by Mitchell Plitnick

All eyes are on US President Barack Obama as he contemplates how to deal with the fact that the Syrian government might have crossed a red line he never should have drawn. The Israelis, even while abstaining from pressuring Obama to act in Syria, meanwhile know [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Mitchell Plitnick

All eyes are on US President Barack Obama as he contemplates how to deal with the fact that the Syrian government might have crossed a red line he never should have drawn. The Israelis, even while abstaining from pressuring Obama to act in Syria, meanwhile know their own decisions are no less troublesome.

Obama dug himself a hole when he declared that Syria’s use of chemical weapons would be a casus belli. Now that it appears that Sarin gas was used in Syria (although such use is certainly not as destructive as some of the “conventional” bombardment that has been employed), Obama is in a quandary. There is no more or less of a reason to significantly increase the US’ involvement in Syria than there was before, but the forces that have been calling for intervention have an enormous new chip to play.

This might be comforting to Israel, because they have to be very concerned about what is happening in Syria right now, and that concern is not based on whether or not Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces used sarin gas. The Syria situation is everything the issue with Iran is not.

Iran represents a potential threat to Israel’s position as a nuclear hegemon and to the whole US-Israel-Saudi matrix of power in the region. But despite the hysteria, those in charge in Israel know very well that Iran has not yet made the decision to construct a nuclear weapon and that, even if they got one, the situation would be one of a nuclear standoff, not an imminent Iranian attack on Israel.

Public rhetoric reflects something different, but no one in the halls of the Israeli Knesset or in Washington thinks Iran will simply decide to push the nuclear button. That reality is precisely why it was so important for AIPAC and other anti-Iran forces to eliminate a containment strategy early on; they knew it was by far the most sensible policy in terms of avoiding war, but would weaken the regional position of the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf compatriots.

Syria is, from the Israeli point of view, a completely different matter. The chemical and biological weapons stockpiles are surely a real concern, but the issue is much wider than that.

While Israelis view Assad as an enemy, they’re well aware that their border with Syria has been basically quiet for forty years. Assad kept things stable while supporting Hezbollah’s activities in Southern Lebanon. Now that situation will likely drastically change.

It remains possible that Assad will prevail, but even if he does, the status quo ante is lost forever. It is very difficult to predict what an Assad regime will look like if he does win. One thing we know is that after all the anti-Assad rhetoric and repeated calls for him to step down, the international community will not be able to simply accept his victory. So Syria will be isolated, at least for a while, even from the rest of the Arab League. How does that affect Syria’s behavior vis-a-vis Israel, Hezbollah, Jordan, Turkey and Iran? Much will depend on the circumstances of any Assad victory, but in any case, it’s currently unpredictable.

The far more likely scenario, though, is that Assad will eventually be toppled and the various opposition groups will begin vying for power. That contest will undoubtedly prolong the extreme violence in Syria, but it will also be a battle for the hearts and minds of the Syrian people. That could well mean engaging Israel directly or by increasing support for Hezbollah. Do we really expect that Israel will just sit back and wait to see what will happen?

The fighting groups in Syria are certainly not all Salafist, al-Qaeda-type groups. But that does describe a number of them, and others are highly sectarian. Various groups are being backed by competing outside powers, including Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with the US and its allies being a peripheral player even among those who are involving themselves from a distance. Iran and Hezbollah have also been working to support groups friendly to them so that they will continue to have an influential presence in the event Assad falls.

Now things get even more complicated. Israel had wisely avoided pushing the US toward intervention, until they announced their finding of the use of chemical weapons, which was likely a way to try to get the US to carry out or go along with an Israeli operation specifically targeting such weapons. Israel is really not anxious to see the US get more involved in Syria, another striking contrast with the Iran situation. It may turn out that US involvement is the best of a host of unpalatable options, but Israel is well aware that escalation in Syria is not in its interest.

The problem is that Hezbollah yesterday raised the possibility of their own direct intervention. A long-term Hezbollah presence in Syria is not likely something that Israel will sit still for. Tensions are flaring on the Israel-Lebanese border, not to mention the ongoing pressure cooker within Lebanon itself, which has been turned up much higher because of the Syrian civil war.

It is impossible to conceive of Israel sitting by quietly if Hezbollah becomes an active participant in Syria. That impossibility stems from the concern Israel has held from the day the armed conflict began, namely that Hezbollah would have access to Syrian weapons, chemical and conventional. Moreover, Israel would be quite concerned that Hezbollah would then have an established fighting presence on both the Lebanese and Syrian borders.

At this stage, there is no reason to believe that Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah’s implication that direct intervention in Syria is on the table is anything more than bluster. Still, it cannot be dismissed. With each day, the likelihood of Assad holding on to power becomes dimmer and dimmer, and just from the sheer numbers, the greatest possibility by far is that a subsequent Syrian regime, or even a conglomeration of mini-states, is not going to be friendly to the Shi’ite militia/party. That’s why Iran continues to back Assad, and Hezbollah has a compelling reason to involve itself more directly in Syria: to bolster the minority forces that might be aligned with them in a post-Assad Syria.

With or without US involvement, these concerns are going to be present for Israel. The Israelis are not totally blind to the ramifications of taking action on their own, of course. But even though rumors of a recent Israeli strike on a chemical weapons depot in Syria appear unfounded, the dual concerns of chemical weapons falling into hands more likely to use them against Israel than Assad, and of a new regime with Salafist or similar tendencies taking power in Syria, are going to compel dramatic Israeli action sooner or later.

Though the Israeli-Syrian border has been quiet for decades, Israel is mindful of the role the pre-Assad Syrian state played in the run-up to the 1967 war. The early Ba’athist regime was more aggressive, consistently engaging Israel and causing then Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to take many of the steps that eventually led to Israel launching the war, steps that he vainly hoped would mollify Syria and convince them to let Nasser handle the confrontation with Israel.

The Assad regime, both father and son, avoided such actions. A new Syrian regime may well embrace them, and given the widespread changes in the region, that prospect is sure to make Israel extremely anxious. Of course, an agreement with the Palestinians would go a long way toward blunting that threat, but that’s nothing but a pipe dream at this point.

Ultimately, the fact that the Israelis believe they have real and immediate reasons to act in Syria (unlike with Iran) — even if they’re reluctant to do so — might be the factor that eventually pushes the US and/or Europe to intervene. Unfortunately, that doesn’t make intervention any wiser or more likely to bring about positive results.

by Jim Lobe

I stopped reading neo-con and Dick Cheney favorite Victor Davis Hanson, “the Sage of Fresno”, after the Bush administration, largely because almost everything he wrote sounded exactly the same (cranky), and he offered no insight into what influential people were thinking. Instead, he simply repeated — in [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Jim Lobe

I stopped reading neo-con and Dick Cheney favorite Victor Davis Hanson, “the Sage of Fresno”, after the Bush administration, largely because almost everything he wrote sounded exactly the same (cranky), and he offered no insight into what influential people were thinking. Instead, he simply repeated — in his own kind of world-weary, father-knows-best way — whatever the neo-con echo chamber was expounding on.

This week, however, I made an exception because his latest piece in The National Review, “Iran’s North Korean Future”, addressed an emerging neo-con meme designed to take full advantage of the ongoing crisis over North Korea. To wit, if you think a nuclear Pyongyang is bad, wait until Tehran goes nuclear. (Cliff May of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, which is trying to become for Iran what the American Enterprise Institute was for Iraq, wrote on the same topic in the Review on the same day.)

Hanson’s Review piece was subsequently published in the Washington Times and the Chicago Tribune and, to my despair, reprinted in the Early Bird edition of the Pentagon’s Current News. The central argument of the article is that a nuclear Iran would be far more dangerous than “other nuclear rogue states” such as Pakistan and North Korea. Why? Pakistan is deterred by a far larger and more powerful India, according to Hansen, while “North Korea can be “muzzled once its barking becomes too obnoxious” to China on whose patronage and support Pyongyang so clear depends. (Hansen also somewhat dubiously claims that Beijing “enjoys the angst that its subordinate causes its rivals.”)

Unlike Pakistan and North Korea, however, Iran has “no commensurate regional deterrent” that would constrain its behavior, according to Hanson. “If North Korea has been a danger, then a bigger, richer and undeterred nuclear Iran would be a nightmare,” he concludes.

Except that earlier in the same op-ed, Hansen notes that Iran would be most unlikely to attack Israel precisely because Israel’s nuclear arsenal is indeed a deterrent. Here’s the relevant passage:

Iran could copy Mr. Kim’s model endlessly — one week threatening to wipe Israel off the face of the map, the next backing down and complaining that problems in translation distorted the actual, less-bellicose communique. The point would not necessarily be to actually nuke Israel (which would translate into the end of Persian culture for a century), but to create such an atmosphere of worry and gloom over the Jewish state as to weaken the economy, encourage emigration and erode its geostrategic reputation.” [Emphasis added.]

So, even while insisting that Iran would not be deterable (because it doesn’t have a powerful next-door enemy like nuclear Pakistan has in India or a powerful patron like nuclear North Korea has in China) Hanson says in virtually the same breath that it is deterable. And this kind of analysis is rewarded by publication in the Current News!

Meanwhile, Paul Wolfowitz somewhat belatedly added his Iraq War retrospective, entitled (predictably) “Iraq: It’s Too Soon to Tell,” to the flurry of op-eds that came out at the end of March to mark the tenth anniversary of the invasion he fought so hard to realize.

Thankfully, it was not published in a U.S. medium beyond the AEI website but rather in the London-based Saudi daily, Asharq Al-Awsat. It appears primarily to be an (extremely lame) exercise in self-exculpation but is nonetheless well worth reading if for no other reason than he is probably the most high-ranking and influential policy-maker to offer an assessment on this occasion.

Unfortunately, I don’t have the time to go into specific details, but you will see some rather obvious problems in the recitation of the facts and logic.

One example: Saddam “also posed a more immediate danger [than his presumed plans to rebuild his WMD capabilities after sanctions were lifted] because terrorists, including Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, had already begun operating from Iraqi territory to plan terrorist attacks in Europe and the Middle East [at the time of the invasion].” If that is the definition of the kind of imminent threat that justifies a U.S. invasion, what other country in the region, leave aside Pakistan, would not qualify?

(Wolfowitz also seems to put a lot of the blame on former Secretary of State James Baker for allegedly failing to heed Saudi appeals for the U.S. to intervene on behalf of the Shi’a uprising against Saddam in southern Iraq after the first Gulf war.)

The closest he gets to expressing regret is the following passage.

There are many things that one could wish had been done differently in Iraq. Even supporters of the war can make a long list. My own list stars with the US decision to establish an occupation government instead of handing to sovereignty to Iraqis at the outset, and with the four-year delay in implementing a counter-insurgency strategy. It was already clear, soon after we got to Baghdad, that the enemy was pursuing an urban guerilla strategy — in order to prevent a new Iraqi government from succeeding and so that the US would give up and leave — and an appropriate counter-insurgency strategy should have been developed much sooner.

Notice the absence of self in this passage. It wasn’t Wolfowitz who was involved in these decisions; the implication is that he opposed them. It wasn’t even the administration of President George W. Bush in which he was the Deputy Secretary of Defense and an architect of the invasion. It was “the US” that made these decisions.

In fact, it was Wolfowitz who championed de-Baathification within the administration, a policy that, combined with the reigning insecurity and de facto dissolution of the Iraqi army, made an occupation necessary. Indeed, Wolfowitz’s whole argument about the occupation was demolished by none other than Dan Senor, the spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), at a Hudson Institute Forum five years ago, as I noted in a blog post at the time.

As for Wolfowitz’s complaint about failure to implement a counter-insurgency strategy, he, of course, has no one to blame but himself. It was he who publicly ridiculed Gen. Eric Shinseki’s warnings about the size of the force that would be needed after the invasion, and it was he who failed to read the intelligence studies that predicted the emergence of an insurgency. That he tries now to somehow separate himself from these failures by referring to the “US” rather than to the specific decision-makers (including himself) responsible for these disasters reflects, in my opinion, a certain lack of moral integrity.

Now, to be fair, a pretty big chunk of the op-ed consists of an appeal for the Sunni-led Gulf Cooperational Council (GCC) countries to do more to support Iraq, whose government is dominated by Shi’a parties. And the fact that he is making that appeal in a Saudi newspaper strongly suggests that the op-ed was consciously written with that purpose foremost in mind. “…(T)he way to keep Iraq out of Iran’s embrace is by supporting Iraq’s new government, not by distancing oneself from it,” he wrote. “This isolation, not a love of Persians, is what has pushed Iraq too close to Iran.”

Still, given Wolfowitz’s heavy responsibility for what took place a decade ago and the series of disasters that befell Iraq while he was still in a key policy-making position — he didn’t leave until 2005 — his efforts at justifying the invasion without acknowledging his personal failures and offering advice appear unseemly at best.

Photo: Former President George W. Bush (right), former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (center) and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (left). DoD photo March 25, 2003 by R.D. Ward.

by Charles Naas

Not even a month in office, Secretary of State John Kerry took his first official trip to the troubled Middle East and immediately felt first-hand the pressures and metamorphosing power relationships in the region. He began his visit with a meeting in Rome with countries that provide assistance to [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Charles Naas

Not even a month in office, Secretary of State John Kerry took his first official trip to the troubled Middle East and immediately felt first-hand the pressures and metamorphosing power relationships in the region. He began his visit with a meeting in Rome with countries that provide assistance to the various resistance forces in Syria. He pledged $60 million in aid for civilian purposes — to be administered by the United Nations — to help the millions of refugees who have been uprooted by the conflict. The Syrian tragedy hung like a pall over the session and Kerry was berated by representatives of the militias for the size of the offer and the continued policy of not sending modern arms. Nevertheless, the US has now taken one more small step toward greater participation with the anti-Assad groups, something the Administration has maneuvered to avoid.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a prickly fellow at any time, was openly rude about a few minute wait for Kerry and took the opportunity to lambaste Israel and Zionism while knowing full well how Kerry would react. He continued to pressure the US to become more involved in the Syrian situation and stressed that Turkey has accepted thousand of refugees and has been struck by errant munitions in the fighting near the border. Was Erdogan’s rudeness of great importance? Not really, but symbolically, yes. Meanwhile in Saudi Arabia, the assault on the Secretary regarding Syria was also in full force.

In Egypt, a number of the leaders of the democratic-secular opposition parties refused to meet with Kerry — or at least to meet him without publicity — and some got together privately. Of great importance? Again, no, but of symbolic significance, yes. Kerry released some aid for Egypt that had been held up but lectured President Mohamed Morsi on some matters. Auntie US can’t seem to refrain from telling others how to run their country.

In Almaty, Kazakhstan last week the nuclear talks with Iran continued after a nine month recess. The P5+1 nations (the  US, England, France, Russia, China and Germany) for the first time eased ever so slightly their previous proposal. It was relatively “well received” by Iran. Tehran is torn internally about its relationship — or the absence of one — with the US but has persevered undeterred by the threats of bombing and the economic sanctions. It’s likely that Iran is following the old Russian KGB tactic of good guy versus bad guy by having mid-level officials speak openly about the desire for an improvement of ties with the US, followed by intransigence in the talks, refusing to meet directly with the head of our delegation and speeches by conservative religious leaders filled with condemnation for the West. Thus, the importance of the “well received” aspect of all this will not be known until the next full meeting in April. The key question is: will Iran reply with some movement of its own, particularly about the buried uranium enrichment plant in Fordow, or “pocket” the proposal and remain obdurate. The Iranian decision could determine whether future talks continue.

Just how or why has this willingness to defy the US come about? Not long ago in the twilight of the Cold War the United States’ position in the Middle East seemed unassailable. We had “lost” Iran but the Soviets had been unable to bring peace and control to Afghanistan . For a couple of decades Musharraf in Pakistan, the Shah in Iran, Sadat and Mubarak in Egypt and various conservative monarchies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia as well as in neighbouring countries in the Persian Gulf stood with us in the struggle to dominate an area with much of the world’s petroleum,vast wealth potential and strategic positioning location wise. There were of course disputes among these nations over clear differences in perceived national interest, but we were able to adjust to such matters.

The changes we are witnessing now have thus been percolating for more than a decade.The end of the Cold War finally permitted the Middle East to reassess what was important to it. The Arabs, Persians and many ethnic and sectarian groups within these populaces have lived through the Ottoman, French and British Empires, as well as through the clash of the Soviet and American pseudo empires.

A number of powerful indigenous forces have accordingly had the opportunity to express themselves. First, there has been nationalism, historical pride and an insistence on mutual respect, which has been inextricably interwoven with religion. Over a billion people from Indonesia to Morocco are involved in one way or another in the search for what Islam means to them and the glory of its past. Who would have thought the Muslim Brotherhood would be governing Egypt prior to the Arab Spring, which sent shockwaves through the world? Pakistan is being destroyed by the fight over Islam’s true meaning. Second, there’s sheer exuberance over the fact that at last the populaces of these countries can govern themselves and make their own mistakes. Finally, a bi-product of all this has been the freedom to attend to old divisive factors such as religious schisms of Sunni versus Shi’a and ethnic differences.

President Obama seems to have recognized that old truisms that previously worked in the US’ favor no longer apply to America’s future relations with the Middle East. Early on he pledged to implement US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. His deep reluctance to get heavily involved in Libya and now in Syria also reflects his understanding of the complexity of these matters and his recognition of the weakness of our economy, the weariness of our military and his desire to pivot to the competition with China. Republican party leaders meanwhile object to any shift in US priorities and any hint that the golden days of American hegemony are over.

But in the Middle East and South Asia, political leaders are largely dedicated to their own problems and finding ways to resolve the serious issues that divide their populace and make governing onerous. They are sensitive to nagging and direction from outsiders. It is within this greatly changed political atmosphere that US diplomacy must operate. It will not be easy, particularly by a nation as seriously divided as our own — not to mention our unflinching support for Israel. But if ever there was a time for Obama to take on this daunting task, it’s during his final term as President.

Photo: Demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square on the morning of 27 November 2012. Credit: Lilian Wagdy.

Lobe Log contributor Emile Nakhleh, an expert on political Islam and Middle Eastern society, recently provided a fascinating primer on Bahrain to the Bahrain Mirror (Arabic version), an e-newspaper run by Bahraini dissidents. As discussed in the Mirror’s introduction, prior to becoming the CIA’s former chief regional analyst, Dr. [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Lobe Log contributor Emile Nakhleh, an expert on political Islam and Middle Eastern society, recently provided a fascinating primer on Bahrain to the Bahrain Mirror (Arabic version), an e-newspaper run by Bahraini dissidents. As discussed in the Mirror’s introduction, prior to becoming the CIA’s former chief regional analyst, Dr. Nakhleh conducted field research in Bahrain from 1972-73 as the first US scholar to do so, with complete access to the country’s societal benchmarks. This ultimately resulted in Nakhleh’s book, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society, one of the most important references on Bahrain to date. Following is the unedited interview, which has been translated into English from Arabic by the Mirror.

Bahrain Mirror: Does the “Urban Tribalism” model that you discussed in your Bahrain book in the 1970s still
apply today?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Despite the passage of 40 years since I researched and wrote my book on Bahrain, the tribal model, unfortunately, still applies to the rule of Al Khalifa family in the country. The hopes that Bahraini citizens—Shia and Sunni—had pinned on the elections of the Constituent Assembly and the National Assembly in 1972-73 and on the constitution which the late Amir Shaykh Issa bin Salman Al Khalifa promulgated in 1974, were dashed two years later. By 1975, the Al Khalifa reverted to its autocratic rule of the country without any input from the citizens. After 1975, when the National Assembly was dissolved and the constitution was frozen, the ruling family continued to view the country and its people as part of Al Khalifa domain.

In fact, many of the key posts—including in the Royal Diwan, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, etc—are currently held by children and grand children of the early founders of Al Khalifa rule. Bahrainis have generally expressed loyalty and allegiance to the head of the Al Khalifa tribe because of at least four reasons. First, Bahrainis generally liked and respected Shaykh ‘Issa. Second, the people were committed to the nationalist idea of an independent Bahrain. Third, many human rights activists in the 1970s, both Shia and Sunnis, remained hopeful that Shaykh ‘Issa would resurrect the National Assembly and re-instate the constitution. Fourth, most human rights activists and a majority of Bahrainis did not view calls for political reform and government accountability as a reflection of a sectarian divide in the country. On the contrary, most activists called for freedoms of speech and assembly and an accountable and transparent government for all Bahrainis. My field research at the time showed that many Bahraini business people resented the pervasive political and financial control that Shaykh Khalifa, the Prime Minister and brother of the Amir, exercised over contracts, dealerships, and projects—from hotel construction to land reclamation and development.

Many of them privately described him as “Mr. 10 percent, 40 percent, or 50 percent” depending on the perceived percentage they thought he got from specific contracts. Pro-reform dissidents maintained the Al Khalifa tribe ran Bahrain as a fiefdom without accountability to the public. After the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79, Shaykh Khalifa and his security forces justified their control as a way to thwart what they perceived as Iran’s support of Shia activism on the Arab side of the Gulf.

Mirror: How will the Arab Spring touch the Gulf Arab states? The 2001 National Charter promised a new reformist constitution, but unfortunately, the people were disappointed because the Amir (renamed King after 2002) reneged on the reform promises he made to the people in 1999. What trajectory will the pro-reform movement take and what impact will it have on the country?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Despite the tribal and dynastic nature of rule in Bahrain, the Arab Spring has touched the country, whether the ruling family likes it or not. Demands for dignity, respect, equality, and freedom of expression know no national boundaries. In a sense, the ruling family has been fortunate in that the key demands of the Bahraini opposition initially did not call for regime change. They focused on establishing a nationally elected parliament with full legislative powers, re-instating the 1974 constitution, replacing the Prime Minister, an independent judiciary, a transparent and accountable government, and an end to discriminatory practices against the Shia majority, especially in employment in the security services, the armed forces, hospitals, universities, and government-controlled corporations and financial institutions.

Those demands were neither sectarian nor driven by Iran. Continued regime repression and unlawful arrests of demonstrators have caused some protesters to raise the slogan of “regime change.” Whereas popular upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and now in Syria from day one called for regime change, in Bahrain the regime change demand is very recent. If wise heads and pro-reform leaders within the ruling family do not prevail, and if the King and the Crown Prince remain marginalized, Al Khalifa rule would become much more tenuous, violence would spread, more Bahraini blood would be shed, and radical elements would become a stronger voice within the pro-reform opposition. What is more troubling is that the authority of the King and his son the Crown Prince is slowly eroding and the anti-reform faction within the ruling family, whether the older generation represented by the Prime Minister or some of the younger senior ministers represented by the so-called “al-Khawalid,” are becoming more rabidly anti-Shia and more influential.

This faction is following the Saudi guidelines on how to oppose democratic reforms. Once Saudi troops entered Bahrain under the guise of the GCC security agreement, Bahrain for all intents and purposes fell under Saudi suzerainty. While the Al Khalifa old guard has welcomed this intervention, pro-reform elements within and outside the ruling family resented the Saudi military presence and accused the Prime Minister of engineering it. Although the Saudi military presence might serve Saudi Arabia’s anti-Iran and anti-Shia policy, in the long run it will bring immense harm to Bahraini stability, society, and government. Egypt’s more powerful military and security services failed to silence the youthful awakening at Tahrir Square. Bahraini security forces would equally fail to silence the opposition. The window for genuine dialogue between the King and the opposition over meaningful political reform is rapidly closing. Once the window closes, Bahrain will find itself in real economic and political trouble, and Al Khalifa leadership would lose the bay’ah of its people–Sunni and Shia.

Mirror: How do you assess US-Saudi troubled relations over democracy and reform in the region and how do you
envision the relationship to evolve?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Saudi-American relations over Arab Spring uprisings upheavals and democratic transitions
became soured since the US President endorsed the pro-democracy movement in Egypt and urged the Egyptian dictator to abdicate. Because of their close relations with Mubarak, the Saudis were angered by the US position and claimed the President was too quick to “throw Mubarak under the bus.” President Obama’s position was that the US would support a leader as long as he enjoys the confidence of his people. Once he loses that, he should go. That was the case with Mubarak in Egypt, Saleh in Yemen, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Qadhaffi in Libya, and now Assad in Syria. The Saudis find it difficult to accept any meaningful role for the people in determining what type of government they should have and who the country’s leader should be. Despite the decades-old strategic relationship between Washington and Riyadh, the Saudi leadership has yet to get over what happened to Mubarak.

This strategic relationship is grounded in a shared American-Saudi view about regional stability, strong military cooperation, oil exports, and Iran’s perceived hegemonic posture in the Gulf region. The US and Saudi Arabia work closely in the military-to military area, coordinate regularly on Iran, and generally see eye to eye on Syria. They disagree on government response to unrest in Bahrain and on the harsh crackdown by Al Khalifa against the Shia majority. Washington did not support the Saudi military intervention in Bahrain and believed such a step would inflame the situation further and would foment sectarianism. Riyadh has not shown any willingness to start a genuine dialogue between Al Khalifa and the opposition, nor does it to envision any meaningful role for the Shia majority in government. Because of concern over Iran’s nuclear program, the horrendous violence in Syria, the presence of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and the 2012 presidential election campaign in the US, the uprising in Bahrain was put on the backburner, at least for the time being. Washington, however, has consistently pushed the Bahraini government, albeit ever so gently, toward a dialogue with the pro-democracy movement and has encouraged the Crown Prince to play a more active role in promoting such dialogue. On the other hand, the US maintains a robust military presence throughout the Gulf and coordinates with Gulf governments in fighting terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, and in countering potential destabilizing actions by Iran.

The US so far has not used its considerable leverage with Al Khalifa to force a dialogue with the opposition. As many analysts had anticipated, the Saudi military intervention has failed to quash the uprising despite the virulent attitude toward the Shia community. On the contrary, it has energized the opposition despite continued regime repression, has empowered the anti-Shia hardliners within the Al Khalifa family, and has indirectly marginalized the King and his son the Crown Prince.

Mirror: Has Saudi Arabia used US dependence on Saudi oil and the huge US arms sales to the Kingdom to blackmail the US into taking a seemingly more tolerant attitude toward the Al Khalifa harsh tactics against pro-democracy activists? Is it possible to divorce US-Bahraini relations from Saudi-American relations?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Saudi Arabia has not attempted to influence US foreign policy toward the Bahraini uprising through blackmail. Such an attempt, if ever done, would be futile and will certainly backfire. As the US becomes self-sufficient in energy, as the war in Afghanistan winds down, and as Iran searches for a negotiated compromise with the international community over its nuclear program, the US would begin to explore strategies to reduce its military presence in the region.

Budgetary and fiscal decisions within the US government could also reduce US American military presence in the Gulf, to include the Fifth Fleet. According to some reports, in a decade and a half from now Saudi Arabia is expected to need between 6-8 million barrels of oil a day for domestic consumption, mainly in power generation and desalination. Consequently, the Kingdom would have less oil to export and less oil revenues. Within the same timeframe, the Saudi government would need more money to provide for the welfare of its citizens, especially in unemployment assistance, education, and health. With less money to spend and a potentially more peaceful relationship with Iran, The Saudi government would be less inclined to spend on massive arms purchases from the US or anywhere else. The government also would be unable to spend billions of dollars on pacifying the restive segments of its population, as King Abdallah did in response to the Arab Spring in 2011. If these projections materialize, the Saudi government would be forced to minimize its support for Sunni hardliners in Bahrain.

Al Khalifa would then be forced to respond to their people’s calls for democracy and justice without Saudi support. Currently, US-Bahraini relations seem to be tied closely to US-Saudi relations because of the pervasive Saudi economic and security influence in Bahrain. As the balance of power changes in the region over the next decade, and as the US reviews its strategic interests and commitments in the region, Al Khalifa would need to explore strategies for genuine reform and economic and social justice. The main challenge would be whether Al Khalifa would have the luxury of time to wait until then. The window of dialogue might close much sooner. If that happens, calls for regime change would trump calls for dialogue. Bahrain has assumed more significance than its size in the past two years because of the power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia; once, this struggle abates, Bahrain would again revert to being a small player in regional power configurations.

Mirror: How do you assess the pro-democracy forces and the democracy movement in Bahrain?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: Like every Arab protest movement in the past two years, Bahrain’s pro-democracy uprising started peacefully demanding genuine political reform and government accountability. Like every regime where protests occurred, Al Khalifa resorted to violence and repression. As the government crackdown turned harsher and bloodier, and as the Al Khalifa Sunni government began to whip up the flames of anti-Shia sectarianism and shoot and beat peaceful protesters and torture prisoners, some in the pro-democracy movement began to question whether the ruling family was at all interested in reaching a compromise with the opposition. Calls for justice and dignity in Duwwar al-Lu’lu’ in Manama were not different from those in Tahrir Square in Cairo.

The responses of the Egyptian dictator and the Al Khalifa, however, differed significantly. Mubarak was convinced to abdicate before much blood was shed , while Al Khalifa, especially the Prime Minister, continue to cling to power. Although the Bahraini pro-democracy movement is indigenous and genuine, it is not monolithic. It consists of numerous Shia and Sunni religious and secular groups ranging from al-Wifaq to al-Wa’ad, al-Minbar, and al-Haqq, among others. As confrontations with government became more violent, some within the opposition began to opt for violence as a justified response to government repression. Others rejected violence and responded positively to some government calls for dialogue. There is also a generational divide within the uprising, with the youthful generation becoming more supportive of violence and opposed to dialogue. Al-Wifaq seems to have lost some of its influence, and the Sunni secular movements are becoming more marginalized.

The democracy movement is divided ideologically and generationally. Some factions still hope for a democratically reformed Bahrain under the umbrella of a “constitutional” Al Khalifa monarchy but without the current Prime Minister. Others, who consider the establishment of a constitutional monarchy as highly improbable, have come out for regime change. Despite the deep disagreements within the democracy movement over which strategies to pursue, most factions agree the current situation in Bahrain is unsustainable. The Al Khalifa dynasty can no longer maintain its grip on power as it did before February 2011.

Mirror: How do you assess the regime use of Iran as a scare tactic to gain Western support for its crackdown against the opposition?

Dr. Emile Nakhleh: The democracy and human rights movement in Bahrain has never been about Shia or about Iran despite regime claims to the contrary. Calls for political reform and labor rights started decades ago while Iran was still under the Shah. Most Bahraini Shia do not turn to Iranian Grand ayatollahs as their marja’. In fact, Bahraini Shia for the most part have followed Iraqi religious leaders in Najaf and Karbala as their source of emulation. Since the advent of the Arab Spring, the Al Khalifa government has parroted the argument of their Saudi benefactors that Iran was behind the protest movement in the Gulf Cooperation Council states. The West believes human rights advocates in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Abu Dhabi, and elsewhere are indigenous groups and not necessarily directed or controlled by Tehran. While continued unrest on the Arab side of the Gulf could benefit Iran’s short-term interests, the current Iranian regime is wary of pro-democracy protests lest they spread to Iran.

The Islamic Republic would not want to see a repeat of the June 2009 massive protests that followed the elections. Iran has already lost much of its influence in the Arab world because of its support of the Assad regime in Syria. Even Shia Hezbollah has lost much of its luster in the Arab street that was built following the 2006 Lebanon war because of its support of Assad. The Bahraini government’s argument that Iran is behind the unrest has not gotten any traction among policymakers in Washington, London, and other Western capitals. The West’s disagreements with Iran and international sanctions against that country are driven by Iran’s nuclear program, not by its perceived support of domestic unrest in Sunni Arab countries. The specter of the so-called Shia Crescent that was raised by Saudi Arabia, Mubarak’s Egypt, and Jordan a few years back has all but faded. In fact, many analysts in the West t now argue that a “Sunni Crescent” is on the ascendancy in the Arab world, and that Iran is becoming more isolated in the region.

Justice is a fiction in much of the Persian Gulf. Nowhere is this truer than in Bahrain, a place where torture and state terror have become the norm. The country’s political elites talk frequently about freedom and the need for legal and political order. The reality, however, is that Bahrain’s judicial [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Justice is a fiction in much of the Persian Gulf. Nowhere is this truer than in Bahrain, a place where torture and state terror have become the norm. The country’s political elites talk frequently about freedom and the need for legal and political order. The reality, however, is that Bahrain’s judicial system is little more than theater. The courts are sites in which freedoms are not assured, but where they are subordinated to the whims of centralized tyranny. Over the last two years, Bahrain has blithely ignored almost all of its domestic and international commitments to refrain from torture, to protect free speech and to honor due process, all conventions that the country has ostensibly built into its “constitutional” order.

In the most recent instance, the country’s highest court upheld lengthy prison sentences for 13 prominent human rights and political activists, including life imprisonment in some of the world’s most brutal dungeons. Having already been subjected to late night abductions, military tribunals, torture, and false accusation, it is hardly surprising that the imprisoned were unable to find relief in Bahrain’s sham appeals process.

More remarkable is the unwillingness of Bahrain’s most important Western patron, the United States, to openly acknowledge that its partner and host to the 5^th Fleet is not merely managing its way through a crisis, but building a regime of fear and violence all while claiming the opposite. In her comments yesterday at the State Department’s daily briefing, spokesperson Victoria Nuland offered what has become a familiar refrain — a mild rebuke dressed up in principle, but one that makes clear that the US is unwilling to say or do more.

The US position on Bahrain’s excesses, in ways that are eerily similar to the island country’s own theatrical posturing, is more histrionic than substantive. Clearly, in spite of their claims otherwise, American leaders are mostly content with the status quo. Nuland expressed “regret” and “concern” about Bahrain’s high court’s decision to uphold the convictions of key opposition figures yesterday. She added “that this decision further restricts freedom of expression and compromises the atmosphere within Bahrain for reconciliation.”

The reality is that there is nothing further to restrict. The only clear willingness for reconciliation has come from the country’s opposition, not the government. In also calling for further investigations into torture and accountability, Ms. Nuland asks her listeners to suspend disbelief and to consider seriously that Bahrain has any real interest in the pursuit of a meaningful resolution. It has been clear for two years that Bahrain’s leaders desire victory and vengeance, the total destruction of the democratic opposition.

While American leaders almost certainly would prefer a political resolution to Bahrain’s challenges, they have done little to help advance the cause. Bahrain’s leaders have learned that mild admonishment is a small price to pay while they consolidate a new era of authoritarianism. They understand that the American approach is feeble and feckless, if often justified, because of Bahrain’s strategic significance. Long a reliable partner in the US mission to police and patrol the Persian Gulf and to ensure the “flow of oil,” American unwillingness to come down too hard on Manama is also a sign of deference to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has little interest in seeing Bahrain’s opposition enjoy political gain.

It is, however, well past time to think seriously about whether US strategy in the Gulf is working or, instead, whether it helps abet the very conditions of instability that threaten the region and prospects for more open and durable regional politics. The reality is that oil’s flow does not need protecting. Bahrain does not deserve a pass because it is home to American military facilities.

Amidst reports that Great Britain has denied the US military use of important British bases for an assault against Iran, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little told reporters on Friday that whenever the DOD considers military action “we do it within the legal confines…of this country.” The US [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Amidst reports that Great Britain has denied the US military use of important British bases for an assault against Iran, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little told reporters on Friday that whenever the DOD considers military action “we do it within the legal confines…of this country.” The US has been contemplating military action against Iran’s nuclear program since at least 2006, but the legality of a unilateral attack has evidently not been a major consideration in Washington. It should be, as should the likely tactical complications of British (and potentially broader) non-cooperation.

In dramatic contrast to apparent US assumptions of legality concerning preventative military action against Iran is the statement the Guardian obtained from a UK government source that “’The UK would be in breach of international law if it facilitated what amounted to a pre-emptive strike on Iran.’” In fact, reportedly based on legal advice from the UK’s attorney general, the UK has denied the US use of important British bases on Ascension Island, Cyprus, and Diego Garcia. The UK position should be of legal interest in Washington because Great Britain would not be the attacking nation, merely a government assisting the attacker. If UK legal instincts are so extraordinarily cautious about even passively aiding an attacker, one wonders how the US, in the role of the attacker, could muster such confidence about being on legal solid ground.

Most of all US resort to force over the past 20-odd years has been in response to direct attacks on the United States or US interests (post-9/11 anti-terrorist military action aimed against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, cruise missile attacks against al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan in response to the East Africa embassy bombings and the attack against the USS Cole, etc.). Even with the iffy — and later debunked — Bush Administration case for war against Iraq, the US maintained that by sustaining a supposed arsenal of WMD, Iraq was in violation of international law tied to red lines laid down in UNSC resolutions linked to Chapter VII enforcement (use of force) concerning very specific requirements levied on Iraq in the immediate wake of the 1991 Gulf War.

So, even in an alleged worst case scenario in which, for sake of argument, Iran was believed to be in the midst of developing nuclear weapons that it planned to meld to an enhanced ballistic missile capability, that in and of itself would not constitute a direct attack on the US (out of range) or US interests (American bases or embassies in the Middle East/South Asia region). Indeed, the presumed threat posed by any such Iranian capabilities primarily would be against US regional allies such as Israel, most notably, and potentially others such as the GCC states, Turkey and so on. It has, however, not been historic US policy to launch preventative attacks against assumed — not active — threats against its allies.

On another, tactical level, the reported UK refusal of basing cooperation could be quite significant with respect to any US attack against Iran (even more so if other key US NATO allies were to follow suit). The potential loss of transit, staging, refueling and basing rights through the UK, Cyprus and particularly the basing of US heavy bombers at Diego Garcia, could complicate considerably the US ability to amass desired support for an attack on Iran (or sustain the preferred pace of military operations) in the robust manner outlined in the leaked 2006 US military operations plan reportedly briefed to President Bush.

Thus, the tactical problems associated with this apparent UK decision might give pause to US policymakers mulling over any massive knockout blow against Iran’s greatly dispersed nuclear infrastructure, as well as the many and varied Iranian military assets available to defend it.

- Wayne White is a Scholar with Washington’s Middle East Institute. He was formerly the Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia (INR/NESA) and senior regional analyst.

This week’s decision by the Bahraini court of appeals to uphold the prison terms against Bahraini opposition activists is a travesty of justice and an indication that Bahraini repression continues unabated.

Bahraini officials, when confronted with angry world reaction to the court’s decision, cynically hid behind the claim they would [...]]]> via IPS News

This week’s decision by the Bahraini court of appeals to uphold the prison terms against Bahraini opposition activists is a travesty of justice and an indication that Bahraini repression continues unabated.

Bahraini officials, when confronted with angry world reaction to the court’s decision, cynically hid behind the claim they would not interfere in the proceedings of their “independent judiciary”.

Despite the threat to U.S. national interests and the security of U.S. citizens in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf, Washington remains oblivious to the ruling family’s violent crackdown against peaceful protesters in the name of fighting “foreign elements”. Pro-democracy Bahrainis are wondering what we are waiting for.

Because of our muted reaction to what’s happening in Bahrain, the ruling family and their Saudi benefactors have not taken seriously Western support for democratic transitions in the Middle East.

The United States and Britain maintain deep economic and security relations with these states but also enjoy strong leverage, including the U.S. Navy’s Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet, which they must revisit in the face of continued egregious violations of basic human rights by some of these regimes. Bahraini civil rights organisations and activists are expecting the United States to use its leverage to end regime repression.

Despite their pro-Western stance, there is nothing exceptional about the autocratic Gulf Arab regimes. And they should no longer be given a pass on the importance of democratic reform.

Staying in power will require Bahrain’s Al Khalifas and other Gulf tribal family rulers to do more than push a vicious sectarian policy and employ slick public relations firms. Their cynical and deadly game might buy them some time, but, in the end, they will not be able to escape their peoples’ wrath.

In the absence of genuine reforms in the next three years, the Gulf’s autocratic regimes will be swept aside by their peoples. The “people power” that emerged from the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and now Syria, cannot be kept out of these tribal states. In reality, they all have been touched by peoples’ demands for dignity and justice.

While Iran might be exploiting the protest movement to discredit these regimes, the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain goes back to the 1960s and 1970s – way before the Islamic Republic came on the scene.

Even more troubling for U.S. national security are the continued efforts by Al Khalifa to whip up anti-American attitudes among Bahrain’s more rabidly anti-Shia and xenophobic Sunnis. Bahrain and some of their Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) allies perceive the growing rapprochement between the U.S. and the new Islamic democrats, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia, as a sign of tacit opposition to Gulf autocrats.

They believe the U.S will throw them under the bus if their peoples rise up against them. They also worry that if the nuclear issue in Iran is resolved, a possible U.S. rapprochement with Tehran would embolden their Shia communities in their struggle for equality and justice.

For 40 years, Prime Minister Khalifa has been the key opponent to reform in Bahrain. In recent ears, however, a new generation within the ruling family, known as the “Khawalids,” has taken up the anti-Shia, anti-reform, and anti-American cry.

They have used pro-government newspapers, blogs, and social media to vilify the Shia, the United States, and the pro-democracy movement. With tacit government encouragement, they frequently describe elements of the opposition as “diseased cells” that must be removed from society.

In the process, they have encouraged extremist Salafi and other Sunni groups to spread their message of divisiveness, sectarianism, and hate.

What Bahrain and the other Gulf sheikhdoms fail to realise is that when they encourage extremist groups to fight the “enemies” of the regime, a time will come when radical Salafi “jihadists” will turn against the regime. The Saudi experience in Afghanistan and Iraq should offer them a sobering lesson. This dangerous game does not bode well for their survival.

As domestic challenges also grow in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom’s interest in Bahraini domestic policy will diminish. Recent estimates indicate Saudi oil exports over the next decade and a half will shrink significantly because of growing domestic needs for energy to generate power and desalinate seawater.

When this happens, Al Khalifa will have to face their people on their own.

- Emile Nakhleh is the former director of the CIA’s Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World”.

The rising specter of terrorism in Syria shows that by clinging to power and refusing to implement meaningful reforms, Arab autocrats in Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere are indirectly contributing to the resurgence of terrorism in their societies. Arab protests started peacefully, but almost in every country regime repression and torture ultimately pushed [...]]]> By Emile Nakhleh

The rising specter of terrorism in Syria shows that by clinging to power and refusing to implement meaningful reforms, Arab autocrats in Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere are indirectly contributing to the resurgence of terrorism in their societies. Arab protests started peacefully, but almost in every country regime repression and torture ultimately pushed popular revolts toward violence.

This cynical calculus allowed Arab autocrats to claim that protests were directed from the outside and resistance was the work of terrorist groups. In Egypt and Tunisia, regimes fell while popular protests were still peaceful.

In Yemen and Libya, regimes refused to leave and instead used bloody repression. While they failed to quell protests, some opposition groups were forced to militarize. In Bahrain and Syria, regimes have changed the narrative from human rights and reform to sectarianism, using the divide and rule approach. Their self-fulfilling prophecy of terrorism has come to pass because of their conscious policy to discredit the opposition and shore up their legitimacy.

While successful in the short-run, this policy is destined to fail in the long run. Domestic terrorist groups that could emerge from the opposition would not only target regime assets; they will go after U.S. and other western economic interests and personnel in those countries.

In Bahrain, for instance, Sunni vigilantes and even some government officials are encouraged by elements within the ruling family to direct their anger against Americans for their perceived support of pro-reform dissidents. Some regime conservatives increasingly view the Americans, the Shia majority, and Iran as an unholy alliance undermining the Khalifa rule.

The recently appointed minister of information Samira Rajab is anti-Shia, anti-American, and a fan of Saddam Hussein. She blames foreign media and outside provocateurs for the problems in her country—a similar narrative to that of the Assad regime in Syria.

The traditional faction within the Bahraini ruling family, including the Prime Minister, is turning to Saudi Arabia for support. The king and his son the crown prince Salman are committed to an independent and more inclusive country. Unfortunately, they have been marginalized by the older members of the family council and their younger xenophobic Sunni supporters.

By inviting Bahrain’s crown prince to Washington last week, the administration was sending a signal to the conservative faction that it still supports the king and his son and their plan to seek meaningful dialogue with the opposition. The other part of Washington’s message is that the resumption of some arms shipments that were halted after last year’s uprising applied to the coast guard and would not be used against the Bahraini people. It gave Salman something to take back, but indirectly signaled to the old guard that the young prince, not his great uncle, is the preferred interlocutor with Washington. Of course, to save face the old guard has touted the release of the arms as a sign that they are still in Washington’s graces.

It’s clear that Saudi Arabia is trying to expand its hegemony over the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), beginning with Bahrain. The Prime Minister Khalifa and his supporters within the ruling family no longer seem to care about the sovereignty of Bahrain or its historically liberal tradition. Their main concern is their own survival. In the 1980s I wrote a book on the GCC and highlighted some of the challenges that would face the organization down the line. I’m afraid, it’s coming home to roost.

If the proposed Saudi-Bahraini federation is concluded, Bahrain would cease to exist as an independent state and would become a province under Saudi suzerainty. The Saudis and their Khalifa quislings would expand their repression of the Shia community and Sunni human rights activists in the name of fighting Shia and Iran. The opposition will likely arm, and domestic terrorist groups would emerge in both countries.

In Syria, human rights protests similarly started peacefully but have been forced to defend themselves with arms confiscated from the military and obtained from the outside. The Assad regime continues to kill and torture civilians. Like Bahrain, Assad is blaming foreign provocateurs and terrorists for the bloodshed. The regime’s acceptance of the Kofi Annan plan is a rouse to placate the international community and buy the regime more time.

The Annan plan is doomed to fail because the regime views the domestic situation as a zero-sum game. It believes its survival can only be assured through continued repression and control. Negotiating with the opposition is a fantasy that Assad cannot afford to indulge in if his Alawite minority rule is to survive.

Since 9/11 Arab autocrats have cooperated closely on counterterrorism with the US and other western countries. At the same time, they branded domestic dissidents and pro-democracy activists as radicals and urged western governments not to fret over their harsh tactics against their citizens.

Arab regimes mistakenly thought that autocracy, not democracy, was critical for fighting terrorism and that Western support for human rights in Arab countries would dilute such an effort. Because Arab autocrats were pliant partners, western governments, unfortunately, became addicted to autocracy, which in turn helped autocrats become more entrenched.

Arab rulers seem to forget that many non-Western democracies, including Muslim Indonesia and Turkey, also have been strong partners with western governments in fighting terrorism. The fall of the dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya would not preclude these countries from fighting terrorism.

Arab Islamic autocrats co-operate in the fight against terrorism to preserve their rule; whereas democracies do so to protect their societies and way of life.

Washington and other Western capitals should make it clear to the remaining Arab dictators, in word and in deed that the game is up. They must implement genuine political reform or step aside. The world cannot tolerate a resurgence of terrorism because of their repressive rule and sectarian politics.

Dr. Emile Nakhleh is the former director of the CIA Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and a National Intelligence Council Associate. He is the author of A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World and Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society.