more of a partnership than a merger, but it has profound implications.
In partnering with Lieberman, Netanyahu is likely chasing moderate voices out of his cabinet, his coalition and his own party. The outcome will surely mean an even harder line stance against the international community, especially the European Union.
Netanyahu obviously believes that increasing Israel’s already significant isolation is worth what he thinks will be increased impunity in dealing with the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states. He hopes that the merger will better equip him in defending against any potential comeuppance from Barack Obama if he wins re-election. If Romney wins, Bibi believes he will have a government ready and willing to take full advantage of a neoconservatives return to foreign policy power in the US. He is certain that his lobby in the US will keep Israel kosher enough, even though this move is going to alienate large numbers of US Jews and will likely increase growing tensions between the US Jewish and Protestant communities.
The effects will be even more profound within Israel. The expanding racism and xenophobia will kick into overdrive and, unless Labor or some new centrist party can truly capture an anti-racist spirit — which seems unlikely — the Israeli public will shift even farther right, and more liberals will be leaving.
But one thing this move will not affect is Iran, at least in the short run. Ha’aretz editor Aluf Benn believes that Netanyahu just created a war cabinet, one which will hasten an Israeli attack, and possibly even frighten the United States into attacking Iran itself before Israel does. I doubt it.
To start with, Benn does make some important points. He writes:
…Netanyahu has finally renounced his attempt to portray himself as a centrist, as a statesmanlike and moderate leader. The mask that he put on before the previous election has finally been tossed into the trash. With Lieberman as second in command and heir to the throne, and his supporters in prominent spots on the joint ticket, Likud will become a radical right-wing party, aggressive and xenophobic, that revels in Israel’s isolation and sees the Arab community as a domestic enemy and a danger to the state.
Quite true, and he later points out that the level of western-style democracy that was defended even by hawks like Benny Begin and others in Likud like Dan Meridor was just put in the crosshairs. What is left of that idealism in centrist Israel won’t survive.
But if, as Benn frames it (correctly, I think), Lieberman essentially replaces Ehud Barak as Bibi’s right hand man, this hardly shifts hard toward war. The final makeup of the next cabinet is still unclear. This joint list idea is going to narrow support for Netanyahu, not broaden it. The influential Shas party is no longer a realistic partner for Bibi, as they are strongly opposed to Yisrael Beiteinu. That’s a big loss. The joint list is almost certain to secure fewer seats than the parties would have separately, but this was a price Netanyahu was willing to pay to lead the biggest party in the Knesset next time (Kadima has the most seats in the current Knesset). But Bibi will have to offer someone, perhaps Yair Lapid’s new Yesh Atid party, some serious carrots to form a majority coalition without Shas. So the makeup of the cabinet and whether it will really be myopic enough to ignore what could become a growing movement against a unilateral strike in the public sphere remains to be seen.
But Benn’s calculation misses important points. First, Barak was a pro-attack force, and a powerful one, until the last few weeks, when he seemed to break with Netanyahu and strike a more moderate tone. Many analysts, as well as several people I’ve spoken to with some inside knowledge, believe this was pure theater to make Barak more electable. If that was the idea, it failed, and few expect Barak’s Atzmaut party to get enough votes in January to gain any seats at all in the Knesset. In any case, Barak is not the voice of moderation Benn makes him out to be.
More importantly, while cabinet opposition to a unilateral Israeli strike was certainly important, the major impediment remains: the military and intelligence establishment. Much like in the United States, where an AIPAC-influenced Congress has been beating the drums for war, the actual soldiers and commanders recognize the ramifications and difficulties of an attack on Iran. That’s not to say in either case that these military leaders would refuse an explicit order from their respective commanders-in-chief. But in both countries, the opposition has been much more important in preventing an attack to date than political forces.
Benn is correct in one sense: having Lieberman as deputy to Bibi’s sheriff is a war time configuration. It’s meant to strengthen the central government, to enable a greater degree of martial law in the event of war and to continue more of it when the war ends. It’s meant to diminish the influence of the military and intelligence leaders who have had the temerity to raise concerns about a war Netanyahu desperately wants.
But at this moment, it does not bring a war with Iran any closer than it was before. We can be thankful for that, at least. And, in a number of other ways, this move may backfire on Bibi in both the short and long terms. That would be more hopeful if there were a viable alternative in Israel or a president in the United States who was willing to take advantage of Israel’s radicalized image to exert real pressure (like that suggested by Protestant leaders earlier this month) for a regional peace agreement. Maybe that’s a second-term Obama, but I’m not holding my breath for that one. In an era of grim outlooks, I’ll content myself with knowing that this move by Netanyahu will not bring war with Iran any closer.
]]>Headlines today featured news of a spike in oil prices based on fears of an Israeli strike on Iran. That fear is based on last week’s major uptick in Israeli rhetoric — mostly from Defense Minister Ehud Barak — which was geared toward goading the United States into military action [...]]]>
Headlines today featured news of a spike in oil prices based on fears of an Israeli strike on Iran. That fear is based on last week’s major uptick in Israeli rhetoric — mostly from Defense Minister Ehud Barak — which was geared toward goading the United States into military action against Iran. While tension has indeed risen, Israel’s tactics could backfire.
The most recent surge of tension began with an “anonymous” leak, widely believed to have come from Barak, stating that the US had a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that showed Iran to be a greater threat than previously believed. Barak then told Israeli Radio that there was a new report, perhaps not a NIE, which brought the US assessment closer to “ours.”
The “ours” Barak referred to was that of himself and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose assessment differs not only from the Obama Administration’s, but also from Israel’s own military and intelligence establishment. Netanyahu and Barak’s take also differs from Israeli public opinion about the threat Iran poses. In a poll conducted by Israel’s Channel 10 and announced earlier today (Hebrew only), only 23% of Israelis support a strike on Iran, while 46% oppose it.
But Netanyahu and Barak had indeed attempted to sway public opinion. The day after Barak’s statements, Israeli headlines were devoted to a possible strike on Iran. Netanyahu also proceeded to rekindle Holocaust fears and another article appeared in the Israeli daily, Ha’aretz, with an anonymous “decision maker” — almost certainly Barak again — warning about the unspeakable consequences of a nuclear Iran and urging action.
It’s no surprise that markets are reacting with fear to all of this, but what can we make of recent events with a more sober eye? For one, Netanyahu and Barak are growing more concerned about the potential for an attack on Iran — something they want very badly. They are also now playing a much higher-stakes political game in order to get Iran attacked.
As Ha’aretz editor-in-chief Aluf Benn points out, Netanyahu and Barak have been screaming hysterically about Iran while other world leaders haven’t been all that concerned about their complaints. Israeli rhetoric has been escalating steadily for years now, but there are good reasons to believe that there will not be an Israeli attack. First, there is serious internal opposition. Second, Israel isn’t likely to strike Iran because it doesn’t have, by itself, the capacity to destroy or substantially set back the Iranian nuclear program. In other words, Israel can’t make the minimal gains required to justify the risks and consequences of taking on Iran alone.
Many analysts have believed for a long time that the Israeli strategy has been more about pushing the US into an attack on Iran rather than actually setting the stage for an Israeli one and this past week seems to support that theory. The election season has been widely viewed as one where President Obama — who is very dependent on pro-Israel donations but who is viewed as a less-than passionate supporter of Israel despite having done far more to support Israeli security than any US president in history — would be particularly vulnerable to pressure to act on Israel’s behalf with regard to Iran.
But Israel’s game of political pressure can be a tricky one. Desperation seems to have taken hold of Barak and Netanyahu, despite the fact that both the US and Europe have imposed unprecedented sanctions on the Iranian regime. They seem to fear that all that pressure is simply not enough. Meanwhile, the fact that both US and Israeli intelligence cannot be persuaded to back their claims about an imminent Iranian threat has caused them to turn to the public arena.
But even the grounds of public opinion are not proving terribly fertile. Israelis oppose an Israeli strike on Iran. Polls conducted in Israel have consistently shown support for Israel to take part in an American or joint operation instead. And, despite the level of anxiety in the US, support for a strike on Iran is lukewarm, except under the most dire conditions, and even then it is far from overwhelming. As an absolute last resort, about half of US citizens would support an attack on Iran, but far less support it otherwise, with 13% being the last reliable figure derived from polling.
Even the sudden rise in oil prices may be a double-edged sword. High gas prices will certainly work against Obama in November, but will that really push him toward a more aggressive stance, or an outright attack, when that would also result in an even bigger jump in gas prices? On the other hand, the looming election may make the Obama administration more conservative with its Iran policy. Would Obama seriously consider potentially involving the US in a whole new military engagement at a time when most Americans are tired of seeing US troops injured and killed in MidEast wars?
Netanyahu and Barak are meanwhile painting themselves into a tightening corner. Their heightened rhetoric and stronger push toward war will leave them with egg on their faces if no attack comes and if Iran continues — as US and Israeli intelligence suggests — to refrain from taking the steps necessary to actually build a nuclear weapon and simply continues to increase its ability to do so.
Netanyahu and Barak no doubt fear that after the US election their task will be even more difficult. Obama will be somewhat less vulnerable to political pressure in a second term, and even if the presumptive Republican nominee Mitt Romney wins, he may well be less eager to actually attack Iran as President. Romney has a much better relationship with and similar worldview to Netanyahu and his current foreign policy advisory staff is stacked with neoconservatives, but the political realities of being in the Oval Office often differ from those projected on the campaign trail. Romney also wouldn’t actually assume office until mid-January and a lame duck President Obama would be extremely unlikely to launch an attack on Iran.
In their desperation, Bibi and Barak are straining US-Israeli ties in the long term. For the first time in its history, Israel is being perceived as not just pushing for US support, which is popular among US citizens, but for the US to go to war for Israel, a concept which is highly unpopular. This is why the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), while pushing hard for tougher stances and for maintaining the “military option”, has steered very clear of anything that could be interpreted as an open call for war on Iran, however much they might like to make one. It is also why so many of their efforts have been geared toward trying to sell the US public on the idea that Iran poses a much graver threat to US security than it actually does.
Barak’s attempt to use leaked US intelligence to pressure Obama into action also broke a cardinal rule of intelligence sharing among allies — you just don’t go public with such things. This breakage of trust will likely be forgiven like so many other incidents where Israel acts like a less than loyal friend to the US. But this incident will likely affect Barak’s relationship with US officials and, given his long-standing diplomatic relationships with non-elected US diplomats and Bibi’s lack of popularity among those same folks, turn into a loss for Israel, at least in the near term.
In fact, it’s hard to see any ground gained toward war with Iran from Netanyahu and Barak’s maneuvers apart from the general heightening of tensions. Indeed, Obama remains committed to diplomacy and sanctions, the US and Israeli military and intelligence communities still contend that it’s a bad idea to attack Iran, and Netanyahu’s own cabinet remains deeply divided on the issue. For its part Congress has continued to beat the sort of drums Bibi wants them to, but they do not, in the end, want to send US troops or fighter planes into another battle in the Middle East.
In the end, it is the President who makes the decision to go to war and despite Israel’s upping of the stakes, the only clear result from Netanyahu’s efforts so far is that people have become more nervous about the prospect of war.
]]>Aluf Benn, the editor-in-chief of Haaretz, states the obvious — brilliantly:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are threatening to attack Iran, and the world does not seem concerned. Israel warns that its face is turned in the direction of a war that will bump up the price [...]]]>
Aluf Benn, the editor-in-chief of Haaretz, states the obvious — brilliantly:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are threatening to attack Iran, and the world does not seem concerned. Israel warns that its face is turned in the direction of a war that will bump up the price of oil and cause many deaths and much damage, and the world does nothing to prevent the tragedy. No emergency meetings of the UN Security Council, no dramatic diplomatic delegations, no live coverage on CNN and Al-Jazeera. There aren’t even any sharp fluctuations in the price of oil and natural gas. Or in Israel’s credit rating. The scene is quiet. Even Iranian counter-threats to hit Israel don’t seem to worry anybody.
At the same time, the “international community” has “created the ideological grounds for an Israeli operation against Iran” and the “public position” of the United States has been “vague”:
U.S. President Barack Obama is considered a sharp opponent to the idea of an Israeli strike against Iran. But his actions say the opposite. Obama once again is leading from behind, as he did in Libya and Syria. This is his doctrine: Instead of complicating America with a new Mideast war, he is outsourcing the fighting to an external agent. In Libya, it was the French, the British and the anti-Gadhafi rebels. In Syria, it is the Free Syrian Army. In Iran, it is the IDF.
If Israel does strike, the planes and the arms will be made in the U.S.A. The Home Front Command will receive early warnings of missile landings from the American radar in the Negev in southern Israel. The financial aid and state support for the day after the strike will probably also come from Washington.
The public position of the U.S. regime is vague. Officials talk about the “unity of the international community,” “tough sanctions” and say things that they will use all available options to stop Iran developing nuclear weapons (as Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta did on his recent visit to Israel). There is no warning here against an Israeli strike. No one is saying, “If you strike, you will put Israel-U.S. relations at risk, and you will remain isolated.”
Read more.
]]>Benn argues that Mubarak was an important, if not crucial, ally for Benjamin Netanyahu in holding together a Sunni axis that stood against a [...]]]>
Benn argues that Mubarak was an important, if not crucial, ally for Benjamin Netanyahu in holding together a Sunni axis that stood against a number of Israel’s enemies.
Netanyahu shared with Mubarak his concerns about the growing strength of Iran. Egypt played a key role in the Sunni, the “moderate,” axis, which lined up alongside Israel and the United States against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his allies in Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip.
While some hawks have warned that the Egyptian revolution could be co-opted by the Muslim Brotherhood, Benn sees the revolution as a largely secular movement. But that doesn’t mean that the new Egyptian leadership will be helpful in backing Israeli attempts to pressure Iran or supportive of a military strike.
On the contrary: they will listen to Arab public opinion, which opposes a preemptive war against Iran. Israel will find it difficult to take action far to the east when it cannot rely on the tacit agreement to its actions on its western border. Without Mubarak there is no Israeli attack on Iran. His replacement will be concerned about the rage of the masses, if they see him as a collaborator in such an operation.
With the supposed Israeli “consensus” over the existential threat posed by Iran quickly melting away—see recent comments by former Mossad chiefs Efraim Halevy and Meir Dagan—Mubarak might be offering Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu the ultimate face-saving solution.
Benn concludes:
]]>Whoever is opposed to a strike, or fear its consequences – even though they appear to be in favor, like Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak – now have the ultimate excuse. We wanted to strike Iran, they will write in their memoirs but we could not because of the revolution in Egypt. Like Ehud Olmert says that he nearly made peace, they will say that they nearly made war. In his departure Mubarak prevented a preemptive Israeli war. This appears to have been his last contribution to regional stability.