Considering the misleading claims made about non-existent Iraqi and Iranian nuclear weapons, and the ramifications of another costly and catastrophic war, there should be more analyses like Scott Peterson’s highlighting of lessons from the lead-up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.
A declassified January 2006 report published in [...]]]>
Considering the misleading claims made about non-existent Iraqi and Iranian nuclear weapons, and the ramifications of another costly and catastrophic war, there should be more analyses like Scott Peterson’s highlighting of lessons from the lead-up to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.
A declassified January 2006 report published in September by the indispensable National Security Archive shows that CIA analysts allowed their search for non-existent Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to overshadow Saddam Hussein’s reasons for bluffing about them. Peterson accordingly suggests that Iranian attempts to eradicate traces of what appears to be previous weapons work (halted in 2003, according to the 2007 NIE), could be a face-saving measure rather than evidence of malicious intent. Increasing “scrutiny and distrust” directed at Iraq also led to counterproductive activities from both sides:
But that Iranian refusal – while at the same time engaging in “substantial” landscaping of the site, which the IAEA says undermines its ability to inspect it for traces of past nuclear work – echoes many Iraqi weapons inspections in the 1990s. In those standoffs, Iraqi officials often behaved as if they had something to hide, when in fact they did not.
As the CIA’s 2006 assessment states, “Iraq’s intransigence and deceptive practices during the periods of UN inspections between 1991 and 2003 deepened suspicions … that Baghdad had ongoing WMD programs.”
The CIA further notes that Iraqi attempts “to find face-saving means to disclose previously hidden information” meant that Iraqi attempts later to “close the books” only “reinvigorated the hunt for concealed WMD, as analysts perceived that Iraq had both the intent and capability to continue WMD efforts.…”
This led Iraq to one conclusion, similar to the public declarations of Iranian leaders today: “When Iraq’s revelations were met by added UN scrutiny and distrust, frustrated Iraqi leaders deepened their belief that inspections were politically motivated and would not lead to the end of sanctions,” read the CIA report.
Some analysts have dared to suggest that Iranian attempts to remove traces of halted weapons work is ultimately a positive sign. Consider the assessment of MIT international security expert Jim Walsh, who focuses on Iran’s nuclear program, talking about Parchin last week at a conference in Washington last week:
]]>So I think they had a weapons program; they shut it down. I think part of what was happening was at Parchin, this gigantic military base that the IAEA visited, but because it’s so large, they went to this building and not that building and that sort of thing. Then they get – IAEA gets some intel that says, well, we think the explosives work was being done in this building, and, you know, all this time, Iran’s being – Parchin’s being watched by satellites continuously, and there’s no activity there. Nothing for five years, right? And then – or – not five years, but some period of time – years.
So then, the IAEA says, well, we want to go to that building, and then suddenly, there’s a whole lot of activity. You know, there’s cartons put up and shoveling and scalping of soil and all that sort of thing. So I read this as – that was a facility involved in the bomb program, and they’re cleaning it up, and IAEA is not going to get on the ground until it’s cleaned up. Now here’s the part where I’m practical and blunt – I don’t care. Right? This is part of a program from the past. And I wish they didn’t have the program from the past, but I’m more worried about Iran’s nuclear status in the future than the past, and so, you know, if it’s dead, and all they’re doing is cleaning it up so there’s no evidence of what they did before, I – you know, it’s regretful and blah, blah, but I don’t care. I would rather get a deal that prevents Iran from moving forward towards a nuclear weapon or moving forward so that we don’t have a military engagement that leads to a nuclear weapons decision by Iran.
The Christian Science Monitor’s star reporter Scott Peterson – author of a must-read book on Iranian history and politics post-1979 — provides an in-depth report on the decision-making process of Iran’s Leader, Ali Khamenei.
From inside his former jail cell, to a lifetime fighting personalities greater than his [...]]]>
The Christian Science Monitor’s star reporter Scott Peterson – author of a must-read book on Iranian history and politics post-1979 — provides an in-depth report on the decision-making process of Iran’s Leader, Ali Khamenei.
From inside his former jail cell, to a lifetime fighting personalities greater than his own, Peterson examines how this bookworm “chic sheikh” cleric — who still reads 2-3 books a week — was elevated to Leader, and ruled until the 2009 crisis saw his portraits burn to chants of “Death to the Dictator!”
Major takeaway: history shows that anti-Americanism is not in Khamenei’s DNA — as practically everyone alleges — and that he has assented to exploring detente with the US when he sensed change on the US side.
]]>1. Meir Dagan. The [...]]]>
]]>1. Meir Dagan. The former head of the Mossad, who served from 2002-2011, called a unilateral Israeli attack on Iran “the stupidest thing I have ever heard” in March. He said that full success in destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities is unlikely, and that the likely outcome would be for the country to redouble it’s clandestine nuclear efforts in response to attack and remove all supervision from the International Atomic Energy Agency. He also worries about a broader war. “It will be followed by a war with Iran. It is the kind of thing where we know how it starts, but not how it will end.”
2. Yuval Diskin. Mr. Diskin ran the Shin Bet from 2005-2011. In April, he declared both Netanyahu and Barak unfit to lead Israel, accused them of “misleading the public on the Iran issue,” and said that contrary to their position that military action would deter Iran “many experts say that an Israeli attack would accelerate the Iranian nuclear race.”
3. Gabi Ashkhenazi. Gen. Ashkenazi, who was chief of staff of the IDF from 2007-2011, said in April that an attack on Iran would be a bad idea now, while expressing grave concern about Iran’s nuclear program. “I think we still have time. It is not tomorrow morning” when Israel needs to act, he said. “It is better to persuade our friends in the world and the region that it is a global threat and [the government] has done a good job on this.”
The crux of their argument is that advocates of the “military option” embrace two false [...]]]>
The crux of their argument is that advocates of the “military option” embrace two false claims: one, that a nuclear armed Iran would blackmail its neighbors, and two, that other countries would be forced to accommodate Iranian demands.
While neoconservatives and Iran hawks usually frame a nuclear-armed Iran as a unique and isolated situation, Fuhrmann and Sechser decide to look to the behavior of nuclear-armed countries to predict how Iran might act if it acquired the bomb.
A close look at the history of the nuclear age shows that countries with nuclear weapons are neither more likely to make coercive threats nor more likely to succeed in blackmailing their adversaries. Nuclear powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union certainly made numerous threats after they acquired nuclear weapons. But so did Libya, Serbia, Turkey, Iraq, Venezuela, and dozens of other countries that did not possess the bomb. Nuclear weapons are not a prerequisite for engaging in military blackmail.
And
Further, there is scant evidence that possessing the bomb makes coercive threats more successful when they are made. Nuclear weapons did not help the United States compel North Korea to release the USS Pueblo and its crew in 1968. Israeli coercive threats backed by the implicit threat of nuclear war failed against Syria prior to the 1982 Lebanon War, just as British threats against Argentina in 1982 were unable to compel the return of the Falkland Islands, despite Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons.
This is exactly the type of thinking that is noticeably missing from most discussions about Iran. Even Richard Haass, a self-proclaimed card-carrying realist and President of the Council on Foreign Relations, has joined the hysteria surrounding the idea of a nuclear Iran and, as I wrote nearly a year ago, publicly burned his realist card when he told CNN’s Fareed Zakaria:
What is an Iranian threat? Well, the idea of a Middle East in which not simply Iran, but other countries would then likely follow suit and have nuclear weapons. The idea that that would dramatically increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons would not only be introduced in the physical sense, but used, goes up tremendously with all that means for that part of the world, access to oil and the rest.
While Haass, along with his fellow Iran-hawks, are free to hypothesize about how a nuclear Iran might behave, the history of nuclear proliferation would suggest very much the opposite. Historically, the only time nuclear weapons were used was when just one country possessed them. But Iran hawks have typically rejected the realist notion that mutually-assured destruction would help deter a nuclear Iran.
Fuhrman and Sechser write:
Many hardliners say Iran’s ideological fervor makes it unique. US officials voiced similar concerns about Mao’s China in the early 1960s. But nuclear weapons did not embolden China. Iran today is certainly different from China in the 1960s, but policymakers would do well to remember that apocalyptic fears about nuclear proliferation are not new.
They conclude:
We should be careful to avoid the twin mistakes of inflating the Iranian threat and downplaying the dangers of military strikes. The United States and its allies should be resolved to curtail Iran’s nuclear program by supporting harsher economic sanctions, but they should not panic and take risky military gambles. Hysteria about nuclear weapons and blackmail is wrong – and potentially dangerous.
It’s a relief to see that political realism and the ability to put the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran in a historical context still exists. It’s reassuring to know that this view has not been completely overlooked in favor of hysteria over a supposedly irrational, suicidal, blackmailing, nuclear-armed Iran.
Indeed, it’s even more refreshing to hear this viewpoint voiced by Fuhrman, a Fellow at the same institution as Richard Haass.
]]>According to two cables released by the British Guardian newspaper (though not yet released by the anti-secrecy Wikileaks organization), Yukiya Amano, who took over as IAEA chief a year ago, said that his role would be less political than his predecessor (Mohamad El Baradai) and that he saw the IAEA primarily as a party to the safeguards agreement with Iran. In other words, he thinks the IAEA role in any P5+1 negotiations ought to be limited.
However, several months later, Amano told a U.S. diplomat that while the full body of the IAEA required him (rightly) to be impartial, “he was solidly in the U.S. court on every key strategic decision.” This includes “the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program,” according to the cable’s author.
In the lead-up to this week’s negotiations, Amano called on Iran to be more cooperative with the IAEA and cited “outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear program,” according to Scott Peterson in the Christian Science Monitor.
Peterson goes on:
But Iran may now see such criticism as part of a broader anti-Iranian slant, given a leaked American diplomatic cable from October 2009 that portrays Amano to be in lockstep with key aspects of US policy.
“It will give the Iranians another lever to apply in pursuance of a weapons-grade program,” says John Large, an independent nuclear expert in London. “For Iran, it really does mean that they don’t have a representative, they clearly don’t have the ear of anyone at the IAEA.”
The Guardian also rounds up and contextualizes related cables, concluding that Amano and the U.S. have a “cozy” relationship.
However, Peterson notes that since the IAEA plays such a technical role, its possible that, should even Iranian allegations of a bias against them be true, there may not be any concrete adverse consequences for Iran:
]]>Despite the Iranian interpretation of an anti-Iran slant from Amano – and stronger IAEA language toward Iran in the past year – any such bias may have a limited impact because of the technical nature of inspections and safeguard compliance.
The New York Times reports:
In a two-paragraph letter answering an invitation offered more than three months ago by the bloc’s foreign affairs chief, Catherine Ashton, the [...]]]>
The New York Times reports:
In a two-paragraph letter answering an invitation offered more than three months ago by the bloc’s foreign affairs chief, Catherine Ashton, the Iranians said their senior negotiator, Saeed Jalili, could hold discussions as of Nov. 10. Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said last month in New York that Iran was prepared to resume talks, but gave no specifics. [...]
Ms. Ashton called the Iranian agreement “very important,” but given the tortuous path of past talks, there was no sense that it signaled any breakthrough. [...]
Western officials have said they are not in any particular rush themselves to revive negotiations. New sanctions agreed to this summer are just beginning to bite, officials have said, and seem to be having an even greater impact on Iran than expected. On the other hand, they say, the longer this drags out, the more time Iran has to add to its stockpile of enriched uranium.
The Iranian letter pointed out that the talks would have to resume under the conditions of Mr. Jalili’s “letter of 6 July.” In it, the Iranian negotiator said that talks should aim to engage and cooperate, that they should be committed to the rationale of dialogue, and that Ms. Ashton should state her “position on the nuclear weapons of the Zionist Regime” — a reference to Israel, which does not confirm or deny that it has nuclear weapons.
On Saturday, Reuters added to the mix new comments from a media adviser to Ahmadinejad who said that Iran’s nuclear program would not be on the table at these talks (which are meant to be on Iran’s nuclear program):
Both sides have said the talks could happen after November 10, but Ali Akbar Javanfekr, a media adviser to the president, said they would not cover the nuclear issue — the one subject the other countries want to address.
“We will not be talking with the Western party about the nuclear energy issue in this round of the negotiations,” Javanfekr said, according to the semi-official Fars news agency. [...]
Javanfekr said the P5+1 countries had yet to address Ahmadinejad’s conditions for resuming talks. He did not say what the talks would cover if they do not address the nuclear issue.
Reuters went on to print recent comments by Ahmadinejad on the subject, including his demand that negotiating parties recognize Israel’s covert nuclear weapons arsenal (estimated at some 200 missiles); the Iranians seem delighted to draw attention to this hypocrisy.
The Obama administration, via a leak to the Times, recently tipped its hand about its soon-to-be-renewed fuel swap proposal.
In its report about the Iranian offer, the Christian Science Monitor noted that Turkey and China — two countries which Iran hawks view as part of the problem because of their trade ties to Iran and hesitance to endorse escalation measures — deserve credit for helping encourage the Iranians to get back to the table.
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