by Wayne White
Libya’s chaos and violence may seem like a continuum of painful replays. However, as the situation festers, the risk of extremist elements gaining a more dangerous foothold and broader freedom of action increases. Indeed, since the beginning of this year, militant Islamists have gained ground overall, undermining what little governance remains. Making matters worse, a Libyan Supreme Court decision has gone against the newly elected and relatively secular government.
Debating whether Libya is a failed state is academic even though the country has resembled one for the past six months. Even a senior Libyan official admitted back in August that most “factors at the moment are conducive to a failed state.” Unfortunately, Libya’s problems won’t be contained. Militant extremists and terrorists thriving amidst this mess will spread violence even farther beyond the country’s practically non-existent borders than they have already.
House of Cards
Most recognizable forms of authority in Libya have steadily imploded this year with the explosion of greater violence in the country’s two largest cities (Tripoli and Benghazi), the flight of foreign workers and embassies amidst kidnappings and murders, and the disarray affecting all manners of central governance (though its writ was already limited). In fact, Libya never evolved beyond the dominance of militias that refused to disarm following the struggle against Muammar al-Qadhafi.
Shaky stability in the capital city of Tripoli until mid-2014 depended on a wary balance of power between two powerful militias employed by Libya’s parliament, the General National Council (GNC). The Islamist militia comes from Libya’s third largest city of Misrata, while the other secular nationalist militia is from the tough Zintan mountain region south of Tripoli. The Misrata militia (now “Libya Dawn”) was linked to Islamist members, and the Zintani forces to its secular caucus. At the time, the GNC had a modest Islamist majority.
But the election in June of a secular majority permanent House of Representatives (HOR) triggered the collapse of the militia power balance. The larger Libya Dawn secured the upper hand over the Zintanis, seizing Tripoli. Libya Dawn reconvened mainly the Islamists from the GNC, proclaiming the body the true Libyan government.
The HOR fled east, taking refuge near the Egyptian border in the small city of Tobruk. Ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s effort since spring 2014 to crush extremists like the al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) had experienced mixed results. Then, after solid gains against ASL forces in Benghazi in October, the beleaguered HOR embraced Haftar as acting on behalf of the newly elected parliament.
But the Libyan Supreme Court declared the internationally recognized HOR unconstitutional on November 6, arguing that the committee that prepared the election law for the June poll, which elected the HOR, violated Libya’s provisional constitution. The court remains, however, in Tripoli under Islamist occupation and originally was not asked to address the legality of the HOR, making its ruling questionable. Moreover, even if there were some inconsistencies involving election procedure, they pale against Libya Dawn’s violent seizure of Tripoli and revival of a rump GNC that no longer has any legal mandate whatsoever. The most recent election, quite an achievement under the circumstances, at least reflected voters’ preferences.
A map featuring Libya’s major cities and border states.
Consequently, despite urgings from some quarters that the HOR be abandoned, the UN and most foreign governments have not done so. As of Nov. 17, Turkey and Chad appeared to be the only exceptions. Embracing the court decision, the rump GNC has offered a national dialogue, something that would have been of value prior to Libya’s descent into far greater chaos in 2014. Earlier this year, when there was more to work with, I had discussed the advantages of such a meeting being held at a neutral venue abroad and being overseen by the UN along with the governments that backed the anti-Qadhafi struggle in 2011.
Of course, Libya has only spiraled further downwards since then. But because both governments share the need for revenue, Libyan exports still rebounded to more than 800,000 barrels per day (BPD) in September (although still only 1/3 of capacity). Following the court decision, however, Libya Dawn sought to control the country’s oil, seizing the 300,000 BPD western El-Sharara field. But Sharara was shut down, with Zintani forces blocking the pipeline to its northern export terminal of Zawiya. Then a security guard strike over unpaid wages closed Tobruk’s Hariga export terminal last weekend. These closures have driven exports down to barely 500,000 BPD.
Whether emanating from a now more aggressive Libya Dawn or the beleaguered ASL (most likely the latter), a number of bombings have also hit HOR-controlled locales in eastern Libya. One went off in the town of Shahat during a meeting there between HOR Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and UN Libyan Envoy Bernadino Leon On Nov. 10. Several car bombings occurred two days later. One hit a busy street in front of the Tobruk hotel housing the HOR; another hit the airport used by al-Thinni near the town of Bayda. A third bomb blew up in Benghazi (where fighting between the forces of Haftar and the ASL has intensified again).
The fighting in Benghazi became so intense that Leon arranged a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire on Nov. 19 so the Red Crescent could evacuate civilians and casualties from affected areas. The UN Security Council meanwhile blacklisted ASL branches in both Benghazi and Derna.
Located between Benghazi and Tobruk, Derna has been an extremist hotbed since the 1990s. Youthful demonstrators there declared their allegiance to the so-called Islamic State’s (ISIS or IS) “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in late October. With Haftar’s air assets sorely limited, Egypt probably took aim at jihadi targets there with airstrikes on Nov. 12, despite Egyptian denials. Egyptian airstrikes have previously hit Tripoli and Benghazi. Fighter-bombers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also staged through Egypt against Benghazi’s extremists.
Spillover Effect
Libya remains a vast arsenal of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The Sinai-based Beit al-Maqdis, which has sworn allegiance to IS, continues to receive Libyan munitions despite Egyptian countermeasures. The Jihadi group killed 33 Egyptian soldiers on Oct. 24. It struck again on Nov. 13, killing five soldiers and police. Near the northern end of the Suez Canal, militants or their smugglers had fired on an Egyptian Navy patrol boat wounding 5 sailors a day earlier, with eight others still missing. Sinai jihadists also released a lengthy video on Nov. 14 showcasing their suicide bombing that killed the soldiers in October, with participants shouting: “good news to al-Baghdadi!” The violence appears to be continuing unabated, with a likely Beit al-Maqdis bombing having hit a police checkpoint in a Cairo suburb just yesterday.
Libya also continues to export violence in various other directions. Four Tunisian soldiers were killed and 11 wounded in a Nov. 5 bus bombing. Much of the residual violence in Tunisia meanwhile stems from the cross-border infiltration of munitions from ASL. Malian jihadists, using Libya as an arsenal and for sanctuary, attacked a border village in Niger on Nov. 19, killing nine Nigerien security personnel.
With the West’s attention absorbed by IS, the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli/Palestinian affairs, and more, Libya has been woefully neglected. Yet the longer the country’s problems fester, the worse they will get. Indeed, even more IS-inspired connections with Libyan and associated jihadists surely will emerge in this chaotic environment. Simply watching Libya’s meltdown has achieved nothing.
]]>by Wayne White
Former General Khalifa Haftar’s (or Hiftar’s) eastern-based military challenge against parliamentary Islamists and armed Muslim extremists continues to spark more violence. Meanwhile, government authority in the capital of Tripoli has practically disintegrated with two rival prime ministers and a parliament bitterly split between Islamists and more secular elements. Amidst [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Former General Khalifa Haftar’s (or Hiftar’s) eastern-based military challenge against parliamentary Islamists and armed Muslim extremists continues to spark more violence. Meanwhile, government authority in the capital of Tripoli has practically disintegrated with two rival prime ministers and a parliament bitterly split between Islamists and more secular elements. Amidst this chaotic scene, the threat to foreign embassies has increased, including to the US, by Libya’s leading terrorist group.
Haftar presses on
Although failing to capture enough organized support across Libya to make decisive gains, Haftar has been able to sustain a robust challenge from his eastern perch. He has found a ready constituency across the country among relatively more secular — even some moderate Islamist — Libyans weary of militia-dominated politics, governmental division, and Islamic extremist violence.
The extent of popular opposition to Islamic militants is illustrated by the personality cult now evident in various locales built around Egypt’s General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Posters of al-Sisi and scattered demonstrations in favor of his presidential bid in Egypt since Haftar began his military challenge last month clearly show many Libyans want Haftar to assume a similar role in Libya, cracking down harshly on the extremists.
Libya’s 2012 parliamentary elections (only a month after Mohamed Morsi’s election as Egyptian president) resulted in a noticeably more secular/liberal line-up than Morsi achieved in Egypt. And this was before Morsi’s abuses of power began undermining his image as a relative moderate.
The possibility of valuable support to Haftar was noted in a May 30 Stratfor assessment: although unconfirmed, Haftar could be receiving Egyptian military aid in various forms. In fact, the Tripoli-based Libyan newspaper al-Wasat claimed on June 2 that Libya’s pro-Haftar minister of culture flew to Cairo along with the foreign affairs, civil society and health ministers seeking “assistance in calming the situation.” The largely al-Sisi controlled Egyptian media has, naturally, favored Haftar. So a measure of concrete Egyptian aid for Haftar either now or in the future is a real possibility.
Fighting in the east especially has continued as Haftar has launched more ground and air attacks against Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), the most dangerous jihadist militia based there (declared a terrorist organization by the US). Earlier this month, air force assets and Libyan Special Forces troops siding with Haftar attacked ASL facilities in and to the east of Benghazi. In the face of air strikes from helicopters and jets, ASL combatants fought back hard. Multiple rocket launcher fire also was exchanged. Casualties were over 100 by June 2, but the fighting appears to have been militarily inconclusive.
Meanwhile, the near continuous clashes have shut down Benghazi. In the latest bombardments, errant bombs hit the university, rockets fell on a warehouse district, and various munitions have fallen in residential neighborhoods.
A tale of two prime ministers
Compounding Libya’s travails, a dispute has been raging since last month over who holds the office of Libya’s prime minister. Islamists, supported by a number of parliamentary independents in Libya’s General National Congress (GNC), appointed — over bitter secularist opposition — a businessman backed by the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Ahmed Maiteeq. However, Maiteeq failed to receive sufficient votes on the first ballot, and the shadowy second ballot that elected him has raised serious questions.
Since that controversial early May vote, Interim Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni has refused to step down, citing conflicting instructions from the GNC members following the vote. Later in May, the Libyan justice ministry’s legal department ruled that Maiteeq’s election had been illegal. Finally, on June 5, an official of Libya’s Supreme Court said the manner of Maiteeq’s election violated Libya’s standing temporary constitution. But al-Thinni said a final court statement would not be issued until June 9.
Two days earlier, Maiteeq, backed by some militiamen and police, took the prime minister’s office from al-Thinni and held his first meeting with his new cabinet. The GNC’s Islamist Speaker Nuri Abu Sahmain also ordered the Libyan Central Bank to freeze all government accounts to cut off al-Thinni’s cabinet ministers from funding their activities. Al-Thinni, however, remained defiant, awaiting word from the court.
While it might appear that the standoff is being resolved in al-Thinni’s favor, the situation is likely to remain chaotic. GNC Islamists, and possibly their militia ally (the Libyan Central Shield from nearby Misrata) doubtless have been angered and may stand by Maiteeq, trying to arrange another GNC vote in his favor. Al-Thinni went to Benghazi yesterday to express sympathy over the city’s plight, perhaps tellingly visiting with Libyan Special Forces there that have sided openly with General Haftar.
Rising potential threat to the US Embassy
On May 27 Ansar al-Sharia leader Mohammad al-Zahawi called Haftar an “American agent” on Libyan TV and warned if the US continued to back him it would suffer a “shameful defeat.” The State Department quickly said there has been no US contact with Haftar and no support, either “explicit” or “implicit.”
Nonetheless, with Zahawi’s group declared a terrorist entity by Washington and now Haftar’s most notable target, widespread belief probably exists among Libyan jihadists that Haftar has gotten some sort of American assistance. In any case, the US promptly warned its citizens against traveling to Libya and those already there to depart immediately, describing the situation on the ground there as “unpredictable and unstable.” On June 5 a Swiss worker with the Red Cross was murdered in the Libyan coastal city of Sirte by unknown gunmen.
Although an elite US military evacuation (or rescue) force, depending on the circumstances, has been poised in Sicily for over two weeks, US Embassy personnel in Tripoli have not been withdrawn. According to the State Department, embassy staffing is somewhat limited “because of security concerns.” On May 27, State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki said the US is continuing “to review the situation and address embassy security concerns.”
Last month, the US, along with other major European players, appointed Libyan envoys to work with the UN in trying to engage with Libyan actors interested in “political transition.” UN Libyan Envoy Tareq Mitri, reportedly roughed up by militiamen on his arrival in Tripoli on June 4, warned that it’s ultimately up to Libyans to solve their own problems.
The bottom line now is that with a robust challenge to central authority, governance and the small Libyan military in disarray, militias gaining more sway in Tripoli, and the ASL increasingly under attack and hitting back, there is no coherent security outside the US embassy’s walls. This was illustrated on June 4; hours after Haftar survived a probable ASL truck bombing at his compound near Benghazi, gunmen fired a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) into the same floor of the prime ministerial building in Tripoli that houses Maiteeq’s office.
This apparent tit-for-tat assault (Haftar views Islamists in the GNC backing Maiteeq as aiding “terrorists”) again shows just how vulnerable Libya’s prime ministers have been. Ali Ziedan last year was kidnapped from his office by a militia on the government’s own payroll, al-Thinni’s home was assaulted (unsuccessfully) by gunmen in March, and now it’s clear that Maiteeq has been unable to secure the area surrounding his own offices.
If the very core of governance can be struck so easily, any thought of meaningful local assistance to resist a violent attack against the US embassy is misplaced. And, with embassy staff shielded by defensive walls only meant to slow down attackers, plus a small US Marine security guard contingent not meant to resist a determined attack, reliable local government security is needed for protection. This is true for US embassies around the world. Moreover, aside from the endemic violence that’s now pervasive, it’s not even clear which parts of the government — let alone militias supposedly working for the government — currently answer to whom.
With this in mind, I must continue to warn, as I did on May 22, that it’s imperative for the White House to act quickly to preclude a possible tragedy in Tripoli that could be far more costly than the September 2012 assault on the more thinly staffed US consulate facilities in Benghazi. In fact, a rescue attempt amidst an attack on the embassy by an extremist militia packing heavy machine guns, RPG’s, and light anti-aircraft weaponry also could involve losses among the rescue teams and their helicopters.
]]>by Wayne White
A robust new military challenge to what passes for the Libyan central government has further destabilized the country and placed Western and other diplomatic missions there in greater danger. Although definitions for “failed states” vary, there should be no doubt now that Libya has crossed that line — one [...]]]>
by Wayne White
A robust new military challenge to what passes for the Libyan central government has further destabilized the country and placed Western and other diplomatic missions there in greater danger. Although definitions for “failed states” vary, there should be no doubt now that Libya has crossed that line — one it has been flirting with for quite a while. Under the circumstances, it is now time for the US, and other governments with diplomatic and civilian missions in Libya, to give serious, prompt consideration to evacuating their personnel.
Libya’s lacking security fundaments
The Libyan situation has been tenuous, violent, and jolting from crisis to crisis particularly since last year. Most militias of various local, tribal, and ideological affiliations that fought against Muammar Qadhafi’s regime remain under arms, in part because of Libya’s failure to establish a sizeable, fully trained national army or police force. They clash with each other and assert local autonomous rights, with some backing factions in the Libyan parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Without other means of maintaining security, the government keeps a number of militias on its payroll for just that reason.
The conflicting militias have caused discord on the streets of Tripoli and the large eastern city of Benghazi; they control neighborhoods and other key pieces of real estate — even sometimes menacing the government for which they supposedly work.
The two dominant militias affecting government affairs in Tripoli have been the Islamist “Central Shield,” based in Libya’s third largest city, Misrata, and a group of secular-oriented militias based in the mountain region centered upon Zintan. They are aligned, respectively, with the Islamist and secular wings of the GNC.
This division within the GNC has significantly paralyzed that fairly elected body charged, among other things, with overseeing the drafting of a constitution as a prelude to the election of a permanent legislature.
The GNC’s original writ ran out in early February, so it extended its own mandate to finish the appointment of a constitutional drafting committee and to maintain continuity. Ever since, it has been branded by many Libyans — as well as self-appointed federalist rivals in eastern Libya — as illegitimate, with calls for it to step down.
The experiences of Libyan prime ministers reflect the dangerous instability plaguing the country. The GNC dismissed longstanding Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in March amidst a tiff over the weak Libyan navy’s failure to stop a tanker with bootleg crude from leaving a port controlled by upstart eastern Federalist and militia commander, Ibrahim Jathran. Yet Zeidan soldiered on despite being kidnapped in late 2013 by an Islamist militia. Then the GNC named Abdullah al-Thinni interim prime minister for two weeks. After gunmen attacked his family compound, al-Thinni resigned, but continues to serve pending the naming of a replacement.
In addition to its seriously flawed, erratic security and central authority, Libya’s governance at all levels is dysfunctional. To a great extent, Qadhafi is to blame. Inheriting a rather decentralized state from the late King Idris, Qadhafi played tribes and regions against each other to maintain power for 42 years. Qadhafi’s bizarre, ramshackle “Jamahiriya” concept of governance degraded rather than reinforced a sense of Libyan civil society, and important governmental and technical skills were woefully neglected. Libya is hugely dependent on foreign companies and contractors for a host of services.
The last key pillar that crumbled from underneath Libya’s waning post-Qadhafi societal stability was the implosion of the country’s oil exports from roughly 1.3 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2012 to only around 200,000 bpd since early this year. Since 2013, most export terminals and inland oilfields have been shut down by a mix of eastern federalist challengers, angry workers, disgruntled guards, or local militias.
Enter General Haftar
Libya’s latest travails stem from a robust challenge to the central government from the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA) led by former General Khalifa Haftar. Haftar denounced the central government back in February, but his appearance went almost unnoticed outside Libya.
On May 16, however, forces organized by Haftar struck extremist militias in Benghazi (especially Ansar al-Sharia) with troops, artillery and even helicopters “to cleanse the city of terrorists.” Intense, bloody fighting continued through much of the weekend resulting in over 200 casualties. On the 18th, Haftar loyalists, reinforced with pro-secular militia elements from Zintan, attacked the GNC in Tripoli, ransacking parliament, and seizing a member and two staffers for allegedly aiding extremists. Pro-Haftar Colonel Muktar Fernana declared the “freezing of the GNC.”
Since May 18, in the east, Haftar has secured the support of two Libyan Air Force (LAF) bases, and federalist renegade Jathran. Libya’s Special Forces commander even instructed his men in Benghazi to join Haftar’s effort. Then, the LAF’s most senior officer, Col. Gomaa al-Abbani, declared his support for Haftar on the 20th, quickly followed on the 21st by the Interior Ministry, Libyan UN Ambassador Ibrahim al-Dabashi (who said Haftar’s “Operation Dignity of Libya” was “not a coup…but a nationalist move”), as well as the biggest GNC political bloc, the secular National Forces Alliance (NFA). NFA leader Mahmoud Jibril said Libya had been “drowning in a swamp of terrorism.”
In addition, former Prime Minister Zeidan declared his support for Haftar from European exile, and sitting Prime Minister al-Thinni has called upon the GNC to stop working. Late on the 21st, Haftar appeared on TV, calling upon the country’s judiciary to form a “civilian presidential high council” to name a cabinet and oversee a transition toward the election of a new parliament.
Haftar’s challenge might seem refreshing to some, but the situation on the ground has deteriorated markedly. Following al-Abbani’s statement of support, various elements launched rockets against and burned offices on LAF bases in Tripoli. Libya’s Navy commander was wounded in an assassination attempt in Tripoli yesterday. On the 20th, a Chinese engineer was murdered by gunmen in Benghazi.
In Tripoli, more fighting took place May 21, with rockets falling on a residential area last night. GNC members tried to convene at another locale to elect a prime minister, but gave up without a quorum and after coming under rocket fire. That prompted GNC Speaker Nuri Abu Sahmain’s call on the 21st for Misrata’s Islamist “Central Shield” militia to take the field against Haftar to protect the remainder of the GNC and re-secure parliament’s original premises. In response to Sahmain’s call, Misrata’s notoriously tough militiamen were observed taking up positions in the capital this morning.
Foreign diplomats facing more danger
The foreign diplomatic community could hardly remain unaffected. Already, gunmen had attacked the Russian Embassy in Tripoli in October 2013, after which Zeidan reiterated his “unlimited commitment to the…security” of all diplomatic missions. Yet, as we have seen, Zeidan could not even protect himself.
The Jordanian ambassador was kidnapped by Islamic militants in March to free an extremist held in Jordan, with the ambassador released in April in exchange for the prisoner. The Jordanian Embassy was subsequently evacuated. Two kidnapped Egyptian diplomats were only freed in January when Egypt agreed to swap a hard-line Islamist militia leader detained in Cairo. Both cases set dangerous precedents.
After recent threats, Algeria sent its special forces to extract its embassy staff from Tripoli on May 16, and then evacuated all Algerian state oil personnel on the 19th. The Saudi Embassy staff also left that day. Likewise, personnel of several major oil companies and private businesses have fled overseas.
In this veritable maelstrom of violence amidst uncertainty regarding which side controls what in Tripoli, all foreign diplomatic missions and other foreigners are at considerable risk. With Islamic extremists under vigorous attack, there is also a greater danger that such elements will attempt to retaliate against foreign governments imagined to encourage or welcome what Haftar & Co. have been doing.
This makes the US a prime target. A number of Islamic militant elements (like Ansar al-Sharia, formally declared a terrorist group by Washington), militias, or gunmen could attack the US embassy in Tripoli. If so, there is no effective Libyan security to bar the way.
Last week, the Obama administration began positioning US military assets in Sicily to carry out a potential emergency extraction of embassy personnel, including 200 troops from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force and MV-22 Osprey helicopters. On the 20th, the Pentagon said 60 more Marines were sent plus more Ospreys (now totaling 8). To avoid flying into an already “hot” situation in which a facility is already under attack or surrounded (like the one that wounded 4 US Navy SEALS aboard Ospreys in an aborted attempt to rescue US civilians in South Sudan last December), it would be prudent to execute that contingency plan as soon as possible.
During my State Department career, I participated several times in final deliberations over such decisions. There were always those who opposed withdrawing (regardless of the risk of staying), arguing that leaving the countries in question would reduce the US’ ability to influence events on the ground. Of course, in this case, for quite some time now the US and other Western diplomatic missions have had precious little impact on what has been unfolding in Libya.
Photo: The French embassy in Tripoli, Libya was bombed on April 23, 2013. It was the first attack on the French embassy in the capital.
]]>by Wayne White
An ominous deterioration in the situation in Libya recently has been overshadowed by media stories about the Oct. 27 “60 Minutes” report on the Benghazi tragedy featuring a witness now known to have given conflicting evidence to the FBI. Meanwhile, developments in Libya reflect a sharp decline [...]]]>
by Wayne White
An ominous deterioration in the situation in Libya recently has been overshadowed by media stories about the Oct. 27 “60 Minutes” report on the Benghazi tragedy featuring a witness now known to have given conflicting evidence to the FBI. Meanwhile, developments in Libya reflect a sharp decline in the already tenuous authority of the central government, heightened violence, clashes between militias, as well as new demands for regional autonomy and minority rights already impacting seriously on Libyan oil and gas exports. Libya now could be drifting closer to what might be called a “failed state” scenario in terms of governance.
Continued, rising lawlessness over the past month has been evident across the country. Illustrating how little authority the police and army have in eastern Libya, the former rebel “Benghazi Brigade” announced on Oct. 22 its arrest of several men allegedly behind weekly car bombings in the city, including three Chadians. A Libyan military source called the detention a “theatrical act” in which armed groups like the one involved in this action “are trying to show…they can replace the army.”
Also in the east, militiamen from the al-Zawiya tribe seized up to 200 Egyptian drivers and demanded the release of associates being held in Egypt for weapons smuggling. On Oct. 18, gunmen murdered the head of the military police’s investigative division outside his vacation home in Benghazi, the day before the same happened to a local army commander in the eastern city of Derna, and two Libyan soldiers were stabbed to death during a militia attack on their base nearby.
The security situation in the capital of Tripoli also has skidded downward in the wake of the brief kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan on Oct. 10 by supposedly government-supported militiamen. Last week there were two outbreaks of heavy fighting (including the use of truck mounted anti-aircraft guns) between rival militias. The Nov. 7 battle began when fighters from a powerful militia in nearby Misrata entered Tripoli to avenge the death two days before of a militia leader from that militia-dominated city (Libya’s 3rd largest) still not under central government authority. With militias on the rampage, many Tripoli residents have armed themselves, and some have erected street barricades to block militiamen from entering their neighborhoods.
Triggers of militia violence are varied and unpredictable: personal vendettas, territory, stolen vehicles, and disputes over smuggled goods including drugs. Although the government tried to harness militias to function as security forces subject to the authorities, most report mainly to their own leaders. On Nov. 10, Zeidan called for a popular effort to compel the militias to disarm peacefully, something unlikely to succeed. And perhaps setting in place a trigger for a future outbreak of violence, Zeidan stated that government payments to militias operating beyond police and army authority would end on Dec. 31.
It comes as no surprise that Libya’s critical oil sector also has been in crisis for several months now, with 2 million barrels per day of normal exports falling to only a few hundred thousand. In the east, militias charged with protecting terminals and fields, joined by oil workers, for several months have squeezed or even blocked exports to pressure the government for various political and work-related concessions. Over the weekend they instituted a de-facto export blockade.
Off in the west, Berber protesters demanding minority rights seized Libya’s large Mellitah natural gas and oil complex on the coast 50 miles west of Tripoli last month. Mellitah is the terminus of the vital Greenstream pipeline operated jointly by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Italian Eni. Yesterday, the Berbers shut it down, cutting off the flow of natural gas to Italy.
Back east, militia-associated elements seeking eastern autonomy, a fair regional share of oil revenues, and holding all key export terminals in the region announced on Nov. 3 the unilateral formation of an eastern regional “Government of Barqa.” On the 10th, this shadowy government established a companion oil company based temporarily in Tobruk to market Libyan crude independent of Libya’s NOC. Under the more relaxed pre-Qadhafi rule of King Idris, Barqa was a semi-autonomous eastern region. Quite a few eastern Libyans reportedly are skeptical of this move, however, because they believe the “autonomy” effort is meant merely to serve the narrower agendas of particular militias.
Nonetheless, the militias have the power, and the central government in Tripoli has had to implore foreign companies not to purchase oil from entities or militias instead of NOC. Prime Minister Zeidan also announced on the 10th that with hydrocarbon exports imperiled, the Libyan government could be unable to cover its expenditures beginning in either December or January if export problems cannot be resolved (especially those in the east).
Not surprisingly, foreign confidence in Libya’s hydrocarbon sector is fading fast. ExxonMobil already has greatly reduced its activity in Libya, with Marathon considering the sale of its portion of a joint venture with the Libyans. And BP has begun talks to relinquish its stake in a large joint natural gas explorations project with NOC. Separate entities holding major terminals turning away foreign tankers in recent days will only frighten foreign investors that much more.
Libyan instability overall also has adverse implications for neighboring countries. In addition to the gun-running into Egypt noted earlier, the remote and lawless Libyan southeast provides a convenient haven for elements linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and similar extremist groups that have raided into Mali and Algeria. Farther north on Oct. 30, a suicide bomber struck in the Tunisian resort city of Sousse. Another bomber was apprehended in a nearby seaside town along with five more plotters nabbed in Sousse that Tunisia’s Islamist government said were members of the radical Ansar al-Sharia movement. All those caught were Tunisians, but they reportedly sortied from Libya, where Tunisian extremists evidently have exploited disorder even in the north not far from Tripoli to obtain training, explosives and arms.
The iffy authority of the Libyan government and the power of the militias have hurt prospects for Western assistance aimed at stabilization because the central government in Tripoli is not a viable partner. Several NATO countries, including the US and the UK, want to train at least some legitimate security and military personnel, but there is concern that even these could end up behaving like militias or strengthen in a destabilizing manner only the security side of the government. In any case, British training will not begin until early next year, and Washington has not made a final decision on plans to train Libyan cadres outside Libya.
With war-weariness dominating Western thinking concerning regional intervention, no government is seriously pondering direct military involvement. As a result, the prospects for Libya seem grim. No real progress — instead quite the opposite — has come from purely domestic attempts to sort out Libya’s many problems since Muammar Qadhafi’s fall two years ago, so Libyan efforts to address this deteriorating situation do not seem likely to gain meaningful traction.
One of Libya’s Berber militiamen blocking the gas and crude oil complex in Nalut. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS
]]>News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 12
“U.S. ambassador to Libya killed in Benghazi attack”: Reuters reports that the US ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, was killed yesterday along with three of his staff when protestors and heavily-armed Islamist militiamen stormed the embassy compound and a [...]]]>
News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 12
“U.S. ambassador to Libya killed in Benghazi attack”: Reuters reports that the US ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, was killed yesterday along with three of his staff when protestors and heavily-armed Islamist militiamen stormed the embassy compound and a safehouse in the coastal city of Benghazi.
The attack, which occurred shortly after the US embassy in Cairo was stormed by a mob, was ostensibly staged over an anti-Islamic film that has been publicized in the US. It is also possible that the demonstration in Benghazi over the film served as “cover” for a pre-planned assault on the compound:
The attack was believed to have been carried out by Ansar al-Sharia, an al Qaeda-style Sunni Islamist group that has been active in Benghazi, a Libyan security official said. Witnesses said the mob also included tribesmen, militia and other gunmen.
The Islamist militia denied it had taken part in the assault on the compound, which AFP suggests was strangely well-coordinated given the fact that the film cited as the reason for the demonstration had not been publicized for very long. Unknown persons set up a firebase in a nearby farm to support the men who breached the walls and set fire to the buildings:
Ansar al-Sharia cars arrived at the start of the protest but left once fighting started, Hamam said. “The protesters were running around the compound just looking for Americans, they just wanted to find an American so they could catch one.”
“U.S. Suspects Libya Attack Was Planned”: The New York Times reports that the Obama Administration has reason to believe the attack in Libya was preplanned – it is not clear if the assault in Egypt is also being investigated for premeditated actions – by al Qaeda sympathizers. The US announced it was pursuing an investigation but had no firm evidence yet:
If it were established that the deaths of the American diplomats resulted not from the spontaneous anger of a crowd about an insult to Islam but from a long-planned Qaeda plot, that might sharply shift perceptions of the events. But officials cautioned that the issue was still under urgent study.
The White House would not comment. “At this stage, it would be premature to ascribe any motive to this reprehensible act,” said Tommy Vietor, a White House spokesman.
But according to comments reported by the Christian Science Monitor, Libya’s Deputy Minister of the Interior Wanis al-Sharif has suggested that there was a link between the attack and the announcement yesterday –posted on the 11th anniversary of 9/11 by al Qaeda’s official As-Sahab news outlet – that Ayman al-Zawahri’s deputy, the Libyan national Abu Yahya al-Libi, was killed by a US drone strike in Pakistan.
Al-Zawahri, the Associated Press reports, “urged Libyans — al-Libi was born in the north African country — to attack Americans to avenge the late militant’s death, saying his ‘blood is calling, urging and inciting you to fight and kill the Crusaders.’”
The Deputy Minister of the Interior has subsequently blamed the American government for not taking precautions over this announcement. The US government has yet to respond to this apparent attempt by al-Sharif to deflect blame for the attack’s successful penetration of the embassy grounds after the outnumbered and outgunned Libyan guards stationed there abandoned their posts.
“Romney Campaign Denies Acting Rashly on Libyan Situation”: The National Journal reports that the Republican Party is deflecting criticism from both parties over their presidential nominee’s assertions that Obama was “sympathizing with those who had breached our embassy in Egypt instead of condemning their actions.”
Romney’s comments referred to a statement, now since walked back, by the US embassy in Cairo condemning the anti-Islamic film for inciting hate. The statement was released shortly before a mob converged on the compound and scaled the wall, but at a press conference in Jacksonville, Florida, Mitt Romney painted the embassy’s statement as a response to the attack after it happened rather than to the film before the protest took place.
Ben Smith reports that in addition to cited condemnations coming from Democrats, Republican foreign policy experts have voiced dismay over Romney making his remarks before more reports were available to judge what had happened in Cairo.
But the campaign has hit back on the criticism of its actions, with Romney not retracting his initial remarks and instead telling reporters that “it’s never too early for the United States government to condemn attacks on Americans and to defend our values.”
Statements published by Jennifer Rubin at the Washington Post – whose editorial board strongly criticized Romney’s remarks – show that several of Romney’s hawkish advisors, most notably former UN ambassador John Bolton, are rallying to his defense and blaming the media for mischaracterizing their candidate’s remarks.
And according to the National Journal, other “senior Romney advisers, who would not speak on the record,” are practicing damage control by presenting the remarks as part of:
]]>“[t]he larger point of Romney’s statement, which accused the administration of initially siding with protesters in Cairo, was that Obama is misreading the violent underbelly of the Arab Spring and jeopardizing U.S. interests in the region.
“This was a story that was building the entire day,” a senior Romney official said of the developments that took place late on Tuesday and into Wednesday morning. …. [a]nd the statement was about the consistent failure of this administration to engage constructively with the aftermath of the Arab Spring.”