by Robert E. Hunter
“Then we’ll have done all we can.”
“Very heartless.”
“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”
Yes, [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
“Then we’ll have done all we can.”
“Very heartless.”
“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”
Yes, Prime Minister.
President Barack Obama, it is said, has painted himself into a corner with his repeated statements that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government will be a “game changer” or cross a “red line.” The difficulty of definitions has produced what must have been one of the most ambiguous letters ever to be put on White House stationery. It came as a response to a demand from two US Senators about presidential policy in the event of such weapons use.
More accurately, however, the president can be said to have painted himself into a corner with Syria on two occasions, initially as early as August 2011, and repeated since, by declaring that “Assad must go.”
Of course, Assad has not gone, thus demonstrating once again the first rule of being US President: never call for something, especially in a simple declaratory sentence, if you are not prepared to follow through and make it happen.
This recitation is not meant to be an attack on the US president. It is an introduction to what has to be a genuine dilemma, indeed, a series of dilemmas, which come in several forms.
Syria’s Future
The first dilemma regards the potentiality of a positive outcome in Syria. Assad and company are engaged in the massive slaughter of their own people, which, along with those killed by the rebels, numbers more than 70,000 by a recent (likely conservative) count, plus the creation of more than a million refugees. There is meanwhile no resolution in sight of what has become a full-scale civil war.
Let us assume that Assad is killed (or decides to seek a safe haven) tomorrow. What then? It is a vast stretch of the imagination to believe that the killing would then stop.
What is happening in Syria is radically different from what happened in the so-called “Arab spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, or even Libya. This is not primarily a matter of whether a leader who stayed too long and was too repressive will go; but whether a particular minority will continue to be able to dominate the rest of the population, or, with “regime change,” whether there will be a bloody free-for-all competition for power. None of the other three regime changes were about that.
More relevant is what happened in Iraq, when the US and partners, by invading in 2003, overturned centuries of admittedly unjust domination of a majority (Shi’ite) by a minority (Sunni). Or what is happening, or rather not happening, in Bahrain, where the situation is just the reverse but has been kept in check by military power, much of which has been applied by neighboring Saudi Arabia, with the US, concerned about its base in Bahrain for the Fifth Fleet, at best “turning a blind eye.”
It’s therefore hard to see what the United States, or any combination of outsiders, could usefully do — not to help overthrow Assad and his Alawite-dominated military (that can be done) — but to help “shape” a future in Syria that won’t lead to even more bloody chaos before something approaching “stability” could ensue. Even if that were possible, it would likely take the form of a new suppression, but by the majority (Sunni) over various minorities.
Public Opinion
The second dilemma — perhaps it should be first — is related to whether the American people are ready and willing to see the US engaged in yet another Middle East war. The answer (“No”) is clear, but so far policy is not — hence the dilemma.
There should be no indulgence in the nonsense that all could be accomplished by providing more lethal arms to the rebels, imposing a no-fly zone, or using air power directly. That would be relatively sterile in today’s military taxology, but even if/when successful, it leads back to the first dilemma. And if unsuccessful, the US would then be called upon to do what, in current jargon, is called “boots on the ground” — that is, invasion. There should be no nonsense, however, about the US being able, as in Libya, to “lead from behind.” Even though the British and the French (the latter was the former mandatory power in Syria after World War I) would like to see something done, they are this time ready to hold the US coat, but not lead themselves.
To his credit, the president so far has been wary of getting more deeply engaged, presumably due to a combination of his awareness of the two dilemmas above, the second of which (US public opinion), if ignored, would surely take attention away from what he clearly sees as his legacy: repairs to the heavily-damaged US economy (and the global financial system) and his historical goal, which can be summarized in a few simple words: the promotion of equality in American society.
Regional Context
The third dilemma derives from the manner in which the conflict in Syria began. It did have domestic roots (as in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya), but it also had external causes and active agents, notably a desire by leading Sunni states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and to a lesser degree, Turkey) to right the informal and rough regional “balance of power” between them and Shi’a states that was so heavily upset by the US invasion of Iraq. This came after the spread of the “disease” from revolutionary Shi’a Iran had both been almost entirely contained in the region and had most of its fires banked at home. Some Sunni states still fear contagion, however, notably Saudi Arabia, where oil lands are heavily concentrated in Shi’a territories (hence Riyadh’s desire to get rid of the Alawite rule in Syria).
So here it is: an already slow-rolling civil war across the region, pitting Sunnis versus Shi’as, but only in part about religion, is also about competitions for power. In this case, it’s an essentially four-cornered competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey, the first three of which have as much to do in fueling the current confrontation with Iran as does its nuclear program.
Would the overthrow of the Assad regime cause this regional civil war to intensify? Or would it lead to a new, informal balance among religious groupings that would be reasonably “stable,” whatever that means in today’s roiling Middle East? It would take a Dr. Pangloss to argue the case for stability over more competition and even less stability and predictability about the future of inter-state relations and internal developments.
Non-governmental Actors
Dilemma number four flows from the above. As the civil war has continued and intensified, Sunni Islamist militants, including elements of al-Qaeda, Wahhabis and Salafists, have increasingly become engaged. That should be no surprise. These groups batten on conflict, especially a conflict with intense emotion and deep-seated religious inspiration. Thus even with Assad gone — perhaps by magic wand tomorrow — would the outcome of the civil war be ruled by a Sunni strongman, pacifying the country by force? Or solidification of another base for continuing terrorist operations by some of our and our allies’ worst enemies?
Israel’s Circumstances
One argument for getting rid of Assad and his Alawite-dominated regime is that this would help deprive the Lebanese Hezbollah of its rear base, which provides political support and a supply route for Iran as it seeks to counter pressure from the US and Israel. But at what (potential) price would Iran be thus incommoded?
Since 1974, Israel existed uneasily but still reasonably comfortably with Assad père et fils, as both countries learned to live with one another. Their mutual frontier along the Golan Heights was so stable that Israel could even invade Lebanon (twice) and attack a Syrian nuclear reactor without a military response. Now that modus vivendi is very much in jeopardy.
Indeed, for many months after the Syrian civil war started, Israel was clearly at least ambivalent about whether Assad’s departure was in Israel’s best interest. It now seems to have passed that point, but even that is not entirely clear.
What should be clear, however, is that if Assad goes and there is an intensifying civil war, with “free play” for Islamist radicals of the worst stripe — the kind that have inspired and in many cases conducted the killing of Americans in Afghanistan — the US will be called upon to be even more robust in support of Israel’s security.
Would that mean US forces on the Golan Heights? Israel has never wanted this direct military engagement from the US, but the need for extra commitments to Israel’s security would be very likely. Furthermore, the argument that Iran would be the big loser from Assad’s departure might even be turned on its head. The balance in Tehran could be tipped toward those who argue that Iran should get nuclear weapons in order to deter a burgeoning list of enemies.
Strategy
Then a final dilemma: the US desire to “pivot” to Asia. But at least some refocusing of policy and military assets will not be as easily done as has been hoped with the end of the Iraq War, the winding down of the Afghanistan War and the efforts to keep Iran from crossing either US or Israeli red lines on its nuclear program.
With Syria and its interlocking dilemmas, plus other continuing challenges in the region, the US will not be able to rid itself of a major security role in the Middle East anytime soon, even if it (rightly) promotes an international approach to even some of these dilemmas, no matter how much oil and gas is eventually produced in the continental US.
It is probably — but not certainly — too late to find some means whereby Assad could stay in power but with genuine power-sharing that would radically reduce the prominence of the Alawites without leaving them to be victimized as they have victimized other Syrians for so long. Of course, power-sharing efforts almost always fail in mechanical approaches to foreign policy, so perhaps that was never a real option, a triumph of Western “hope over experience.”
So what is to be done at this juncture of “no good options?” The best to be hoped for now is for President Obama to keep his nerve (backed by the US military leadership) and continue resisting attempts to drag the US even more deeply into Syria. At the same time, the US must avoid the temptation to perceive another looming chance to experiment with “nation building”; Iraq and Afghanistan should have inoculated us against that.
As a cardinal principle, the US should internationalize whatever is done — by the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and Arab League — and not regard Syria as a test of US “leadership,” as asserted in the aforementioned White House letter (“strengthen our leadership of the international community.”) It should put out the word in very clear terms to other states in the region to stop meddling in Syria, and in particular, to rein-in their nationals who are engaged in spreading Islamist militancy in Syria (and elsewhere), with both ideas and arms.
Finally, the US needs to begin seeing the region as a whole, not as a series of bits and pieces, loosely connected to one another, with Washington attempting only “to put out fires” here and there, while pretending that the whole region is not potentially ablaze. The president has to recruit for his administration the very best people to think strategically and this time plan ahead. They must understand that the US has to create consistent and coherent policies for the entire region that have some chance of success for the long haul.
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
All was not as it seemed during President Barack Obama’s appearances in Jerusalem and Ramallah, where he addressed audiences of Israelis and Palestinians. On the surface, it looked like Obama was swearing fealty to Israel, and pledging unconditional US support for any and all Israeli actions. But a [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
All was not as it seemed during President Barack Obama’s appearances in Jerusalem and Ramallah, where he addressed audiences of Israelis and Palestinians. On the surface, it looked like Obama was swearing fealty to Israel, and pledging unconditional US support for any and all Israeli actions. But a closer look at what was and was not said, as well as some of the surrounding circumstances, suggests that what Obama was really doing was paving a road toward a reduced US role in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The contradictions in evidence abound, and could be seen from the very beginning. Obama kept calling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his nickname, Bibi, at their joint press conference. “Oh, yes, we’re just the best of friends. Don’t worry, AIPAC,” Obama seemed to be saying. “Any friction between us is a thing of the past.” Yet, Obama had made a pointed decision to deliver the keynote speech of his trip not at the Knesset, but to an audience from Israel’s major universities. The many students invited excluded only those from Ariel University, the lone Israeli university located in the West Bank settlements.
The ham-handed excuse offered by the US embassy, that they only invited those universities with whom they partnered, was a convenient one. They don’t work with that university because of the political ramifications, and the exclusion here was for the same reason. And that sent a message to Obama’s “good friend,” Bibi.
Not speaking to the Knesset sent a message as well, and it was reflected in Obama’s speech. There is no reason for Obama to speak in a chamber where there is so much hostility toward him. Instead, he told his young Jerusalem audience: “let me say this as a politician — I can promise you this, political leaders will never take risks if the people do not push them to take some risks. You must create the change that you want to see.” Translation: “I can’t work on peace with your current government. You need to drive the change and open the door.” That, too, was a message to Bibi.
But more important than what was said was what was not said. For all the fawning that Obama did, he offered nothing new or of substance — not the slightest deviation from his well-established policies. There’s no new version of Dennis Ross, Anthony Zinni or George Mitchell being sent to the Middle East. There are no new incentives or confidence-building plans, however pointless. There was just a whole bunch of pronouncements about the unshakeable bond between the US and Israel.
Does that sound like a president who intends to maintain the US’ current level of involvement? It seems more like a President who is telling Israelis exactly what AIPAC is buying. The annual military aid will continue, as will money for Iron Dome, and never mind the many federal employees who were just sequestered out of a job or furloughed. The security and intelligence cooperation is likely to continue as well. Israel will, as Obama put it, remain “…the most powerful country in this region. Israel has the unshakeable support of the most powerful country in the world.”
While the US president sent a clear signal that he holds little hope that the current Israeli government is able or willing to pursue peace in any substantive way, he also cautioned Israelis about their growing peril. “Given the frustration in the international community about this conflict, Israel needs to reverse an undertow of isolation,” Obama said. “And given the march of technology, the only way to truly protect the Israeli people over the long term is through the absence of war. Because no wall is high enough and no Iron Dome is strong enough or perfect enough to stop every enemy that is intent on doing so from inflicting harm.”
Note that it’s Israel that needs to reverse this trend, and there’s no mention of any kind of US charm offensive or even advocacy on Israel’s behalf to assist the effort. The implication is clear: Israel’s policies and actions are to blame for its troubles and the US can’t change that, and, because of the political problems it would cause, this administration will not try. Could that also result in a somewhat diminished defense at the United Nations and other international arenas, on the part of the US? Time will tell.
Obama also let the Palestinian Authority know they should look elsewhere. By choosing to condemn Hamas for the rockets that hit Sderot earlier that day during his Ramallah speech rather than in Israel, he surely alienated many in the crowd he was addressing. By refusing to use even moderately stern language on settlements or promise even the mildest pressure on Israel, he seriously undermined Mahmoud Abbas, the man he was purportedly coming to support. Throughout his speech, despite his expressions of sympathy for the daily struggles of Palestinians, Obama never mentioned Israel’s responsibility to end the occupation, let alone to respect human rights or abide by international law.
That sent a very clear message: don’t look to the United States to deliver the goods. If Abbas was listening at all, he must know that internationalizing his cause, as he did last year at the UN, is the only option Obama has left for him. It was so clear, it had to be a deliberate message.
This might all be considered fanciful until one considers the changing position of Israel in the US view. As Aluf Benn, editor-in-chief of the Israeli daily, Ha’aretz points out, the entire Middle East region is of considerably less importance in the broader geo-political strategic view of the United States. “U.S. President Barack Obama said Wednesday his visit to Israel was meant to be a reassuring one,” Benn writes. “He is here to make it clear to Israelis that America stands behind them and will ensure their security, even though the neighborhood has become tougher… The visit comes at a time when the United States is withdrawing from its deep involvement in the Middle East, amid the growing fear of Israel and other regional allies that America will abandon them to radical Islamic forces.”
Benn’s alarmist language aside, he’s right. A big part of this is the oft-discussed “pivot to Asia,” that is the cornerstone of Obama’s foreign policy. Asia’s importance is growing as the Middle East’s is shrinking. The Middle East, particularly the Arabian Peninsula, was once called the “greatest material prize in history” by the US State Department because of its wealth of oil resources. But the US and Europe both see themselves on the road to “energy independence.” This sounds a little more grandiose than it really is. Local oil resources and increased reliance on alternative energy sources will significantly diminish the role of Middle Eastern oil both in terms of serving energy needs and in terms of its role in the global economy, but it won’t eliminate it. OPEC will still be a major force in determining the price and supply of oil, but it won’t have the near-monopoly it does today.
But that’s not the only factor. The so-called “Arab Spring” is not the simple romantic vision of emerging democracy that so many in the West thought it was, while they watched Egyptians oust Hosni Mubarak. It’s also not just the massive violence of Libya and Syria. Even in Tunisia and Egypt, transitions have been bumpy and marked with dissatisfaction and political jockeying as well as some very fundamental debates about the role of women, the military, religion and other key groups and institutions in their respective societies. Moves toward true independence and self-determination in these countries will be a long and unpredictable road. And no matter who ends up controlling the oil, they will have less leverage over the West than their predecessors with even more of a need to sell their oil there. So the strategic situation will be less favorable for the Arab governments that arise from this situation.
Not to mention the situation on the ground. Israel has elected a new government that has no interest in peace with the Palestinians. Settlement expansion continues while the Israeli bunker mentality is fortified. For their part, the Palestinians remain trapped between a Palestinian Authority which has lost virtually all legitimacy in the eyes of its people but is the only acceptable “partner” for the US and Israel, and a Hamas government that no one will talk to. Both sides of that divide seem as uninterested in reunification as Netanyahu is in a viable Palestinian state.
But then there’s the big mitigating factor, the US Israel Lobby. Obama has a lot of work to do in the next four years, and he needs Congress to do it. Much of that work focuses on domestic economic issues, but there are foreign policy questions as well. He simply cannot afford to spend the political capital of his second term fighting with AIPAC all the time. Nor do his colleagues in the Democratic Party wish to see him jeopardize their chances of making gains in the midterm elections by picking a fight with Israel.
But that domestic pressure is really all that is holding the US to Israel at this point. Powerful as AIPAC is, the President can still set broader policy priorities, as he seems to be. Asia will have its own difficulties, but the interests there are growing, while the US stake in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Yemen, and yes, even Israel and Palestine, are diminishing. To be sure, there is still a significant US stake in the Israel-Palestine conflict. And AIPAC will make sure we pay attention to it, as will the fact that Israel is a long-standing ally and while AIPAC may represent a small minority of US citizens, most do not want to see Israel as vulnerable to attack.
Ultimately though, Obama knows that the US has spent inordinate time and energy on this issue. He also knows that it’s becoming less and less vital for US concerns that really matter to him as time goes on. So, he goes to Israel, warms some hearts and minds and gives AIPAC the platitudes and assurances it wants. As Benn wrote, “With every passing day, Israel becomes less capable of taking out Iran’s nuclear facilities by itself, while its dependence on the United States for military superiority just keeps growing.” The US will continue to lead on Iran, which is something Obama wants.
As for the peace process? Obama would like to see Israel make peace possible, but absent that, he’s sent them a message: we’ll help if you want, but until you show some interest in changing the status quo, we have bigger fish to fry.
Photo: President Barack Obama waves to the audience after delivering remarks at the Jerusalem Convention Center in Jerusalem, March 21, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
]]>by Charles Naas
Not even a month in office, Secretary of State John Kerry took his first official trip to the troubled Middle East and immediately felt first-hand the pressures and metamorphosing power relationships in the region. He began his visit with a meeting in Rome with countries that provide assistance to [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
Not even a month in office, Secretary of State John Kerry took his first official trip to the troubled Middle East and immediately felt first-hand the pressures and metamorphosing power relationships in the region. He began his visit with a meeting in Rome with countries that provide assistance to the various resistance forces in Syria. He pledged $60 million in aid for civilian purposes — to be administered by the United Nations — to help the millions of refugees who have been uprooted by the conflict. The Syrian tragedy hung like a pall over the session and Kerry was berated by representatives of the militias for the size of the offer and the continued policy of not sending modern arms. Nevertheless, the US has now taken one more small step toward greater participation with the anti-Assad groups, something the Administration has maneuvered to avoid.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a prickly fellow at any time, was openly rude about a few minute wait for Kerry and took the opportunity to lambaste Israel and Zionism while knowing full well how Kerry would react. He continued to pressure the US to become more involved in the Syrian situation and stressed that Turkey has accepted thousand of refugees and has been struck by errant munitions in the fighting near the border. Was Erdogan’s rudeness of great importance? Not really, but symbolically, yes. Meanwhile in Saudi Arabia, the assault on the Secretary regarding Syria was also in full force.
In Egypt, a number of the leaders of the democratic-secular opposition parties refused to meet with Kerry — or at least to meet him without publicity — and some got together privately. Of great importance? Again, no, but of symbolic significance, yes. Kerry released some aid for Egypt that had been held up but lectured President Mohamed Morsi on some matters. Auntie US can’t seem to refrain from telling others how to run their country.
In Almaty, Kazakhstan last week the nuclear talks with Iran continued after a nine month recess. The P5+1 nations (the US, England, France, Russia, China and Germany) for the first time eased ever so slightly their previous proposal. It was relatively “well received” by Iran. Tehran is torn internally about its relationship — or the absence of one — with the US but has persevered undeterred by the threats of bombing and the economic sanctions. It’s likely that Iran is following the old Russian KGB tactic of good guy versus bad guy by having mid-level officials speak openly about the desire for an improvement of ties with the US, followed by intransigence in the talks, refusing to meet directly with the head of our delegation and speeches by conservative religious leaders filled with condemnation for the West. Thus, the importance of the “well received” aspect of all this will not be known until the next full meeting in April. The key question is: will Iran reply with some movement of its own, particularly about the buried uranium enrichment plant in Fordow, or “pocket” the proposal and remain obdurate. The Iranian decision could determine whether future talks continue.
Just how or why has this willingness to defy the US come about? Not long ago in the twilight of the Cold War the United States’ position in the Middle East seemed unassailable. We had “lost” Iran but the Soviets had been unable to bring peace and control to Afghanistan . For a couple of decades Musharraf in Pakistan, the Shah in Iran, Sadat and Mubarak in Egypt and various conservative monarchies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia as well as in neighbouring countries in the Persian Gulf stood with us in the struggle to dominate an area with much of the world’s petroleum,vast wealth potential and strategic positioning location wise. There were of course disputes among these nations over clear differences in perceived national interest, but we were able to adjust to such matters.
The changes we are witnessing now have thus been percolating for more than a decade.The end of the Cold War finally permitted the Middle East to reassess what was important to it. The Arabs, Persians and many ethnic and sectarian groups within these populaces have lived through the Ottoman, French and British Empires, as well as through the clash of the Soviet and American pseudo empires.
A number of powerful indigenous forces have accordingly had the opportunity to express themselves. First, there has been nationalism, historical pride and an insistence on mutual respect, which has been inextricably interwoven with religion. Over a billion people from Indonesia to Morocco are involved in one way or another in the search for what Islam means to them and the glory of its past. Who would have thought the Muslim Brotherhood would be governing Egypt prior to the Arab Spring, which sent shockwaves through the world? Pakistan is being destroyed by the fight over Islam’s true meaning. Second, there’s sheer exuberance over the fact that at last the populaces of these countries can govern themselves and make their own mistakes. Finally, a bi-product of all this has been the freedom to attend to old divisive factors such as religious schisms of Sunni versus Shi’a and ethnic differences.
President Obama seems to have recognized that old truisms that previously worked in the US’ favor no longer apply to America’s future relations with the Middle East. Early on he pledged to implement US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. His deep reluctance to get heavily involved in Libya and now in Syria also reflects his understanding of the complexity of these matters and his recognition of the weakness of our economy, the weariness of our military and his desire to pivot to the competition with China. Republican party leaders meanwhile object to any shift in US priorities and any hint that the golden days of American hegemony are over.
But in the Middle East and South Asia, political leaders are largely dedicated to their own problems and finding ways to resolve the serious issues that divide their populace and make governing onerous. They are sensitive to nagging and direction from outsiders. It is within this greatly changed political atmosphere that US diplomacy must operate. It will not be easy, particularly by a nation as seriously divided as our own — not to mention our unflinching support for Israel. But if ever there was a time for Obama to take on this daunting task, it’s during his final term as President.
Photo: Demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square on the morning of 27 November 2012. Credit: Lilian Wagdy.
]]>by Charles Naas
On the Washington Post’s front page February 2 there is a photo of Mrs. Clinton departing the State Department surrounded by admiring staff members with a big smile on her face. She already looks five years younger. And why not? The burden of the Secretary of State is [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
On the Washington Post’s front page February 2 there is a photo of Mrs. Clinton departing the State Department surrounded by admiring staff members with a big smile on her face. She already looks five years younger. And why not? The burden of the Secretary of State is exhausting, generally thankless and terribly complex; each day a new challenge arises or one that you hoped had been put on the back burner reappears. Secretary Kerry, may you age well.
Yet Secretary Kerry’s problems are enhanced by the continued absence of a consensus among prominent politicians on what the United States’ role in a vastly changing world should be. Some are desperately defending actions and policies of the Bush period, many others view “bipartisanship” as a dirty word or a call for surrender of their views and values. Others are locked into one issue, which prevents them from seeing larger schemes of interrelationships — and then we have our neo-isolationists. “Leading from behind” is an implicit recognition of the grave, perhaps insurmountable, problems we face abroad as well as on the Hill. Added to all this, despite President Obama’s sweeping electoral victory, some want to make sure that he fails in whatever he does to ensure that he will be the only black president.
During his first term, Obama tried to pivot US policy and recognize the increasing importance of China and its surrounding countries in East Asia, as well as address new tensions with Russia and the muscular Vladimir Putin who is enjoying his return to preeminence. But, no matter how much Kerry might like to spend more time on the these issues and respond to the urgings of important lobby groups on Africa, Latin America, or even Europe, the Middle East will intrude each day. I Promise. Let’s take a brief overview.
Recently, India and Pakistan were engaging in talks to see what could be done to reduce tensions and look to future relations, but, it seems that every time they get to that point — with US encouragement — something fouls the nest. This time firing across the line of control in Kashmir has been as usual followed by instant charges of blame and perfidy from politicians of both sides. However, even when local peace is regained, the tensions of 55 years and three wars and terrorist actions are almost certain to prevent significant cooperation. Both nations have extreme religious movements and each has substantial nuclear arms with multiple delivery systems. Afghanistan poses an area of special importance for both. Pakistan has posited that Afghanistan is its defense in the event of a war in which India’s superior-sized forces sweeped eastern Pakistan and nuclear war was to be avoided. Both countries are looking ahead to the American departure and trying in advance to out-influence the other. India has opened consulates in important Afghan cities, has increased trade, and offered considerable training and aid.
Afghanistan is looking ahead with both trepidation and hope. The rulers from the heights of Kabul realize that many Afghans are simply weary of the American presence, but are not yet ready to take on the Taliban and strong tribal raiding forces that span the border with Pakistan. Al Qaida may have remaining influence but much of that organization’s appeal has shifted to the Yemen and east and North Africa. Our deadline for ending combat presence is December 2014 but we have continuing huge responsibilities to retire, having done every task possible to give the Afghans a chance to survive as a unified nation with a degree of stability. Talks in Qatar to test possible political detente between the Taliban, Kabul and the US have apparently died on the vine. Iran has strong security and historical interests in whatever happens in western Afghanistan as do the former Soviet nations in the north.
What is there to say about us and Iran? The hostage taking 34 years ago and the victory of the conservative clerics in the post-Shah struggle for control, the chanting even today of Marg ba Amrica (“Death to America”) have left strong negative feelings about that country. From the Iranian point of view, the tenacious beliefs that the US was responsible for the Shah’s every action and that our policy aim is the overthrow of the regime and the institution of a “green” movement in power has made some degree of normality impossible. Israel’s expressed fear of Iran’s nuclear power program reverberates powerfully in a Congress that has imposed rigorous economic and financial sanctions. The so-called P5+1 negotiating team — the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany — is scheduled for another negotiation early in Kerry’s term to ascertain whether extended talks are possible to begin to resolve the great differences that divide us. Any success until after Iran’s elections later this year is highly unlikely and looking further into the future is probably beyond hope unless Israel lowers its concerns and even then Kerry would have to gain a Congressional consensus and untangle the sanctions. The threat of conflict hangs over us.
We will find out some time in the future whether our invasion of Iraq was a great military/political success or a serious strategic mistake. That question remains a very bitter one on the Hill as we have seen in the nasty and contentious interrogation of Chuck Hagel. It will remain a continuing sore between the Republicans and the Obama security team. We were lucky when the Iraqi government would not sign a Status of Forces Agreement with us that would have given American troops legal immunity. A continuing military presence would have made our non-involvement in the on-going Sunni-Shi’a conflict near impossible. As a result of Nouri al Maliki’s decision, we could with honor pull out our forces and let the Iraqis address their problems without us. However, the civil conflict flows over the Kurdish questions, control of petroleum seeps into Iranian Kurdistan, affects substantial Iranian trade, Iranian sympathy for the Shi’a government, and concern over travel to the key religious shrines.
No one is very sure what the US should be doing in Syria. The tens of thousands who are fighting the Assad regime are a collection of secular, democratically-inclined young people perhaps inspired by the Arab spring. Also very much engaged are extreme Salafis, remnants of al Qaida, Sunni fighters from all the neighboring Sunni countries intent on overthrowing Syria’s quasi-Shi’a government, thugs and just about every thing else. Kerry will be under increasing pressure from leading liberal, pro-Israel media, neo-con intellectuals and even a number in his own party “to do something”. Do what is proving to be argumentative and we are nowhere near domestic political agreement. The fighting could spread to Turkey, various Kurdish groups, Jordan and Israel
US and Israeli relations are about as intimate as two nations can have. Disagreements, sure, but usually cleared up quickly. We share ideals and convictions on the need for Israel to be superior militarily and certain of its regional security. The problem for Kerry and past Secretaries is that this very closeness affects one way or another every relationship in the region.
Finally, Egypt again. Tahrir Square is aflame, significant deaths are occurring, the army is probably warming the tanks, and questioning where their loyalties lie. A year or so ago, we were disturbed by the prospect of an elected Muslim Brotherhood, but wisely accepted the decision of the Egyptian people and tried to get along. Mohamed Morsi’s overreach for greater powers than the law permits reopened the fears of the large secular democratic parties and we are now in the middle of a counter reaction and the extensive use of force. We have depleted influence in the country but the importance of Egypt will make our efforts to calm matters inevitable.
So, good morning, Mr. Secretary, good luck and God speed. You assume office at a time that is described by historians as post-Cold War, or post-Colonial, or perhaps post-Ottoman or, simply, the next stage in continuing tension between West and East. Take your pick.
]]>