Well, now the deputy commander of U.S. operations in Iraq is telling [...]]]>
Well, now the deputy commander of U.S. operations in Iraq is telling us that Iranian influence appears to be waning and not scaling up, contrary to what Iran hawks would have you believe.
Then today, the New York Times reported on the early stages of a deal to end the impasse on forming a new Iraqi government. And — surprise! — the supposed agent of Iranian influence in process, the paradoxically nativist cleric Muqtada al Sadr, has an “unclear…role” in the formation of a coalition to run government. The hawks’ earlier consternation was based on Sadr’s residence in the Iranian holy city of Qom. Soon-to-be prime minister again Nouri al Maliki’s men visited Sadr there to try to gain the cleric’s support for the government.
But, first, the U.S. brass in Iraq, via AFP (with my emphasis):
A top US military officer said Monday that Iran’s influence has waned in neighboring Iraq, where prolonged negotiations have struggled to decide on a new government.
“Probably in the last couple months, in this period of government formation, I think that we think that the Iranian influence has diminished somewhat,” said Lieutenant General Robert Cone, the deputy commander of US operations in Iraq.
Cone gave a nuanced take on the role of Iran, which is a sworn foe of the United States but also strongly opposed Saddam Hussein’s regime.
“We see all sorts of Iranian influence — some of it positive, in fact,” Cone told reporters in Washington by video-link.
“We believe some of it (is) negative, although it’s very difficult to attribute that to the Iranian government,” he said, explaining that weapons heading across the border could come from non-government players.
So that’s that, for now at least, as it seems to always be in Iraq.
Then there’s the coalition wrangling. Remember there was much concern among Iran hawks that Sadr, a Shia anti-American firebrand who was forced into exile during the late stages of the civil war, became a person of interest when it appeared he might be playing kingmaker for the coalition. A bloc with his blessing was likely to be even more staunchly sectarian than his fellow Shia Maliki would be on his own.
But now the Times reports that, far from a clear kingmaker, Sadr’s role is “unclear”:
Also unclear is the role for the bloc led by the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr, whose surprise support for Mr. Maliki all but ensured the prime minister a second term. The broader alliance among parties and sects proposed by the United States was intended to minimize the influence of the Sadrists.
For the moment, it seems the new government will have the support of other sectarian and ethnic groups. The Kurds will retain their seat as president (which they were set to reluctantly do anyway, even with Sadr in the mix). And it appears that even the leader of Iraq’s most prominent Sunni bloc, Ayad Allawi, will have a place in government.
The Times again:
The deal late on Wednesday ensured, for now at least, the participation of Sunni Arabs, who supported the bloc led by Mr. Maliki’s chief rival, Ayad Allawi, which narrowly won the most seats in elections in March. The deal was struck when Mr. Allawi’s group relented and agreed to join the new government, said Jaber al-Jaberi, one of Mr. Allawi’s chief allies, despite months of adamantly insisting it would never do so.
In exchange, Mr. Allawi’s bloc, called Iraqiya, was given the position of speaker of the Parliament as well as leadership of a newly created committee overseeing national security, officials from three factions said. The creation of the committee was a compromise pushed by the Obama administration to ensure the participation of Sunnis, Iraq’s former rulers, who have been underrepresented in the Iraqi government since the American invasion.
So if the Iranians are, as hawks allege, trying to make a power play in Iraq using Sadr to ensure across-the-board Shia dominance, they seem to be doing an exceedingly poor job of it.
And that’s that, for now at least, as it always seems to be in Iraq.
]]>I e-mailed the TB‘s founder, Kelly Niknejad, and expressed my doubts. She was gracious enough to ask me to contribute a short piece on my concerns.
You can read the whole thing at TB, but here’s an excerpt:
Though some on the right and left here in the United States have made this accusation [Iran pulls strings], there is little concrete evidence to support it. And there are accordingly many skeptics out there, among them on the right Fouad Ajami and Max Boot, and, on the left, Michael Hanna, whose Atlantic piece on the subject I covered for LobeLog.
Several other theories — and that’s what this talk of a “secret deal” describes: theories (using unnamed and even unidentified sources) — put forth reasons for Sadr’s move. One is that Sadr, after being outside the government for so long, is interested in being able to leverage his significant street power (and parliamentary seats) to gain access to state coffers. This means folding some of his militia into security forces and other things like access to powerful cabinet positions and the like.
In fact, none of the explanations of Iranian pressure have, as of yet, given a rationale for Sadr abandoning his pronounced Iraqi nationalist streak and acquiescing to Iranian demands. One reason for cutting the deal, however, could indicate that this instinct rages on: the alternate coalition often proposed by the press — the Allawi block — is not truly viable and would likely be unable to form a stable coalition to govern. Perhaps Sadr saw his opportunity to play kingmaker as a way to end the impasse that has been dogging Iraq, which would allow the government to truly get on with state business.
[...] It’s all very convoluted, and concrete facts are few and far between.
As I say, I offer nothing but theories and conjecture in this argument, and would note that those who have sealed the deal on Iranian occupation of Iraq do much the same thing. I’m only making a case for a balanced presentation of information that does not portray conjecture and hole-filled reporting as fact.
Thanks to Niknejad and the staff of TB for letting me express my dissent.
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