Amidst UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’s attempts to achieve a temporary Syrian ceasefire, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton this week announced a boost in American non-lethal assistance to the Syrian rebels.  Meanwhile, Russian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Nikolai Makarov declared that Moscow has “reliable information that Syrian militants have foreign…anti-aircraft [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Amidst UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’s attempts to achieve a temporary Syrian ceasefire, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton this week announced a boost in American non-lethal assistance to the Syrian rebels.  Meanwhile, Russian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Nikolai Makarov declared that Moscow has “reliable information that Syrian militants have foreign…anti-aircraft missile systems, including those made in the USA.” Recent footage from Syria shows resistance fighters with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile launchers. But those seen were Russian-style SA-7’s possessed by the Syrian army and many other Middle East militaries, rather than advanced US models like the FIM-92 Stinger.

The question of whether to provide arms to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is fighting a desperate battle against the Assad regime, remains a difficult and conflicted decision for the US and most other NATO countries. For some, sending arms to the FSA to bring an earlier end to the regime and the continuing bloodshed and destruction is a “no-brainer”. Others maintain that giving the rebels more (and perhaps better) arms would only contribute further to the overall mayhem that might not end for quite a long time regardless.

For those wishing to respond to rebel pleas for arms, Islamist extremists — scattered among the scores of militias and local contingents comprising the FSA — are a central concern. As the civil war has dragged on, there has been rising evidence of these extremists fighting alongside rebel fighters, especially in the north where foreign correspondents have far more access. Many are Syrians, but a number of them have been coming in from neighboring countries to fight as scattered contingents within the FSA (or perhaps merely to find yet another venue for “jihad” against an unpopular secular regime).

And there is real reason for concern among governments sympathetic to the opposition about arms falling into the wrong hands. It is, after all, difficult to determine who would be the ultimate recipient of munitions assistance once it passes into Syria. In a fluid environment with scores of FSA factions, militant groups might also construct deceptive liaisons to convey false assurances of moderation once they catch wind of selective distribution. Finally, in cities like Aleppo, a number of armed factions appear to be fighting alongside each other and might feel compelled to share munitions for mutual support and protection against regime attacks. The injection of surface-to-air missiles into this conflict is especially risky because they could end up in the hands of terrorist groups and be used against commercial airliners.

That said, anger is increasing among anti-regime elements within Syria over the failure of the West to provide armed assistance. Had arms been supplied to Syrian rebels considerably sooner, the number of Syrians embittered over the lack of tangible support from the outside, the vast extent of destruction wrought mainly by the regime’s aircraft and heavy weapons, and the number of militants arriving from neighboring countries might have been more limited before the fall of the Assad regime (which this writer assumes is highly likely). The palpable rise in anger toward major Western powers for withholding arms could alone render more Syrians toward anti-Western Islamist appeals.

This, in a nutshell, is the US and Western dilemma. Standing by without providing vital arms while the bloodshed continues will probably mean less sympathy and increasing militancy among the rebels over time. After all, more of them (and members of their families) are being killed and maimed because they lack proper arms and sufficient ammunition.

On the other hand, if the rebels gain access to considerable more arms (meaning militants too in many cases), anti-Western anger would likely abate. But the conflict has already gone on long enough to produce a problematic post-Assad scenario featuring more robust militias competing for power, along with perhaps even more ugly sectarian score-settling against Alawite and Christian minorities that have been supporting the regime. In fact, the great amount of infrastructure, commercial establishments and all manner of housing already destroyed by regime firepower will likely be the source of a potentially profound economic crisis that would generate a heavy measure of frustration, anger and recrimination over some years even after the fall of the regime.

Consequently, in terms of the available options at this late stage in the struggle, those governments agonizing over the pros and cons of providing arms might well perceive the choice as a sort of “Catch-22.” In the context of the argument on the positive side of the policy ledger that providing arms could bring a swifter defeat of the regime, there is one more possible plus. So far, major Syrian Army units have not chosen to defect en masse, probably because (in addition to the obvious regime-loyalty notion) many realize facing off against the regime would be considerably more dangerous than combating relatively lightly armed rebel contingents. Should, however, rebel forces become considerably more militarily formidable, that shift might trigger such defections and a change on the ground that could be more significant than what the rebels have achieved so far. That said, even if plenty of additional arms were provided, the FSA is unlikely to receive tanks, other armored vehicles and heavy artillery that could match regime capabilities because most rebel fighters are not army defectors and would not be able to operate these more complex weapon-systems nearly as effectively as the Syrian military. So, not only has the US evidently provided little or no arms to the Syrian opposition, Washington may well remain (like many other potential Western suppliers) quite conflicted with respect to doing so.

News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 15

“No Rush to War“: The editorial board of the New York Times highlights the Iran Project report – authored and endorsed by a bipartisan group of high-level national security experts – that we discussed earlier this [...]]]> via Lobe Log

News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 15

“No Rush to War“: The editorial board of the New York Times highlights the Iran Project report – authored and endorsed by a bipartisan group of high-level national security experts – that we discussed earlier this week, adding that:

There is no reason to doubt President Obama’s oft-repeated commitment to keep Iran from having a nuclear weapon. But 70 percent of Americans oppose a unilateral strike on Iran, according to a new poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and 59 percent said if Israel bombs Iran and ignites a war, the United States should not come to its ally’s defense.

Iran is advancing its nuclear program in defiance of the United Nations Security Council. That’s a danger to Israel, the region and all efforts to curb proliferation. But administration officials and many other experts say Iran is still a year or more away from producing an actual weapon, and, if it begins to build one, they will know in time to take retaliatory action.

The best strategy is for Israel to work with the United States and other major powers to tighten sanctions while pursuing negotiations on a deal. It is a long shot, but there is time to talk. And that’s where the focus must be.

“Leadership Rifts Hobble Syrian Rebels“: Charles Levinson of the Wall Street Journal reports on the tensions among anti-regime militias in Aleppo. While the regime’s crackdown against the militias there has been blunted somewhat, at the same time the rebels are hobbled by dearth of unity, men and material. In one camp that Levinson reported from are self-proclaimed local Islamists known as the “Tawhids,” while the other camp is led by an ex-Syrian Army colonel, who does not wholly trust the “Tawhids” because they have carried out extrajudicial killings and are a recruiting rival for his own command:

The colonel’s main tools to force loyalty are his control of weapons caches and a belief by urbanites and exiles funding the cause that Islamist peasants aren’t the proper leaders of the rebellion.

…. For commanders, arms are the way to secure the loyalty of fighters—and cadres of loyal fighters translate into political influence.

…. Similar tensions hurt rebel efforts in the battle for Aleppo’s strategic Salaheddin neighborhood, the bloodiest and most pivotal battle in the war for Aleppo so far.

The divisions among these two forces highlight the problems that proponents of arming the rebels – such as Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Joe Lieberman (I-CT) – face in convincing the Obama Administration to authorize arms transfers to the militias. And the Syrian Support Group, so far the only Syrian Diaspora organization authorized (by a special Treasury Department exemption) to raise private funds in the US for the militias, says it has not disbursed any of its funds due to logistical and “vetting” hurdles.

The White House has so far only approved the transfer of several millions dollars worth of non-military aid (as well as some personnel) to assist Syrian exiles in Turkey set up refugee camps and run counterpropaganda campaigns against Syria’s state-run media.

“Watching and waiting as Syria’s violence spreads“: The Washington Post’s editorial board criticizes the Obama Administration for withholding “lethal aid” to Syrian militias fighting against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Claiming that an al Qaeda resurgence in Iraq (and Syria) and the destabilization of Turkey and Saudi Arabia will likely be the fruits of further US indecision, the editors urge Obama to “reconsider” his decision against arming the anti-Assad militias:

The United States has consequently withheld lethal aid — only to watch a deepening war in which al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups are gaining ground, while Shiite-Sunni clashes have steadily escalated in Iraq and Lebanon.

…. If the fighting continues to spread, important U.S. allies, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey, could be destabilized; both are indirectly backing Sunni fighters. The fragile political order in Iraq, bought with thousands of American lives, could collapse. Al-Qaeda could acquire new recruits and sanctuaries across the region.

The best means of preventing this, as State Department Middle East experts have been pointing out for months, is to accelerate the downfall of the Syrian regime. There are several ways of doing that, short of direct military intervention: materiel aid to the rebels is one. Now that its refusal to take that step has led to the very consequences it warned of, the administration would be wise to reconsider.

“Iraq’s Maliki says backs Syrian people’s wish for reform“: Reuters reports on the “tightrope” that the Iraqi government is walking over the Syrian conflict, caught between Iranian and American expectations as well as its own sectarian fault lines:

Close to Iran himself, Maliki has taken a more muted stance on Syria. He has not joined calls for Assad to quit, much less enforce sanctions against Damascus approved by the Arab League, but has called for reforms to end one-party rule in Syria.

Ali al-Moussawi, Maliki’s media adviser, said the meeting was not the first time Baghdad government leaders had met with Syrian opposition.

“We are with the demands of the Syrian people. We confirmed to the delegation that we are with them, stand with them, but we will never dictate to them and will not interfere in their affairs,” he said.