by Wayne White
The remorseless death toll and Assad regime gains in Syria have generated intense criticism in Washington of US policy toward the country. Other observers have also taken up this meme, often claiming the regime would have fallen long ago had the US and West intervened militarily or even just [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The remorseless death toll and Assad regime gains in Syria have generated intense criticism in Washington of US policy toward the country. Other observers have also taken up this meme, often claiming the regime would have fallen long ago had the US and West intervened militarily or even just armed the Syrian rebels. Robust US/NATO military action may well have overthrown the regime, but too many recent critics have forgotten the political obstacles (and flawed assumptions) that undermined such choices during the war’s first 18 months. And now, despite widespread appeals, a substantial improvement in humanitarian aid and a political solution are also elusive, at least in the near-term.
Humanitarian crisis
The situation in Syria is appalling and “extremely challenging,” said UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on March 26, almost one month after a UN Security Council resolution called for swift and unlimited humanitarian access to Syrians in need. But the regime demands “convoluted” ministerial approvals for aid deliveries, most of which are not honored by low-level officials on the scene. Among the many millions of desperate Syrians still inside the country, rebels are to blame for besieging some, but the government is blockading over triple that number.
The large northern city of Aleppo seems to be bearing the brunt of the regime’s indiscriminate wrath against civilians. Human Rights Watch reported on March 24 that satellite imagery suggested no fewer than 340 massive government “barrel bombs” were dropped on rebel-held areas of Aleppo between early November 2013 and late February.
A March 26 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing involving senior State Department officials accordingly featured blistering bi-partisan criticism of US policy toward Syria. The administration’s failure to do more to address the crisis was characterized as “delusional” by senior committee Republican Senator Bob Corker, accusing the White House of having “sat by and watched genocide taking place.”
However, consider the Congressional reaction to the prospect of robust US military involvement in NATO’s Libyan no-fly zone and interdiction campaign back in 2011. That intensely negative reaction set the tone for what the administration thought possible regarding Syria during the most critical early phase in the opposition effort against the regime.
Libyan precedent
On June 3, 2011 a House of Representatives resolution offered by Speaker John Boehner called upon the administration to withdraw US forces from all NATO operations over and around Libya — a far less demanding and financially taxing task than taking on Syria’s formidable military. Ten days later, another House resolution prohibited the use of any funds for Libyan operations. Both resolutions passed with over 130 Republican and 110 Democratic votes. Later that month, a Senate resolution sponsored by Senator Bob Corker required formal congressional approval for any further US participation in the Libya mission.
This was not surprising at the time, with highly politicized budgetary issues at the forefront of the American domestic debate. Additionally, the US was withdrawing from Iraq, and the notion of major new military commitments was highly unpopular within both parties on Capitol Hill as well as the electorate. There was also resistance among the Pentagon’s military brass for a new undertaking involving a prolonged military effort. So, for well over 2 years in official Washington those favoring bold US involvement in Syria, like Senator John McCain, remained fairly isolated voices.
Advantage regime
Meanwhile, a series of regime reverses from 2011 to early 2012 convinced many observers that Assad was losing his struggle to survive. A decent body of opinion back then judged the rebels capable of bringing down the regime themselves in the not too distant future.
Yet, the fundamental drivers determining why the rebels have not prevailed or attracted large-scale US and Western arms shipments revolve around the rebels themselves.
First and foremost has been a problem I underscored in October 2012: “major Syrian army units have not chosen to defect en masse.” Clearly, not only Syria’s terrified Alawite and Christian minorities, but also a substantial minority of Syria’s Sunni Arab community have remained loyal to the regime. This has given Damascus a sufficient base from which to rebound militarily as well as to regain the initiative. In fact, Bashar al-Assad recently felt confident enough to make a few public appearances to kick-off his bid for re-election this summer.
Another serious drawback has been a lack of opposition unity in the exile leadership, rebel combatant groups in the field, or between the two. The exile leadership has been in constant turmoil, and the rebels inside Syria are comprised of hundreds of localized units frequently not cooperating — or aligned — with each other. In recent months, heavy fighting between secular and more moderate Islamist rebels on the one hand and extremist combatants on the other has sapped rebel strength — a gift to the regime.
Most crippling with respect to lethal Western assistance, however, was the rapid rise of al-Qaeda linked or inspired extremist rebel groups beginning in December 2011. These elements in the first half of 2012 quickly rose to prominence as the most formidable anti-regime combatants. Their dangerous militancy and atrocities against regime prisoners (as well as Syrian civilians) severely jolted the West. The fear of arms falling into their hands steered US and Western suppliers away from providing the rebels with the arms needed to stand up to the well-equipped Syrian military.
According to one report, while in Riyadh late last week President Barack Obama agreed to consider providing — or authorizing the Saudis to provide — surface-to-air missiles to moderate rebels. The White House has mulled over arming such rebels since mid-2012, but backed off repeatedly (because of the presence of rebel extremists).
Another blow to the Syrian opposition stems from a rift developing within the Arab League (previously united behind the rebels). A bitter feud between Qatar on the one hand and mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other has been highly disruptive. Consumed by their own feuding and stung by rebel defeats and disunity, the most active pro-rebel Arab governments have finally fallen out completely over which rebels to arm. In fact, for the first time since the Syrian rebellion, several Arab countries backing Syria capitalized on all this to block the Syrian opposition’s seating at the conclave as representing Syria.
All the while, one damaging constant has been in play: Moscow has been serving its own narrow interests by providing a lifeline of arms, munitions, and military spares to the Syrian regime. Russia only joined the effort to remove Syria’s chemical weapons (CW) arsenal to head off US military action and buy time so the international community would ultimately be dependent on a coherent Syrian government to turn the weapons over.
Another compelling concern driving Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to cooperate was to eliminate the possibility of CW being seized by rebel jihadists. There are some Chechen fighters among Syrian extremist combatants; one commanded the militant force that seized a Syrian airfield last year. The thought of Chechen jihadis smuggling Syrian CW into Russian territory is a Kremlin nightmare.
Similarly, Iran has remained steadfast in its support for its Syrian ally. Not only does Tehran continue to send munitions, Revolutionary Guard trainers and advisors, but it also helped arrange for thousands of Hezbollah militiamen to join the Assad regime’s struggle against the rebels, bolstering Syrian army infantry units decimated by combat attrition.
Meanwhile, prospects for peace in the last round of Geneva talks were nil, with the regime flushed with battlefield success, an exile opposition not fully representative of rebel fighters inside Syria, and rebel strength sapped by intense in-fighting.
Aid as a weapon
There was, nonetheless, some hope at the beginning of the December 2013 Geneva conclave related to one goal: a breakthrough on humanitarian assistance. The Assad regime knows, however, that in a fight to the finish (as this war has become), humanitarian supplies — especially food and medicine — are vital assets best denied to one’s opponents. So, as in 20th Century “world wars” replete with blockades and submarine interdiction to isolate, starve and otherwise weaken enemies, Damascus is blocking humanitarian aid to break the will and staying power of the rebels and the populations sustaining them.
As a result, much like a political settlement to end the carnage, getting humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable of the conflict’s victims inside the country will remain a daunting challenge. In the face of these grim realities, it likewise will continue to be exceedingly difficult for Washington or Western European capitals to fashion Syria policies with much hope of success.
Photo: President Barack Obama meets with Members of Congress to discuss Syria, in the Cabinet Room of the White House, Sept. 3, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
For three years, the Syrian civil war has continued unabated; and for three years, the so-called “international community” has achieved almost nothing — other than to head off the war’s escalation over the use of chemical weapons following President Barack Obama’s ill-considered drawing of a so-called red line [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
For three years, the Syrian civil war has continued unabated; and for three years, the so-called “international community” has achieved almost nothing — other than to head off the war’s escalation over the use of chemical weapons following President Barack Obama’s ill-considered drawing of a so-called red line against such use.
Another try begins tomorrow in Geneva. But this meeting, dubbed “Geneva II” in reference to the last attempt in 2012, is already star-crossed. Late last week UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon invited Iran to take part. This was a reasonable, indeed necessary step, given that Iran is deeply engaged in all the relevant issues and could well be in a position to scotch any agreement.
Then, yesterday, the Secretary General rescinded the invitation. The reason — or pretext — for doing so? That Iran was unwilling to accept a key component of Geneva I: in effect providing for the departure from power of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. The actual formulation: “The establishment of a transitional governing body which would exercise full executive powers.” In the interpretation by Assad’s opponents, that means he has to go. That transitional body “…could include members of the present government…,” but it would be “…formed on the basis of mutual consent,” which of course would not be granted to President Assad. (This is the full text of the June 30, 2012 “Action Group for Syria Final Communique.”)
Reportedly, pressure on the Secretary General to rescind his invitation came principally from the US and the UK. If Iran would be in Geneva, the opposition would not: ergo, no negotiations. Of course, this begs the question of cui bono: who potentially has most to gain from the talks? Since the opposition has not been winning on the ground, this was a bluff that might have been called.
But the Obama administration had to consider a further factor: parallel negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. These are already fraught with difficulties, notably, the opposition to the interim agreement by Israel, Persian Gulf oil states, and many members of the US Congress. The timing of the Geneva fracas was also important: yesterday, both Iran and its interlocutors began to implement the Joint Plan of Action, including some relaxation of sanctions. Was it worth risking even more intense political opposition to Washington’s dealing with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program by allowing Tehran to come to Geneva? By the same token, there is also risk that the “disinvitation” will play into Iranian hard-liners’ opposition to dealing with the American Great Satan. Hopefully the administration has accurately calculated that risk.
There is a broader context. President Obama faces difficult choices in his Middle East strategy, conditioned in major part by domestic politics and pressures. He cannot at one and the same time exert pressure on the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, allow Iran to join the Syria negotiations, and pursue a nuclear agreement with Iran that includes reducing sanctions. The obvious strategic priority is boxing in the Iranian nuclear program, even if that risks postponing serious attempts to stop the killing in Syria.
Thus the Syria talks do not begin auspiciously, to say the least.
The imbroglio over Iran’s participation also reveals two other fault lines. The first derives from a requirement that Obama imposed in 2011, in addition to his red line against the use of chemical weapons — namely that Assad must go. To resolve the Syrian conflict, that condition may be necessary. But to make it a precondition was hardly likely to encourage Assad and his government to “play ball.”
Even more, there is little willingness to understand that Assad acts not just for himself but as leader of a significant, though minority part of the Syrian population, the community of Alawites, a Shi’a sect. Notably, at Geneva I, only Iraq represented a Shi’a perspective; and with Iran now excluded, the same is true of Geneva II. Geneva I did argue that in Syria “There is an overwhelming wish for a state that.…[0]ffers equal opportunities and chances for all…. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.” But as with so much international diplomacy, “wishful thinking” is unlikely to reassure the part of the population being asked to give up power and possibly to face savage retribution.
To be sure, the Alawite minority has dominated the rest, including the majority Sunni community; and to end the civil war, that situation has to change. But without providing solid assurances to the Alawite community (and to others), chances of a peaceful settlement are zero.
The second fault line is that Syria’s civil war is part of a broader struggle for power and preeminence throughout the region, at one critical level between Sunnis and Shi’as. The current phase in that struggle began with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, toppling a minority Sunni regime dominating a Shi’a majority population. The Syrian civil war is in major part a “get even” effort by Sunni states led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Worse, there is an influx of Islamist terrorists inspired, financed and armed by people in the same Sunni states that want to redress the Sunni-Shi’a regional balance.
The US and others thus face a dilemma at Geneva. They can persevere in demanding that Assad depart as part of “transitional” arrangements, while excluding a key regional player (Iran); or they can decide that Assad can remain and run for reelection (as he has said he would do), but in elections that are structured to redress at least some legitimate grievances of the non-Alawite community (Assad would lose such an election); that solid guarantees must be put in place for all Syrian communities, if that can be done; that all relevant outsiders be engaged at Geneva; and that states permitting free rein for Al Qaeda and its ilk must finally be called to account.
This is called strategy, diplomacy, leadership, willpower, and the willingness of the Obama administration to put US national interests ahead of domestic politics.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
You’re no doubt aware by now of a proposal by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for Syria to hand over its (still only accidentally acknowledged) chemical weapons to international control, which his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Moualem said Syria “welcomes”. Syrian ally Russia was jumpstarted into action after [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
You’re no doubt aware by now of a proposal by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov for Syria to hand over its (still only accidentally acknowledged) chemical weapons to international control, which his Syrian counterpart Walid al-Moualem said Syria “welcomes”. Syrian ally Russia was jumpstarted into action after Secretary of State John Kerry apparently went off script in London today by floating the proposal (suggested over a year ago by former Senator Richard G. Lugar) and doubting its feasibility in the same sentence after CBS reporter Margaret Brennan asked if there was any way Syria could avert military action:
Sure, if he could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community, in the next week, turn it over. All of it, without delay and allow a full and total accounting for that, but he isn’t about to do it and it can’t be done, obviously.
Novelist Teju Cole has broken all this down for us in Twitter-speak
Kerry: We won’t attack…if you do this impossible thing. Syria: Oh? We’ll do it. Russia: They’ll do it. UN: They’ll do it. Kerry: Shit!
— Teju Cole (@tejucole) September 9, 2013
While it’s too soon to get excited with the proposal’s details still in the making, Kerry’s words have taken on a life of their own (though some have suggested this was at least somehow related to a behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuver). The State Department and White House seem to have forgotten to talk to each other before issuing statements on all this earlier today. State Department Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf called Kerry’s words “hypothetical” and “rhetorical” and said the Russian proposal was considered “highly unlikely”. She also — wait for this — categorically stated that “the Secretary was not making a proposal.” Later the White House said during its daily press briefing that it would take a “hard look” at the Russian proposal, but Press Secretary Jay Carney also repeatedly emphasized that all this would not have occurred without the credible threat of force against President Bashar al-Assad’s alleged actions. He meanwhile urged Congress to vote for an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Syria, which the administration has been strongly pushing for, and which Kerry’s words may have now endangered.
Speaking at the White House during a Forum to Combat Wildlife Trafficking immediately after Carney’s appearance, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said she had just met with President Obama and seemed to have the most updated speech on the issue:
…if the regime immediately surrendered its stockpiles to international control as was suggested by Secretary Kerry and the Russians, that would be an important step. But this cannot be another excuse for delay or obstruction.
While many are labelling Kerry’s words a “gaffe”, Clinton strategically tried to frame it as a purposeful move by Kerry, being forced, of course, to include the Russians. Perhaps the White House is hoping everyone will eventually forget Harf’s opposing description.
In any case, here’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting Ben Rhodes with the most recent WH statement:
US will review Russian proposal. We want Syrian CW under intl control. Important that this only proposed bc credible threat of mil action
— Ben Rhodes (@rhodes44) September 9, 2013
It should also be noted that earlier in the day UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had said following the Russian announcement that he was “considering urging the Security Council to demand the immediate transfer of Syria’s chemical weapons and chemical precursor stocks to places inside Syria where they can be safely stored and destroyed” if it was proven that chemical weapons have been used.
It will be interesting to see how Obama tackles all this during his many scheduled interviews today and during his speech to the nation Tuesday night wherein he will urge for military action against Syria, especially considering how a majority of Americans continue to oppose it, even after the release of those horrific videos of the Syrian victims of the Aug. 21 attack.
]]>by Wayne White
The Bush administration’s deception and irresponsible military action involving Iraq had a wide-ranging adverse impact on populations in countries critical to the enforcement of international standards regarding war crimes. Yesterday’s vote by the British parliament to oppose UK participation in military action against Syria illustrates just how deep that [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The Bush administration’s deception and irresponsible military action involving Iraq had a wide-ranging adverse impact on populations in countries critical to the enforcement of international standards regarding war crimes. Yesterday’s vote by the British parliament to oppose UK participation in military action against Syria illustrates just how deep that mistrust and anxiety still runs today. Yet, as British Prime Minister David Cameron has said, failure to act could give the Syrian regime a virtual “green light” to take even more brutal measures against the opposition and Syrian civilians. Nonetheless, the vote should warn the Obama Administration to slow down (and perhaps scale back) its plans for punitive military action considerably in order to address the serious concerns that surround it.
Five days after the August 21 attack, we have just learned, a regime attack was launched against an urban area in the vicinity of Aleppo using incendiary munitions that terribly burned scores of schoolchildren. This additional outrage took place even before Bashar al-Asad and his unconditional allies in Moscow and Tehran were buoyed by the news from London. Though not banned, the use of horrific flammable munitions against an urban area could offer yet another a foretaste of what is to come in the absence of a firm international response.
Official and public disquiet over the planned strike emanating from the UK, Germany, global media, and the US typically features concerns associated with the distortions of intelligence and military overreach of the Bush Administration ten years ago. Although wariness toward potentially deceitful government behavior is a healthy counterbalance overall, such concerns can be taken to extremes.
In the wake of the Bush Administration’s appalling abuses and their weighty negative consequences, a global mindset has developed in which practically all pronouncements out of Washington are subject not only to great scrutiny, but almost knee-jerk skepticism — even when pitted against assertions on the part of notoriously abusive and deceitful authoritarian governments like Syria’s that face virtually no domestic accountability whatsoever.
Consequently, there have been wide-ranging demands for a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate despite its futility in the face of a certain Russian veto because Moscow fully supports the Syrian regime in its war of internal repression and is incapable of viewing the facts of this case impartially. Similar Russian tolerance of atrocious war crimes in Bosnia on the part of another of Moscow’s allies in the 1990’s compelled a NATO coalition to act in lieu of the UNSC. But that was prior to the 2002-2003 episode of US (and UK) intelligence deception in support of a vastly more extensive military intervention.
Still, the Obama Administration must deal with the situation as it is. Barreling ahead with a “compressed” timeline for punitive strikes despite extensive pushback resembles in the eyes of many just the sort of brash behavior exhibited by the Bush Administration. And this is precisely what President Obama (and French President Francois Hollande) should avoid under the circumstances.
Personally, I believe some observers are exaggerating the potential fallout from limited military action in this case. In fact, much of the bluster from Damascus and Tehran probably consists mainly of scare tactics meant to play to nervous Western constituencies. However, to head off any regrettable consequences, allied punitive action against Syria must narrowly focus on the issue at hand—and not be expanded to include strikes meant to weaken the regime and play out over two to three days.
Critical to salvaging the situation and calming many of those now hesitant, the White House must patiently await the results of the UN inspection team. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has said the findings should be made available to the UN Security Council on Sunday.
Sunday is only two days away. The Syrian military is tied down holding various vital positions lest the rebels move in and seize them, so it cannot simply go away and hide in preparation for punitive strikes strikes — even if proper consultations require another week. And if the UN inspection results confirm the use of nerve agent against the affected Damascus suburbs, that information could reinvigorate the Western allies to act more as Washington hopes (even if, as expected, the Russians once again block UNSC consensus to serve their own craven interests in Syria).
]]>by Wayne White
Continuing extremist attacks in northern Mali are a reminder that this vast Saharan region, given to raiding and smuggling for more than a millennium, could remain an attractive haven even for a much weakened al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). Now that sweeping French and allied African military [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Continuing extremist attacks in northern Mali are a reminder that this vast Saharan region, given to raiding and smuggling for more than a millennium, could remain an attractive haven even for a much weakened al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). Now that sweeping French and allied African military operations have decimated AQIM’s larger forces and driven surviving AQIM bands to switch to localized terrorist assaults, concerned parties have shifted their priorities toward more enduring counterinsurgency operations and peacekeeping. Yet, for those seeking to deal further, lasting blows to AQIM must remain mindful of the ethnic complexity of the Malian Sahara.
Demonstrating it is still a force to be reckoned with, AQIM claimed responsibility for another attack on the northern Malian city of Timbuktu over the weekend. A checkpoint outside the city was bombed as a diversion to enable more than 20 fighters to infiltrate the city while defenders rushed first to the site of the bombing. A few infiltrators managed to gain brief access to the grounds of the Hotel Colombe (frequented by journalists and aid workers), possibly a prime target. The local Malian governor and his staff at the hotel had to be evacuated hastily amidst efforts to hunt down the infiltrators. One Malian soldier was killed; several Malian troops and one French soldier were wounded. A probable AQIM land mine placed on a road also recently inflicted casualties on African forces participating in operations in support of the Malian government.
Given the sheer size of the largely ungoverned northern third of the country, plus some of its forbidding terrain, most likely it would be impossible to fully eradicate AQIM, especially since small groups could take refuge in similarly trackless areas of neighboring Niger, Mauritania or Algeria from which they could continue such attacks. Consequently, all parties involved in addressing the problem are wisely shifting to more drawn out strategies.
French President Francois Hollande said late last week that French troops (originally slated for withdrawal after a few months) will now stay through the end of the year in limited numbers, and has offered 1,000 troops to stay even longer as part of a hoped for UN peacekeeping operation. He reiterated the latter on April 4. Meanwhile, the European Union has begun the first phase of a 15-month training operation under the guidance of military personnel from 7 EU countries with an initial contingent of Malian army trainees. The EU training mission eventually is slated to field 500 such trainers. On a mission to the Malian capital of Bamako on April 2, Senator John McCain said the US also would explore ways of providing equipment and training to assist the EU mission and technology to support the French efforts to help run down AQIM elements still at large. Intelligence sharing among the US, the UK, France and key EU governments on AQIM-related developments undoubtedly will expand.
Last week UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called upon the Security Council to authorize the transformation of the various African forces in Mali along with additional police assets into a UN peacekeeping force of over 12,000 (that the French could then bolster with troops of their own). Ban cited the challenge posed by AQIM’s “residual threat” as justification for the deployment of such a force in being. Clearly, statements by Hollande, Ban and McCain illustrate the international community has become more resigned to a continued presence in Mali to provide the Malian government a reasonable chance to bounce back from the recent AQIM challenge.
To head off potential trouble on a closely related front, however, both Malian authorities and their foreign allies must tread carefully around longstanding tensions between the Tuareg Berber population of the Saharan north and Mali’s dominant, sub-Saharan African peoples of the south. The Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (NMLA), although wary — even hostile — toward AQIM, vainly attempted to coexist with AQIM as the latter embarked on its offensive against Malian government forces last year. With the AQIM routed by the French, the more secular NMLA last week named its own civil administrator for the key northern regional capital of Kidal; the NMLA and its core Tuareg constituency remain deeply suspicious — even hostile — toward Malian troops and central governance.
Those hoping to bring as much stability as possible to the situation in northern Mali must bear in mind that not only was there a protracted Tuareg rebellion in both Mali and Niger during 2007-2009, but what morphed into the AQIM power grab in Mali late last year started with an NMLA revolt in northern Mali in January 2012. At least some AQIM cadres probably are Tuareg; other Tuareg who are not, but participated in the Libyan civil war, likely remain especially restive. Yet, the Tuareg are far more knowledgeable than any others about the wild Saharan terrain in which many AQIM cadres have sought shelter, and could assist foreign — and perhaps even Malian — forces root out AQIM remnants. But that may well require serious concessions, perhaps toward a measure of self-governance, to address longstanding northern grievances.
]]>The US-led sanctions regime isn’t directly targeting Iran’s healthcare system but reports continue to suggest that critically-ill Iranians are being affected. The Al Jazeera English clip above squares with Najmeh Bozorgmehr’s Financial Times article from September about how sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank are preventing critically-ill patients from getting crucial medical aid:
[...]]]>The US-led sanctions regime isn’t directly targeting Iran’s healthcare system but reports continue to suggest that critically-ill Iranians are being affected. The Al Jazeera English clip above squares with Najmeh Bozorgmehr’s Financial Times article from September about how sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank are preventing critically-ill patients from getting crucial medical aid:
The government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says international sanctions have had little impact on the country and insists that its nuclear program should continue. It has launched a public relations campaign stressing that 97 percent of Iran’s medicine is produced domestically — a clear attempt to prevent panic that medical supplies could be at risk.
However, Ahmad Ghavidel, head of the Iranian Hemophilia Society, a nongovernmental organization that assists about 8,000 patients, says access to medicine has become increasingly limited and claims one young man recently died in southern Iran after an accident when the blood-clotting injection he needed was not available.
“This is a blatant hostage-taking of the most vulnerable people by countries which claim they care about human rights,” Ghavidel said. “Even a few days of delay can have serious consequences like hemorrhage and disability.”
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in October that sanctions are affecting the supply of humanitarian essentials for Iranians regardless of special waivers:
“The sanctions also appear to be affecting humanitarian operations in the country,” Ban wrote in the report, dated August 22, to the 193-member General Assembly on the “Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
“Even companies that have obtained the requisite license to import food and medicine are facing difficulties in finding third-country banks to process the transactions,” he said.
US officials are apparently aware of these scathing reports, which bring back memories of the catastrophic effects that their past sanctions regime had on Iraqi civilians. Samuel Cutler and Erich Ferrari write in Al-Monitor that the Treasury Department has quietly rewritten regulations governing key aspects of the sanctions and now permit “US companies to sell certain medicines and basic medical supplies to Iran without first seeking a license from OFAC”. However, the authors add that it’s “difficult to predict exactly what effect the new authorization will have on the humanitarian situation in Iran”.
Iran’s healthcare system isn’t the only unintended victim of the sanctions’ crippling effect. Even independent Iranian publishers, which are already under the heavy hand of the Islamic Republic, are being hit.
This summer, Iran scholar Farideh Farhi also informed us about a report by the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) detailing the negative impact of sanctions on ordinary Iranians. Farhi’s article provides useful context and analysis for Bozorgmehr’s piece:
]]>If ICAN’s analysis is accurate, it also foretells harsher economic realities for the most vulnerable elements of Iran’s population, a harsher political environment for those agitating for change, and a more hostile setting for those who have tried to maintain historical links between Western societies and Iranian society.
Sanctions impact calculations, but usually not in the intended fashion.
This is becoming a recurring theme: sanctions are affecting the supply of humanitarian essentials for Iranians regardless of special waivers. Reuters has the report:
“The sanctions also appear to be affecting humanitarian operations in the country,” Ban wrote in the report, dated August 22, to the 193-member General Assembly on [...]]]>
This is becoming a recurring theme: sanctions are affecting the supply of humanitarian essentials for Iranians regardless of special waivers. Reuters has the report:
“The sanctions also appear to be affecting humanitarian operations in the country,” Ban wrote in the report, dated August 22, to the 193-member General Assembly on the “Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
“Even companies that have obtained the requisite license to import food and medicine are facing difficulties in finding third-country banks to process the transactions,” he said.
In September, Najmeh Bozorgmehr reported on how US-imposed sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank are preventing critically-ill patients from getting crucial medical aid:
The government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says international sanctions have had little impact on the country and insists that its nuclear program should continue. It has launched a public relations campaign stressing that 97 percent of Iran’s medicine is produced domestically — a clear attempt to prevent panic that medical supplies could be at risk.
However, Ahmad Ghavidel, head of the Iranian Hemophilia Society, a nongovernmental organization that assists about 8,000 patients, says access to medicine has become increasingly limited and claims one young man recently died in southern Iran after an accident when the blood-clotting injection he needed was not available.
“This is a blatant hostage-taking of the most vulnerable people by countries which claim they care about human rights,” Ghavidel said. “Even a few days of delay can have serious consequences like hemorrhage and disability.”
Iran scholar Farideh Farhi also informed us in July about a report by the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) that details the negative impact of sanctions on ordinary Iranians, particularly women. Farhi’s article provides useful context and analysis for these events. She writes:
]]>If ICAN’s analysis is accurate, it also foretells harsher economic realities for the most vulnerable elements of Iran’s population, a harsher political environment for those agitating for change, and a more hostile setting for those who have tried to maintain historical links between Western societies and Iranian society.
Sanctions impact calculations, but usually not in the intended fashion.
The end of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran has been an occasion for pundits on all sides to engage in post-game spin. In Iran, the spin began right in the middle of the summit when Iranian television mistranslated — read lied about — Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s words to present his position on Syria as not that different from Iran’s. Once the summit was over Hossein Shariatmadari of Kayhan, whose editorials usually give a lesson to hardliners regarding how to frame an argument, didn’t repeat the lie regarding Syria. But he put new words in Morsi’s mouth and attempted to convince his readers that Morsi’s stance regarding Syria so contradict his positions on Palestine, Egypt’s ability to be a “strategic ally” to Iran, and “the necessity to combat Israel and support the resistance axis”, that Morsi will soon change his mind. “In the Tehran summit, Mr. Morsi announced Egypt’s new identity and this new announced identity is not in line with support for the opposition in Syria [particularly] alongside America, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. For sure Morsi’s position will change in the future,” Shariatmadari ended his column confidently.
Outside Iran, the urge to frame the summit has taken a different form. Iran’s relationship to the West is after all a win-or-lose game not only in the current Iranian leadership’s mind. So Morsi’s support for the Syrian opposition, Ban Ki-moon’s criticism of Iran’s non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions regarding its nuclear program, and its human records, are interpreted as a defeating blow to Iran’s efforts to showcase itself as a country that it is not isolated. Even though Morsi had already called for Syrian regime change at the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Jeddah two weeks earlier (where Iran cast the only vote against Syria’s expulsion), somehow his stating of an already stated position in support of Syria’s opposition — with no mention of Iranian, Russian, or Chinese support for Bashar Assad — turns into the “slamming” of Iran and even more ambitiously, a diplomatic disaster as far as the whole summit goes, thereby underlining Iran’s isolation.
What few are willing to acknowledge is that post-event spin is usually geared towards different audiences. Even more likely is the fact that such spin is geared towards the already converted. Those expecting failure got one. Those hoping for a statement regarding Iran’s non-isolation also received a decent amount from global participants and more importantly, from their point of view, a fairly strong statement of support by NAM for Iran’s nuclear program.
For those of us less interested in keeping score, the summit nevertheless provided a few interesting highlights and/or revealing points regarding Iran’s external relations and domestic politics. Let me mention three.
- 1. Given Iran’s geographic location and resources, it is simply not good business for many countries in the neighborhood to isolate Iran. And at least from the looks of things, the sanctions regime imposed by the West is being perceived as an opportunity by some countries. Nothing illustrates this better than Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tehran. Tellingly, he and the large contingent who came with him were met at the airport by Iran’s Economy Minister, Shamseddin Hosseini. And before embarking on his 4-day visit, his staff made clear that bilateral economic relations were on his mind.
Iran and India currently have about $15 billion worth of trade with each other but the balance is heavily in favor of Iran to the tune of more than 4 to 1 and that has turned into a real issue because of sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union on financial transactions between the two countries. Getting paid in Rupees for 45 percent of its exports to India has been a partial solution but India is hoping to increase its export of agricultural goods as well as machinery as another alternative. In other words, both countries continue to work hard to find ways to get around sanctions because it’s worth it. This does not mean that sanctions are not bad for Iran or that they are not constraining Iran’s optimal use of its resources. The current opportunity costs of the sanctions regime are huge for Iran. But Iran’s location and resources are countervailing forces that cannot be ignored. Furthermore, there are quite a few countries that see the sanctions regime as an opportunity. This dynamic will likely continue to inspire US efforts to openly attempt to impose new ways of restricting Iran’s international trade while other countries openly collude with Iran to find ways to get around those attempts.
2. International engagement is good for Iran. As far as I am concerned, the most important lesson of Ki-Moon and Morsi’s visit lies in the value of engaging Iran directly. Many of those who are now touting Ki-moon’s and Morsi’s words of wisdom in Tehran should remind themselves that they tried hard to prevent these folks from going there. That their words and actions have created a conversation in Iran is a good thing made possible by the Iranian desire not to appear, nor be, isolated. Ki-moon in no uncertain terms identified his purpose in his speech at the Foreign Ministry’s School of International Relations, “to highlight the cost of Iran’s current trajectory, both at home and in the international arena.” He also made the case that ‟Any country at odds with the international community is one that denies itself much-needed investment and finds itself isolated from the thrust of common progress.” Ki-moon’s skillful focus on the basic contradiction in Iran’s foreign policy — wanting to be a respected member of the international community while loudly and unskillfully challenging some of the established codes of conduct of that same international community — is a lesson for all.
3. The NAM summit was a showcase for the outside world with really no domestic implications, but it did tell us something about the current shape of Iranian politics. It told us that the Leader Ayatollah Khamenei now sees himself in charge of even implementing Iran’s foreign policy and not just setting the “general direction of the country” and letting the president engage in the task of executing these general directives as delineated by the Islamic Republic’s Constitution.
Even the appearances were awkward. Khamenei entered the summit room first followed by former president and current chair of the Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is also an unelected official. Iran’s current president followed next and was mostly treated as a non-person by the Iranian media. Comparing this to the last major international meeting in Iran, which was the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in December 1997, is telling. Fresh from being popularly elected, Mohammad Khatami took charge of the meeting and Khamenei had almost no presence. Furthermore, as a popularly elected president, Khatami had no need for underlings to shower him with accolades regarding how incredibly insightful and important he is. There was no need to have someone like former foreign minister and current senior advisor Ali Akbar Velayati to lie to the Iranian audience that Ki-moon, in a private meeting with Khamenei, identified him not only as the leader of Iran but also as “the leader of the Islamic world.” How incredibly ironic that the man who routinely speaks in the name of the inalienable rights of the Iranian people in the face of Western hostility now has to rely on ingratiating promoters who try to elevate his international role with the hope of enhancing his domestic standing.
This would the first time an Israeli Prime Minister has ever agreed to a UN investigation into the actions of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Israel had refused to cooperate with an investigation conducted by the UN Human Rights Council, headed by Richard Goldstone. Israel accused Goldstone, a renowned South African Jewish jurist, of focusing disproportionately on Israeli actions when the UNHRC report was released. The “Goldstone report” concluded that both Israel and Gaza’s militant Hamas rulers had committed war crimes.
Now, Netanyahu claims that it is “in Israel’s national interest to ensure that the factual truth regarding the flotilla incident would be exposed for the world to see.” When Ban originally proposed the investigative panel on the Gaza flotilla in early June, days after Israeli commandos intercepted the Gaza-bound convoy, Haaretz reported that “Senior government officials said the Foreign Ministry recommends responding favorably to establishing the committee because Turkey will probably oppose it.”
Another opinion about why Israel agreed to be part of the investigative panel: as the Israeli say in Hebrew, Ayn breira–no choice.
“There was no choice but to agree to the international community’s demands, first and foremost those of the US and the UN,” one official source said.
“We could have been considered naysayers, or we could have done what we did, which was to take part in determining the mandate that will be given to the committee and affect its program.”
The source said the committee would have been established in any case, even without Israel’s consent. “Though Israel didn’t want another inquiry, there was no choice,” he said.
The panel will be authorized to review reports submitted by investigators in both Israel and Turkey, but will not have the authority to subpoena any witnesses. One of the concessions Israel won as a condition of its participation is that neither Israeli soldiers nor any Israeli citizens can be questioned by the panel. At most, political leaders may be allowed to give statements.
Turkey, which withdrew its ambassador to Israel and suspended joint military exercises with Israel in protest of the attack, has been demanding an international investigation into the attack on the flotilla all along. Eight Turks and one Turkish-American on the convoy’s flagship were killed by Israeli naval commandos determined to keep the flotilla’s Gaza-bound aid from reaching to shore. Just before Ban announced Israel’s acceptance of the UN panel of inquiry, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated in a phone conversation with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu that Turkey insists on its right to an apology and compensation for the victims.
The UN Panel of Inquiry is to be chaired by former Prime Minister of New Zealand Sir Geoffrey Palmer, an international lawyer and an expert on maritime law. Palmer anticipates that chairing the inquiry be a “very challenging and demanding task.”
The outgoing President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, will be the panel’s Vice-Chair. Representatives of Israel and Turkey will also serve on the panel, which is to begin its work on August 10 and give Ban a progress report by mid-September.
The choice of Uribe for a prominent role on the investigative panel might seem curious. Tensions have been rising between Colombia and its neighbor Venezuela. Last week, Venezuela’s Ambassador Valero met with Ban, and presented him with a letter accusing Colombia of warlike acts. On July 23, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez severed diplomatic ties with Colombia.
The pro-American Uribe is viewed favorably by Israelis because of his criticism of Chavez, whom Uribe accuses of aiding FARC rebels. Chavez has taunted Colombia for being “the Israel of Latin America” and the US as the “evil empire.” Colombia, the largest recipient of US military and foreign aid in Latin America, granted the Pentagon the use of seven military bases last year after Ecuador refused to renew a 10 year lease on the US’s regional military base in Manta.
Colombia is one of Israel’s biggest customers in Latin America for military equipment. During a visit to Israel in at the end of April to promote expanded ties, Colombia’s Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez told the Jerusalem Post:
Colombia and Israel have had a very long relationship and a very strong partnership, too. Both countries and our peoples have suffered and have endured, in a way, similar difficulties. At the same time, I would say that we both are resilient and determined, that we share somehow a lot in common. I would say that for us, it’s very important to make a partnership with Israel in several aspects.
Colombia employs former Israeli intelligence experts as mercenaries to fight against left wing guerillas. The UN Working Group holds mercenaries responsible for many of the human rights violations of which Colombia has been accused. Furthermore the use of mercenaries violates the United Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, which entered into force in 2001.
In 2007, the American Jewish Committee presented Uribe with its “Light unto the Nations” Award:
“President Uribe is a staunch ally of the United States, a good friend of Israel and the Jewish people, and is a firm believer in human dignity and human development in Colombia and the Americas,” said AJC President E. Robert Goodkind, who presented the award at AJC’s Annual Dinner, held at the National Building Museum in Washington.
Under President Uribe’s tenure, Colombia has fought rebel guerillas and drug traffickers and has made a serious attempt at demobilizing the paramilitary. Colombia is the third-largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid.
“Despite many odds, President Uribe has remained committed to the pursuit of security, peace and broad-based economic growth for all Colombians,” Goodkind said. Indeed, while President Uribe and his family have personally suffered due to the violence that has long plagued Colombia, he remains committed first and foremost to curbing violence and restoring peace and security.
Goodkind noted the shared experiences of Colombia and Israel. “Both Colombia and Israel have been forced for decades to face challenges regarding their survival and their citizens have suffered the threat of terror on a daily basis,” he said. “Nevertheless, Colombians like Israelis continue tirelessly to build democratic and prosperous societies, and remain passionate about achieving peace.”
[nb: In 2009, the AJC conferred its National Human Relations Award to media magnate Rupert Murdoch.]
It’s quite obvious why Israelis would want Uribe on the UN panel. What’s in it for the Turks?
Turkey has been seeking closer diplomatic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean since the late 1980s. An “Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean” was prepared and put into effect in 1998. The year 2006 was declared to be the “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean.” Trade between Turkey and Latin America has more than quadrupled in the past decade. Turkey has resident embassies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela, but not in Colombia–as yet.
What Turkey does have going in Colombia (besides an Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group) is its participation in the advanced and cost-effective M60A1 battle tank, for which Colombia may be the first customer. A new joint venture announced this spring between Turkey’s procurement agency, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, or Savunma Sanayi Mustesarligi (SSM), and state-owned Israel Military Industries (IMI), who are teaming up to ward off at least four competitors and to sell Columbia’s military an order of tanks worth about $250 million,
The defense ministries of the two countries approved the joint venture and requisite licensing issues at the height of tensions between the Islamist government of Turkish Prime Minister Recip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rightist coalition government over Israel’s early 2009 war in Gaza and disputes over Gaza, Iran and Syria.
The joint venture between IMI and Turkey’s Aselsan aims for a 50-50 work share based on Israeli electronics, subsystems and weaponry, with the bulk of production and assembly work to take place in Turkey and later under licensed production in customer countries.
So while Israeli and Turkish diplomats foreign ministry officials may be snarling at each other, it’s those guys at their respective Ministries of Defense who understand how important getting along is to the business of war.
Seen in this dim if somewhat perverse light, Uribe becomes a very suitable, if surprising, investigator and arbitrator, if not a particularly neutral one. While Uribe’s bias toward Israel is unquestionable, the participation of Colombia and Turkey on the panel may quietly yield improved ties between them, whatever the panel concludes about the Gaza flotilla.
Sir Geoffrey Palmer, however, may be the most interesting panel participant and the one who most bears watching. Palmer , who served as New Zealand’s Prime Minister for about a year (1989-90) and was appointed to the International Whaling Commission in 2002, says he was asked to take the job because he is seen as “detached and evenhanded” and New Zealand as “impartial.” (Surely any investigative panel should have at least one of those, at least on principle.) Although the panel will be based in NY, Sir Geoffrey doesn’t plan on spending very much time there, although he will travel there soon to meet with Ban and define his mission.
Nonetheless, NZ Foreign Minister Murray McCully, welcoming Palmer’s appointment, took the trouble to point out:
“He will be acting entirely as an independent expert, and in no way as a representative of the New Zealand government. Sir Geoffrey is taking on a challenging and demanding task, and I wish him well in his work – the long-term goal for this government, and for others, is an enduring peace for all in the Middle East.”
As the old saying goes, still waters run deep. Palmer has stated that “”This is a very sensitive matter. It’s a quasi-judicial inquiry, so it is really very important to maintain a sense of detachment.” Is it possible that that the understated and aloof Sir Geoffrey might actually be the one person on the panel who will make some waves if he opines, even on the narrowest technical grounds, that according to the Law of the Sea, Israel’s interception of the Gaza flotilla in international waters, was a violation of international law for which it owes Turkey a mea culpa, however half-hearted, and some cash, however nominal? This has been the Turkish demand along.
Uribe’s job, on the other hand, may be to bring Turkey back on board with the US, Israel and Colombia, if not as a partner for peace, then at least a partner in war. Zvi Bar’el of Haaretz identifies Turkey as one of two contenders (the other is Bulgaria) to host a high powered American x-band radar system to counter the threat of Iranian-launched missiles, described in this past Sunday’s Washington Post. Furthermore, Bar’el writes, “Turkey could also receive Patriot anti-missile systems from the U.S., while Turkish press reports suggest plans in the country to acquire long-range offensive missiles from its American ally.”
There’s much more truth than humor in the old joke that advises a young lawyer starting out: “When the facts are on your side, pound the facts. When the law is on your side, pound the law. And when neither the facts or the law are on your side, pound the table.”
Israel has agreed to join the panel because it’s sure that the facts are on its side: not necessarily concerning what did or didn’t happen in the assault on the Mavi Marmara, but rather the fact that Israeli technology is inextricably embedded in almost every weapons system and piece of military technology the US produces and sells to its allies. Through Israel, Turkey has the opportunity to actively participate in that military technology network.
Turks are invoking the Law of the Sea in defense of the Turkish-led Gaza flotilla at the very point in the twenty-first century when maritime law is ripe for reinterpretation. The resurgence of piracy off the African coast; the sanctions against Iran that call for inspection of ships in the Persian Gulf that might be providing Iran with dual use good and other articles forbidden by western fiat; the damage done by oil companies to bodies of water and ecosystems far from their home offices; and the massive aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and giant oil tanker platforms that have been silently redefining the notion of territorial waters may give even the most modest interpretation about the actions of Gaza flotilla–and Israel’s handling of it–long-term and long-distance significance. The Washington Post reports that the US Navy has been deploying Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers equipped with ballistic missile defense systems in the Mediterranean Sea for the past year.
The ships, featuring octagonal Spy-1 radars and arsenals of Standard Missile-3 interceptors, will form the backbone of Obama’s shield in Europe.
Unlike fixed ground-based interceptors, which were the mainstay of the Bush missile defense plan for Europe, Aegis ships are mobile and can easily move to areas considered most at risk of attack.
Another advantage is that Aegis ships can still be used for other missions, such as hunting pirates or submarines, instead of waiting for a missile attack that may never materialize.
These are the facts that will underlie and shape the findings of the UN Panel.
Don’t like them? Pound the table.
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