via USIP
On April 22, Canadian authorities arrested two men who allegedly planned to derail a U.S.-bound passenger train. Officials said al Qaeda elements in Iran gave “direction and guidance” to Chiheb Esseghaier, 30, and Raed Jaser, 35. But police have not found evidence of Iranian state sponsorship. And Tehran [...]]]>
via USIP
On April 22, Canadian authorities arrested two men who allegedly planned to derail a U.S.-bound passenger train. Officials said al Qaeda elements in Iran gave “direction and guidance” to Chiheb Esseghaier, 30, and Raed Jaser, 35. But police have not found evidence of Iranian state sponsorship. And Tehran has denied any connection to the plot.
What has been the relationship between Iran and al Qaeda?
Iran and al Qaeda have had a complex and rocky relationship for two decades. The Shiite theocracy and the Sunni terrorist organization are not natural allies. Al Qaeda’s hardline Salafi/Wahhabi interpretation of Islam believes that Shiites are heretics. In 2009, a leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula proclaimed that Shiites, particularly Iranians, posed more of a danger to Sunnis than Jews or Christians. Iran has likewise been hostile toward al Qaeda and its former Taliban hosts in Afghanistan.
But countries and movements with seemingly inimical views can work together when circumstances warrant. The 9/11 Commission reported that Iran and al Qaeda contacts go back two decades, beginning when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan. The report also noted “strong but indirect evidence” that al Qaeda played “some as yet unknown role” in the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, a U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia, by the Iran-supported Saudi Hezbollah. A number of the 9/11 hijackers traveled through Iran to Afghanistan, although there is no evidence that Tehran was aware of the plot.
Some of the best information available on the al Qaeda-Iran relationship was found during the May 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Documents “show that the relationship is not one of alliance, but of indirect and unpleasant negotiations over the release of detained jihadis and their families, including members of Bin Laden’s family,” according to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. “The detention of prominent al Qa`ida members seems to have sparked a campaign of threats, taking hostages and indirect negotiations between al-Qa`ida and Iran that have been drawn out for years and may still be ongoing.”
Iran and al Qaeda are clearly at odds in the Syrian civil war. Bashar Assad’s regime is Iran’s key Arab ally, and Tehran is expending considerable effort to prop up Damascus. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, has joined the anti-Assad insurgency. Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s successor, has urged fighters from around the region to join the battle against Assad. The Nusra Front, one of Syria’s strongest rebel groups, recently pledged its allegiance to al Qaeda.
Are there known al Qaeda elements in Iran? Where?
Hundreds of al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan fled west to Iran after the U.S.-led coalition intervention in October 2001, and many were detained by Iranian authorities in eastern Iran, near the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Iran claims to have extradited more than 500 to their home countries in the Middle East, Africa and Europe.
Some high-profile detainees, including top al Qaeda strategist Saif al Adel and Osama bin Laden’s son-in-law Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, were held with their families under house arrest in Iran, possibly as insurance against al Qaeda attacks on Iranian interests or for use as bargaining chips. Al Adel and Abu Ghaith were given greater freedom to travel in exchange for the 2010 release of an Iranian diplomat who had been held in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Abu Gaith was captured in Jordan by the United States in February 2013.
It’s unclear how close an eye Iranian security services are keeping on al Qaeda elements currently living in eastern Iran. The remote area along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is sparsely populated and home to the Baloch ― a Sunni ethnic group that has waged a decades-long insurgency against Pakistan and Iran. A 2011 U.S. Treasury Department report accused Tehran of having a secret deal with al Qaeda that allows the group to funnel funds and operatives through Iranian territory. But the report did not cite Iranian officials for complicity in terrorism.
Canadian police said there is no evidence of Iranian sponsorship so far. What is known about Iran’s role?
It would mark a shift in strategy if Iran was actively involved in the planning of al Qaeda attacks. Canadian officials have claimed that al Qaeda leaders in Iran gave the two men considerable independence in planning and carrying out the alleged plot. The Iranian government probably would not have allowed them that operational freedom. Based on the evidence released by Canada, Tehran was probably not involved in any significant way.
The costs would not have been worth the benefits to Iran either. Any proven Iranian role in a terrorist attack that derailed a passenger train would have further strengthened international opinion against Tehran. It is already isolated and faced with many layers of economic sanctions. The timing is also awkward. Iranian complicity could jeopardize negotiations over its controversial nuclear program with the United States and five major world powers. At the same time, Iranian strategy has been opaque even to those who have observed Iran for decades.
– Matthew Duss is a policy analyst at the Center for American Progress.
- Photo: Al-Qaida leaders Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden and Suleiman Abu Ghaith in 2002.
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Recently, the Canadian government severed ties with Iran, citing threats to its diplomats in Tehran. While Israel has hailed the decision as a “clarion call to action”, few Canadian diplomats are convinced.
It is not too often that I find myself nodding in agreement with the rhetoric [...]]]>
via The Majalla
Recently, the Canadian government severed ties with Iran, citing threats to its diplomats in Tehran. While Israel has hailed the decision as a “clarion call to action”, few Canadian diplomats are convinced.
It is not too often that I find myself nodding in agreement with the rhetoric being spouted by Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi. But on Monday, when Salehi decried Canada’s surprise decision on 7 September to sever diplomatic relations with Iran, describing Prime Minister Steven Harper’s government as “neo-conservative extremist[s]”, I could not agree more. Canada’s abrupt decision to sever relations with Iran has left myself and many others scratching their heads, asking why?
The Canadian government’s rationale for severing of relations with Iran was contained in a statement released by Canada’s Foreign Minister, John Baird, last Friday. It offers the following explanation for severing ties: “The Iranian regime is providing increasing military assistance to the [Syrian] regime; it refuses to comply with UN resolutions pertaining to its nuclear program; it routinely threatens the existence of Israel and engages in racist anti-Semitic rhetoric and incitement to genocide; it is among the world’s worst violators of human rights; and it shelters and materially supports terrorist groups”.
This statement is a bit confusing. While it is fair to criticize Iran for its support for Bashar al-Assad, its failure to adhere to UN resolutions on its nuclear program, its support for Hizbollah and Hamas, and its poor human rights record, I fail to see how Canada’s foreign policy has anything to do Iran’s rhetorical jousting with Israel. Even the Obama administration is trying to distance itself from Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s hysterical rhetoric about Iran. And since when has Iran incited anyone to commit genocide? There is simply no factual basis for this claim and underscores just how out of touch with reality the Harper government really is.
Another reason cited for the severing of ties is Iran’s “blatant disregard for the Vienna Convention and its guarantee of protection for diplomatic personnel…. Our diplomats serve Canada as civilians, and their safety is our number one priority.” Of course ensuring the safety of your diplomats is a priority, but when have our diplomats in Tehran ever been in danger?
Certainly, Ottawa has not had glowing relations with Tehran. Indeed, following Canada’s involvement in exfiltrating six American diplomats, including the U.S. Charge d’Affairs, Bruce Laingan, from Iran at the start of the Iranian hostage crisis in November 1979, Iran expelled Canadian diplomats for eight years. In 1991, Canada and Iran resumed diplomatic relations, but did not exchange ambassadors until 1996. This was all part of a policy that Canadian diplomats called “controlled engagement”, with the Liberal government of Jean Chretien believing that while some form of dialogue was necessary to express Canadian concerns over Iran’s deplorable human rights record, its nuclear program, and its opposition to the peace process. It also allowed Canadian diplomats to be on the ground. But Canadian-Iranian relations underwent a chill in 2003 when a Canadian photojournalist, Zahra Kazemi, was arrested and beaten to death while in custody. While Canada described the death as “state-sanctioned murder” and recalled its ambassador from Iran, it still maintained its embassy in Tehran, albeit with a small staff. It was not until 2007, when Tehran kicked out Canada’s ambassador, John Mundy, in retaliation for Ottawa’s rejection of two of its nominees for ambassador. Since then, Canada has maintained a small diplomatic team in Tehran. This sequence of events suggests that even though Canada and Iran have had a tumultuous relationship since reestablishing relations in 1988, through thick and thin, Canadian policymakers have consistently felt it wise to maintain the embassy in Tehran.
Part of the reason for this stems from the depth of Canada’s cultural ties to Iran. Next to the US, Canada has the largest expatriate Iranian community, with some 120,000 Canadians of Iranian ancestry and 400,000 Iranians living in Canada. But the severing of ties also makes it incredibly difficult for Canadians to travel to Iran and for those already inside Iran to receive consular services.
Now, imagine yourself under arrest in Iran, accused of spying for your country, and having been sentenced to death, when suddenly your country abandons you, leaving you with no help and no ties to your homeland or family. This is exactly the scenario of what has just happened to two Canadians, Hamid Ghassemi-Shall and Saeed Malekpour. Worse yet, the Harper government’s actions could potentially put these two at great risk, as the Iran’s leaders assess their retaliatory options. While Harper pledged that his government will continued “to aid our citizens [in Iran] in co-operation with our partners and allies in the democratic world,” that is simply not enough. The Harper government has recklessly abandoned two of its citizens.
On Saturday, I wrote a letter to the editor at the Globe and Mail, Canada’s leading national newspaper, to condemn the Harper government’s move. In my letter, I argued that Canada’s decision was based the Harper government’s “narrow-minded ideology and not a realpolitik calculation of national interests. Indeed, if it were the latter, Canadian diplomats would be allowed to continue observing and reporting on the internal dynamics of this incredibly important country.”
Since having my letter published, at least three former Canadian ambassadors, two of which were ambassador to Iran, have publicly questioned the Harper government’s move.
Writing in February after Harper made the bold claim that Iran would have “no hesitation” about using nuclear weapons, Canada’s last full ambassador to Iran, John Mundy, who was expelled in 2007, expressed his concern about the direction Canada’s Iran policy was taking. “This is the first time in decades that a Canadian prime minister, Liberal or Conservative, appears to be advocating approaches that reduce diplomatic opportunities for peace during an international crisis.” After the news broke on Friday, Mundy described the move as “a grave step” and warned that it cannot “easily be reversed.”
Former Canadian ambassador to Iran, Kenneth Taylor, who famously played a role in the “Canadian Caper”, which saw Canadian officials help the CIA smuggle six American diplomats that had escaped the US embassy in 1979 during the Iranian hostage crisis, is also disturbed by the government’s decision. “I really can’t see the rationale of this move,” Taylor told Canada’s CTV News on Friday. “It’s a very bold stroke to sever diplomatic relations and close the embassy within five days.” And if Iran posed a threat to Canada, Taylor argued, it was actually more important to have officials on the ground who can “size up the situation and report from the spot” than the opposite.
This is exactly the position of Canada’s former ambassador to Spain, Daniel Moglat, who wrote in the Globe and Mail: “Canadian embassies, like the one just closed in Iran, exist to serve a number of purposes. One purpose is to speak for Canada, and to listen. When you close an embassy, you are closing your ears, shutting your eyes and covering your mouth.”
More recently, Mundy followed up his February Op-Ed with a new piece, published on Monday in the Globe and Mail, which argues: “Canada’s action reduces our presence on the ground in Iran to zero. We will no longer have the ability to communicate directly with Iran’s government in Iran. We will no longer have Canadian diplomats following political developments within the country and using their local contacts and knowledge to assess how Iranian policy towards the outside world might evolve. A new presidential election to replace President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is scheduled for 2013 and we won’t be there to talk to the various actors and pass back to other interested governments, particularly the United States, our assessment of the candidates. Lastly and very significantly, our diplomats will no longer be able to protect the rights of Canadian citizens in Iran.”
Taken together, it is hard not to make the following conclusions: the Canadian government’s decision to sever ties with Iran is based entirely on ideology, does not advance Canada’s national interests in any form, is completely reckless, and endangers the lives of its citizens, the very people it must protect at all costs. And for what? Beyond improving Canada’s image with Israel’s hardline leadership, which is equally reckless in its pursuit of war with Iran, not a single net benefit is to be gained by this fiasco. As I concluded in my letter, “In this time of growing uncertainty, we need people on the ground, lest we follow the same path the Americans took in 2003. This decision is perhaps one of the most ill-conceived ideas in modern history. At least when the Americans and British cut ties, they had good reason.”
- Bryan R. Gibson is a PhD candidate in International History at the London School of Economics and author of “Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran Iraq War”. He specializes in US foreign policy toward the Middle East, with particular emphasis on the Iran, Iraq, and the Kurds.
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European leaders are telling their publics that the latest EU sanctions are to persuade Iran to talk to the P5+1 about its nuclear program. In the House of Commons, on 24 January, Foreign Secretary William Hague said the sanctions represent “peaceful and legitimate pressure on the Iranian [...]]]>
European leaders are telling their publics that the latest EU sanctions are to persuade Iran to talk to the P5+1 about its nuclear program. In the House of Commons, on 24 January, Foreign Secretary William Hague said the sanctions represent “peaceful and legitimate pressure on the Iranian government to return to negotiations”.
This begs a question: why does Iran need to be coerced into negotiating? Surely it is in Iran’s interest to take every opportunity to convince the P5+1 that it intends to abide by its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitment to place all nuclear material in its possession under International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards and to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear explosive devices—and that the 18 years during which Iran pursued a “policy of concealment” were an aberration that Iran’s leaders now regret.
The answer lies, I suspect, in the letter that EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton sent to Iran’s nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, on 21 October. The letter was made public by the EU on 20 January. It contains the following sentences:
We remain committed to the practical and specific suggestions which we have put forward in the past. These confidence-building steps should form first elements of a phased approach which would eventually lead to a full settlement between us, involving the full implementation by Iran of UNSC and IAEA Board of Governors’ resolutions.
Dr. Jalili and his advisers could be forgiven for interpreting these sentences to mean that there is no point in turning up for talks unless they are committed to satisfying UN and IAEA demands in full. It looks as though the real goal of sanctions is not to get Iran back to the negotiating table, but to get Iran to give way on the demands that it has spent the last six years declining to concede.
These demands have become increasingly baroque with the passage of time, but in essence they remain unchanged since 2006:
- - suspension of all enrichment-related activity and of the construction of a heavy water moderated reactor (HWRR);
- application of the Additional Protocol;
- resolution of all outstanding IAEA safeguards inspection issues.
This brings us to another question: why are the P5+1 so determined to get Iran to implement all the demands that, using their political muscle, they have persuaded the Security Council to adopt? After all, they could have recognised that over time some of these demands have become less relevant to the global community’s non-proliferation needs, and that some might more readily be accepted by Iran in the context of an open-ended search for common ground through the give-and-take of a genuine negotiation.
Suspension of all enrichment-related activity stands out as the demand that now least serves a practical non-proliferation purpose. Suspension was first conceived, in 2003, as a way of halting Iran’s progress towards the mastery of enrichment technology, while the IAEA looked into the nature and purpose of the activities that Iran had undertaken when pursuing a “policy of concealment”. Now the P5+1 look like a hapless groom trying to shut the stable door long after the horse has bolted: Iran has developed three or more centrifuge models and appears to have overcome most, if not all, of the technical problems involved.
Of course suspension would put a halt to the accumulation of low-enriched uranium (LEU) by Iran. But Iran’s LEU stocks are not in themselves a proliferation threat. They are under IAEA safeguards. Any attempt by Iran to draw on them for use in a clandestine enrichment program would be brought immediately to the world’s attention. The calibration of future LEU production to reactor fuel needs is something that Iran might be ready to concede in the context of a genuine open-ended negotiation.
Suspension of HWRR construction is probably too far advanced now for Iran to be ready to write off its investment. But from a proliferation perspective this suspension is no more vital than the suspension of LEU production. Once completed, the HWRR will be placed under IAEA safeguards. Any diversion of spent fuel rods, containing plutonium, to a reprocessing plant would be quickly detected. Besides, there is no evidence to date that Iran intends to build a reprocessing plant; hence there is good reason to think that Iran might be ready to foreswear reprocessing as part of a balanced deal.
Continuing P5+1 insistence on reapplication of the Additional Protocol is entirely reasonable, but is another demand that Iran would almost certainly accept if it felt that the playing-field were level. It must be apparent to Iran’s leaders that the Majles vote to terminate application prior to ratification was a classic own goal.
Had the Protocol remained in force since 2006, the IAEA might well have concluded by now that there are no undeclared “nuclear activities or material” in Iran, greatly complicating the task of any who wish to exploit the nuclear controversy for ulterior purposes. (The alleged nuclear-related studies, which now constitute the only major issue on Iran’s IAEA file, fall outside the scope of IAEA safeguards. The IAEA mandate for investigating them comes from the Security Council, not from Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement. Such studies are “nuclear-related activities”, not “nuclear activities”.)
These alleged studies are nonetheless the biggest obstacle to a peaceful settlement. They cannot be ignored but they are problematic because:
- - The West asserts that the evidence for them is authentic but seemingly lacks the means to satisfy Iran that they are not forgeries.
- Initially the IAEA secretariat took a sceptical view of the authenticity of this evidence. In the last two years the secretariat seems to have become more confident that the material is authentic, but they have not spelled out why in sufficient detail for those who are free of all political influence to be able to form their own judgements.
- Iran may well be deterred from making an avowal and moving on—assuming there is something for them to avow—by the thought that the West might try to use an avowal to persuade non-Western members of the Security Council to further tighten UN sanctions, or authorise an attack on Iran (though I suspect that now Russia has achieved WTO admission it will be more robust in resisting Western pressure for anti-Iranian Council resolutions).
A solution to the alleged studies issue is not inconceivable, however. In the context of a genuine, open-ended negotiation one can imagine Western diplomats finding ways to reassure Iran that an avowal will not be misused—unless, as some fear, Western policy is driven not by non-proliferation goals, but by some ulterior purpose.
Other Obstacles to a Peaceful Settlement
The inflexibility apparent in Baroness Ashton’s letter, and the West’s apparent failure to take a fresh look at how Western non-proliferation goals might most realistically be achieved, are not my only reasons for feeling pessimistic about prospects for a peaceful settlement.
First, were there to be a genuine P5+1/Iran negotiation this year, what would the West have to offer Iran? The White House acted on Congressional demands in December and prevailed on EU doubters to adopt oil sanctions in January because, in an electoral year, it wants protection for the President from the charge of being weak on Iran. The White House will not easily surrender that protection by allowing the EU to repeal its oil sanctions in return for Iranian concessions, or offer meaningful US concessions.
Second, Western policy appears to be suffering from a sense of proportion failure. The British Defence Secretary announced in Washington on 5 January that Iran is working “flat-out” to make nuclear weapons. The US intelligence community, however, (and now, if Haaretz can be believed, even the Israeli intelligence community), assesses that the decision to make such weapons has yet to be taken, and may not be taken provided the likely consequences of taking it remain dissuasive.
Then the Canadian Prime Minister said that Iran is a “very serious threat to international peace and security”, followed by President Sarkozy, Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Cameron accusing Iran of being on a path that “threatens the peace and security of us all”. Yet the Security Council has so far failed to determine that Iran’s nuclear activities represent a “threat to the peace”. This is in marked contrast to what the Council has said about North Korea’s nuclear excesses. All this raises questions about Western perceptions of Iran and somewhat undermines the validity of the “international obligations” that the Council has imposed on Iran, and that Iran is frequently called upon to respect. (A careful reading of chapter VII of the UN Charter suggests that a threat to the peace determination ought to precede the creation of obligations under article 41.)
If Western policy-makers really believe that Iran’s nuclear program is a threat to international peace and security, they cannot be expected to accept Iran’s NPT right to enrich (provided all Iranian nuclear material is under safeguards), and consequently hope of a peaceful settlement is vain. The fact that most of the world believes that Iran has yet to become a threat to peace is unlikely to change anything.
The final causes for pessimism (though my list is not intended to be exhaustive) are called Saudi Arabia and Israel. It ought to be well within the range of Western diplomacy to persuade Saudi Arabia that Iran’s nuclear activities still fall short of constituting a threat to Saudi security, and to remind Riyadh that, as a party to the NPT, it is committed to refrain from seeking nuclear weapons. But I have yet to come across evidence of the West taking such a line.
The Israeli case is complicated by ever-changing messages from Tel Aviv. One day Iran’s nuclear program constitutes an existential threat to Israel, the next it does not. One day Israeli pilots are warming up their engines in preparation for take-off to the East, the next senior Israelis are explaining why an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would lead to catastrophe for Israel and the West.
Yet Israel remains hugely dependent on US benevolence. For a non-American it is hard to understand why this does not entitle the US to tell the Israelis to make a vow of silence on Iran and leave the West to settle this controversy in a manner consistent with the provisions of the NPT, and with maintaining the integrity of this vital global regime.
Like most pessimists, I am yearning for my judgements to prove mistaken.