Erbil—After a period of frostiness, Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Turkey seem intent on mending the ties, as each of the parties show signs of needing the other.
But the Kurds appear more cautious this time around, leery of moving too close to Ankara lest they alienate the new Iraqi government in Baghdad with which they signed a breakthrough oil deal Tuesday.
The agreement, which will give Baghdad greater control over oil produced in Kurdistan and Kurdish-occupied Kirkuk in exchange for the KRG’s receipt of a bigger share of the central government’s budget, may signal an effort to reduce Erbil’s heavy reliance on Turkey.
The warmth between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey was a rather strange affair to begin with. It emerged unexpectedly and evolved dramatically since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.
Whereas Turkey is a major player in the Middle East and Eurasia regions, Iraqi Kurdistan is not even an independent state. The imbalance of power between the two parties made their development of a “strategic” relationship particularly remarkable.
Given the deep historical animosity in Ankara towards all things Kurdish, the change of heart on its leaders’ part also seemed almost miraculous, even if highly lucrative to Turkish construction companies in particular.
But those ties suffered a major blow in August when the forces of the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) marched toward Kurdish-held territories in Iraq.
With IS threatening Kurdistan’s capital city, Erbil, Turkey did little to assist the Kurds. Many in Kurdistan and beyond were baffled; it was a case of “a friend in need is a friend indeed” gone wrong.
The overwhelming sense in Erbil was that Turkey had abandoned Iraqi Kurds in the middle of a life-and-death crisis. KRG President Masoud Barzani, Ankara’s closest ally, felt moved to publicly thank Iran, Turkey’s regional rival, for rushing arms and other supplies to Kurdish peshmerga fighters in their hour of need.
In their efforts to simultaneously develop an understanding and save face, some senior KRG officials defended Ankara, insisting that its hands were tied by the fact that more than 40 staff members in its consulate in the Iraqi city of Mosul, including the consul, had been taken hostage by IS. Other officials were more critical, slamming Ankara for not having acted decisively in KRG’s support.
The that the country was experiencing elections where the ambitious then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was running for the newly enhanced office of president was also invoked as a reason for his reluctance to enter into war with such a ruthless group.
It also appeared to observers here that Erdogan did not want to do anything that could strengthen his archenemy, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, even if that meant effectively siding with the Sunni jihadists.
But last month’s visit to Iraq by Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu appears to have helped repair the relationship with the Kurds in the north. Davutoglu turned on his personal charm to reassure his hosts, even visiting a mountainous area where Turkish special forces are now training members of the Kurdish peshmerga.
The question of how long it takes for the relationship to bounce back to the point where it was six months ago is anyone’s guess.
It’s clear, however, that despite the recent slide in relations, both sides need each other.
As a land-locked territory, Kurds will be looking for an alternative that they can use to counter pressure from the central Iraqi government.
Focused on laying the foundation for a high degree of economic and political autonomy—if not independence—from Baghdad, the Kurds’ strategic ambition is to be able to control and ideally sell their oil and gas to international clients. And geography also dictates that the most obvious and economically efficient route runs through Turkey, with or without Baghdad’s blessing.
As for Ankara, Iraqi Kurdistan is now its only friend in an otherwise hostile region.
Once upon a time, not long ago, politicians in Ankara boasted of the success of their “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy that had reshuffled regional politics and turned some of Turkey’s long-standing foes in the region, including Syria, into friends. But that era is now gone.
Ankara has come to see Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential major supplier of its own energy needs and has generally sided with the KRG in its disputes with Baghdad.
Kurdish leaders have been criticized for putting most of their eggs in Ankara’s basket.
The last time Kurds invested so much of their trust in a neighboring country was during the 1960s and 1970s when they were supported by the Shah of Iran who used them to exert pressure on Baghdad. This produced disastrous results when the Shah abruptly abandoned Kurds in return for territorial concessions by the Iraqi government in the Shatt al-Arab River separating southern Iran from Iraq.
Turkey’s indifference and passivity in August when all of Iraqi Kurdistan came under existential threat by the IS jihadists reminded many here of the consequences of placing too much trust in their neighbors. The hoary proverb that “Kurds have no friends but the mountains” suddenly regained its currency.
IS’s siege of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani—just one kilometre from the Turkish frontier—compounded that distrust, not only for Iraqi Kurds, but for Kurds throughout the region, including in Turkey itself.
Indeed, Turkey’s refusal to assist Kurdish fighters against IS’s brutal onslaught has made it harder for the KRG to initiate a reconciliation.
Although Ankara has now changed its position—under heavy US pressure—and is now permitting peshmerga forces to provide limited assistance and re-inforcements for Kobani’s defenders, the process of mending fences is still moving rather slowly.
While that process has now begun, it remains unclear how far both sides will go.
Will it be again a case of Ankara and Erbil jointly versus Baghdad, or will Erbil play the game differently this time, aiming for balance between the two capitals?
Indeed, the much-lauded oil deal struck Tuesday between Baghdad and the KRG may indicate a preference for the latter strategy, particularly in light of their mutual interest in both confronting the IS and compensating for losses in revenue resulting from the steep plunge in oil prices.
Still, given the history of deals sealed and then broken that have long characterized relations between the Kurds and Baghdad, nothing can be taken for granted.
Photo: KRG President Masoud Barzani at the official opening of the Erbil International Airport and Turkish Consulate in 2011. Credit: Official KRG Photo
Mohammed A. Salih is a journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. He has written for almost a decade about Kurdish and Iraqi affairs for local and international media.
]]>by Wayne White
Once again American observers are outbidding each other over how serious a threat the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) poses. Recent IS gains in Iraq heightened Washington’s concern, causing President Obama to huddle with coalition defense ministers. In this air of heightened crisis, the option of deploying US combat troops has been revived. Yet this supposed fix (even just talk of it) involves a host of likely problems.
The 19th Century politician, diplomat and writer Don Piatt once said, “A man’s greatness can be measured by his enemies.” If applied to the Islamic State, IS falls short in terms of the ground conflict. The radical Sunni group’s foes consist of the demoralized, ill-led Iraqi Army; Iraq’s sectarian, dysfunctional government; the better, but potentially shaky, Iraqi Kurds; the paltry forces of the rebel Free Syrian Army; and the fierce-fighting but under-armed and ill-supplied Syrian Kurds. Naturally, IS has scored successes against such weak opponents. But that does not make it the irresistible force portrayed by many.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has been virtually useless since replacing the discredited Nouri al-Maliki. Surrounded by much the same hyper-sectarian Shia politicians, Abadi has not made an earnest, good faith effort to weaken IS by wooing away many of its Sunni Arab tribal and military supporters. This is, by far, the most critical factor in Iraq on the ground. Far more pressure from the US and perhaps mediation by regional actors must be considered.
Without a Sunni Arab game change against IS, isolated western Iraqi garrisons in towns and bases have been falling. The al-Asad Airbase complex near the city of Hit may be next. Largely government-held Ramadi remains out of IS hands, but only because surrounding tribes oppose the group. And even with Baghdad at its back, the Iraqi Army’s performance has been marked by repeated failures.
Meanwhile, the Free Syrian Army has received little of the military support for which it has begged for three years. Plagued by inferior weaponry and ammunition shortages, and comprised of a welter of semi-autonomous local militias, it poses little danger to IS.
Though more determined and coherent than the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Kurdish fighters, the Peshmerga, typically advance behind heavy US air support or in relatively weakly held IS areas. Despite a few exceptions, they are generally reluctant to advance very far—and hold ground—much beyond their own borders.
Meanwhile, the US ignored heroic resistance by tougher Syrian Kurds until recently. They represent the only major contingent of highly motivated anti-ISIS boots on the ground. Probably in response to Turkish wishes, the US largely withheld air support for nearly two weeks.
Yet since declaring Kobani a humanitarian disaster on Oct. 14, the US has hammered IS positions at Kobani with waves of airstrikes, after strikes last week proved too few. Intelligence sharing between the US and the defenders of Kobani has made the strikes more effective. Had strikes this powerful been launched two weeks earlier, Kobani itself would not have become a battlefield.
Providing no military assistance whatsoever, Turkey has blocked thousands of Turkish Kurdish reinforcements from reaching Kobani. Fighters and doctors on the scene report numerous border closures and wounded combatants dying just inside Syria awaiting treatment in Turkey. Other fighters from Kobani have been arrested at the border, including some wounded.
Still, all around the Islamic State’s current holdings are countries with powerful militaries capable of dealing serious blows to IS regardless of the group’s fanaticism. Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, and Jordan to the south represent dangerous potential IS enemies if attacked. Just beyond Damascus and northwestern Jordan lies perhaps the most formidable local foe: Israel. Much of Iraq’s Shia south would become a graveyard for IS forces attempting to seize sizeable portions of this hostile area, in part because Iran would not let this area and Shia Islam’s holiest shrines fall.
The Anti-IS Front
Turkish cooperation with NATO against IS would vastly boost anti-IS operations. Air support could be based much closer to targets, Syrian and Iraqi Kurds could receive assistance, and the Islamic State’s smuggling of goods and recruits could be curbed. A Turkish volte-face might also salvage its peace process with the Kurds. Turkey has been holding its support hostage to demands such as coalition airstrikes against the Syrian regime. The coalition must keep pushing back; compliance would dissipate the air war against IS.
Other coalition partners, including NATO states like Germany, have also remained on the sidelines or provided little. This too needs to change to impose further pressure on IS.
If Kobani is an example of solid boots on the ground, Iraqi troops fighting west of Baghdad represent the opposite (despite heightened air support and attacks by US Apache helicopter gunships). In Kobani, Kurds have responded to strikes by attacking to clear IS fighters from some areas lost earlier. Heavier strikes near Baghdad barely shore up wavering defense lines.
Instead of responding to lackluster ground forces by boosting air strikes, it should be made clear that forces willing to fight hard to capitalize on air strikes will receive priority. Otherwise under-motivated forces may do even less, hoping air power would do their jobs for them—a losing proposition.
Is such a policy risky? Yes, but so is pouring in US combat troops in the numbers being discussed. Iraqi forces—with Baghdad at stake—must be forced by circumstance to stand their ground. And if densely populated Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad are threatened, they probably would.
Some have downplayed the impact of airstrikes against IS. They maintain strikes must be complimented by decent ground troops–correct where IS goes for more territory. However, a month of pounding undoubtedly has had an overall impact on IS even if that is not yet evident in some frontline fighting. The air campaign also is a long-term affair, with adjustments, mounting contributions, and accumulated impact. One plus is the Islamic State’s fanaticism, driving it to continue exposing its military assets to airstrikes along frontlines where heavy damage could be inflicted.
Committing US combat troops to battle around Baghdad would signal to Iraqi ground troops that they need not take most of the responsibility for the capital’s defense. Americans concerned that sending combat troops would escalate demand for more (“mission creep”) are correct. Reliance on US troops also would regenerate an unhealthy dependency.
More US advisors instead of line combat troops would be wiser, but competence is not the main problem; Iraqi soldiers must see they have no choice but to fight it out with IS. That goes beyond advice, and some advisors caught up in rapid, haphazard Iraqi retreats could be killed or captured by IS. Although advisors are also valuable in coordinating frontline aerial targeting, Americans would have to be prepared for losses. Some of those might well involve the ritual execution of captured US soldiers—perhaps the biggest risk involved in committing large forces.
]]>by Wayne White
Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate could be too much for quite a few of his Sunni Arab Iraqi allies to swallow. Yet, capitalizing on this surprising IS move will be exceedingly difficult as long as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to slow formation [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate could be too much for quite a few of his Sunni Arab Iraqi allies to swallow. Yet, capitalizing on this surprising IS move will be exceedingly difficult as long as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to slow formation of a new government by scrambling for ways to survive. Fortunately, IS most likely cannot seize much in the way of new territory, but the collective Iraqi political will and military heft needed to begin the daunting task of pushing IS back remains elusive.
Excessive IS Hubris
Naming al-Baghdadi “Caliph” of all Muslims by the newly branded IS at the beginning of Ramadan, a stunning act of hubris, probably expands the potential for driving wedges between IS and its Sunni Arab fellow travelers. The militant Sunni Arab Association of Muslim Scholars already has announced that IS “did not consult” with its “allies” or “their leaders,” and an “oath of allegiance” demanded by IS is “not binding on anyone.” In Mosul, evidently regarded by IS as mostly its own exclusive conquest (not ruled in cooperation with powerful allies), IS reportedly has asked those scattered allies on the scene to turn in their arms, another likely source of resistance and pushback.
Whether Sunni Arabs angry over Maliki’s abuses can be peeled away from IS is not the only matter relevant to the announcement of a Caliphate (doubtless considered blasphemous by many Muslims, Sunni and Shi’a). The IS declaration does nothing to alter military realities on the ground: although Baghdad’s efforts to wrest a few places like Tikrit from IS have been frustrated, IS itself also largely has been stalled.
Military Frustration in Baghdad
With politics weighing heavily on Maliki’s mind, his civilian and military leaders selected mainly for loyalty (not professionalism), and amidst endemic governmental dysfunction, Maliki’s ability to oversee a military rebound is iffy. Worse still, Maliki himself is a politician without any particular feel for military matters (despite retaining the defense ministry portfolio).
So far, his forces fighting in Tikrit and ringing Baghdad appear to be a hodge-podge of army units and Shi’a militiamen (many of the latter who took up arms against Sunni Arabs, U.S. troops and Iraqi authorities in 2004-2008). West of Baghdad, a sizeable contingent of veteran Shi’a volunteers who fought alongside regime forces in the Syrian civil war have been deployed, perhaps the strongest element overall. Without far greater air and heavy-weapons support, these forces are best suited to defense, as opposed to driving back IS fanatics occupying positions that are well dug in.
According to US officials, there are a number of militant Sunni Arab “sleeper cells” in Baghdad awaiting a call to arms. Yet, with the vast majority of the capital now Shi’a, attacks by Sunni Arab combatants would trigger Shi’a violence against the city’s greatly outnumbered Sunni Arab population. One or two Sunni Arab neighborhoods might fall under militant control, and acts of violence could be widespread for a while. However, the bulk of Baghdad would remain in government hands. Sadly, an outbreak of such bloodshed ultimately could result in another wave of sectarian cleansing, replete with atrocities, further reducing Baghdad’s dwindling Sunni Arab population.
Parliamentary Stand-off and Maliki’s Deception
Iraqi leaders cannot exploit opportunities to reach out to Sunni Arab tribes, former military officers, etc. without a new government. And should Maliki lead that new government, its ability to divide its enemies would be crippled.
The Shi’a National Alliance parliamentary bloc (dominated by Maliki’s State of Law coalition) failed to select Maliki or an alternative to Maliki prior to parliament’s July 1 session. Consequently, all Kurdish and Sunni Arab members left after a break in the proceedings (joined by a few Shi’a independents).
In a televised speech the next day, Maliki expressed hope that Iraq’s travails could be overcome through “openness” and “democratic mechanisms” (both of which Maliki has undermined as prime minister). He also lamely offered amnesty to tribes currently siding with IS — a promise of the kind to which he personally turned his back in the wake of the Sunni Arab “Awakening.” In any case, most disaffected Sunni Arabs do not want amnesty: they want comprehensive change in Baghdad’s exclusionary policies toward them.
There is a desire among some in State of Law to dump Maliki. Likewise, a shift away from Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s demands for a swifter decision on a new and inclusive government is unlikely (although Sistani may use tomorrow’s Friday prayers to clarify his position). Hopefully, despite Maliki’s machinations, he will soon be history.
US Military Reaction: Mission Creep
As some observers predicted, the Obama Administration’s initial deployment has been followed by more “boots on the ground.” Clearly alarmed by Iraqi governmental gridlock, several hundred more American troops have been sent to Baghdad to bolster the defense of the US Embassy in various ways.
The fumbling performance of the Iraqi military as it struggles to rebound also probably spurred this decision. There are, of course, risks. The more American troops inserted into an Iraq in crisis (particularly in varied locations, such as the placement of some US troops at Baghdad International Airport) increases their vulnerability. The likelihood of casualties somewhere down the road is rising ominously with each successive deployment.
Waiting for That Other Shoe to Drop
The military situation could fall into a pattern of heavy skirmishing roughly along the present front lines while the Baghdad political mill grinds on. Without greater incentives to defect, most Sunni Arab tribes, ex-officers, Ba’this, and others fed up with Baghdad are not likely to abandon IS — at least for now. Thus, the composition of Iraq’s next government will define the road ahead, making this year’s post-election jousting far more important than any in the past.
Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, a State Department translator, and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad, June 23, 2014. Credit: State Department photo/ Public Domain
]]>Song: “Stranger in Moscow” by the late and great, Michael Jackson
Julian Borger, Laura Rozen and Scott Peterson report on the “wide gap” and the “nitty gritty” details of the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of [...]]]>
Song: “Stranger in Moscow” by the late and great, Michael Jackson
Julian Borger, Laura Rozen and Scott Peterson report on the “wide gap” and the “nitty gritty” details of the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) in Moscow. Long story short: Iran is arguing that the West–though primarily the U.S. egged on by the “Zionist regime” and a like-minded Congress–are asking for too much while offering too little. The Iranians are accordingly at least posturing like they won’t move on a major point of interest unless something gives. (Recall that prior to the disappointment of Baghdad, Iran indicated that it could budge on 20% enrichment and offer increased and “permanent” monitoring of their nuclear program in return for real incentives.) Iranian hyperbolic paranoia notwithstanding, when it comes to Congress, Tehran’s argument is hard to deny. For its part the West seems unwilling to go big as some have suggested or reconsider its recent offering which was received by the Iranians like a bunch of sticks and a half-eaten, moldy carrot. While the lack of real progress gives the usual suspects reason to be gleeful since the prospect of a military confrontation will seem more likely, people with real-world policy expertise remind us that diplomacy is a marathon, not a sprint.
Meanwhile Jonathan Bernstein injects some sense into the opinion pages of the Washington Post regarding Mitt Romney’s latest ridiculisums on Iran, Kenneth Waltz pens a taboo opinion on Iran nuclear weapons, the U.S. continues its dangerous bargaining game with the terrorist-designated Mujahideen-e-khalq (MEK), and George Perkovich explains why “A Nuclear Deal Helps Human Rights in Iran“.
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Last month in a barely noticed op-ed prominent voices Lee H. Hamilton, Gary Hart and Matthew Hodes strongly recommended focusing on “shared interests” and the “broader issues” that have marred U.S.-Iran relations since the Iranian revolution during renewed talks with Tehran. They reference missed windows of opportunity and expert analysis that we’ve highlighted here before from diplomatic cold war veterans Thomas Pickering and William Luers and the national security-focused Stimson Center before concluding that hawkish rhetoric should be resisted in favor of serious diplomacy:
As we approach the next round of negotiations, we must beware of extreme voices that will want to limit the conversation to an expansion of threats — a structure of confrontation or capitulation. Bellicose words can box us in just as they can box in the Iranians, making a military confrontation more likely. We would be better served by quiet, frank discussions about our respective interests and our potentially shared interests. We should never forget that during the Cold War, we faced an adversary that was equipped and prepared to destroy us and our allies. But while we never let our guard down, we nevertheless looked for opportunities to cooperate. Eventually, we found areas of mutual interest that helped build confidence in our ability to manage that complicated relationship. That policy worked for us during the Cold War; it should work for us with a regional actor today.
The authors’ bottom line is that any deal will require moving beyond the confines of the nuclear issue and working to realign Iran’s behavior and relationship with the international community without increasing the probability of military confrontation. Their words are all the more weighty because of their impressive credentials. Rep. Hamilton represented Indiana for 34 years and was the ranking Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He previously headed the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, co-chaired the Iraq Study Group Report and was the vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission. Sen. Hart was the former frontrunner for the Democratic nomination in 1988 and has been heavily involved in national security consulting since leaving politics. For his part, international relations expert Matthew Hodes is the Executive Director of the bipartisan Partnership for a Secure America where Hamilton and Hart are advisory board members. (Interestingly, an IPS News investigation revealed that Hamilton had been paid a “substantial amount” in 2011 to appear at panel for the U.S.-terrorist designated Mujahideen-e-khalq (MEK). Hamilton told reporter Barbara Slavin that he was not aware of the group’s true nature at the time.)
Their article’s title, “Enlarging the Frame”, sums up what some analysts are arguing needs to be done as expectations for the next round of talks flip flop between periods of optimism and pessimism almost daily based on each and every development that is reported. Writes Lobe Log’s own Peter Jenkins who previously served as the United Kingdom’s former permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA):
]]>US frustration over Iranian refusal to meet bilaterally is understandable. But Iran’s position is not incomprehensible. The Supreme Leader has made very clear that he has no confidence in the US. “[Americans] break their promises very easily. they feel no shame…they simply utter lies.” The trust deficit is not one-sided. Mutual confidence-building is required.
Surely the right call at this point is not to tear up the script and start afresh, but to try to come up with a better package of incentives and to set up a mechanism that permits intensive negotiation?
It’s unclear what “a broader proposal” would look like but the implication that it would be “accompanied by a military threat” is cause for foreboding. How much time has to pass before some in [...]]]>
It’s unclear what “a broader proposal” would look like but the implication that it would be “accompanied by a military threat” is cause for foreboding. How much time has to pass before some in the West understand that sticks don’t work with Iranians, who are not donkeys. Our Western addiction to coercion reminds me of what Talleyrand said about the Bourbons after the Restoration: “They learnt nothing and they forgot nothing”. In any case isn’t it a little early to be “doubting the viability of an incremental deal” and changing track? It’s only two months since the United States agreed, in Istanbul, to a “step-by-step” negotiation based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the principle of reciprocity. Does the US so easily go back on its word? God help the rest of the world, if so.
Some of us are not surprised that the Baghdad offer was unattractive to Iran. It would not have attracted us had we been representing Iran. Instead of offering some of the sanctions relief of which Iran is in sore need, the West offered no additional sanctions–and this in return for one of Iran’s strongest negotiating assets: the 20% enrichment activity at Fordow. It was rather like a mugger saying to a victim:” Hand over your wallet and I promise to stop kicking you.”
Incidentally, the “reversibility” of a freeze at Fordow would be no greater than the “reversibility” of a Western promise to abstain from further sanctions, or even to freeze the implementation of sanctions not yet in force.
US frustration over Iranian refusal to meet bilaterally is understandable. But Iran’s position is not incomprehensible. The Supreme Leader has made very clear that he has no confidence in the US. “[Americans] break their promises very easily. they feel no shame…they simply utter lies.” The trust deficit is not one-sided. Mutual confidence-building is required.
Surely the right call at this point is not to tear up the script and start afresh, but to try to come up with a better package of incentives and to set up a mechanism that permits intensive negotiation?
And wouldn’t it be sensible to turn a deaf ear to Israel? Israeli Ministers have made clear that they do not want this negotiation to succeed, because they know that a condition for success is recognition of Iran’s rights under the NPT (a treaty to which Israel has not seen fit to become a party). Israel’s refusal to join the NPT as a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State has created a big political problem for all in the West who regard the NPT as a more effective bulwark against nuclear proliferation than all the tricky wheezes of the “counter-proliferation” gang, and ought to vitiate Israel’s moral right to pronounce on nuclear non-proliferation issues.
]]>It’s almost as if Mitt Romney adviser John Bolton is rooting for a war with Iran. That’s sure what it seems like when the hawkish former U.N. ambassador cheers the lack of concrete progress in diplomatic talks with Iran over its nuke program, and then goes on to fear-monger about [...]]]>
It’s almost as if Mitt Romney adviser John Bolton is rooting for a war with Iran. That’s sure what it seems like when the hawkish former U.N. ambassador cheers the lack of concrete progress in diplomatic talks with Iran over its nuke program, and then goes on to fear-monger about Iranian advances. And that’s exactly what Bolton did in a new Washington Times op-ed.
First, Bolton started off by expressing his relief that the last round of talks in Baghdad between Iran and the West yielded no breakthroughs:
Fortunately, however, the recently concluded Baghdad talks between Iran and the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany (P-5+1) produced no substantive agreement.
War isn’t the only alternative to immediate success in the diplomatic negotiations in Baghdad (indeed, there’ll be another round of talks for later this month in Moscow), but Bolton’s record indicates that’s clearly what he’s aiming for. Since at least 2008, Bolton has been calling for the U.S. to support an Israeli attack on Iran — even suggesting a nuclear attack. He’s also called for a U.S. attack, and any old excuse will do. (Mubarak falls in Egypt? Bomb Iran.) Bombing is, as Media Matters put it, his “default setting” — even though he acknowledges it might not work.
It’s no surprise, then, that Bolton turned to some baseless fear-mongering on the Iranian nuclear program. U.S., Israeli, and U.N. estimates all reportedly indicate that Iran has not made a decision to build a nuclear weapon. But Bolton, at every turn, asserts that objective without evidence. In the Washington Times, he cited the latest International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran’s program:
The most eye-catching item was evidence from the deeply buried Fordow facility of U-235 enrichment up to 27 percent, which Iran quickly dismissed as a technical glitch. Alternatively, of course, Iran could have been experimenting to find the most efficacious path to weapons-grade U-235 levels.
Iran wasn’t the only one to dismiss this as a “technical glitch.” The AP, which published the initial report on the traces of uranium enriched to 27 percent purity, cited the “diplomats who had told the AP of the existence of the traces before publication of the confidential report” as saying that “the higher-enriched material could have been a mishap involving centrifuges over-performing as technicians adjusted their output rather than a dangerous step toward building a bomb.” And the New York Times reported that U.S. officials and nuclear experts shared this view:
“It’s definitely embarrassing but not nefarious,” David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington research group that tracks the Iranian nuclear program, said in an interview.
A senior Obama administration official agreed that “the most likely explanation” for the discovery was technical.
Don’t count on Bolton, though, to explain those perspectives to his readers. Doing so wouldn’t bolster his long-standing calls for war. And don’t count on him for airing any of the possible negative consequences of war either (in line with the Romney campaign’s modus operandi), not least of which that an attack may spur Iran to actually build a bomb.
Those consequences and the intelligence estimates are the reasons the Obama administration, despite its view that a potential Iranian nuclear weapon would constitute a threat to the U.S., its allies and the non-proliferation regime, pursues its dual-track of pressure and diplomatic engagement. And that’s why the administration, instead of cheering for diplomacy to fail like Bolton, considers a negotiated diplomatic solution to be the “best and most permanent way” to end the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program.
Bolton has made it clear that he’s rooting for American diplomacy to fail and has repeatedly called for a rush to war with Iran. Gov. Romney needs to be clear with the American people: Does he believe there’s still time for diplomacy to work? Or is he ready to take us to war, like his advisor John Bolton is advocating? …If Gov. Romney shares his advisor John Bolton’s views that it is time for the US to go to war with Iran, the American people deserve to know.
Weekly Reads/Watch:
- News: U.S. Neo-Conservatives Assail Possible Compromise on Iran Talks[...]]]>
Weekly Reads/Watch:
- - News: U.S. Neo-Conservatives Assail Possible Compromise on Iran Talks
- News: Nuclear talks with Iran set to resume next month
- News: Hopes fade for progress at Iran nuclear talks in Baghdad
- News: Iran nuclear talks a ‘complete failure,’ says Iranian diplomat
- News: U.S. Hard Line in Failed Iran Talks Driven by Israel
- Opinion: The Iranian view on how to strike a deal
- Opinion: Undercutting negotiations hurts the U.S.
- Opinion: The Baghdad Talks and the Politics of Inflexibility
- Opinion: Iran Nuclear Talks Post-Mortem: Time to Cash in Some Sanctions
- Opinion: The Politics of Dignity: Why Nuclear Negotiations With Iran Keep Failing
- Opinion: The Nixon Option for Iran?
- Opinion: Are We Focusing on the Wrong Nuclear Threat?
- Watch: Iranian Nuclear Talks: Are Expectations Seriously Mismatched?
- Watch: Iranian insider: ‘Don’t ask for diamonds in return for peanuts’
Jamie Fly and Matthew Kroenig, Washington Post: In January academic Matthew Kroenig, who served for one year as a strategic analyst in the office of the secretary of defense, claimed that the U.S. could militarily strike Iran without causing havoc and catastrophe in the region. His arguments were widely criticized and supported by the usual suspects. The executive director of the neoconservative Foreign Policy Initiative, Jamie M. Fly, was one hawk who disagreed with Kroenig, but only because Kroenig did not go far enough. This week the two penned an op-ed where they claimed that President Obama has offered Iran too many carrots. This was just days before the talks almost collapsed after the only “relief” the P5+1 offered was spare parts for Iranian aircraft that have suffered tremendously from sanctions. What do Fly and Kroenig think will help the negotiation process? More military threats:
Success in the Baghdad talks would mean starting a process that would halt Iran’s program rather than just buy more time for Tehran. To do so, the United States must not only lay out the curbs on Iran’s nuclear program that Washington would be willing to reward, but also clearly outline what advances in Iran’s nuclear program it would be compelled to punish with military force. This is the only way to prove to the Iranians that, as Obama has said, the window is indeed closing.
Foreign policy analyst and president of the National Iranian American Council Trita Parsi responds:
The op-ed represents neo-conservatism 2.0. There are no longer open calls for invasion or military action a la Iraq. Kroenig and Fly even write that “No one wants military action.” Instead, they try to eliminate all other options by complaining that diplomacy has enabled Iran to buy time (as if Iran only has managed to advance its program amid talks, but been forced to halt it under sanctions and military threats), by bemoaning the UN Security Council’s slowness in handling Iran (as if the unilateral approach of the Bush administration was more effective), and by setting the bar for diplomacy at an impossible level in order to ensure its failure.
…
Yet, it is exactly this brinkmanship that has enabled the Iranian nuclear advances that the authors lament. In this game of pressure and counter pressure, the West has amassed economic sanctions on Iran (ostensibly to change Iran’s nuclear calculus) and Tehran has pressured back by expanding its nuclear program (ostensibly to present the West with a fait accompli). Diplomacy, in its most classic sense, has been tried very infrequently, and, consequently, no exit from this self-reinforcing cycle of escalation has been found.
Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post: The Post’s blogger who thinks the U.S. should go to war with Iran on Israel’s behalf asks when the U.S. is going to bomb Iran already!
Isn’t it time to stop the charade, call the administration’s approach what it is — a failure — and put the question squarely to the administration: Is it prepared now to use all options to stop Iran’s nuclear program or are we imply slow-walking toward acceptance and “containment” of a nuclear-armed Iran?
Jennifer Rubin/Mark Dubowitz, Washington Post: Rubin seeks the advice of the executive director of the ultra-hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies Mark Dubowitz (who says the goal of the U.S. with Iran should be regime change) on Iran. Here’s why:
Between now and the next meeting, he recommends some spine stiffeners: “Now is the time to get the new Iran sanctions legislation into conference committee, strengthen it in some fundamental ways and get it passed. That’s the right message to the Iranians and those whose negotiating strategy is to cave at the first sign of Iranian brinksmanship.” Dubowitz urges the administration to support sanctions “that blacklist the entire energy industry as a zone of proliferation concern, shut down the use of energy companies like Naftiran Intertrade and all other Iranian energy entities used as Central Bank of Iran workarounds to settle oil trades, impose a comprehensive insurance embargo on the underwriting of any sanctionable activity, designate the National Iranian Oil Company, its scores of subsidiaries, and NITC (Iran’s tanker fleet), enforce a comprehensive embargo on the imports of all goods and services for Iran’s broader commercial sector except for food and medicine, and enforce the establishment of both Europe and the United States as Iranian oil-free zones.”
But given what we have seen so far, it is quite possible, even if sanctions pass, that the Iranians are unmoved. (Given how silly the U.S. negotiators sound, you’d understand if the Iranians were not quaking in their boots.) What then? Dubowitz is blunt: “Congress should then declare on a bipartisan basis that, despite the best efforts of the administration, all sanctions and diplomatic measures are exhausted. It then should require President Obama to follow through on his commitment to use other, more coercive instruments of American power to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program.”
Charles Krauthammer, Fox News: Neoconservative hawk Charles Krauthammer declares on national television that the Obama administration should have armed the Green Movement and conducted covert operations in Iran in 2009 to help bring about regime change:
]]>O’REILLY: But what else could he have done except rhetoric?
KRAUTHAMMER: Weaponry — he could have done a lot of things. Rhetoric is one thing and not to support the legitimacy of the regime. Clandestine operations. Why do we have $50 billion in secret operations in the CIA if not for an opportunity like this? He was hands off. He did nothing and we lost one of the great opportunities in history.
Two days of talks between Iran and six world powers have ended in Baghdad without any concrete agreement, except to meet again next month in [...]]]>
]]>Two days of talks between Iran and six world powers have ended in Baghdad without any concrete agreement, except to meet again next month in Moscow.
At the heart of the talks is an attempt by the US and other world powers to persuade Iran to accept immediate restrictions on its nuclear programme.
The US believes the Iranians want to build atomic weapons. But Tehran denies this and says its nuclear reactors will be used only for energy and research purposes. Iran was previously enriching uranium up to 3.5 per cent, and only started enriching to 20 per cent in 2009.
After the talks concluded, Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief, said: “We expect Iran to take practical steps to urgently meet the concerns of the international community, to build confidence and to meet its international obligations.”Known as the P5 + 1 group, the powers negotiating with Iran include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – the US, Britain, Russia, China, France - plus Germany. They want Iran to stop enriching uranium to a concentration of 20 per cent. They say at that level it is easy to enrich the uranium further to develop weapons grade material.
Meanwhile, the Iranians went into the negotiations seeking an easing of crippling economic sanctions that have primarily targetted its oil exports.
Hans Blix was the former chief weapons inspector for the UN’s nuclear watchdog in the run up to the US-led invasion of Iraq. Among other things, he told Al Jazeera: “It would be in Israel’s interest to avoid that there will be any enrichment plants anywhere in the Middle East … the question will be for the Israelis are they willing to sacrifice their own nuclear weapons, which they have regarded as a life insurance, but in return getting a well-verified zone free all sorts of fuel-cycle activities like enrichment and re-processing? I think the whole Middle East would benefit from that.”
Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator had a rare “chat” with the head of the US delegation after talks between Tehran and world powers over the Islamic republic’s nuclear programme Thursday, officials said.
The “brief encounter” came after Iran rebuffed [...]]]>
Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator had a rare “chat” with the head of the US delegation after talks between Tehran and world powers over the Islamic republic’s nuclear programme Thursday, officials said.
The “brief encounter” came after Iran rebuffed a US offer of face-to-face discussions between Wendy Sherman and her counterpart Saeed Jalili at the last talks between Iran and world powers in Istanbul last month.
“Jalili paused to chat with Sherman as they were leaving one of the plenaries,” a US official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Why is this so threatening to Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) that she actually tried to make it illegal? (Read Ali’s report from November here.)
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