by Derek Davison
The three key timelines at the center of the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program were the subject of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center today. Jon Wolfsthal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies spoke about the duration of a hypothetical comprehensive [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
The three key timelines at the center of the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program were the subject of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center today. Jon Wolfsthal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies spoke about the duration of a hypothetical comprehensive agreement, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association (ACA) discussed Iran’s “breakout” period, and Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center talked about possible timeframes for sanctions relief.
While there may be flaws in the P5+1’s (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) decision to make “breakout” their primary focus, it is that timeline, and specifically its uranium enrichment component, that dominates the negotiations and related policy debates. Uranium enrichment capacity is, according to Kimball, the “key problem” in terms of coming to a final agreement, given that more progress seems to have been made between the two parties on limiting the Arak heavy-water reactor’s plutonium production, and on more intensive inspection and monitoring mechanisms. He also discussed the contours of a deal that would allow Iran to begin operating “next generation” centrifuges, which enrich uranium far more efficiently than the older models currently being operated by the Iranians.
Kimball’s suggestion mirrored a new piece in the ACA’s journal by Princeton scholars Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Hossein Mousavian, and Frank von Hippel. They proposed a two-stage process for modernizing Iran’s enrichment technology and eventually finding a stable consensus on the enrichment issue. In the first stage, to last around five years, Iran could begin to replace its aging “first generation” centrifuges with more advanced “second generation” centrifuges so long as Iran’s overall enrichment capacity remains constant, and it would be able to continue research and development on more modern centrifuge designs so long as it permitted inspectors to verify that those more advanced centrifuges were not being installed. That five year period would also allow Iran and the international community time to work out a more permanent uranium enrichment arrangement, which could take the form of a regional, multi-national uranium enrichment consortium similar to Urenco, the European entity that handles enrichment for Britain and Germany.
As the authors note, Iran is one of only three non-nuclear weapon states (Brazil and Japan are the others) that operate their own enrichment programs, so the global trend seems to be moving in the direction of these multi-national enrichment consortiums. It is unclear if Iran would agree to this kind of framework, but this piece was co-authored by Mousavian, who has ties to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, suggesting that it could become acceptable to the Iranian government.
One major hurdle in the talks remains Iran’s desire, as noted by Kimball, to be able to fully fuel its Bushehr reactors with domestic enriched uranium by 2021, the year when its deal with Russia to supply fuel to Bushehr runs out. Fueling the Bushehr reactors alone would require vastly more enrichment capacity than the P5+1 would be able to accept, and Iran has plans for future reactors that it would presumably want to be able to fuel domestically as well. The P5+1 negotiators, and well-known non-proliferation organizations including ACA, argue that Iran can simply renew its fuel supply deal with Russia and thereby reduce its “need” for enriched uranium substantially. But from Iran’s perspective, domestic enrichment is its only completely reliable source of reactor fuel. Indeed, Russia has historically proven willing to renege on nuclear fuel agreements in the name of its own geopolitical prerogatives. Any final deal that relies on outside suppliers to reduce Iran’s enriched uranium requirements will have to account for Iranian concerns about whether or not those outside suppliers can be trusted. It’s possible that the kind of enrichment consortium described in the ACA piece will satisfy those concerns.
The other timelines in question, the overall duration of a deal and the phasing out of sanctions, spin off of the more fundamental debate over enrichment capacity, and both revolve around issues of trust. Wolfsthal argued that the P5+1 may require a deal that will last at least until Rouhani is out of office, in order to guard against any change in nuclear posture under the next presidential administration. In his discussion of sanctions relief, Litwak pointed to an even more fundamental question of trust: is Iran willing to believe (and, it should be added, can Iran believe) that the United States is prepared to normalize relations with the Islamic Republic and to stop making regime change the paramount goal of its Iran policy? If the answer is “yes,” then Iran may be willing to accept a more gradual, staged removal of sanctions in exchange for specific nuclear goals, which the P5+1 favors. If the answer is “no,” then Iran is likely to demand immediate sanctions relief at levels that may be too much, and too quick for the P5+1 to accept.
]]>Those unnamed officials “from a country critical of Iran’s nuclear program” are at it again. This week they leaked an illustration to to the Associated Press which supposedly demonstrates that “Iranian scientists have run computer simulations for a nuclear weapon that would produce more than triple the explosive [...]]]>
Those unnamed officials “from a country critical of Iran’s nuclear program” are at it again. This week they leaked an illustration to to the Associated Press which supposedly demonstrates that “Iranian scientists have run computer simulations for a nuclear weapon that would produce more than triple the explosive force of the World War II bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.” The AP headline is sure to bring in hits, but is it accurate reporting?
“The diagram leaked to the Associated Press this week is nothing more than either shoddy sources or shoddy science,” write physicists Yousaf Butt and Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. “In either case, the world can keep calm and carry on,” say the experts, whose article should be read in full.
Butt and Dalnoki-Veress use the word “shoddy”, but that may be an understatement when evaluating the central point of George Jahn’s “exclusive” report:
The graphic has not yet been authenticated; however, even if authentic, it would not qualify as proof of a nuclear weapons program. Besides the issue of authenticity, the diagram features quite a massive error, which is unlikely to have been made by research scientists working at a national level.
The image released to the Associated Press shows two curves: one that plots the energy versus time, and another that plots the power output versus time, presumably from a fission device. But these two curves do not correspond: If the energy curve is correct, then the peak power should be much lower — around 300 million ( 3×108) kt per second, instead of the currently stated 17 trillion (1.7 x1013) kt per second. As is, the diagram features a nearly million-fold error.
This diagram does nothing more than indicate either slipshod analysis or an amateurish hoax.
…this graph – which is only slightly less hilariously primitive than the one Benjamin Netanyahu infamously touted with a straight face at the UN – has Farsi written under it to imbue it with that menacing Iranian-ish feel, but also helpfully uses English to ensure that US audiences can easily drink up its scariness. As The Atlantic’s Robert Wright noted: “How considerate of the Iranians to label their secret nefarious nuke graph in English!”. It’s certainly possible that Iranian scientists use English as a universal language of science, but the convenient mixing of Farsi and English should at least trigger some skepticism.
…the Associated Press story does not change the U.S. Government’s assessment that Iran would require, not a few weeks, but many months to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, if it decided to do so. Secretary of Defense Panetta recently estimated that it would take two to three years, similar to the estimate made by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. In order to implement such a crash program, Iran would need to expel IAEA inspectors, use existing facilities and stockpiles to produce weapons grade uranium, and probably test a nuclear device, all of which would raise the alarm to the international community.
And Greenwald reminds us why journalists need to be especially accurate and skeptical when reporting on Iran’s nuclear program:
The case for the attack on Iraq was driven, of course, by a mountain of fabricated documents and deliberately manipulated intelligence which western media outlets uncritically amplified. Yet again, any doubts that they are willing and eager to do exactly the same with regard to the equally fictitious Iranian Threat should be forever dispelled by behavior like this.
As always, the two key facts to note on Iran are these: 1) the desperation to prevent Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon has nothing to do with fear that they would commit national suicide by using it offensively, but rather has everything to do with the deterrent capability it would provide - i.e., nukes would prevent the US or Israel from attacking Iran at will or bullying it with threats of such an attack; and 2) the US-led sanctions regime now in place based on this fear-mongering continues to impose mass suffering and death on innocent Iranians. But as long as media outlets like AP continue to blindly trumpet whatever is shoveled to them by the shielded, unnamed “country critical of Iran’s atomic program”, these facts will be suppressed and fear levels kept sky-high, thus enabling the continuation and escalation of the hideous sanctions regime, if not an outright attack.
Write Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Greg Thielmann at Arms Control Now:
Taken together, the IAEA report findings provide further troubling evidence that Iran is continuing to pursue sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle activities in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and is slowly enhancing its nuclear weapons breakout potential.
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Write Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Greg Thielmann at Arms Control Now:
Taken together, the IAEA report findings provide further troubling evidence that Iran is continuing to pursue sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle activities in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and is slowly enhancing its nuclear weapons breakout potential.
However, Iran remains years, not months away from having a workable nuclear arsenal if it were to choose to pursue that capability. Given this reality, it is clear that new and more energetic diplomatic efforts are necessary to reduce the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran.
How should the diplomatic process — regarded as the most effective and sustainable way of countering Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions — proceed?
The overall goal for U.S. and P5+1 negotiators must be to halt the most significant proliferation risk, which is Iran’s accumulation of 20% enriched uranium. Their efforts should focus on limiting—not permanently suspending—Iran’s enrichment to normal power reactor-grade levels (3.5%), and limit its stockpiles to actual nuclear power needs, while securing more intrusive IAEA inspections to ensure that Iran has halted previous weapons-related experiments, all in exchange for a phased rollback of international sanctions on Iran.
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The Arms Control Association’s Kelsey Davenport summarizes a case made by a Turkish professor of international relations for Turkey to be included in the p5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany):
Despite the failure of the Tehran Declaration, Turkey’s experience negotiating with Iran [...]]]>
The Arms Control Association’s Kelsey Davenport summarizes a case made by a Turkish professor of international relations for Turkey to be included in the p5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany):
Despite the failure of the Tehran Declaration, Turkey’s experience negotiating with Iran lends strength to [Mustafa] Kibaroglu’s argument for Turkey’s inclusion. Ankara demonstrated it can work with Tehran. Additionally, in June 2010 Turkey was one of two countries that voted against UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed sanctions on Iran for failing to comply with early resolutions regarding its nuclear program. Given the animosity spurred on by the current sanctions, Iran may be more willing to work with Turkey than the members of the P5+1.
In addition, Kibaroglu reminds us that Israel is not the only Middle Eastern country that would be threatened by Iran obtaining nuclear weapons and that other regional perspectives on the security environment need to be considered. According to him, a nuclear armed Iran would be the “game changer” that affects the relationship between the two countries and tips the balance of power in Iran’s favor.
While Turkish inclusion in the P5+1 may not be the creative solution that revives the negotiations with Iran, Kibaroglu’s recommendations serve as an important reminder that there is no “one size fits all” formula for diplomatic negotiations. If the current P5+1 track does not achieve a breakthrough, it does not mean that negotiations have failed. Rather, that it is time for diplomats to get creative and consider alternative options, such as exploiting the good offices of new parties, to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear question.
For assessing how Iran may respond to Turkey’s inclusion in the P5+1, read Iran expert Farideh Farhi’s recent analysis of Iran-Turkey relations.
]]>Writes Eckholm:
- Proponents of a more comprehensive military intervention will argue that a full-scale invasion is the only means by which to crush the regime and its military apparatus, guarantee total elimination of the Iranian nuclear enterprise, and create a window for democratic change. But the price of invasion would be astronomical, and the nationalistic reaction would be fierce; thus, the projected cost in life and treasure must be weighed against the envisioned, yet unpredictable, advantages of a new regime in Tehran.
Crail ends by noting that:
- So when members of Congress say we should consider military force, or presidential candidates talk about a “military solution” to Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, it is important to ask just what kind of military action they propose, and whether they have also addressed the types of consequences that military leaders and defense analysts describe.
In doing so he is also alluding to the fact that the majority of U.S. intelligence and military analysts are opposed to invading Iran, which raises the question of why certain members of congress and presidential candidates keep bringing the “military solution” up. Who are they being influenced by and who are they trying to please by adopting this kind of aggressive posturing?
Read Crail’s entire post below.
The Military Option on Iran: Be Careful What You Wish For
By Peter Crail
TIME Magazine has recently highlighted an analysis entitled “Invading Iran: Lessons from Iraq” by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Leif Eckholm, who works in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the analysis was published by Stanford’s Hoover Institution, where Eckholm served as a defense fellow).
As the title suggests, the analysis examines many of the challenges in securing a post-invasion Iraq, and how they would be similar, different, or magnified in the context of Iran.
One of the key takeaways, however, is a brief cost/benefit assessment of the decision to attack Iran and a recognition that the only sure-fire way that military force could stop Iran’s nuclear program is through an Iraq-style invasion and occupation:
- Should tensions over nuclear ambitions rise to the point of military intervention, an air campaign seems a more likely course of action. Military airstrikes provide a stand-off capability that could severely hamper or delay Iran’s march towards weapon production without bearing the cost of occupation and reconstruction, but not without a price of its own. Targeting the key nuclear infrastructure sites like the Bushehr Research Reactor, the Arak Heavy-Water Reactor/Plutonium Separation Facility, the Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center would certainly be a major setback to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but the regime has devoted considerable effort to hide, diversify, and protect its nuclear assets, and the regime’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons actually may well increase after such a strike. Furthermore, the regime would remain in place and likely benefit from a nationalistic reaction that would strengthen domestic political support. Proponents of a more comprehensive military intervention will argue that a full-scale invasion is the only means by which to crush the regime and its military apparatus, guarantee total elimination of the Iranian nuclear enterprise, and create a window for democratic change. But the price of invasion would be astronomical, and the nationalistic reaction would be fierce; thus, the projected cost in life and treasure must be weighed against the envisioned, yet unpredictable, advantages of a new regime in Tehran.
This assessment echoes the acknowledgement by former Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman General James Cartwright during an April 2010 Senate hearing that the only way military action would end Iran’s nuclear program would be through invasion and occupation. Cartwright went on to say during the hearing that, while the United States military could carry out such an operation, “there would be consequences to our readiness and the challenges that we already face in this nation economically to pay for war.”
It is important to note that an air campaign against select nuclear facilities wouldn’t be a walk in the park either, as former DIA analyst and Washington Institute Defense Fellow Jeffrey White said during an ACA event in June:
- I think there are a lot of issues – important issues – related to an “attack,” in quotes, on Iran and so it would be very complicated, problematic in some ways. I think the desired levels of destruction could be achieved, especially by us. But it would not be an easy operation and it is, I think, in my mind kind of in a last resort category.
Discussing Israel’s own military option, Former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan was even more straightforward, saying it was “the stupidest thing I have ever heard.”
Lt. Col. Eckholm’s analysis provides an important contribution to answering questions that were not adequately addressed prior to the Iraq invasion, including what are the likely consequences and is it worth it? Military leaders naturally need to prepare for the possibility that they would be asked to undertake such operations. At the same time, those who are or aspire to be in a position to order those operations need to be aware of the extent of the military and economic commitments they, and ultimately the American people, would be making.
So when members of Congress say we should consider military force, or presidential candidates talk about a “military solution” to Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, it is important to ask just what kind of military action they propose, and whether they have also addressed the types of consequences that military leaders and defense analysts describe.
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