Anthony Cordesman, a highly respected military and security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), writes in a co-authored CSIS report that while the US should be prepared for the worst — an Iranian sprint towards a nuclear weapon — successful negotiations still offer the longest-lasting [...]]]>
Anthony Cordesman, a highly respected military and security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), writes in a co-authored CSIS report that while the US should be prepared for the worst — an Iranian sprint towards a nuclear weapon — successful negotiations still offer the longest-lasting positive results. Importantly, Cordesman says negotiations can still be successful:
Sanctions and diplomacy are the best of a bad (or at least highly uncertain) set of options, but it is far from clear that they will stop Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapons capability. Despite the lack of diplomatic progress, and the appearance that the Iranians are stalling for time, negotiations can still be successful. Negotiations can bring about long-term change in the US Iranian relationship where military strikes or more sanctions cannot.
The military option, which requires the most resources and carries the most risk, should be the last option:
]]>Preventive attacks might end the chance of successful negotiations for the life of the Islamic
Republic, and usher in a period of containment analogous to the Cold War. Application of this
level of military force might also convince the Iranian regime that nuclear weapons are required
in order to prevent future attacks and will redouble their efforts to produce a weapon. A single
series of military strikes might also only delay Iran for several years, lead it use them as an
excuse to withdraw from the NNPT and IAEA inspection, and use even more resources to surge
towards the deployment of nuclear-armed forces. Such action should only be taken if it becomes
clear that Iran’s regime has reached such ideological extremes where it cannot be deterred or that
there is evidence Iran will produce and quickly use a nuclear weapon.
Virginia tech economist and Lobe Log contributor Djavad Salehi-Isfahani adds to the growing list of reasons why the Obama administration’s Iran sanctions policy is counterproductive in Foreign Policy Magazine:
Despite everything, Iran seems to be weathering the storm better than advertised. Sanctions were intended to inflict economic pain [...]]]>
Virginia tech economist and Lobe Log contributor Djavad Salehi-Isfahani adds to the growing list of reasons why the Obama administration’s Iran sanctions policy is counterproductive in Foreign Policy Magazine:
]]>Despite everything, Iran seems to be weathering the storm better than advertised. Sanctions were intended to inflict economic pain on Iran’s population, with the hope that Iranians would persuade their leaders to compromise with the West on the nuclear standoff. But these hopes have been dashed:Tehran may have fumbled its economic response to sanctions and failed to minimize their overall level of pain, but it does seem capable of dealing with their political fallout by managing the distribution of the pain. Its principal means in doing so is the multiple-exchange-rate system, which eases the sanctions’ impact on Iranians below the median income — Ahmadinejad’s political base. Meanwhile, the system shifts the burden to upper- and middle-income Iranians, who have shown little affection for the controversial president in any case.
To protect lower-income people, the Iranian government will likely act conservatively in supplying foreign exchange for nonessential needs and make sure that it has enough reserves for critical imports of food and medicine. This will mean the value of the rial in the free market will continue to fall — but such an event should not be interpreted as a sign of economic collapse.
Ironically, if this scheme succeeds, much of the pain will be borne by upper-income Iranians who are generally most friendly to the West and least likely to revolt, because they have more to lose. They will be the unintended victims of Western sanctions, which have so far proved a very blunt instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Upper-income Iranians have plenty to be upset about with their own government, but now there is a distinct possibility that they will also blame the West for their misfortune.
This is not only unproductive from the point of view of Western policymakers — but it will also complicate relations with Iran if and when the country rejoins the global economy.
The Guardian today about the bellicose rhetoric surrounding the Obama administration’s Iran sanctions policy. In addition to highlighting related policy recommendations from certain hawkish think tankers, I was also able to interview Paul Pillar, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Hooman Majd and Hans Blix. Here’s how I begin:
The United States claims that sanctions against Iran are designed to convince it to change its behavior on a range of issues, but even the language used to describe them tells a different story. Sanctions are central to the Obama administration‘s “dual-track” strategy – explained as a combination of pressure and engagement intended to increase US leverage at the negotiating table. As Iranians struggle with increasingly “crippling” measures, advocates are justifying the resulting pain as the alternative to war.
No single influential figure has made war with Iran seem like a prospect more than Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, despite warnings against the dire ramifications from key Israeli and western security advisers. Yet it was Netanyahu who inspired more standing ovations during a May 2011 hardline speech to Congress (29 in total) than Obama did during his state of union address in January of that year, and it has been Congress that has been pushing forward the harshest measures against Iran.
While Obama criticized the “loose talk of war” that was rampant during the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) conference in March, discussions of sanctions by the administration remain heavily focused on the punitive element – in response to ongoing pressure from Israel and a seemingly pro-Netanyahu Congress. Obama’s unwillingness to match his red line on Iran (acquirement of a nuclear weapon) with Netanyahu’s red line (acquirement of “breakout capability”) is a key reason why relations between the two leaders remain publicly cool. At the same time, the administration’s efforts to project an image of toughness toward the Islamic Republic significantly overshadow any displays of confidence-building diplomacy.
Read more.
]]>Here’s the Wall Street Journal’s Jay Solomon on Tuesday, [...]]]>
Here’s the Wall Street Journal’s Jay Solomon on Tuesday, with my emphasis:
WASHINGTON—The Obama administration enacted new financial sanctions on Iran’s elite military unit and the country’s largest shipping company, as the U.S. intensifies efforts to choke Tehran off from the global financial system.
The U.S. Treasury Department’s announcement Tuesday comes just weeks ahead of a scheduled second round of negotiations in Turkey between Iran and the international community focused on containing Tehran’s nuclear program, which Iran says is peaceful in nature.
Senior U.S. officials said the new measures illustrate that Washington and its allies won’t relax their financial campaign against Iran even as the diplomatic process continues in late January. “It’s clear that our policy is going to be to continue to impose pressure on Iran so long as it defies its international obligations,” said Stuart Levey, the Treasury’s point man on Iran sanctions.
The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, held an earlier diplomatic round with Iran on Dec. 6-7 in Geneva. The talks registered little progress and have sparked concern that Iran may seek to use the diplomacy as a means to deflect international pressure while continuing to advance its nuclear capabilities.
The Journal, among other outlets, reported the new sanctions target the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and various linked organizations, including several banks and an insurance company that works with Iran’s state-run shipping company.
As for the notion that the West is skeptical about continuing diplomacy, David Crawford, also at the Journal, had this report last weekend (again with my emphasis):
The U.S. and representatives of the European Union have agreed to impose joint sanctions against Iran in January and are considering breaking off talks with the country, as patience with Tehran’s nuclear activities wears thin, according to people familiar with the matter.
Western officials are discussing making further talks with Iran contingent on Tehran’s progress toward compliance with existing United Nations Security Council resolutions, which call on Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog. [...]
Some Western officials accuse Iran of playing for time by agreeing to talks but refusing to engage in meaningful negotiations. Senior diplomats from the U.S., U.K. and France met in Paris on Tuesday to chart the new course, amid growing frustration over Iran’s obstruction of IAEA inspections. London and Paris help to coordinate policy for the entire EU on Iran.
Washington Post‘s neoconservative blogger Jennifer Rubin promptly seized on the report and asked:
Could the Obama administration really be stiffening its spine and responding to the advice of those warning that talks with the Iranian regime are counterproductive?
We summed up her blog post thusly in our Daily Talking Points:
]]>The Post’s neoconservative blogger Jennifer Rubin picks up on a Wall Street Journal story where anonymous U.S. officials comment that the United States may soon abandon engagement with Iran. “Could the Obama administration really be stiffening its spine and responding to the advice of those warning that talks with the Iranian regime are counterproductive?” she asks hopefully. She interviews Foreign Policy Initiative’s Jamie Fly, who remarks: “I’m skeptical that they will be the ‘crippling’ sanctions we were promised but have yet to see.” Rubin also speaks to an “advisor to a key senator” who says, “My point is just that they are very well-positioned to pursue a very hawkish policy towards Iran now.” Rubin then espouses her own Iran policy: “The real issue is whether the administration will, if needed, employ force to disarm the revolutionary Islamic state.” She is doubtful, but hopes that the next U.S. president will attack Iran.