Looking back over the past year, Moscow appears to have good reason to congratulate itself on the success of its foreign policy toward Iran and Syria in particular, and toward the Middle East in general. Indeed, while they did not necessarily do so at Moscow’s behest, several actors that play an [...]]]>
Looking back over the past year, Moscow appears to have good reason to congratulate itself on the success of its foreign policy toward Iran and Syria in particular, and toward the Middle East in general. Indeed, while they did not necessarily do so at Moscow’s behest, several actors that play an important role in the Middle East have come around to adopting policy approaches that Russian leaders have been urging on them.
The Russian position on the Iranian nuclear issue has long been that while Moscow does not want Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, it does not want America and its allies to pursue this goal either through the use force or further ratcheting up of economic sanctions against Iran. Moscow has long called for a negotiated settlement to this issue involving Tehran taking steps to reassure the international community that it is not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for a relaxation of the international sanctions regime.
In the past few months, this is exactly what has happened. Secret Iranian-American negotiations led to an interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, and to subsequent negotiations for a permanent settlement. The prospects for armed conflict over the nuclear issue, which Moscow has sought to prevent, have definitely receded.
Since the inception of the Arab Spring conflict in Syria, Putin and his associates have claimed that the Assad regime, despite its problems, is better than the opposition forces seeking to replace it, which Moscow has characterized as consisting largely of radical Sunni Islamists whose victory would threaten Western interests as much as Russian ones. While not outwardly agreeing with Moscow on Assad, several other governments that have called for him to step aside have grown increasingly nervous about the nature of the Syrian opposition.
Further, three governments in particular have made policy changes that support the Russian goal of keeping Assad in power. In Egypt, the ouster of the elected Islamist President, Mohamed Morsi, by Egypt’s secular military also resulted in Cairo moving from being sympathetic to unsympathetic toward the Syrian opposition.
After the Assad regime used chemical weapons against its opponents in August 2013, the Obama administration first threatened the use of force against it but then accepted the Russian proposal for an internationally sanctioned effort to remove chemical weapons from Syria. Since this process depended heavily on the cooperation of the Assad regime, the Obama administration’s support for it resulted in tacit American acceptance of its continuation in power — something that the Syrian opposition and their supporters in the Gulf resented bitterly.
In addition, while the Turkish government has previously been strongly supportive of Syrian opposition efforts to oust Assad, recently Ankara launched military strikes against jihadist forces inside Syria — thus signaling it may be coming round to accepting the Russian view that the Assad regime is better than that which seeks to replace it.
Regarding both Iran and Syria, then, policy changes by others have recently become more supportive of Russian foreign policy preferences. There is no guarantee, however, that this will remain the case going forward.
The US Government has recently expressed concern that the Assad regime is dragging its feet on the chemical weapons agreement. If this continues, Russian interests could be hurt. If the US Government comes to believe that Moscow is supportive of the Assad regime’s lack of cooperation in this matter, a decidedly negative image of Russian intentions is likely to re-emerge in Washington. Under these circumstances, the Obama administration might well be unable to resist the likely rise of demands in Congress and by some US allies to seek retaliatory measures against Moscow for having duplicitously led Obama to believe that Assad would cooperate on the chemical accord. But even if Moscow were not blamed for the Syrian government’s recalcitrance, Washington would still come to see Putin as unable to deliver Assad on the chemical issue (as had been previously believed) — and thus there would be no point in further coordinating with Moscow on this issue.
While a deterioration of the situation regarding Syria could serve to marginalize Russia, an improvement of the situation regarding Iran could do so too. If indeed real progress is made in resolving the nuclear issue, then economic sanctions against Iran will be lifted either in whole or in part and Iranian cooperation with the West will increase. To the extent that Iranian relations with the West (especially the U.S.) improves, the less need Iran will have for relying on Russia — with which it has had a prickly relationship up to now despite their common animosity toward the U.S.
Furthermore, reduced economic sanctions on Iran could well result in Tehran producing and exporting far more oil than it does now, thus depressing oil prices and reducing the income of other oil exporters, including Russia. The desire to avoid this may have motivated Moscow to enter negotiations with Tehran over a bilateral exchange agreement worth $1.5 billion per month whereby Russia would reportedly buy up to 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil per day in exchange for Russian goods. But even if such a Russian-Iranian agreement comes into force, Tehran is hardly likely to forego the opportunity to increase oil exports to the rest of the world if the sanctions regime is relaxed.
So while Russian foreign policy toward Iran and Syria has benefited from recent events going Moscow’s way, its success is highly fragile as it could easily be damaged by the situation in Syria further deteriorating or by the situation regarding Iran improving.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
For three years, the Syrian civil war has continued unabated; and for three years, the so-called “international community” has achieved almost nothing — other than to head off the war’s escalation over the use of chemical weapons following President Barack Obama’s ill-considered drawing of a so-called red line [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
For three years, the Syrian civil war has continued unabated; and for three years, the so-called “international community” has achieved almost nothing — other than to head off the war’s escalation over the use of chemical weapons following President Barack Obama’s ill-considered drawing of a so-called red line against such use.
Another try begins tomorrow in Geneva. But this meeting, dubbed “Geneva II” in reference to the last attempt in 2012, is already star-crossed. Late last week UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon invited Iran to take part. This was a reasonable, indeed necessary step, given that Iran is deeply engaged in all the relevant issues and could well be in a position to scotch any agreement.
Then, yesterday, the Secretary General rescinded the invitation. The reason — or pretext — for doing so? That Iran was unwilling to accept a key component of Geneva I: in effect providing for the departure from power of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. The actual formulation: “The establishment of a transitional governing body which would exercise full executive powers.” In the interpretation by Assad’s opponents, that means he has to go. That transitional body “…could include members of the present government…,” but it would be “…formed on the basis of mutual consent,” which of course would not be granted to President Assad. (This is the full text of the June 30, 2012 “Action Group for Syria Final Communique.”)
Reportedly, pressure on the Secretary General to rescind his invitation came principally from the US and the UK. If Iran would be in Geneva, the opposition would not: ergo, no negotiations. Of course, this begs the question of cui bono: who potentially has most to gain from the talks? Since the opposition has not been winning on the ground, this was a bluff that might have been called.
But the Obama administration had to consider a further factor: parallel negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. These are already fraught with difficulties, notably, the opposition to the interim agreement by Israel, Persian Gulf oil states, and many members of the US Congress. The timing of the Geneva fracas was also important: yesterday, both Iran and its interlocutors began to implement the Joint Plan of Action, including some relaxation of sanctions. Was it worth risking even more intense political opposition to Washington’s dealing with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program by allowing Tehran to come to Geneva? By the same token, there is also risk that the “disinvitation” will play into Iranian hard-liners’ opposition to dealing with the American Great Satan. Hopefully the administration has accurately calculated that risk.
There is a broader context. President Obama faces difficult choices in his Middle East strategy, conditioned in major part by domestic politics and pressures. He cannot at one and the same time exert pressure on the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, allow Iran to join the Syria negotiations, and pursue a nuclear agreement with Iran that includes reducing sanctions. The obvious strategic priority is boxing in the Iranian nuclear program, even if that risks postponing serious attempts to stop the killing in Syria.
Thus the Syria talks do not begin auspiciously, to say the least.
The imbroglio over Iran’s participation also reveals two other fault lines. The first derives from a requirement that Obama imposed in 2011, in addition to his red line against the use of chemical weapons — namely that Assad must go. To resolve the Syrian conflict, that condition may be necessary. But to make it a precondition was hardly likely to encourage Assad and his government to “play ball.”
Even more, there is little willingness to understand that Assad acts not just for himself but as leader of a significant, though minority part of the Syrian population, the community of Alawites, a Shi’a sect. Notably, at Geneva I, only Iraq represented a Shi’a perspective; and with Iran now excluded, the same is true of Geneva II. Geneva I did argue that in Syria “There is an overwhelming wish for a state that.…[0]ffers equal opportunities and chances for all…. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.” But as with so much international diplomacy, “wishful thinking” is unlikely to reassure the part of the population being asked to give up power and possibly to face savage retribution.
To be sure, the Alawite minority has dominated the rest, including the majority Sunni community; and to end the civil war, that situation has to change. But without providing solid assurances to the Alawite community (and to others), chances of a peaceful settlement are zero.
The second fault line is that Syria’s civil war is part of a broader struggle for power and preeminence throughout the region, at one critical level between Sunnis and Shi’as. The current phase in that struggle began with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, toppling a minority Sunni regime dominating a Shi’a majority population. The Syrian civil war is in major part a “get even” effort by Sunni states led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Worse, there is an influx of Islamist terrorists inspired, financed and armed by people in the same Sunni states that want to redress the Sunni-Shi’a regional balance.
The US and others thus face a dilemma at Geneva. They can persevere in demanding that Assad depart as part of “transitional” arrangements, while excluding a key regional player (Iran); or they can decide that Assad can remain and run for reelection (as he has said he would do), but in elections that are structured to redress at least some legitimate grievances of the non-Alawite community (Assad would lose such an election); that solid guarantees must be put in place for all Syrian communities, if that can be done; that all relevant outsiders be engaged at Geneva; and that states permitting free rein for Al Qaeda and its ilk must finally be called to account.
This is called strategy, diplomacy, leadership, willpower, and the willingness of the Obama administration to put US national interests ahead of domestic politics.
]]>by Wayne White
Most international attention remains focused on locating, inspecting and destroying Syria’s chemical weapons (CW) arsenal, but the bloody conventional civil war rages on. The process of getting rid of Syria’s CW probably will take at least until mid-2014, giving the international community an implicit stake in the Assad [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Most international attention remains focused on locating, inspecting and destroying Syria’s chemical weapons (CW) arsenal, but the bloody conventional civil war rages on. The process of getting rid of Syria’s CW probably will take at least until mid-2014, giving the international community an implicit stake in the Assad regime’s survival for quite some time despite the latter’s brutal effort to crush his opposition. The issue of getting military aid to the rebels seems partly adrift, and extremist rebels have been sparring with Syria’s Kurds in addition to ongoing efforts against regime forces and moderate opposition combatants. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation worsens, and the prospects for peace talks in Geneva next month look iffy at best.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) announced on Oct. 27 that Syria had met the deadline for submission of an initial declaration covering its entire CW program and a proposed plan for destruction. There was concern that the regime might drag its heels (still a possibility as events play out) to prolong the process of keeping major outside players vested in the regime as long as possible. Syrian ally Russia, which also wants all CW out of Syria to prevent any from falling into jihadist hands, probably warned Damascus to cooperate expeditiously. Still, a process that some hoped could be finished within about six months already has been extended by the OPCW through the end of June 2014.
The CW elimination process has had, of course, little effect on the continuing bloodletting between the Syrian regime and the armed opposition. Just last week, government forces succeeded in cutting off a key rebel-held suburb of Damascus from resupply, placing it under siege. After heavy fighting between extremist rebels and government forces over a Christian town in the north adjacent to the vital north-south highway, the regime prevailed yesterday. Amidst other fighting, the regime claims to have killed dozens of rebels and a major militant combatant leader. Rebel militants also have been fighting along the Turkish border with elements of a Syrian Kurdish militia charged with keeping the civil war out of Kurdish areas.
Regime air strikes and heavy artillery fire remain the leading causes of destruction and civilian casualties, especially in the Damascus suburbs (one of which has held out despite a government siege of nearly a year). And for every report of a human rights violation by one side or the other, there doubtless are many more that go unreported. In fact, despite occasional focus on incidents involving executions, the government’s indiscriminate shelling and bombing of cities and towns results in a continuous stream of such violations (most all of which go unreported in any specificity).
Making the plight of civilians trying to survive amidst this ugly maelstrom worse, neither the government nor many of the rebels have welcomed humanitarian aid. Valerie Amos, UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, told the Security Council on the 25th that the UN appeal to all warring parties to permit the free flow of such aid three weeks ago largely has been rebuffed. The Assad regime wants besieged rebel-held areas to suffer in order to wear down resistance, and many rebel groups (mostly the extremists) mistrust humanitarian workers particularly because they fear such personnel might collect intelligence inside rebel-held areas.
An estimated 2.5 million civilians currently remain in besieged or otherwise largely cut off areas, many already in great distress. The onset of winter will render their situation critical in many cases, resulting in a rise in deaths from exposure, malnutrition, and lack of medical attention. A jarring development reported by the World Health Organization is an outbreak of polio in the eastern province of Deir al-Zor — the first such outbreak in Syria since 1999. This highly contagious disease will be far more difficult to address because of heavy fighting in that area, reduced access to basic hygiene, and crowding.
In terms of munitions, it is unclear how well relatively moderate or extreme rebel factions have been supplied of late. Government troops reportedly uncovered a large cache of rebel arms near Damascus last week, but the reliability of the claim — as well as the question of which rebel groups have such stocks and which do not — is difficult to sort out. One thing does seem clear: on the whole, extremist combatants are far better armed than their moderate counterparts (even attracting secular recruits simply because extremists have the weaponry needed to counter the regime). So, despite reverses at the hands of the regime, their dominance of the rebel combatant movement has been expanding.
Despite promises made to “vetted” moderate fighting groups, US policy remains conflicted by the fear of arms falling into jihadist hands. Still more potential disruption to already sputtering military assistance to such rebels could result from Saudi Arabia’s recent tantrum over American actions across the Middle East (including those concerning Syria), which included a purported Saudi threat to end or reduce Riyadh’s cooperation with Washington on aiding “vetted” rebel groups.
Circumstances prevailing now hold little promise for the US-Russian sponsored peace talks involving the regime and opposition leaders originally set for late November (which may have to be postponed). The opposition’s Syrian National Coalition (SNC) leadership in exile has not yet agreed to attend. Aware of militant opposition, Secretary of State John Kerry has encouraged the SNC’s moderate component “to make up its own mind.” Yet, if the SNC as a whole (or in part) opted to attend, that would damage already strained ties between the coalition and many rebel combatant groups doing the actual fighting inside Syria.
Meanwhile, UN Syria envoy Lakhdar Brahimi (who just arrived in Damascus) has called for Iranian participation, which he deemed “natural and necessary.” The US, however, stipulated in early October that in order to attend Tehran would have to accept the 2012 Geneva conference’s call for a transitional government to rule Syria (at least partially supplanting the Assad regime). Should this condition stand, not only the Iranians, but perhaps also the Syrian government could decide to stay away.
Finally, even if all parties could be badgered into attending, the achievement of the principal objective (a peace deal) remains highly elusive. The regime now holds the military upper hand, and surely would not cede power or agree to push aside key leaders like Bashar al-Assad. And the opposition (although difficult to capture in one word given its deep divisions) is loath to make concessions that would allow the cabal it so despises to maintain any power.
Photo: Civilians near the Syrian village of Ma’arrat al-Numan. Credit: Shelly Kittleson/IPS
]]>by Chas Freeman
An acquaintance who, like me, used to work on foreign affairs in the U.S. government, told me the other day that he thought that, in going after Bashar al-Assad, President Barak Obama had decided on an approach more akin to Bush 41 (carefully building a consensus) than Bush 43 [...]]]>
by Chas Freeman
An acquaintance who, like me, used to work on foreign affairs in the U.S. government, told me the other day that he thought that, in going after Bashar al-Assad, President Barak Obama had decided on an approach more akin to Bush 41 (carefully building a consensus) than Bush 43 (you are either with us or against us). He added that, to make a success of bombing Syria as Bush 41 made of bombing Iraq in the first Gulf War, the president didn’t just need the support of the Congress and the public but also of NATO, the Arab League, and a coalition of the willing. But the obstacles Obama faces are much greater than those George H. W. Bush did and I don’t think the analogy to the first Gulf War really holds.
The circumstances today are totally different than in 1990, when strong impulses to rally behind the United States borne of the Cold War continued to animate allied decisions. There is no longer a common external threat to draw other countries into formation behind us. Two decades of perceived American indifference to allied and friendly views on a wide range of issues have taken their toll, especially in the Middle East and Europe. The Syrian issue, although greatly complicated by foreign players within the region and beyond it, has no global context of Manichean struggle to channel reactions to it.
In 1990-1991, as the USSR collapsed, the Russians ceased to be a significant factor in the Middle East, erasing the bipolar order of the past and freeing Saddam wrongly to assume that he could act on his own and with impunity against Kuwait. In 2013, the region is driven by regional rather than global dynamics but, thanks to events in Egypt and Saudi disillusionment with the U.S. policies of the past thirteen years, Russia is on the make and poised for a comeback as a strategic player in the Middle East.
In 1990, the world’s Muslims were solidly anti-communist and mostly well-disposed to the United States. Anti-communism is now an irrelevancy. The fallout from 9/11, the failed American pacification campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and U.S. identification with Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Gaza have replaced Muslim goodwill with animosity. The appeal of American values has been tarnished by numerous abuses, and the worldwide credibility of U.S. intelligence is low. The British defection from the enterprise leaves our pretensions to speak and act for the “international community” in tatters. (The poodle has left the American lap and walked off the job. The French are halfheartedly applying for the position. They aren’t house-trained and will want too much to get it.)
Major actors in the international community, such as it is, value the institutions that embody it, the U.N., the U.N. Charter, and international law, to none of which the U.S. has deferred, except highly selectively, since our Kosovo intervention with NATO in October 1998. Fifteen years of selective adherence to treaties and laws greatly detract from the credibility of our claim now to be acting to enforce the Geneva Convention of 1929 in Syria, especially when the “international community” as well as the Arab League and our own allies have declined to authorize us to do so. Abroad, we are not seen as righteous vigilantes on behalf of humanitarian principles but as proponents of the theses that military might confers right, that military actions trump diplomacy (which is mostly just for show), and that political solutions are for wimps. There will be no international rally behind an essentially unilateral U.S. attack on Syria. On the contrary, if we carry out such an attack, it will further diminish our international standing and leadership. Illegal actions to enforce legality are the very definition of cynicism.
When Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, it was a clear and abrupt challenge to the rule of law in the post-Cold War era, not to mention an obvious threat by a single, very selfish state to monopolize the world’s major sources of energy. From the outset, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia sought and received U.N. authorization to “form a posse” to deal with these challenges. The atrocities in Syria are the product of a civil war, not of a violation of any other country’s sovereignty. The situation in Syria is also an unfolding humanitarian catastrophe that has been allowed to fester for over two years, with respect to which the U.N. has been marginalized and is now ignored by us and some other players. Whatever happens, it is highly unlikely that we will accede to the desire of other great powers that we defer to the U.N. and hence to their interest in international norms of behavior. For this reason, President Obama is likely to take a drubbing from allies, friends, and adversaries alike at the upcoming G-20 meeting in St. Petersburg, where he must make the case for what he has unilaterally decided but Congress has yet to approve.
To my mind, the most interesting and significant aspect of what has just happened — the issuance of an order to attack, followed by its sudden suspension until Congress can review it — is the domestic rediscovery of the fact that wars cannot be successfully mounted or sustained without a measure of domestic political backing. (In tactical terms, this is an attempt to share the political blame and pin the charge of vacillation and weakness on the Republican House.) There is a chance that, in the course of debating the order to attack Syria, someone will actually read our Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11) on how wars are to be legally authorized. I note that, in his statement Saturday, the president claimed inherent authority to make war. I hope that this concept, like the divine right of kings in its pedigree, is appropriately challenged in the debate. Unfortunately, the divine right of legislatures, an equal problem in the breakdown of the separation of powers and hence the operation of our system of government, will not be challenged.
Getting our country, our government, and the president’s authority in foreign affairs into the multiple conundrums in which they now find themselves was the work of many administrations and Congresses, not just poor Mr. Obama (as the venerable Israeli peace activist, Uri Avnery aptly termed him in a recent column). I don’t think anyone could envy the position our president is now in domestically or internationally. He was dealt a bad hand. He has not played the game in such a way to pick up better cards since. Now his bluff has been called.
– Chas Freeman served as U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the war to liberate Kuwait and as Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1993-1994. Since 1995, he has chaired Projects International, Inc., a Washington-based firm that creates businesses across borders for its American and foreign clients. He was the editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica entry on “diplomacy” and is the author of five books, including “America’s Misadventures in the Middle East” and “Interesting Times: China, America, and the Shifting Balance of Prestige.”
by Peter Jenkins
For the last week the British government has given every sign of being in a dreadful muddle over how to react to the suspicion that chemical weapons (CW) were used in the suburbs of Damascus early on 21 August.
Two words that ought to have featured prominently in ministerial [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
For the last week the British government has given every sign of being in a dreadful muddle over how to react to the suspicion that chemical weapons (CW) were used in the suburbs of Damascus early on 21 August.
Two words that ought to have featured prominently in ministerial statements, “due process”, were entirely absent. Instead, Messrs William Hague and James Cameron spoke at times as though the UK and its Western allies were fully entitled to act as judge, jury and executioner.
I hope I won’t offend US readers if I say that Europeans half expect that sort of mentality from US leaders. We look on the US as a country in which habits formed in the Wild West in the nineteenth century resurface from time to time. But from our own European politicians, schooled by centuries of intra-European conflict, we look for more measured and cautious responses.
Reinforcing the impression of indifference to international legality, British ministers seemed hopelessly confused about how the precipitate use of force that they were advocating could be justified, and about what it was supposed to achieve.
At one moment President Bashar al-Assad had to be “punished”; at another the West had to “retaliate” for his use of CW (although so far Western nationals are not reported to be among the victims).
Some statements suggested that the West should act to uphold an international norm against the use of CW, others that the West had to act in order to protect Syria’s population from further CW attacks (although none of the military measures reportedly under consideration can come close to delivering “protection”).
Mercifully, as of 29 August, it looks as though Messrs Hague and Cameron are at last starting to come to their senses, sobered perhaps by parliamentary resistance to signing a blank cheque for a resort to force and by opinion polls suggesting that the British public is opposed to force by a margin of more than two to one.
To those of us who are familiar with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) this pantomime has been puzzling.
Syria is one of (only) seven states that have not ratified the CWC. The rational way to proceed, however, is to treat Syria, mutatis mutandis, as though it were a CWC party, since the norm enshrined in the CWC dates back to 1925 and is, effectively, a global norm, a norm that no state can reasonably reject (unlike the so-called “right to protect”, propagated by Mr. Blair and others, which is far from being universally accepted).
The relevant provisions of the CWC can be summarised as follows:
- CWC parties are entitled to request “challenge inspections” to clarify possible instances of non-compliance with the Convention’s prohibitions, and to have this inspection conducted “without delay”;
- The inspection team will produce a report which contains factual findings as well as an assessment of the cooperation extended by the inspected party;
- The inspected party has a right to comment on that report and to have its comments submitted to other parties;
- The parties shall then meet to decide whether non-compliance has occurred, and whether further action may be necessary “to redress the situation and to ensure compliance”.
Note the emphasis on giving the inspected party a right to comment before parties come to conclusions about what the inspection report implies. This could be especially important in the Syrian case if, as leaked signal intelligence implies, a Syrian army unit used CW last week against the wishes of the Syrian Ministry of Defence.
Note, too, the emphasis on redressing the situation. What matters in Syria now, if the UN inspectors report that government CW were used last week, is that the government take steps to ensure that this never happens again. Ideally, the UN Security Council (acting, so to speak, on behalf of CWC parties in this instance) can persuade the Syrian government to adhere to the CWC and destroy its CW stocks under international supervision. There will be no resistance to that outcome from Russia, Iran or China, all fervent supporters of the CWC.
Note, finally, the absence of any reference in the CWC to the “punishing” of non-compliance. That is consistent with a view that it is inappropriate for sovereign states to treat one another like common criminals (a view to which the West eagerly subscribes when the non-compliant state is Israel). Of course, if the Syrian government wishes to punish the commander(s) of any unit(s) found to have been responsible for last week’s outrage, this is another matter.
By giving priority to “due process” and “redressing the situation” Western leaders have an opportunity to set a good precedent for the handling of future challenges to global norms.
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