by Jasmin Ramsey
As I mentioned here, the debate over US military action to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon was mostly on the back burner last year, but as Iran and six world powers known as the P5+1 head to Vienna to negotiate a comprehensive solution, it’s rearing its head [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
As I mentioned here, the debate over US military action to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon was mostly on the back burner last year, but as Iran and six world powers known as the P5+1 head to Vienna to negotiate a comprehensive solution, it’s rearing its head again. That’s because we’re at an unprecedented, pivotal moment in this conflict’s history. If a final deal is reached, the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon will become highly unlikely; if no deal is reached, those chances increase along with the prospect of some kind of war.
“Diplomacy is so much cheaper than using the military instrument,” said ambassador Peter Galbraith, who has been heavily involved in peace negotiations for more than two decades, on a call today hosted by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
“But a more important point is that in all these things, you need to consider what your alternatives are and frankly, there is no good alternative to a negotiated solution,” he added.
A US military campaign to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons would likely be another expensive, resource-heavy, prolonged conflict in the Middle East. This has been the conclusion of reputable US military and intelligence experts, and no matter how much Israel beats its chest, it can’t effectively go at it alone. What’s more, striking Iran could actually compel it to rush for a bomb, which the leadership — after all these years — has not decided to do as of yet.
“What is keeping Iran from developing nuclear weapons is not a technological ability,” notes Galbraith, who served for 5 years as a senior advisor to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Near East and South Asia. “It’s that it has made a political decision for the time being not to develop them.”
That political decision is being verified as we speak while the interim deal known as the “Joint Plan of Action” (JPA) reached in Geneva on Nov. 24 is being implemented.
“People who think this is a waste of time overlook fact that the interim agreement gives us a far better view of whats going on in Iran than without it,” said Lt. General Robert Gard (ret.), who saw saw combat in the Korean and Vietnam Wars during his 31-year military conflict, also on the call.
Under the JPA, Iran has halted and even rolled back parts of its program as well as opened itself up to inspections and verification visits by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in addition to those already imposed on it by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran is even cooperating with the IAEA on the contentious issue of past possible military dimensions to its program.
Laicie Heeley, a policy expert at the Center who moderated the call, said people shouldn’t expect a “perfect agreement” because as with all negotiations, “compromises will need to be made”. But the fact remains that if a mutually acceptable deal is reached, “we’re avoiding an Iranian nuclear weapon and another war in the Middle East.”
Who can argue against that?
Photo: The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, shakes hands with International Atomic Energy Agency chief Yukiya Amano, right, on Nov. 13, 2013 after signing an agreement in Tehran to allow inspectors broader access to Iranian nuclear sites.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
Dennis Ross, President Obama’s former top Middle East aide, writes that the exclusion of Hashemi Rafsanjani from Iran’s June 14 election signals that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is uninterested in a nuclear deal:
I say that not because Rafsanjani would have been capable of initiating [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Dennis Ross, President Obama’s former top Middle East aide, writes that the exclusion of Hashemi Rafsanjani from Iran’s June 14 election signals that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is uninterested in a nuclear deal:
I say that not because Rafsanjani would have been capable of initiating a deal on his own — any deal he might strike would still have to be acceptable to the Supreme Leader — but because if the Supreme Leader were interested in an agreement, he would probably want to create an image of broad acceptability of it in advance. Rather than having only his fingerprints on it, he would want to widen the circle of decision-making to share the responsibility. And he would set the stage by having someone like Rafsanjani lead a group that would make the case for reaching an understanding. Rafsanjani’s pedigree as Khomeini associate and former president, with ties to the Revolutionary Guard and to the elite more generally, would all argue for him to play this role.
Alireza Nader, a Rand analyst specializing on Iran, tells LobeLog the election has more to do with the power struggle in Tehran than Iran’s nuclear program. “Rafsanjani’s disqualification was a result of the rivalry between the former president and Khamenei. The nuclear program is important in Khamenei’s calculations, but it doesn’t appear to be the most important motivation,” said Nader.
In a Rand report released today, Nader expands on this notion, arguing that Khamenei is “primarily concerned with regime security”:
Khamenei will still play the decisive role on nuclear policy after the election. But the next Iranian president could have an opportunity to defuse some of the tensions created by Ahmadinejad. This is not to suggest that the election will lead to an immediate resolution of the crisis, but it is safe to assume that the next president will be less polarizing and more diplomatic than his predecessor. This could provide a limited easing of the nuclear stalemate, but the true problem for Iran’s nuclear program stems from conflicting interests between the United States and Iran, not from vexing personalities.Ross, unlike Nader, does not even allow for the possibility that a new presidential era in an economically pressured Iran — now free from the rabble-rousing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — could present an opening for a less “intransigent position.”
Unlike Nader, Ross doesn’t even allow for the possibility that a new presidential era in an increasingly pressured Iran — free from the rabble-rousing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — could present an opening for a less intransigent position. Still, Nader admits that Iran’s next president is likely to pursue the Supreme Leader’s nuclear policy:
…Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator with the P5+1 and one of the main presidential candidates, tends to parrot Khamenei’s discourse of “resistance” regarding the United States. From Tehran’s standpoint, the answer to new and harsher sanctions could be a policy of greater intransigence, a policy that would be supported by both Khamenei and possibly the new president.
As if on cue, the Supreme Leader made another speech yesterday (for the anniversary of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death) urging the presidential candidates not to submit to Western pressure. “Some, following this incorrect analysis – that we should make concessions to the enemies to reduce their anger – have put their interests before the interests of the Iranian nation. This is wrong,” he said.
The US’ current approach has failed to compel Tehran to change it’s nuclear stance, so why not try something new? Enter the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, which published a report on the Iranian sanctions regime this week. ”To make genuine progress on the Iranian nuclear issue, the Obama administration and Congress must shift their focus toward sanctions relief and compromise, rather than sticking with the pressure-only approach that’s proving increasingly counterproductive,” write Usha Sahay and Laicie Heeley. Of course, the opposite seems to be happening.
]]>Sanctions Are Holding Back Our Talks with Iran
by Usha Sahay and Laicie Heeley
There is a consensus in Washington that more sanctions will help convince Iran to halt its nuclear development. On June 3, President Obama issued an executive order — his sixth in two years —
Sanctions Are Holding Back Our Talks with Iran
by Usha Sahay and Laicie Heeley
There is a consensus in Washington that more sanctions will help convince Iran to halt its nuclear development. On June 3, President Obama issued an executive order — his sixth in two years — announcing new sanctions targeting Iran’s currency and its auto industry. Meanwhile, a number of separate sanctions bills are being circulated in Congress, with additional penalties expected to be passed later this summer. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez recently remarked, “The sanctions are working – but they aren’t enough, and they aren’t working fast enough.”
The logic of both the White House and Congress seems to be that we need more sanctions to compel Iran to negotiate and freeze its controversial nuclear program. But our research suggests the opposite: repeated intensifications of economic pressure are not bringing Iran to the negotiating table. In fact, sanctions now appear to be pushing the long-sought-after nuclear agreement further away.
A report released this week by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation concluded that sanctions are not “working” the way they should be. Yes, they’ve hit Iran’s economy hard — but that doesn’t mean the policy is succeeding. Crucially, sanctions haven’t persuaded Iran’s leadership to come to an agreement with the West and may have begun to strengthen the Iranian regime and cement its determination to continue defying the international community.
How is it that sanctions are doing the opposite of what they were supposed to? This wasn’t always the case. Particularly in the early years of the Obama administration, when the President exerted considerable political muscle to get international allies on board with tough penalties on Iran, sanctions helped signal to Tehran that the international community was serious about the nuclear issue. Moreover, by focusing on sanctions instead of taking the drastic step toward military action, the President showed a preference for resolving the impasse through diplomacy rather than war.
Since then, however, a curious thing has happened. Thanks to the sheer number of sanctions that have been put in place, the American commitment to a diplomatic solution appears increasingly hollow. Theoretically, Iran should be interested in talking to the West in order to negotiate for sanctions relief. But the actual process of lifting sanctions is far more complicated than it appears — a number of legal and political hurdles have prevented the U.S. and its European allies from credibly committing to significant sanctions relief during negotiations with Iran.
For instance, sanctions passed by Congress require another act of Congress before they can be repealed and U.S. lawmakers would be loath to pass such legislation for fear of appearing weak on Iran. Another problem is that many sanctions are written with built-in conditions that need to be met before they can be terminated. Some of these conditions are so out of reach that Iran may no longer see a point in even showing up for the negotiations.
Due to all the strings attached to sanctions legislation, Iranians perceive the U.S. as being more interested in sanctions than in coming to an agreement.
Even as these legal and bureaucratic difficulties stall the diplomatic process, the impact of sanctions within Iran is also hurting U.S. interests. Rather than weakening the defiant regime, sanctions have actually given the Iranian government the ability to manage the economy and consolidate its power. Through patronage, currency manipulation, and other methods, Iran’s leaders have taken advantage of the sanctions by forcing people in dire economic straits to rely on special government favors.
Meanwhile, younger Iranians and political moderates — who, somewhere down the line, could be useful allies for the U.S. — are seeing their economic and political power diminished. They’re also starting to blame the West for their woes.
In the long term, then, sanctions are eroding American influence in Iran. And in the short term, sanctions aren’t giving the U.S. and its allies the leverage they need in nuclear negotiations. More sanctions, according to our research, will not solve this problem. In fact, more sanctions will make the problem harder to solve. As veteran Middle East diplomat Ryan Crocker recently warned, “…it seems to me that the more you press this regime, the more they dig in.”
On June 3, while unveiling the new executive branch sanctions, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney noted, “Even as we intensify our pressure on the Iranian government, we hold the door open to a diplomatic solution.” Carney’s comments obscured a troubling reality: sanctions no longer go hand in hand with the diplomatic process. Rather, sanctions are hindering efforts to negotiate with the Iranians and to resolve the problem peacefully.
Economic sanctions could have served as a useful element of a sophisticated, multi-faceted effort to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Now, however, sanctions are fast becoming the entirety of our policy — and a policy of pressure alone has little chance of succeeding. To make genuine progress on the Iranian nuclear issue, the Obama administration and Congress must shift their focus toward sanctions relief and compromise, rather than sticking with the pressure-only approach that’s proving increasingly counterproductive.
]]>by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay
After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily [...]]]>
by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay
After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily given up nuclear weapons, and no doubt Western negotiators hope for a similar outcome with Iran’s controversial nuclear activities. Previous negotiations with Iran fell apart in the summer of 2012, and the question on everyone’s mind is: will this time be different?
There’s reason to hope that it will. Certainly, some circumstances have shifted in ways that could be favorable to a deal. Most obviously, the squeeze of sanctions has made it much more difficult for Iran to defy the international community. The depletion of Iran’s currency reserves is testing the regime’s ability to sidestep sanctions, and leaders are worried about public discontent with the state of the economy. Iran has also been downgrading some of its enriched uranium to a level that can’t easily be converted to weapons-grade, which may be a small indication that the government is willing to moderate its stance. Key Iranian figures from the foreign minister to the intelligence ministry have also expressed a measure of willingness to cooperate with Western diplomatic efforts.
On the other hand, the path to negotiations has seen a number of stumbling blocks. Signals from Iran have been mixed at best. Supreme Leader Ali Khameini recently rejected the idea of negotiating with the United States, saying that Iran “would not be intimidated” by US pressure. Iran also just revealed plans to install thousands of new centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear facility. Finally, it’ll soon be election season in Iran, which means officials will be anxious not to be seen as caving under Western pressure.
Ultimately, though, all of this may not tell us much, because what lies behind us is far less important than what lies ahead. The hopeful or ominous developments of the past few months only matter insofar as they signal what negotiators will or won’t be willing to put on the table. To that end, it’s worth speculating not just about what this new centrifuge and that new statement might mean, but also about what compromises could be made to make this round the one that matters.
The crucial issue to resolve is Iran’s production of 20% enriched uranium, and Iran has been relatively more flexible on this than other matters. A workable deal might require Iran to deposit its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium abroad, stop enriching at the Fordow facility, and agree to limit future enrichment to a low level suitable for civilian power reactors. Under such a deal, Iran would also need to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, to facilitate future inspections. In exchange, the P5+1 could offer sanctions relief and a freeze on new sanctions.
That’s how a deal might ideally resolve the thorniest issues in Iran’s standoff with the West. But the talks could bring progress even if we don’t make it that far. An alternative strategy could focus on confidence-building measures, or “baby steps” that ease the two sides out of the straitjacket of mistrust that has constrained previous efforts. For instance, Iran could agree to temporarily halt uranium enrichment or to downgrade its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to the less potent form needed for civilian reactors. In exchange, the P5+1 could agree to temporarily suspend some key sanctions, which would open the door for further sanctions relief once other issues (the Fordow facility, the Additional Protocol, enrichment levels in the future) are resolved.
Negotiators might also take a big-picture approach that brings in other, more long-standing concerns, such as Iran’s alleged links to terrorist groups, suspicions of previous weapons development, and the question of gradually normalizing diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and the West.
In sum, although some forecasts for the talks have been gloomy, there actually is no dearth of options available — that is, if negotiators want to take them. It’s almost a truism to say, but a rehash of last year’s negotiations will only bring a rehash of last year’s dismal outcome. As Einstein famously said, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.
So this time in Almaty, let’s try a new approach, one oriented around mutual concessions rather than stubborn digging into unworkable positions. If we do that, with any luck, this time really can be different.
- Laicie Heeley is the senior policy analyst and Usha Sahay a Hurbert J. Scoville Peace Fellow, both at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a Washington-based non-profit think tank.
Photo: The 19 September 2012 meeting of EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Dr. Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in Istambul, Turkey. (Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS)
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