by Wayne White
Libya’s chaos and violence may seem like a continuum of painful replays. However, as the situation festers, the risk of extremist elements gaining a more dangerous foothold and broader freedom of action increases. Indeed, since the beginning of this year, militant Islamists have gained ground overall, undermining what little governance remains. Making matters worse, a Libyan Supreme Court decision has gone against the newly elected and relatively secular government.
Debating whether Libya is a failed state is academic even though the country has resembled one for the past six months. Even a senior Libyan official admitted back in August that most “factors at the moment are conducive to a failed state.” Unfortunately, Libya’s problems won’t be contained. Militant extremists and terrorists thriving amidst this mess will spread violence even farther beyond the country’s practically non-existent borders than they have already.
House of Cards
Most recognizable forms of authority in Libya have steadily imploded this year with the explosion of greater violence in the country’s two largest cities (Tripoli and Benghazi), the flight of foreign workers and embassies amidst kidnappings and murders, and the disarray affecting all manners of central governance (though its writ was already limited). In fact, Libya never evolved beyond the dominance of militias that refused to disarm following the struggle against Muammar al-Qadhafi.
Shaky stability in the capital city of Tripoli until mid-2014 depended on a wary balance of power between two powerful militias employed by Libya’s parliament, the General National Council (GNC). The Islamist militia comes from Libya’s third largest city of Misrata, while the other secular nationalist militia is from the tough Zintan mountain region south of Tripoli. The Misrata militia (now “Libya Dawn”) was linked to Islamist members, and the Zintani forces to its secular caucus. At the time, the GNC had a modest Islamist majority.
But the election in June of a secular majority permanent House of Representatives (HOR) triggered the collapse of the militia power balance. The larger Libya Dawn secured the upper hand over the Zintanis, seizing Tripoli. Libya Dawn reconvened mainly the Islamists from the GNC, proclaiming the body the true Libyan government.
The HOR fled east, taking refuge near the Egyptian border in the small city of Tobruk. Ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s effort since spring 2014 to crush extremists like the al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) had experienced mixed results. Then, after solid gains against ASL forces in Benghazi in October, the beleaguered HOR embraced Haftar as acting on behalf of the newly elected parliament.
But the Libyan Supreme Court declared the internationally recognized HOR unconstitutional on November 6, arguing that the committee that prepared the election law for the June poll, which elected the HOR, violated Libya’s provisional constitution. The court remains, however, in Tripoli under Islamist occupation and originally was not asked to address the legality of the HOR, making its ruling questionable. Moreover, even if there were some inconsistencies involving election procedure, they pale against Libya Dawn’s violent seizure of Tripoli and revival of a rump GNC that no longer has any legal mandate whatsoever. The most recent election, quite an achievement under the circumstances, at least reflected voters’ preferences.
A map featuring Libya’s major cities and border states.
Consequently, despite urgings from some quarters that the HOR be abandoned, the UN and most foreign governments have not done so. As of Nov. 17, Turkey and Chad appeared to be the only exceptions. Embracing the court decision, the rump GNC has offered a national dialogue, something that would have been of value prior to Libya’s descent into far greater chaos in 2014. Earlier this year, when there was more to work with, I had discussed the advantages of such a meeting being held at a neutral venue abroad and being overseen by the UN along with the governments that backed the anti-Qadhafi struggle in 2011.
Of course, Libya has only spiraled further downwards since then. But because both governments share the need for revenue, Libyan exports still rebounded to more than 800,000 barrels per day (BPD) in September (although still only 1/3 of capacity). Following the court decision, however, Libya Dawn sought to control the country’s oil, seizing the 300,000 BPD western El-Sharara field. But Sharara was shut down, with Zintani forces blocking the pipeline to its northern export terminal of Zawiya. Then a security guard strike over unpaid wages closed Tobruk’s Hariga export terminal last weekend. These closures have driven exports down to barely 500,000 BPD.
Whether emanating from a now more aggressive Libya Dawn or the beleaguered ASL (most likely the latter), a number of bombings have also hit HOR-controlled locales in eastern Libya. One went off in the town of Shahat during a meeting there between HOR Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and UN Libyan Envoy Bernadino Leon On Nov. 10. Several car bombings occurred two days later. One hit a busy street in front of the Tobruk hotel housing the HOR; another hit the airport used by al-Thinni near the town of Bayda. A third bomb blew up in Benghazi (where fighting between the forces of Haftar and the ASL has intensified again).
The fighting in Benghazi became so intense that Leon arranged a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire on Nov. 19 so the Red Crescent could evacuate civilians and casualties from affected areas. The UN Security Council meanwhile blacklisted ASL branches in both Benghazi and Derna.
Located between Benghazi and Tobruk, Derna has been an extremist hotbed since the 1990s. Youthful demonstrators there declared their allegiance to the so-called Islamic State’s (ISIS or IS) “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in late October. With Haftar’s air assets sorely limited, Egypt probably took aim at jihadi targets there with airstrikes on Nov. 12, despite Egyptian denials. Egyptian airstrikes have previously hit Tripoli and Benghazi. Fighter-bombers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also staged through Egypt against Benghazi’s extremists.
Spillover Effect
Libya remains a vast arsenal of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The Sinai-based Beit al-Maqdis, which has sworn allegiance to IS, continues to receive Libyan munitions despite Egyptian countermeasures. The Jihadi group killed 33 Egyptian soldiers on Oct. 24. It struck again on Nov. 13, killing five soldiers and police. Near the northern end of the Suez Canal, militants or their smugglers had fired on an Egyptian Navy patrol boat wounding 5 sailors a day earlier, with eight others still missing. Sinai jihadists also released a lengthy video on Nov. 14 showcasing their suicide bombing that killed the soldiers in October, with participants shouting: “good news to al-Baghdadi!” The violence appears to be continuing unabated, with a likely Beit al-Maqdis bombing having hit a police checkpoint in a Cairo suburb just yesterday.
Libya also continues to export violence in various other directions. Four Tunisian soldiers were killed and 11 wounded in a Nov. 5 bus bombing. Much of the residual violence in Tunisia meanwhile stems from the cross-border infiltration of munitions from ASL. Malian jihadists, using Libya as an arsenal and for sanctuary, attacked a border village in Niger on Nov. 19, killing nine Nigerien security personnel.
With the West’s attention absorbed by IS, the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli/Palestinian affairs, and more, Libya has been woefully neglected. Yet the longer the country’s problems fester, the worse they will get. Indeed, even more IS-inspired connections with Libyan and associated jihadists surely will emerge in this chaotic environment. Simply watching Libya’s meltdown has achieved nothing.
]]>by Wayne White
The withdrawal of American and most other foreign missions from Libya has left its people more alone than ever before. Legitimate political authority and much of the economy has been seriously damaged. Despite temporary successes, none of the militias or Libyan army units flailing away at each other have [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The withdrawal of American and most other foreign missions from Libya has left its people more alone than ever before. Legitimate political authority and much of the economy has been seriously damaged. Despite temporary successes, none of the militias or Libyan army units flailing away at each other have scored enough gains to alter the overall situation. The international community should attempt to coax the leading players in this mess to assemble at a foreign venue where enough differences might be hashed out to dampen the raging violence and chaos.
The July 26 American withdrawal from Tripoli was part of a bunch of countries pulling out their embassy staffs, foreign workers, and other nationals. France followed suit on July 30 extracting its ambassador, several dozen French expatriates, and some British nationals. Spain abandoned its embassy on the 31st, and China evacuated hundreds of its workers to Egypt. The Greek Navy pulled out its diplomats and over 100 other foreigners today.
The escalation in clashes involving militia, renegade, and government forces is not the only driver. Doing any sort of work or business in Libya has become too risky. Kidnappings, murders, or combat-related deaths of foreigners spiked in 2014. On July 26, 23 Egyptian workers died when a militia rocket destroyed their Tripoli quarters. Unknown gunmen attacked and attempted to hijack a British convoy heading for the Tunisian border with some embassy staff on the 27th. Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario rushed to Libya on July 31 to organize the departure of 13,000 Philippine workers after one worker was beheaded and a nurse gang-raped.
Over 100 Libyans have been killed and 400 wounded in Tripoli in recent weeks, most in the vicinity of the embattled airport where Libyan airliners are smoking hulks, the main terminal is shattered, and fuel tanks continued to burn through the 31st because of fighting involving artillery and rockets. Fighters have closed off approaches to southern Tripoli with earthen barricades. The main adversaries are the Islamist “Central Shield” militia from Libya’s 3rd largest city, Misrata (supporting Islamists in parliament), and the rugged nationalist militias from the mountainous Zintan area south of Tripoli (backing parliamentary secularists and renegade anti-extremist General Hiftar).
Had Tripoli not descended into such intense violence recently, the focus would have stayed on Benghazi where General Khalifa Hiftar (or Haftar) has continued his “Operation Dignity” against extremist Muslim militias, especially Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL). Hiftar has the support of more moderate militias, the Libyan Army’s Special Forces, the Libyan Air Force, and many police. Although suspect in some quarters because of his past CIA and distant Qadhafi regime connections, Hiftar was hailed by many Libyans as a potential savior from Islamic militancy.
More recently, however, Operation Dignity has run into trouble. Just in the past few days, ASL, with allied militants from the Benghazi Shura Council, downed a Libyan Air Force fighter jet, overran a Special Forces base, and today blew up Benghazi’s police headquarters seizing stocks of weapons at several facilities as they pushed back Hiftar’s forces.
With less protection than diplomats or other foreigners from fighting in their midst, and other violent crimes against Libyans now more common, Tunisia announced that up to 6,000 Libyans have been crossing the border per day this week to escape Libya’s dangerous lawlessness. Mustafa Abushagur, briefly Libya’s first post-Qadhafi prime minister and newly elected member of parliament, was kidnapped on July 29.
Typically, Libyans targeted for crimes are more affluent, skilled, politically active, or relatively Western-oriented. These people comprise most of Libya’s professionals and highly trained workers. As they flee, the country’s ability to function in terms of medical services, education, technical services, etc. erodes.
Governance Vacuum
Acting Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, who has recently been in eastern Libya, has been trying (unsuccessfully) to separate various warring parties. Meanwhile, in order to elect a new prime minister, Libya’s General National Congress (GNC), discredited and with its mandate expired, is set to pass the torch to the recently elected House of Representatives (HOR) on August 4. This was supposed to be a notable step toward a permanent legislature.
Islamists narrowly held the upper hand in the GNC, but not in the new HOR. With Tripoli in turmoil, the formal handover had shifted to Benghazi. But with fighting also raging there, it may have to be moved to the smaller city of Tobruk between Benghazi and the Egyptian border. Little has been heard of a commission appointed a couple of months ago to draft a final constitution.
Clearly, efforts to establish a measure of enduring central authority have all but foundered. Earlier this year, the GNC gamely set about to move the ball forward with elections (which came off with some difficulty) and a schedule for transition, despite considerable strife at that time. Now goals challenging enough a few months ago could be put on hold or become irrelevant in the face of more conflict, even societal implosion. In addition to previous indicators of collapse like crippled oil exports and iffy governance with alternative nodes of power often in confrontation, even shipping currency to the country’s banks is now crippled, strangling commerce, trade, and over normality.
Can New Diplomatic Ground Be Broken?
On the scene, foreign missions could achieve very little while hunkered down with violence flaring all round them. However, their departure, although symbolic of Libya’s failures, need not halt international efforts to assist.
In fact, outside engagement might make a difference. That would mean summoning under the aegis of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as many major Libyan players as possible. Under the circumstances, this should be daringly comprehensive, involving not only recognized officials, but also militia leaders, eastern federalist leader Ibrahim al-Jathran, and General Hiftar.
A few of the non-official actors in particular may never have come face to face before. Several extremist militias probably would not show up, especially ASL. However, that could make such an exercise more likely to succeed. With Islamist extremists already a common enemy among most of the rest (including quite a few relatively more moderate Islamists), putting aside or resolving differences in order to face such a dangerous foe more successfully could emerge as such a conference’s most compelling incentive for progress.
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