Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took heat from his right flank on the issue during a 2009 push for [...]]]> A WikiLeaks cable reported this week suggested that the main Iranian obstacle to striking a nuclear fuel swap deal with the West was not the deal itself (or the Western countries involved), but internal Iranian politics.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took heat from his right flank on the issue during a 2009 push for the deal, reportedly telling Turkish interlocutors (who recounted the point to U.S. diplomats) that “the core of the issue is psychological rather than substance… The Iranians agree to the proposal but need to manage the public perception.”

The website EA Worldview also covered the cable:

Ahmadinejad’s barrier to this mission was not the Americans. Instead he faced “serious domestic problems inside Iran… The Turks actually see Ahmadinejad as ‘more flexible’ than others who are inside the Iranian Government.”

A fuel swap deal in which Iran would ship some of its nuclear material abroad for ready-made fuel for a medical reactor has long been bandied about as a confidence-building measure to de-escalate Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West. In the run-up to the latest round of U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran, a group of foreign policy heavyweights called a Brazilian and Turkish mediated deal a “first step,” but the U.S. rejected the deal in favor of pursuing sanctions.

Whether or not one views Ahmadinejad’s recent assertiveness as a good thing, this cable shows that his consolidation of political power might, contrary to early assessments, actually make a fuel swap agreement easier for the president to broker.

All of this is to say that, while it ain’t exactly the stars aligning, the U.S. should take the opportunity of talks this month — as I’ve argued before – to try to revive the confidence-building measure and de-escalate the tense standoff with Iran.

Takeyh starts with a little armchair psychology on the Islamic Republic’s enforcers — the mid-level officials as well as the foot [...]]]> Council on Foreign Relations scholar Ray Takeyh has an intriguing op-ed in the International Herald Tribune, the global edition of the New York Times. He asks: “Just how stable is Iran’s clerical regime?”

Takeyh starts with a little armchair psychology on the Islamic Republic’s enforcers — the mid-level officials as well as the foot soldiers of the regime — “all require an overweening ideological cover to justify their brutalities to themselves.”

Yet the crackdown against Iran’s nascent Green Movement after the June 2009 elections is calling these justifications into question:

The subtle and subversive victory of the Green movement is to hollow out the state and demonstrate to its loyalists that they are not defending a transcendent orthodoxy but craven and cruel men addicted to power at all cost. In the words of the reformist cleric, the late Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri, in the violent crackdown following the elections in June 2009, the Islamic Republic ceased to be either Islamic or a republic.

In his seminal study of revolutions, Crane Brinton observed that a ruling class becomes imperiled when “numerous and influential members of such a class begin to believe that they hold power unjustly, [and] that the beliefs they were brought up on are silly.”

Takeyh points to a string of high level defections of some former defenders of the regime to the opposition. He says the “accomplishments of the Green movement are impressive,” but stressed the future of Iran is still very much uncertain. In his estimation, it’s not a matter of if the regime collapses, but when.

Here’s the rub for U.S. policy:

The series of decisions that the United States and its allies make today will help condition the contours of power in tomorrow’s Iran.

This is not to suggest that the United States should cease negotiating with Iran. Ronald Reagan continued to sign arms control compacts with a Soviet Union whose demise he perceived as certain. The pursuit of important security objectives did not derail Reagan from embracing Solidarity in Poland or comparable opposition groups throughout Eastern Europe. The important point is that the Iran conundrum is not limited to compelling Tehran to spew out some of its accumulated uranium. Our choices speak as much to our values as they do to our interests. In the long run, America has never gone astray by standing with those who hope for a more decent future.

The “anti-appeasement” hawks may have a tough time with that last graf. Takeyh cites Ronald Reagan (!!! — might as well be pro-appeasement right-wing idol Winston Churchill!). He also implies a fuel-swap confidence building measure is in U.S. interests, although U.S. interests should “not be limited” to this goal.

At PBS/Frontline‘s Tehran Bureau, I laid out what I think is a pretty compelling case that the [...]]]> In January, Iran and the P5+1 countries, which includes the United States, will sit down in Istanbul for the second of the latest iteration of talks between the West and the Islamic Republic over the latter’s nuclear program.

At PBS/Frontline‘s Tehran Bureau, I laid out what I think is a pretty compelling case that the United States should put a confidence-building deal — specifically some new version of the long discussed fuel-swap arrangement — on the table.

From the Tehran Bureau piece:

If, in Istanbul next month, Iran balks at U.S. and P5+1 efforts to arrange a confidence-building fuel swap, the Islamic Republic’s intransigence will be put on full display. If, on the other hand, Iran agrees to such a deal, little harm will be done to the West’s longterm prospects of ending the nuclear standoff without drastic measures – and Iran will turn over a sizable chunk of its nuclear material. If the United States and the rest of the P5+1 make the Iranians an offer they can’t refuse, it could be a win-win situation.

John Limbert, a Naval Academy professor and distinguished former foreign service officer who was an Iranian hostage and later ran the Iran desk at Obama’s State Department, is fond of saying, “They always zig when we zag.” The inverse is also true and, at this moment, the United States seems to be the one doing the zigging. But a zigging line and a zagging line just might cross paths, and the Obama administration should take advantage if the opportunity arises in Istanbul. It may not work, but to do nothing, and to try nothing, is to passively slide down the path to confrontation.

Check out the whole thing here.

Let’s get caught up with [...]]]> Does the selection of Iran’s nuclear czar as its new (interim) foreign minister say anything about nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West? We don’t really know, and given that the next round of talks is only a month away, we might not know until news breaks from Istanbul.

Let’s get caught up with Iran: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sacked Manoucher Mottaki — widely seen as a political figure — on Monday in a surprise move. The outgoing FM, who had long been known to be at odds with Ahmadinejad, was quickly replaced in the interim by the now-former head of Iran’s nuclear agency, Ali Akbar Salehi. Salehi, who was partly educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), is known as a technocrat.

Laura Rozen at Politico does Iranian “Kremlinology” with analysis from experts in D.C.. Trita Parsi told Rozen:

“The fact that Salehi, a longtime hand in the nuclear program, replaces [Mottaki] may indicate the nuclearization of Iranian foreign policy,” Iranian analyst Trita Parsi said. “While Mottaki was never central to the nuclear program, the person replacing him and taking over the entire foreign policy machine is a person that for decades has been instrumental to the program.”

“This may indicate, if not renewed seriousness on the part of the Iranians, at least a recognition that the parties recognize that they are close to crunch time and they are fielding their best players as a result,” he said.

I reached out to Iran expert and University of Hawaii professor Farideh Farhi, an expert on Iran’s byzantine politics, who told me both the sacking and the new hire remain a mystery to her. She emphasized that the appointment is an interim one, so Ahmadinejad could have simply put off a more controversial pick that would have aroused opposition in the Majles, or Iranian parliament. We don’t yet know, however, what the pick means for Ahmadinejad’s relationship with the Supreme Leader. Farhi (the links are mine):

Some people are speculating that it may have something to do with [this month's Iran-P5+1 talks in] Geneva and the portrayal of success by the negotiating team inside Iran, giving Ahamdinejad the confidence to do this. One other analyst in Tehran suggested that the presidential advisor [Esfandiar Rahim] Mashaie’s visit this week to Jordan and King Abdullah’s positive response to Ahamdinejad’s personal letter might have given Ahmadinejad motivation to do this. There is indeed a possibility that Ahmadinejad sacked Mottaki the same way he sacked Ali Larijani as nuclear negotiator, without prior approval from [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei. If this is the case then it bespeaks a confident Ahmadinejad since, as I mentioned above, it was merely a month or so ago that Khamenei supported Mottaki by name. If indeed Ahmadinejad did this without Khamenei’s prior approval, it means the game is not yet over.

It sounds like, once again, with Iran and the U.S. inching closer together, uncertainty will hang over the proceedings. If the U.S. comes through on hints, a confidence-building measure could be in the works, so the U.S. will likely be busy no matter what.

“Between now and January,” wrote Robert Dreyfuss on his Nation blog, “the United States is going to have to engage in some spirited, behind-the-scenes talks with Iran to make the negotiations work.” Dreyfuss noted, and focused on, that amid all the the action in Tehran, the U.S. seems to be ready to offer up a fuel swap agreement that, for the meantime, would allow centrifuges to keep spinning in Iran. It’s just the sort of “first step” deal, as Rozen noted, that Salehi hammered out with the Brazilians and Turks in the run-up to the last round of U.S. led UN Security Council sanctions.

Julian Border, at the Guardian, has a good piece covering the optimistic take on Salehi. Just after he pulls a few WikiLeaks docs to show several takes of Western diplomats on Salehi — he speaks good English and is a preferred interlocutor, but seems to not wield much influence in the halls of power — Border summed up the ever-ambiguous “Western diplomat” reaction:

Western diplomats, however, are generally cheered by the appointment because it might mean that their contacts with the foreign ministry will now have more substance. During the prolonged sparring between Mottaki and Ahmadinejad, the ministry increasingly became an empty shell, bypassed over major decisions, and irrelevant on the nuclear dossier.

Rozen, again, has a great observation, via Suzanne Maloney from the Brookings Institution, that Salehi is subject to an EU travel ban. Earlier, it had been reported that Salehi was named in the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution, but apparently this was not right (though the agency which he formerly headed was). Had the UNSC bit turned out to be true, my reaction was that the move could be a provocation. Given that it’s only an EU ban and, as Rozen points out, it gets waived for higher-ups in foreign governments, I don’t really think so.

As I said, could it mean something for nuclear negotiations? Looks like we’ll have to wait for next month’s talks to find out.

Late-breaking: Inside Iran‘s Arash Aramesh has the take of a recent Iranian diplomatic defector. It’s worth checking out for the opinions of someone who was very recently, indeed, on the inside.

The letter (PDF, with full text below), broken by Foreign [...]]]> Five Senators sent a letter to U.S. President Barack Obama on Monday warning the administration not to offer concessions in upcoming talks with Iran over its nuclear program. If Obama takes the advice, experts say, it could sink his engagement efforts with Tehran.

The letter (PDF, with full text below), broken by Foreign Policy‘s Josh Rogin, calls for zero enrichment on Iranian soil as a U.S. pre-condition for any negotiated deal to end Iran’s standoff with the West over its nuclear program.

“[G]iven the government of Iran’s patterns of deception and noncooperation, its government cannot be permitted to maintain any enrichment or reprocessing activities on its territory for the foreseeable future,” said the letter. “We would strongly oppose any proposal for diplomat endgame in which Iran is permitted to continue these activities in any form.”

But the Iranians have placed a high priority on domestic enrichment, and would likely oppose a deal precluding such activity. Iran denies accusations from the West that eventual weaponization is the goal of its nuclear program, which is widely considered a point of Iranian national pride.

Even some U.S.-based non-proliferation experts are questioning the wisdom of taking such a hard line as the Senators’ letter.

“There are mixed views in the arms control community,” said Peter Crail, a non-proliferation analyst at the Arms Control Association (ACA). “But there seems to be growing sentiment that if we’re looking at a negotiated solution, ‘zero enrichment’ is not going to be an option.”

“This attempt by congress to bind the adminsitration would kill negotiations,” he added.

Signed by Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Mark Kirk (R-IL), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Robert Casey (D-PA), and Joe Lieberman (I-CT), with John McCain (R-AZ) reportedly later adding his name, the letter also called on Obama to “continue ratcheting up” U.S. and international pressure on Iran.

Iran should be squeezed until it freezes enrichment and passes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections (including submitting to the Additional Protocols, an extended set of safeguards measures), the letter said.

The Senators wrote that their positions are ”reflective of a consensus among a broad, bipartisan majority in Congress.” Despite Peter Baker of the New York Times‘s suggestion that the Senators’ letter was a show of “bipartisan support,” it appeared to instead be a threat of push-back from Congress should Obama pursue a deal that allows any Iranian enrichment.

“[T]he letter makes the point that there will be very strong opposition to any kind of proposal that allows the Iranians to keep some sort of enrichment capability,” an anonymous Senate aide, explaining the “thinking behind the letter,” wrote to the Washington Post‘s new neoconservative blogger Jennifer Rubin. “This is an extremely dangerous idea that it is important to knock down.”

But experts think the tack — pressure for strict pre-conditions to talks — could be repeating the same mistakes of recent U.S.-Iran relations, where Iran was further isolated as its nuclear programs continued.

“This again shows that part of the problem in negotiations has been a lack of political space domestically for both sides,” said Trita Parsi, President of the National Iranian American Council and a Woodrow Wilson center fellow. “Obama realizes that in order to get a deal, there needs to be mutual compromises on both sides.”

“What you have now is that some members of Congress are adopting the (President George W.) Bush position, that, ‘No, we’re not going to compromise on anything, It has to be maximalist approach,” Parsi said. “That has caused problems in the past becaue it makes it impossible to have a real negotiation.”

The Senators pressed Obama just as the first two-day round of talks between the P5+1 group, which includes the U.S., were getting underway. Little had been accomplished as the negotiations drew to a close Tuesday, but another round is expected in January.

Going into the latest round, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hinted in an interview in Bahrain that the U.S. might be willing to accept Iranian enrichment.

“They can enrich uranium at some future date once they have demonstrated that they can do so in a responsible manner in accordance with international obligations,” Clinton reportedly told the BBC.

“During the Obama period, there has been some ambiguity about whether (zero enrichment) is the American red line,” said NIAC’s Parsi, pointing to Clinton’s comments. “The position that these law makers are taking (in the letter) is identical with the Israeli and Bush red lines, and seems to be at odds with the Obama red line.”

Rumors are already flying that the second round of the latest talks, to be held in Turkey, could see the U.S. offer a deal whereby a fuel swap agreement — involving sending nuclear fuel to Russia for reprocessing — would allow Iran to maintain domestic enrichment.

While Iran says it has a right to domestic enrichment as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Crail of the ACA notes that the treaty only guarantees “a peaceful nuclear program.”

“In the end, there is an implicit understanding that, yes, countries can enrich,” he said, adding, however, that he prefers that the technology not spread and all nuclear fuel production be internationalized.

But Crail emphasized that Iran, too, must be willing to make some concessions: “According to the NPT, in order for Iran to get all its rights under the NPT, Iran needs to cooperate with international inspections.”

The full text of the letter:

December 6, 2010

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As diplomats from the United States join talks today between the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva, we write to share some thoughts about these discussions, and our broader Iran policy. In particular, we wish to express our support for a set of principles that we believe are reflective of a consensus among a broad, bipartisan majority in Congress, who stand ready to work with you and your Administration to stop Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability — a grave threat that would compromise our security and the security of all our allies in the Middle East.

First, we strongly support the cascade of measures that have been put in place over the past several months by your Administration, in cooperation with our partners around the world, to increase the pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We applaud and are encouraged by the strong actions taken thus far by the Administration to secure meaningful economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Iranian regime, which are absolutely essential for any prospect of a peaceful resolution to this challenge.

Second, we believe that it is absolutely essential that the United States and its partners make clear to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran that we intend to continue ratcheting up this pressure, through comprehensive enforcement of existing sanctions as well as imposition o new measure, until the full, verifiable, and sustained suspension by Iran of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related activities, as demanded by multiple UN Security Council resolutions. The pressure track should likewise continue on its current trajectory until Iran resumes full cooperation with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol; resolves all outstanding concerns about its nuclear program and complies with the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions directed at its nuclear program. The government of Iran must undersand that there is absolutely no possibility of any freeze or reduction in the momentum of the pressure track until these minium requirements have been met.

Third, we remain concerned about the possibility that the Iranian regime will seek to buy time or otherwise dilute the focus of our diplomacy through unrelated “confidence-building measures” that fail to address the core concerns associated with Iran’s illicit nuclear activities. Such tactical maneuverings are of course no substitute for a real negotiation, and therefore should not be mistaken as such.

Fourth, we believe that it is critical that the United States and our partners make clear that, given the government of Iran’s patterns of deception and noncooperation, its government cannot be permitted to maintain any enrichment or reprocessing activities on its territory for the foreseeable future. We would strongly oppose any proposal for diplomat endgame in which Iran is permitted to continue these activities in any form.

We thank you for your continued leadership on this matter of critical importance to our national security. We pledge to you our continued support to do all that is necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

Best Regards,

Joseph I. Lieberman
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Jon Kyl
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Kirsten E. Gillibrand
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Robert P. Casey, Jr.
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Mark Kirk
UNITED STATES SENATOR

The New York Times reports:

In a two-paragraph letter answering an invitation offered more than three months ago by the bloc’s foreign affairs chief, Catherine Ashton, the [...]]]> The European Union told reporters on Friday that Iran responded to it’s offer for P5+1 talks on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear stand-off with the West.

The New York Times reports:

In a two-paragraph letter answering an invitation offered more than three months ago by the bloc’s foreign affairs chief, Catherine Ashton, the Iranians said their senior negotiator, Saeed Jalili, could hold discussions as of Nov. 10. Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said last month in New York that Iran was prepared to resume talks, but gave no specifics. [...]

Ms. Ashton called the Iranian agreement “very important,” but given the tortuous path of past talks, there was no sense that it signaled any breakthrough. [...]

Western officials have said they are not in any particular rush themselves to revive negotiations. New sanctions agreed to this summer are just beginning to bite, officials have said, and seem to be having an even greater impact on Iran than expected. On the other hand, they say, the longer this drags out, the more time Iran has to add to its stockpile of enriched uranium.

The Iranian letter pointed out that the talks would have to resume under the conditions of Mr. Jalili’s “letter of 6 July.” In it, the Iranian negotiator said that talks should aim to engage and cooperate, that they should be committed to the rationale of dialogue, and that Ms. Ashton should state her “position on the nuclear weapons of the Zionist Regime” — a reference to Israel, which does not confirm or deny that it has nuclear weapons.

On Saturday, Reuters added to the mix new comments from a media adviser to Ahmadinejad who said that Iran’s nuclear program would not be on the table at these talks (which are meant to be on Iran’s nuclear program):

Both sides have said the talks could happen after November 10, but Ali Akbar Javanfekr, a media adviser to the president, said they would not cover the nuclear issue — the one subject the other countries want to address.

“We will not be talking with the Western party about the nuclear energy issue in this round of the negotiations,” Javanfekr said, according to the semi-official Fars news agency. [...]

Javanfekr said the P5+1 countries had yet to address Ahmadinejad’s conditions for resuming talks. He did not say what the talks would cover if they do not address the nuclear issue.

Reuters went on to print recent comments by Ahmadinejad on the subject, including his demand that negotiating parties recognize Israel’s covert nuclear weapons arsenal (estimated at some 200 missiles); the Iranians seem delighted to draw attention to this hypocrisy.

The Obama administration, via a leak to the Times, recently tipped its hand about its soon-to-be-renewed fuel swap proposal.

In its report about the Iranian offer, the Christian Science Monitor noted that Turkey and China — two countries which Iran hawks view as part of the problem because of their trade ties to Iran and hesitance to endorse escalation measures — deserve credit for helping encourage the Iranians to get back to the table.

David Sanger, who I’m told views himself as something of [...]]]> Even though Iran has yet to respond to an invitation for the P5+1 talks that are now only a few weeks away, officials in the Obama administration are leaking details to the New York Times of an offer that could be on the table.

David Sanger, who I’m told views himself as something of a player, has the scoop:

A senior American official said Wednesday that the United States and its partners were “very close to having an agreement” on a common position to present to Iran. [...]

The new offer would require Iran to send more than 4,400 pounds of low-enriched uranium out of the country, an increase of more than two-thirds from the amount required under a tentative deal struck in Vienna a year ago. The increase reflects the fact that Iran has steadily produced more uranium over the past year, and the American goal is to make sure that Iran has less than one bomb’s worth of uranium on hand.

Iran would also have to halt all production of nuclear fuel that it is currently enriching to 20 percent — an important step on the way to bomb-grade levels. It would also have to make good on its agreement to negotiate on the future of its nuclear program.

While it was Iran that rejected the Vienna deal, it was Washington that dismissed a later, watered-down fuel swap deal known as the Tehran Declaration.

As Eli previously reported, the P5+1 has supported the Vienna Group fuel swap deal, over the Turkish and Brazilian mediated Tehran Declaration deal. Iran favors the latter deal, which even some eminent U.S. foreign policy figures have called a good “first step.”

Those positions hold. But bridging them — which depends heavily on both sides’ red lines — does not seem an impossible task.

Nonetheless, Sanger quotes an unnamed U.S. official who says that Iran’s response to the deal will indicate to the Obama administration “whether the Iranians still think they can tough it out or are ready to negotiate.”

The invitation is for talks to be held in Vienna for three days in mid-November, according to a [...]]]> Laura Rozen and Reuters are reporting that the P5+1 — the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany — have invited Iran to resume talks over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.

The invitation is for talks to be held in Vienna for three days in mid-November, according to a statement from the spokesperson of the European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton.

“Following recent positive indications from Iran that [chief Iranian negotiator Saeed] Jalili is willing to meet High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the E3+3/P5+1 — – the United States, Britain, China, France, Russia and Germany — High Representative Ashton today officially proposed to Iran that these talks should take place over three days in mid November,” the spokesperson said, according to Rozen’s foreign policy blog at Politico.

The “positive indications” were apparently comments that Jalili had made in the press.

Reuters notes that while Jalili had sent a letter to Ashton over the summer requesting the talks, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has since set additional conditions on negotiations, including adding additional participants, making some participants declare their hostility to Iran, and making them state their positions on Israel’s covert nuclear arsenal. However, Reuters was unable to secure a current comment from Ahmadinejad, who is traveling in Lebanon today.

Rozen also laid out some differences in the approaches of the two main parties — the U.S. and Iran:

Iran observers and diplomats have said that Iran prefers to hold talks with an expanded version of the so-called Vienna Group, comprised of the U.S., France and Russia, with which it had previously negotiated a possible nuclear fuel swap deal that broke down, than with the P5+1.

The U.S. is putting more attention on possible international P5+1 Iran nuclear talks, while envisioning a second track of lower-profile technical consultations between the Vienna Group and Iran on a possible updated fuel swap deal.

As Eli previously reported, the P5+1 has supported the Vienna Group fuel swap deal, brokered a year ago in Geneva, over the Turkish and Brazilian mediated Tehran Declaration deal. Iran favors the latter deal, which even some eminent U.S. foreign policy figures have called a good “first step.”