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IPS Writers in the Blogosphere » confidence-building https://www.ips.org/blog/ips Turning the World Downside Up Tue, 26 May 2020 22:12:16 +0000 en-US hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.5.1 Iran’s Enrichment Offer: So Near And Yet Not Far Enough https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/irans-enrichment-offer-so-near-and-yet-not-far-enough/ https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/irans-enrichment-offer-so-near-and-yet-not-far-enough/#comments Tue, 02 Dec 2014 18:26:42 +0000 Peter Jenkins http://www.lobelog.com/?p=27202 by Peter Jenkins

So much has been written and said about the uranium enrichment aspect of the 14-month nuclear negotiation with Iran that it is hard to look at it with fresh eyes, and starting from first principles. Nonetheless what follows is an attempt to do so. It suggests that the US and Iran are closer on enrichment than once seemed possible, but are still at risk of failing to find common ground in the course of the extension agreed a week ago.

From an international legal perspective the text that matters is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Iran deposited its last instrument of ratification on 5 March 1970, the same day as the deposit of the US instruments. Under the NPT the US is a “Nuclear Weapon State,” Iran a “Non-Nuclear Weapon State” (NNWS).

The NPT does not prohibit the acquisition of enrichment technology by NNWS. Nor does it impose any limit on the size or number of NNWS enrichment facilities. It merely requires NNWS to use that technology exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to place all the nuclear material fed into and produced by such facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

In the current negotiation, Iran has assured the US that it takes its NPT obligations very seriously. It has also reaffirmed its intention to use enrichment technology exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to continue to implement the NPT safeguards agreement that it concluded in 1975.

Some people assume that such assurances are worthless. They point to the breaches of the NPT safeguards agreement that occurred between approximately1991 and 2003. However, none of those breaches amounted to evidence of an intention to use enrichment for non-peaceful purposes. And US intelligence has yet to come across any such evidence; suspicion of Iranian nuclear weapon intent has rested on inference, not evidence. States, like people, can make mistakes and then resolve not to repeat them.

There are also several resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) between 2006 and 2010 that make legal demands of Iran. But none of them imposes limits on the size and number of Iranian enrichment facilities. Still less do any of them outlaw Iranian possession of enrichment technology for peaceful purposes. One of them requires Iran to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve concern that Iran has engaged in research into nuclear weapon-related technologies. Iran has been doing that since November 2013, albeit with increasing hesitancy.

In the Iranian case another perspective is as important as the legal perspective; it is the confidence-building perspective. This was crucial to an attempt to resolve the problem peacefully in the wake of the IAEA Director General reporting the safeguards breaches to which reference is made above, because these breaches had undermined confidence in Iran’s peaceful intentions.

In the autumn of 2003, Iran volunteered, in the interest of confidence-building, to go beyond the requirements of its NPT safeguards agreement and make available to the IAEA the information and access required by the Additional Protocol (AP). Tehran also undertook to suspend activity at its only enrichment facility while it negotiated longer-term confidence-building measures with the UK, France and Germany (E3). The Iranians implemented these short-term measures scrupulously and ceased doing so only after they had grasped that nothing less than renunciation of the enrichment option would satisfy the E3.

In the current negotiation, various reports suggest that Iran has so far volunteered to renew application of the AP, de facto initially and later de jure; to accept limits on the size and number of its enrichment facilities during a confidence-building period; to refrain from producing uranium enriched to more than 5% U235; to convert some of its under 5% U235 uranium (LEU) into forms in which it would not be readily available as feed material; and to send the rest of its LEU stock to Russia for use in the fuel that the Rosatom corporation is supplying to the power reactor at Bushehr. Iran’s negotiators also have reportedly suggested that they are ready to extend the Bushehr fuel supply contract well beyond 2021.

In parallel, Iran has negotiated that Rosatom will help build two further power reactors and will supply them with fuel throughout their operating lives.

In confidence-building terms, this amounts to an impressive package. With only 10,000 IR-1 centrifuges in operation in only one facility, and its LEU stock unavailable to serve as feed material, Iran would need at least six months to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for one nuclear device. With only 8000 IR-1s and no LEU feed, Iran would need at least eight months.

And if the Bushehr supply contract were extended to 2031, Iran would only need to consider increasing the available quantity of separative work units (a measure of centrifuge output) in the late 2020s.

In other words, Iran is offering a package that exceeds its NPT obligations by a wide margin. IAEA inspectors would be able to acquire confidence that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or material in Iran. The international community would know that it had six to eight months at least to react to any sign of Iranian misuse of its enrichment capacity for non-peaceful purposes.

So why in Vienna did it seem that this package is not enough for the US? That is for representatives of the US administration to explain. Past statements suggest that they will say that they need certainty that Iran will be incapable of producing (“cannot”) even one nuclear weapon.

That may sound reasonable but is in fact an unrealistic goal. It would require Iran not only to destroy all its centrifuges but also to wipe the minds of its engineers clean of all their knowledge and experience of enrichment technology. It also puts the negotiation at risk of the same fate as the 2003-5 E3 negotiation, because Iran is unready to build confidence by closing down its enrichment program. And it runs counter to the spirit of the NPT, since the NPT bases nuclear non-proliferation on self-restraint, political will, and deterrence through verification, not on nuclear technology surrender.

If instead the administration admits that it cannot literally “close all pathways” to a weapon but claims that it needs at least 12 months to react to any break-out attempt, then they should be asked why six to eight months would not be enough.

It is self-evident that 12 months of additional sanctions would not cause Iran to abandon a break-out attempt. Eight years of sanctions have failed to persuade Iran to re-suspend enrichment. Post-1918 history is littered with failed sanctions policies.

On the other hand, 12 months are more than are needed to get UN Security Council approval for the use of force to prevent break-out and to act on it—or for a coalition of the willing to form in the unlikely event of Russia or China threatening to veto a UNSC resolution. In 1990, only six months were needed for the US to gain approval for and prepare a massive operation to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. As recently as last April, Secretary John Kerry was formulating the goal as “six to 12 months.”

This analysis will be misconstrued by some as an apologia for Iran. Others will realize, I hope, that it is an attempt to clarify the progress that has been made on enrichment over the last 12 months; to explain why the current Iranian offer is reasonable from a legal and from a confidence-building perspective; and to counter the pernicious influence on US negotiating goals of people who want the bar set so high that Iran will refuse the jump.

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Obama’s Near East Trip: Time to be Bold https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/obamas-near-east-trip-time-to-be-bold/ https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/obamas-near-east-trip-time-to-be-bold/#comments Wed, 06 Mar 2013 13:57:46 +0000 Robert E. Hunter http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/obamas-mideast-trip-on-the-path-to-final-status/ via Lobe Log

by Robert E. Hunter

The stakes in President Barak Obama’s impending visit to Israel, the West Bank and Jordan have risen steadily in recent days. It is taking take place, after all, almost immediately following Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip around the region — but not to the same stops [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Robert E. Hunter

The stakes in President Barak Obama’s impending visit to Israel, the West Bank and Jordan have risen steadily in recent days. It is taking take place, after all, almost immediately following Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip around the region — but not to the same stops on the President’s tour — which, coming so soon after Kerry assumed office, almost inevitably can do little to advance America’s regional agenda. This agenda includes fostering regime change in Syria and ending its civil war; promoting political stability in Egypt and reinforcing its relationship with Israel; gaining Iran’s compliance on the nuclear issue; and setting the stage for a more salubrious course for the so-called Arab spring than has been seen so far, at least in the Near East. On top of that, Kerry had to deal with a complicating comment by the Turkish prime minister: “It is necessary that we must consider — just like Zionism, or anti-Semitism, or fascism — Islamophobia as a crime against humanity.” That slur did nothing to increase Israel’s confidence regarding its neighborhood.

Also inevitably, an unavoidable linkage between President Obama’s trip and the issue of the Iranian nuclear program was reinforced by the administration’s obligatory recitation of its policies before the annual meeting in Washington of AIPAC, “America’s pro-Israel lobby.” Vice President Biden was most dramatic: “President Barack Obama is not bluffing. He is not bluffing. We are not looking for war. We are looking to and ready to negotiate peacefully, but all options, including military force, are on the table.” That is nothing more than Obama has already said, in one way or another. But it comes immediately after the resumption of talks in Kazakhstan between Iran and the so-called “P5+1” countries — the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the European Union. These talks, containing at most a sliver of hope of future progress, were probably just a “time buyer” in any event — especially to get both sides past the Iranian presidential elections in June. But, now, “confidence-building,” assuming that it’s possible, will have to wait for another day.

President Obama’s trip thus does not begin on an upbeat note for America’s overall ambitions in the region. But on one level, that is almost beside the point. This is, after all, the first time he has been to Israel, more than four years into his presidency. The very fact of his going is thus important. A neat parallel was President Anwar Sadat’s almost-hectoring speech to the Israeli Knesset in 1978. At the time, I asked a leading Israeli whether Sadat’s words undercut his message of peace. “The fact that he was standing there in the Knesset,” my interlocutor said, “spoke so loudly I couldn’t hear what he was saying.”

So Obama will be there, underscoring by his presence not just that the US “has Israel’s back,” but also, made necessary by the fact of his trip, that Israel-Palestine negotiations are on his agenda. But what else?

Certainly, given the administration’s declared objective of restarting the moribund Israeli-Palestinian “peace process” — where Kerry has characterized failure as a “catastrophe” — Obama has to address the subject, and do so in more than pro forma terms. Most important is providing a sense of his own personal commitment, assuming that that is his intent, to seeing the process move forward, a highly-elastic term. One observer with about as much experience as anyone, Ambassador Dennis Ross, laid out his own 14 steps for confidence-building in last Sunday’s New York Times. While quite possibly realistic in terms of confidence-building, they are far from confidence-inspiring and are devoid of significant concrete goals, much less an end point, the so-called “final status.” Notably, Ross did not mention the so-called “Clinton Parameters,” of December 2000, which can be viewed here, and which are widely understood to be the only realistic basis for peace and the “two-state solution.”

While nothing is easy in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, the Clinton Parameters compete for the prize: land-swaps would incorporate most West Bank Jewish settlements into Israel; Jerusalem would be the capital of both Israel and a Palestinian state; Palestine would be essentially demilitarized, with Israel retaining some residual rights of defense; outside peacekeepers (probably NATO) would be introduced; and arrangements would be made for Palestinian refugees, certainly better than their current circumstances. But 12 years after these sensible ideas were put forward — and 33 years since negotiations began — success is not now even remotely in sight.

Obama’s peace mission — if that is how he sees his Near East trip — will be complicated by Israel’s deep security concerns, most immediately the civil war in Syria. Jerusalem and Damascus have had a tacit agreement since the mid-1970s to prevent a breakdown in their uneasy truce, but that is now in jeopardy. And although Egypt’s continuing commitment to its treaty with Israel, the latter’s geopolitical linchpin, will probably hold, this is not something on which Israel can bet the farm.

And then there is Iran and the nuclear conundrum. Of necessity, Obama will have to repeat, and perhaps even reinforce, what Vice President Biden said to AIPAC. He can express hopes for a peaceful outcome, but he will have to underline, and underline again, the military consequences if Iran does not respond in terms that the US, with Israel at its elbow, has set. This will not be the time or place for the US president to lay out a comprehensive strategy for dealing with Iran, including one essential element that has so far been missing: that the security needs not just of the US and Israel, but also of Iran, must all be on the table. Instead, Obama’s trip will be a time primarily to provide, and provide again, reassurances to Israel, the sine qua non for everything else.

This, of course, will do little to move forward efforts to defuse the time-bomb with Iran. But with those efforts necessarily being on hold until after its June elections, nothing should be expected from the US president, other than some reference to giving diplomacy a chance. But what of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process?

An old rule of thumb, based on both the facts and appearance of power, is that US presidents don’t do “fact-finding” or go on “listening tours.” They have mid-level officials to do that. What American presidents are expected to do by both friend (with hope) and foe (with fear), is to lead. Words will not suffice: Obama has already done that in Cairo, Ankara, and Accra with three essays in eloquence that advanced the proposition that hope buttressed by hard work can triumph over experience. Now the world waits to see his Act Two.

There is one thing to do: be bold. Not baby-steps, like those suggested by Dennis Ross — as well as by others over the years — and which have yielded so little for so long. The place to start consists of two steps that go directly to “final status.” First, to endorse in clear-cut terms the Clinton Parameters as the United States’ bottom-line, a formal commitment to a two-state solution — full stop; and second, to promise the diplomatic and other efforts needed to see them through to completion, whatever it takes. I have already argued for the appointment of Bill Clinton as Special Negotiator. Or perhaps the Secretary of State would want to do it, though that would necessarily take him away from the rest of his global duties. But the principle is clear: if the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians is ever to succeed — a huge “if” — the US president has to enunciate a concrete, simple, and unambiguous plan, set his seal to it, and be a bull terrier in carrying it through.

Be bold, Mr. President, or it would be better that you stay home.

Official White House Photo by Pete Souza

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On Clarifying Iran’s “Possible Military Dimension” https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/on-clarifying-irans-possible-military-dimension/ https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/on-clarifying-irans-possible-military-dimension/#comments Mon, 10 Dec 2012 12:01:13 +0000 Peter Jenkins http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/on-clarifying-irans-possible-military-dimension/ via Lobe Log

President Obama’s re-election last month raised hopes that the US government would at last be in a position, politically, to work with Iran towards a negotiated settlement centred on confidence-building and the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This was the basis of the understanding reached this April in Istanbul. It was therefore [...]]]> via Lobe Log

President Obama’s re-election last month raised hopes that the US government would at last be in a position, politically, to work with Iran towards a negotiated settlement centred on confidence-building and the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This was the basis of the understanding reached this April in Istanbul. It was therefore a little puzzling that during the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on 29 November, the US representative was once more engaging in a diplomacy of threats and ultimata.

The issue under discussion was the absence of progress in relation to clarifying concerns about past, but also possibly ongoing, Iranian activities of a non-peaceful nuclear nature, often referred to as a “possible military dimension” (PMD). The US representative asserted that Iran could not be allowed indefinitely to ignore “its obligations” and implied that in the event of a continuing absence of progress when the Board meets in March, the US will argue for Iran to be found in non-compliance with those obligations.

This raises two questions. To what extent is Iran in non-compliance with its IAEA obligations in failing to cooperate to resolve these concerns? And, is Iran likely to become more cooperative as a result of this threat?

It is widely accepted that Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA entitles the agency secretariat to verify not only that all nuclear material declared by Iran remains in peaceful use, but also that such declarations are correct and (most importantly) complete.

Notably, paragraph 73 of the standard NPT safeguards agreement (to which Iran is subject) states that the IAEA may request a special inspection if it deems information made available by a state inadequate for the Agency to fulfil its official responsibilities.

So, insofar as Iran is failing to cooperate to resolve concerns which may reasonably imply the existence of undeclared nuclear material, there is a case for saying that Iran is in breach of its obligation to cooperate.

However, in this instance it’s questionable whether all the activities for which Iranian cooperation has been sought imply with adequate credibility the possibility of undeclared nuclear material. These activities were described in the annex to GOV/2011/65 of 8 November 2011 (the IAEA report used to build support for further sanctions at the turn of the year). A careful reading of that annex suggests that several of these activities, maybe even the majority of them, would not have involved nuclear material.

Of course it could be argued that PMD activities not involving nuclear material, such as missile warhead design work, can imply that at some future stage a state intends to acquire nuclear material which it does not intend to declare. That, however, seems a very tenuous basis on which to base an IAEA non-compliance finding. Moreover, it would also imply that all states that have engaged, even as a precautionary measure, in research into any aspect of the design or construction of nuclear devices should be found non-compliant.

So, my first conclusion is that if the US decides in March to accuse Iran of fresh non-compliance, it should take care to focus the accusation on activities that can reasonably be suspected of involving the use of nuclear material and are manifestly not the figment of some other state’s imagination.

However, to come to my second question, is proceeding in that way likely to be productive? The experience of the last seven years suggests not. Each time the West has resorted to punitive or coercive measures to influence Iranian behaviour, the results have been either unproductive or, worse, counterproductive. Iran was far more cooperative when, between October 2003 and April 2005, a less aggressive diplomacy was used to influence Iran’s leaders.

Furthermore, for some time there have been hints that Iran’s failure to cooperate in resolving PMD concerns is not its last word. On the contrary, cooperation can be expected in return for Western flexibility on sanctions and certain assurances in the context of an overall settlement based on the provisions of a treaty to which Iran insists it’s committed to, the NPT.

Moreover, if Iranian suspicion of Western good faith is one of the greatest obstacles to achieving an agreement, then the priority in the coming months should be to overcome that suspicion. This will not be achieved by seeking yet again to unite the IAEA Board in a humiliating condemnation of Iran, least of all if the legal grounds for that condemnation are not watertight. On the contrary, securing a further IAEA non-compliance finding would be a rum way to go about convincing Iran’s Supreme Leader that the US should no longer be seen as the Great Satan.

If, nonetheless, the US persists on the non-compliance course and succeeds, what then? Will Russia and China allow Iran to be penalized in the absence of evidence that it has decided to make nuclear weapons and therefore constitutes a genuine threat to international peace and security? If they do, will Iran pay any more heed to such a resolution than it has to the five previous Chapter VII resolutions of dubious legitimacy?

It’s certainly desirable that light be shed on suspected research into nuclear warhead construction and delivery, especially if it involved or involves undeclared nuclear material. But at last US voters have created political space for the West to revert to less aggressive, less confrontational tactics. At last the West can afford to experiment with a more exploratory, empathetic approach. It would be a pity to squander that opportunity.

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Nuclear Talks with Iran: Prospects https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/nuclear-talks-with-iran-prospects/ https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/nuclear-talks-with-iran-prospects/#comments Fri, 02 Nov 2012 12:51:11 +0000 Peter Jenkins http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/nuclear-talks-with-iran-prospects/ via Lobe Log

The Western members of the P5+1 are showing signs of serious intent, if re-election of President Barack Obama allows nuclear-related talks with Iran to resume in the next few months.

This ought to be cheering news for all who believe that this dispute can be resolved according to the provisions of [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The Western members of the P5+1 are showing signs of serious intent, if re-election of President Barack Obama allows nuclear-related talks with Iran to resume in the next few months.

This ought to be cheering news for all who believe that this dispute can be resolved according to the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enhanced by some well-chosen, voluntary confidence-building measures.

Yet scepticism remains in order. Why? Several past opportunities to resolve the dispute through negotiation and confidence-building have been squandered. Two vital questions also remain imponderable: is Iran’s Supreme Leader really interested in a nuclear settlement, and will Israeli politicians resist the urge to exercise Israel’s formidable powers of influence in Western capitals to close down the political space for a negotiated outcome?

The Supreme Leader has not hidden his distrust of the United States and his aversion to the West’s “dual-track” approach. In August 2010, for instance, he is reported to have said: “We have rejected negotiations with the US for clear reasons. Engaging in negotiations under threats and pressure is not in fact negotiating.” And at Friday Prayers on 3 February 2012 he said:

We should not fall for the smile on the face of the enemy. We have had experience of them over the last 30 years… We should not be cheated by their false promises and words; they break their promises very easily. They feel no shame. They simply utter lies.

Does he, in addition, calculate that a nuclear settlement would not be in the interest of the Islamic Republic, even if the terms were fair and consistent with the NPT?

I have come across people who believe that this is the case. They argue that Iran’s leaders need the nuclear dispute to prevent a thaw in relations with the US which might bring about unwelcome social change; to mobilise popular support for the Islamic Republic; to distract attention from political repression, human rights abuses and the corrupt practices of an elite; and to excuse economic mismanagement.

I have no evidence for saying that this view is mistaken. If, however, I try to look at the issue “from the other side of the hill”, it seems to me that the Supreme Leader could afford to give up the nuclear dispute as a domestic political instrument; he would still be left with several other ways of arousing indignation against the West and of avoiding a thaw in relations with the US. And in cost/benefit terms, the gain from a nuclear settlement — if it results in the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions —  looks to me enticing.

On the other side of the equation, we are all familiar with the arguments Israel’s leaders will deploy if they do not want a nuclear settlement. They will claim that an Iranian enrichment capacity, though not outlawed by the NPT, and even if subject to international inspection, represents a threat to Israel’s survival.  They will remind us that Iran is the world’s “leading sponsor of terror”, even though many of us know that the process which leads to a state being branded a “sponsor of terror” is highly political and highly partial. They will assert that continuing uranium enrichment in Iran will compel Saudi Arabia and Turkey to violate their NPT obligations and become nuclear-armed. They will point to Iran’s lamentable human rights record.

We are also familiar with their motives: to convince the US that Iran remains a threat to US interests in the Middle East, against which an indispensible ally, Israel, is a necessity (cf. Trita Parsi’s A Single Roll of the Dice); to justify an absence of progress in the Middle East peace process; to distract attention from their lack of interest in a Middle East free of Israel’s nuclear weapons; and to create common ground with Gulf monarchs who fear and loath Iran.

Until now Israel’s political harvest from keeping the Iran Nuclear pot at simmering temperature has been rich (I hope I can be forgiven a mixed metaphor). So it is hard to imagine that Israeli politicians will abstain from applying pressure on the West in 2013, if Iran fails to do their job for them by aborting renewed negotiations, and if things appear to be heading towards a settlement.

Yet the story could have another ending. Perhaps this time Western politicians will recall their primary responsibility: the welfare of those who elect them. Safeguarded Iranian nuclear activities pose no threat to the security of these voters. These voters are paying a price for the imposition on Iran of oil and other trading and investment sanctions. And a war on Iran, inevitable in the absence of a negotiated settlement, would entail risks to Western living standards, as well as to Western lives.

But enough! These musings will seem the stuff that dreams are made of if Governor Romney is elected and some of his neoconservative advisers are let loose on Iran policy.

- Peter Jenkins was a British career diplomat for 33 years. He specialized in global economic and security issues. His last assignment (2001-06) was that of UK Ambassador to the IAEA and UN (Vienna).

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Senate Draft Letter Presses Administration To Offer Few Concessions For Confidence-Building Deal With Iran https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/senate-draft-letter-presses-administration-to-offer-few-concessions-for-confidence-building-deal-with-iran/ https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/senate-draft-letter-presses-administration-to-offer-few-concessions-for-confidence-building-deal-with-iran/#comments Tue, 12 Jun 2012 18:42:50 +0000 Ali Gharib http://www.ips.org/blog/ips/senate-draft-letter-presses-administration-to-offer-few-concessions-for-confidence-building-deal-with-iran/ via Think Progress

Photo: Sens. Blunt (L) and Menendez (R)

With negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program moving to Moscow next week, a draft letter to be circulated among Senators for signature calls on the Obama administration to not offer Iran major concessions without a comprehensive deal on its nuclear program. The draft letter, [...]]]> via Think Progress

Photo: Sens. Blunt (L) and Menendez (R)

With negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program moving to Moscow next week, a draft letter to be circulated among Senators for signature calls on the Obama administration to not offer Iran major concessions without a comprehensive deal on its nuclear program. The draft letter, obtained by ThinkProgress, says that, should the Iranians not take certain steps demanded by the Senators, the U.S. should “reevaluate the utility of further talks.”

Authored by Sens. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Roy Blunt (R-MO), the draft letter outlines the “absolute minimum steps” Iran must take in Moscow: shutting down its Fordow enrichment facility, ending enrichment of uranium to high levels, and shipping out its stockpile of high-enriched uranium. The letter says that Iran’s agreement to these steps would “justify continued discussions,” but doesn’t outline any other possible concessions.

While that leaves the door open for other possible lesser concessions, the Senators rule out acceding to a key Iranian goal until Iran agrees to the full spectrum of Western and U.N. demands. The New York Times reported that, in Baghdad, Iran asked for “an easing of the onerous economic sanctions imposed by the West,” something the Iranians have “relentlessly” pursued. But the Senators refuse to consider such steps without a comprehensive deal. In the draft letter, they write:

Barring full, verifiable Iranian compliance with all Security Council resolutions and full cooperation with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], including a new, far more intrusive inspections regime under the additional protocol, we see no circumstances under which Iran should be relieved from the current sanctions or those scheduled to come into effect at the end of this month.

That restriction could, in effect, stymie moves toward a “confidence-building” deal. A deal identical to the one mentioned by the Senators — demanding the “absolute minimum steps” but offering little sanctions relief — was on the table in Baghdad. After it failed to advance, an Iranian diplomat told the Christian Science Monitor that Iran would not “accept these things this way.”

The sanctions in question, due to take effect next month, forbid any third-party entity from doing business with Iran’s Central Bank. A European Union embargo on Iranian oil is set to kick in at around the same time.

The Senate letter comes just as preliminary talks indicate potential wiggle room to get a deal. The Washington Post’s Jackson Diehl noted one such conversation in his column today. He added that, while there’s been no promised sanctions relief for tangible Iranian steps, the West has indicated that Iranian “steps will be met by reciprocal steps.”

The Center for American Progress’s Brian Katulis, Rudy DeLeon and Peter Juul noted in a brief last month that sanctions relief will be a top Iranian priority in the next round of talks:

Iran’s interests will be more to come to an agreement that averts the implementation of sanctions than in stalling talks. Tehran’s clock to avoid sanctions is now moving faster than its nuclear program is progressing.

In an op-ed for the Jewish Chronicle, the Ploughshares Fund’s Joel Rubin said that some in Congress “seek to undermine American efforts at political dialogue with Iran by reducing the administration’s negotiating flexibility.” He went on:

The way forward in the near term should therefore be one of negotiating modest, step-by-step, and fully verifiable concessions and agreements. The United States and the other powers at the negotiating table need to be prepared to give some ground in order to make progress toward the outcome we want.

A potential Iranian nuclear weapon is widely considered a threat to both the security of the U.S. and its allies in the region, as well as the nuclear non-proliferation regime. U.S.U.N. and Israeli intelligence estimates give the West time to pursue a dual-track approach of pressure and diplomacy to resolve the crisis. Questions about the efficacy and potential consequences of a strike have led U.S. officials to declare that diplomacy is the “best and most permanent way” to resolve the crisis.

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