by Thomas Lippman
For the United States, Saudi Arabia, other supporters of the rebels in Syria, and for the rebels themselves, this has been a month of fast-paced, intense diplomatic and political activity. It is tempting after so much time and so many deaths to dismiss all the events [...]]]>
by Thomas Lippman
For the United States, Saudi Arabia, other supporters of the rebels in Syria, and for the rebels themselves, this has been a month of fast-paced, intense diplomatic and political activity. It is tempting after so much time and so many deaths to dismiss all the events since mid-January as the inconclusive comings and goings of people who simply don’t know what to do about the intractable conflict, but it’s also possible to add it all up and see the possibility of an emerging new energy, cohesion, and perhaps more effective action.
At the very least, the events and consultations since mid-January seem to have put the United States and Saudi Arabia back on the same page.
A useful point to begin this review is the visit to Washington in mid-January of Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia’s minister of interior and the most powerful man in the country other than the king. Nayef, who is respected in Washington for his leadership of Saudi Arabia’s struggle against an al-Qaeda uprising a decade ago, saw everyone in the U.S. national security establishment, plus key members of Congress. Not much was said publicly about the outcome, but within a couple of weeks events began to unfold rapidly.
On Feb. 3, a few days before Prince Muhammad left for Washington, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia issued a royal decree making it a crime, punishable by prison time, for any Saudi citizen to fight in a foreign conflict. This reflected Riyadh’s concern about the hundreds of young Saudis who have joined extremist rebel groups in Syria and could some day return to make trouble at home. It also was aimed at deflecting criticism from Washington, where some officials have said Riyadh was not doing enough to cut off the flow of fighters.
That same day, Feb. 3, the White House confirmed reports that Obama will visit Saudi Arabia in late March. This has been a difficult year for U.S.-Saudi relations due to disagreements over Iran’s nuclear program and policy toward Egypt, as well as over Syria. Obama’s planned visit is clearly intended to smooth over some of these differences; the conversations would have been more difficult still if the issue of Saudis going to Syria to fight with the jihadi extremists were still on the table.
On Feb. 12, according to the Saudi embassy, Prince Muhammad met with Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and with Under Secretary Wendy Sherman. She holds the administration’s Iran nuclear portfolio and has strongly defended its interim agreement with Tehran, a deal that caused heartburn in Riyadh. While in Washington, Muhammad also met with CIA officials and with the intelligence chiefs of Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and other supporters of the rebels, according to press reports.
Then the pace of events accelerated.
On Feb. 12, King Abdullah II of Jordan, whose country is straining under the burden of supporting Syrian refugees, met with Vice President Joe Biden to discuss “ongoing efforts to bring about a political transition and an end to the conflict in Syria,” the White House said. Two days later, Abdullah conferred with Obama.
On Feb. 15, the UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva ended, predictably, in failure. Secretary of State John Kerry put the blame squarely on the Assad regime’s intransigence, but regardless of who was responsible, that avenue now appears to have come to a dead end.
The next day, the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army — that is, the non-extremist rebels whom Washington and presumably Riyadh support — announced that Gen. Salam Idriss, the overall military commander who had been increasingly criticized as ineffective, was being replaced. His successor, backed by the Saudis, is Brig. Gen. Abdul-Illah Bashir al-Noeimi. It is too early to know whether he will be able to enlist the support of all the often-divided rebel factions, who are battling extremist forces aligned with al-Qaeda as well as the Syrian army.
Back in Washington, the White House announced on Feb. 18 that Robert Malley, a veteran Middle East hand from the Clinton administration, would return to the National Security Council. His assignment is to manage relations with the often-fractious allies of the Arab Gulf states, a group that includes Saudi Arabia.
A day later, Feb. 19, the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal broke the news that Prince Muhammad bin Nayef had taken over as boss of the kingdom’s effort to arm and strengthen the Free Syrian Army and other non-extremist groups. The Post’s Karen de Young reported the next day that the intelligence chiefs, at their Washington gathering a week earlier, had agreed on how to define which rebel groups were eligible for new aid, and on new arms shipments to them. Muhammad, a firm if low-key operative, replaced the mercurial Prince Bandar bin Sultan, whose personal charisma had evidently not impressed the rebels.
That same day, Feb. 19, Deputy Secretary Burns delivered a speech that was widely depicted as a preview of what Obama will say to King Abdullah next month: the United States is committed to its strategic partnership with the Arab Gulf states, and will not be bamboozled into a permanent agreement with Iran that would leave Tehran with any path to nuclear weapons. Telling the Saudis what they want to hear, Burns said that in Syria, “the simple truth is that there can be no stability and no resolution to the crisis without a transition to a new leadership.” That is, Bashar al-Assad must go, as the Saudis and Obama himself have long demanded, and Riyadh should not interpret the agreement by which Syria is due to give up its chemical weapons as U.S. acquiescence in Assad’s legitimacy.
Meanwhile, of course, Syrians are dying by the thousands as the government continues to bomb civilian areas, and there is no end in sight. Even if Assad steps down, Burns said, the United States has “no illusions” about “the very difficult day after — or, more likely, the very difficult years after.”
Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah are still supporting Assad. It is possible that he could survive to preside over some rump state. But it does appear that the working program of those who want to get rid of him is, at least, less messy and disorganized than it was a month ago.
*This post was revised on Feb. 25 to make an adjustment to the sequence of events.
Photo: Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud (left) with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdul Azi
]]>by Emile Nakhleh
The horrific scenes of starving Syrians and falling barrel bombs and missiles on Homs, Aleppo, and Deraa offer evidence of Bashar al-Assad’s determination to destroy his country and massacre his people in order to stay in power.
No other Arab dictator in recent memory, including Saddam Hussein, has committed [...]]]>
by Emile Nakhleh
The horrific scenes of starving Syrians and falling barrel bombs and missiles on Homs, Aleppo, and Deraa offer evidence of Bashar al-Assad’s determination to destroy his country and massacre his people in order to stay in power.
No other Arab dictator in recent memory, including Saddam Hussein, has committed such systematic and callous brutality as Bashar al-Assad of Syria. It’s time that President Barack Obama and other Western leaders respond to Assad’s atrocities and force his ouster.
NATO acted, with Washington’s support, to save Benghazi. Homs is no different. Syria burns while Washington watches. When will Homs become the tipping point for immediate action?
Almost two years ago, several experts argued, including on this Blog, for arming the rebels in order to level the playing field. Had that happened, the regime would have fallen and the Syrian people would have been spared much of this misery.
According to media reports at the time, debate raged within the White House and the US Department of State on this issue, with Secretary of State John Kerry favoring a military solution but without putting boots on the ground. Those who argued against arming the rebels, however, prevailed.
Three reasons underpinned the non-military approach. First, arming and training the rebels would ultimately lead to “mission creep” and direct military involvement. Second, the arms, especially anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, could fall into the hands of militants and terrorist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra. Third, the American people, including many Democrats in Congress, were opposed to another possible war in the Mid-East.
In the final analysis, what drove President Obama’s objection to a military solution was his visceral opposition to starting new wars and strong support for ending them.
Unfortunately for Syria, not arming the opposition resulted in thousands being killed and an emboldened Assad. The moderate opposition became much weaker, and radical Salafi groups, including the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), became the face of the opposition.
A Syrian Christian family that just got out of Syria told me of the paralyzing fear that is constantly being inflicted on innocent civilians — women, children, and the elderly — as bombs and missiles rain down on their homes and shelters. One of them said they are forced to accept the horrific reality that the death of a neighbor or a relative has become ordinary and banal.
Many of these Christians, who initially supported Assad, now see his legacy as one of destruction with no remorse or care for the country or its people. They are demanding justice from this war criminal.
Geneva II is failing. In fact, it was doomed from the start because Assad, his foreign minister, and their Russian benefactors have used the meetings to buy time. Assad has no intentions to negotiate his exit from power. Anyone who thinks otherwise is naïve or complicit.
Russian President Vladimir Putin used Geneva as a convenient crutch because a forceful international action on Syria could muddy his Winter Olympics. He wanted the world to focus on Sochi, not Homs. Starving Syrians should not sully his Olympian dreams; unfortunately, the world went along.
The op-ed President Obama and the French President Francois Hollande wrote in the Washington Post Feb. 10 barely addressed the constant, heart-wrenching suffering of the Syrian people. The two leaders called on the international community to “step up its efforts to care for the Syrian people, strengthen the moderate Syrian opposition, and work the Geneva II process toward a political transition that delivers the Syrian people from dictatorship and terrorism.”
This rhetoric will not move Assad to abdicate and turn the reins of power to an interim government. Geneva II is already stalled, but Assad continues to use it as a fig leaf to cover his atrocities. He is pounding his country to smithereens while world leaders watch.
Whenever civilians flee their towns to places on the Lebanese border, such as Arsan, regime planes and missiles follow them and wreak havoc regardless of which side of the border they are on.
The “international community” will not act on its own without American leadership and resources. The United States, therefore, in concert with its NATO allies must take several steps immediately.
First, declare a no-fly zone over all of Syria as a warning to Assad to stop the regime’s aerial bombardment and the killing of innocent civilians. If missile attacks do not cease within 24 hours, NATO should bomb missile sites.
A Syrian Christian told me, “Assad owns the skies over Syria and unless that changes, he will not stop his butchery.”
Second, arm the Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups with adequate weapons, including anti-tank and anti aircraft rockets. Recent conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us that some of the weapons that are provided to legitimate rebel forces sometime fall in the hands of radical jihadis and Salafis. We should expect a similar possibility in Syria. As the disparate rebel groups unify, however, they would become more effective on the battlefield and a more formidable fighting force. This in turn would weaken the radicals.
Third, through private channels, perhaps from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, inform radical groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, that ISIS and other terrorist groups would not be tolerated, currently or in a post-Assad Syria.
Mainstream rebel groups should ostracize and reject ISIS as part of the opposition or as a potential player in a post-Assad Syria. Opposition leaders within Syria and outside it should collect information on ISIS activists and mark them for arrest and deportation once Assad falls. If Jabhat al-Nusra will not reject ISIS or terrorism, it too should be targeted for arrest and deportation.
Fourth, organize an immediate, massive, multi-state humanitarian aid effort to bring food, medicine, water, blankets, and other necessities to Syrians trapped in cities and towns across the country. If Assad prevents supplies from reaching the needy, he should be told in no uncertain terms that force would be used to protect aid deliveries.
Fifth, declare Assad and his closest associates as international war criminals and initiate indictment proceedings at The Hague. Assad’s foreign minister Waid al-Muallem should be told privately that he too could be indicted as a war criminal if he does not defect from the regime. The message should be equally conveyed to other senior members of the regime, both civilian leaders and military.
Sixth, the UN Secretary General should direct Lakhdar Brahimi to begin working with the opposition on a post-Assad constitution, electoral law, and a representative governmental structure that would be put in place once the Assad regime collapses. The charade of Geneva II should end.
The draft constitution, which must be approved by a popular referendum openly and freely, should be based on the principles of inclusion, tolerance, freedoms of speech and assembly, and human rights, especially for women and minorities. No single party, including the Ba’th Party, should be allowed to dominate the political landscape.
Let us be clear: Arming the rebels does not mean direct US involvement in the Syrian civil war. Regardless of the expected public opposition to the proposed steps, President Obama cannot possible continue to exalt America’s values and moral standing while Syria burns.
Photo: Beirut, Lebanon, February 11 (UNHCR) — More than 1,100 civilians have taken advantage of a three-day “humanitarian pause” this weekend to flee the besieged Old City of Homs in western Syria. Credit: SARC/B.AlHafez
]]>by Farideh Farhi
The meeting between Javad Zarif and John Kerry on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 2 was reportedly mostly focused on nuclear negotiations. But this didn’t prevent a “senior US official” from telling reporters that Kerry also tried to bring in Syria.
According [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
The meeting between Javad Zarif and John Kerry on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 2 was reportedly mostly focused on nuclear negotiations. But this didn’t prevent a “senior US official” from telling reporters that Kerry also tried to bring in Syria.
According to this anonymous official, “Secretary Kerry raised his concerns about the delay in moving chemical weapons to the port in Latakia, and the humanitarian situation on the ground specifically in the besieged areas.” Iran was also urged “to show a willingness to play a constructive role in bringing an end to the conflict.”
Alas, again according to the US official, when Kerry raised the issue, Zarif indicated that he was not authorized to discuss Syria.
This is an interesting plant devoid of any context for the reader regarding why Zarif might not want to talk about Syria with Kerry. To be sure, Steven Erlanger of the New York Times did offer one line of context: Zarif apparently declined to participate in this conversation because “Iran’s policy on Syria is not controlled by the Foreign Ministry.”
Conveniently forgotten is Kerry’s condescension on Jan. 6 that Iran could “contribute from the sidelines… to help the process.” The spectacle of Iran’s invitation and then dis-invitation by Ban Ki-moon to Geneva II under pressure from the same Secretary of State is not mentioned either.
Even those who may be unfamiliar with Iranian politics will be able to discern that Zarif’s refusal had less to do with his lack of authorization to talk Syria policy and more with the decision of the political leadership in Iran, which now includes Zarif, to tell Kerry that he cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Ultimately, this event is telling commentary about the US leadership’s presumption that it can easily engage in public denigration of Iran and then have a closed-door conversation regarding the input Iran can — and should — have in a process that it was barred from participating in publicly.
Let’s be clear, the issue was not Zarif’s lack of authorization per se. The point was that if Iran is called upon to show a “willingness to play a constructive role,” then it should be treated like a stakeholder in the process. Kerry’s predicament was likely caused by a full-blown Saudi freak-out over Iran’s participation. But given the circumstances, there is really no reason for Iran to show understanding of Kerry’s predicament even behind closed doors.
Zarif has as much input in Iran’s Syria policy these days as Kerry does in the US’ Syria policy. The highly fluid dynamics on the ground limits them both; so does input by other institutions, including the military and security establishments, and domestic political actors. The difference lies in the current reality that the US’ Syria policy is confused, conflicted and under pressure while Iran’s is not.
Iran’s support for the Assad regime is odious and yet its long-standing warnings that the attempt to remove Bashar al-Assad will open the path for sectarian extremism and a deepening of the conflict — irrespective of whether the Assad regime or even the Iranian regime have fed extremism and the conflict — have proven correct. Tehran faces little pressure or conflict at home regarding its role in Syria and can rely on Moscow to make sure that Assad does not fall. Lest we forget: it was Russia that prevented UN Security Council resolutions against Assad’s regime. And despite all sorts of reports regarding Iranian arms shipments, technical and intelligence assistance, and even personnel support, Russia remains Assad’s much more consistent and robust arms supplier and supporter.
This is why Zarif reacted to Iran’s dis-invitation to Geneva II with a shrug. An invitation would have been nice and an official acknowledgment of Iran’s role as a key player in the region. It would have also made Iran a stakeholder in the resolution of the Syrian conflict through an internationally guided process. A behind-closed-doors conversation regarding what Iran can do to help, on the other hand, offers nothing.
Meanwhile back in the USA, if this report is correct, even Kerry has lost faith in his administration’s approach to the crisis in Syria. Laments are plenty: Assad is failing to uphold his promises on chemical weapons; Russia is not helpful and continues to supply arms (there is tellingly no reference to Iranian arms and support here); and Geneva II is not working. In the hawkish Senator Lindsey Graham’s rendition, Kerry “openly talked about supporting arming the rebels. He openly talked about forming a coalition against al Qaeda because it’s a direct threat.”
Graham is likely placing his wishes on Kerry’s tongue. Nevertheless, he stands at one pole pressuring an administration that is well aware of another pressure pole consisting of a general public that wants nothing to do with another mission creep in the Middle East. If the political process doesn’t go anywhere, pressures to do something else are bound to increase.
But as far as the US-Iran dynamic regarding Syria is concerned, the basic issue persists. If Iran is influential in sustaining the Assad regime, then turning it into a stakeholder in the political process makes eminent sense — but not behind closed doors or on a seat in the back of the room.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
For three years, the Syrian civil war has continued unabated; and for three years, the so-called “international community” has achieved almost nothing — other than to head off the war’s escalation over the use of chemical weapons following President Barack Obama’s ill-considered drawing of a so-called red line [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
For three years, the Syrian civil war has continued unabated; and for three years, the so-called “international community” has achieved almost nothing — other than to head off the war’s escalation over the use of chemical weapons following President Barack Obama’s ill-considered drawing of a so-called red line against such use.
Another try begins tomorrow in Geneva. But this meeting, dubbed “Geneva II” in reference to the last attempt in 2012, is already star-crossed. Late last week UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon invited Iran to take part. This was a reasonable, indeed necessary step, given that Iran is deeply engaged in all the relevant issues and could well be in a position to scotch any agreement.
Then, yesterday, the Secretary General rescinded the invitation. The reason — or pretext — for doing so? That Iran was unwilling to accept a key component of Geneva I: in effect providing for the departure from power of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. The actual formulation: “The establishment of a transitional governing body which would exercise full executive powers.” In the interpretation by Assad’s opponents, that means he has to go. That transitional body “…could include members of the present government…,” but it would be “…formed on the basis of mutual consent,” which of course would not be granted to President Assad. (This is the full text of the June 30, 2012 “Action Group for Syria Final Communique.”)
Reportedly, pressure on the Secretary General to rescind his invitation came principally from the US and the UK. If Iran would be in Geneva, the opposition would not: ergo, no negotiations. Of course, this begs the question of cui bono: who potentially has most to gain from the talks? Since the opposition has not been winning on the ground, this was a bluff that might have been called.
But the Obama administration had to consider a further factor: parallel negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. These are already fraught with difficulties, notably, the opposition to the interim agreement by Israel, Persian Gulf oil states, and many members of the US Congress. The timing of the Geneva fracas was also important: yesterday, both Iran and its interlocutors began to implement the Joint Plan of Action, including some relaxation of sanctions. Was it worth risking even more intense political opposition to Washington’s dealing with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program by allowing Tehran to come to Geneva? By the same token, there is also risk that the “disinvitation” will play into Iranian hard-liners’ opposition to dealing with the American Great Satan. Hopefully the administration has accurately calculated that risk.
There is a broader context. President Obama faces difficult choices in his Middle East strategy, conditioned in major part by domestic politics and pressures. He cannot at one and the same time exert pressure on the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, allow Iran to join the Syria negotiations, and pursue a nuclear agreement with Iran that includes reducing sanctions. The obvious strategic priority is boxing in the Iranian nuclear program, even if that risks postponing serious attempts to stop the killing in Syria.
Thus the Syria talks do not begin auspiciously, to say the least.
The imbroglio over Iran’s participation also reveals two other fault lines. The first derives from a requirement that Obama imposed in 2011, in addition to his red line against the use of chemical weapons — namely that Assad must go. To resolve the Syrian conflict, that condition may be necessary. But to make it a precondition was hardly likely to encourage Assad and his government to “play ball.”
Even more, there is little willingness to understand that Assad acts not just for himself but as leader of a significant, though minority part of the Syrian population, the community of Alawites, a Shi’a sect. Notably, at Geneva I, only Iraq represented a Shi’a perspective; and with Iran now excluded, the same is true of Geneva II. Geneva I did argue that in Syria “There is an overwhelming wish for a state that.…[0]ffers equal opportunities and chances for all…. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.” But as with so much international diplomacy, “wishful thinking” is unlikely to reassure the part of the population being asked to give up power and possibly to face savage retribution.
To be sure, the Alawite minority has dominated the rest, including the majority Sunni community; and to end the civil war, that situation has to change. But without providing solid assurances to the Alawite community (and to others), chances of a peaceful settlement are zero.
The second fault line is that Syria’s civil war is part of a broader struggle for power and preeminence throughout the region, at one critical level between Sunnis and Shi’as. The current phase in that struggle began with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, toppling a minority Sunni regime dominating a Shi’a majority population. The Syrian civil war is in major part a “get even” effort by Sunni states led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Worse, there is an influx of Islamist terrorists inspired, financed and armed by people in the same Sunni states that want to redress the Sunni-Shi’a regional balance.
The US and others thus face a dilemma at Geneva. They can persevere in demanding that Assad depart as part of “transitional” arrangements, while excluding a key regional player (Iran); or they can decide that Assad can remain and run for reelection (as he has said he would do), but in elections that are structured to redress at least some legitimate grievances of the non-Alawite community (Assad would lose such an election); that solid guarantees must be put in place for all Syrian communities, if that can be done; that all relevant outsiders be engaged at Geneva; and that states permitting free rein for Al Qaeda and its ilk must finally be called to account.
This is called strategy, diplomacy, leadership, willpower, and the willingness of the Obama administration to put US national interests ahead of domestic politics.
]]>by Tyler Cullis
On Jan. 22, 2014, the long-promised Geneva II conference will begin, with close to 30 countries sending delegations in a last-ditch bid to end the violence in Syria. The talks, which will include both the Assad regime and parts of the opposition, hope to win support for a [...]]]>
by Tyler Cullis
On Jan. 22, 2014, the long-promised Geneva II conference will begin, with close to 30 countries sending delegations in a last-ditch bid to end the violence in Syria. The talks, which will include both the Assad regime and parts of the opposition, hope to win support for a mutual ceasefire and to forge a political settlement to nearly three years of civil war. Nevertheless, optimism is in short order. Below are critical questions the Geneva II conference will need to answer and address if peace is to prove possible.
Who does the Syrian opposition represent?
Syria’s opposition is split on attending the talks. The Syrian National Council has voiced its opposition to any negotiations with the Assad regime, threatening to leave the larger Syrian National Coalition should talks move forward under their aegis. Major parts of the opposition — including the Islamic Front and al-Qaeda-linked groups — have publicly stated that they will not be bound to any agreement reached during the conference. Thus, whether opposition representatives can uphold their end of any bargain reached in Geneva is an increasingly dim prospect.
That makes negotiation all the more difficult. Without a strong, unified opposition capable of binding all parties to an agreement, it is highly unlikely that the Assad regime will commit to a ceasefire — the obvious first step to a political resolution. In this way, a problem that has plagued Syria’s rebels all along — lack of cohesion — threatens to undermine the talks before they even begin.
Will Iran attend the talks in Geneva?
As of this posting Iran has yet to be formally invited to the Geneva II conference. According to the United Nations-Arab League envoy to Syria, Lashkar Brahimi, the UN welcomes Iran’s participation in Geneva, but the United States has blocked efforts to extend an invitation. Talks are said to continue on this matter, up to and until Jan. 22, but it is looking less and less likely that Iran will be permitted to formally attend the negotiations.
Nonetheless, Iran has proven a resilient partner to the Syrian government in the face of regional and international disapprobation, so it is highly unlikely that the Assad regime would consider any deal at Geneva without Iran’s direct input. Moreover, Brahimi has noted that he has a direct line of contact with Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. Even if not formal, then, Iran’s presence in Geneva will nevertheless be felt by conference participants.
What kind of political resolution is being considered?
A product of the Action Group on Syria, the Jun. 30, 2012 Geneva Communique, is ostensibly the basis for the Geneva II negotiations. The Communique, which assumes the continued “national unity and territorial integrity” of Syria, recognizes the need for a mutual ceasefire and for the establishment of a transitional governing body, which would be inclusive of all parties to the conflict. This body would then consider constitutional reforms.
However, the Geneva Communique is not the only available solution. In fact, viable alternatives are being widely discussed.
For instance, the Taif Agreement, which ended Lebanon’s 15-year civil war, is being considered as an alternative model. Just as the Taif Agreement ended the privileged status of the Christian Maronites and heralded an era of (unsteady) co-existence between the various Lebanese sects, so too must a political resolution to the Syrian conflict bring to a close the privileges of the Alawites and forge a power-sharing agreement between the contending parties. A political resolution à la Taif would be full of bumps in the road, as Lebanon can attest to, but would at least provide a mechanism to peacefully resolve political disputes when and as they arise.
What is the cost of failure?
Since the civil war intensified in the summer of 2012, tens of thousands of Syrians have died and millions more have been uprooted from their homes. This is the status quo, which will remain intact so long as the parties refuse a political compromise.
For the United States, there will be big questions in need of answers including how long it can endure a conflict that is proving fertile ground for al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Already, as Ryan Crocker’s recent remarks highlight, some U.S. policymakers are seriously considering a future with Assad and thus are urging the White House to open up a line of communication. U.S. policy might thus be forced to undergo a turnabout in the months ahead if no settlement is found.
The worst outcome of failure, however, is that the civil war will render permanent the disintegration of Syria, as the Assad regime, its opposition and the Kurds fight to a stalemate and exercise political autonomy within their respective territorial spheres of control. If this is the case, the United States, its European partners and the Middle East region might have a bigger problem on its hands than it ever have imagined.
]]>by Tyler Cullis
Few places deserve less optimism than Syria, where a civil war has raged unabated for more than two years. The situation on the ground continues to deteriorate at an appreciable rate, with close to 10 million people presently in need of food relief and medical assistance and 6.5 [...]]]>
by Tyler Cullis
Few places deserve less optimism than Syria, where a civil war has raged unabated for more than two years. The situation on the ground continues to deteriorate at an appreciable rate, with close to 10 million people presently in need of food relief and medical assistance and 6.5 million displaced from their homes. Even by conservative estimates, 126,000 people have fallen victim to the conflict since it began in March 2011. There is little to recommend the hopeful in Syria’s unending tragedy.
And yet for a conflict that has fallen into a kind of stasis, with neither the Syrian regime nor its opposition able to claim victory, there just might be a way forward if recent events are any suggestion. Last week, a date was finally set for the long-awaited Geneva II conference, although attendance — especially from the Syrian opposition — remains thus far unclear. The day prior, an interim deal was struck between the United States and its international partners and Iran concerning Iran’s nuclear program. The two followed so closely on the heels of one another that speculation was ripe — though empty — that the U.S.-Iran dialogue had reached as far as the Syrian conflict. Regardless, the interim deal augured well for the possibility that the U.S. extend an invitation to Iran for Geneva II and the pair compromise to realize mutual interests in ending the Syrian conflict.
This would, no doubt, require a change in the U.S.’s strategic calculus, which has thus far enacted a strict bar to Iran’s participation in the Geneva talks. But, as has long been recognized, without the Iranians at the table and without their interests adequately represented in Geneva, Iran can play spoiler to any kind of political resolution tabled there. The view in Damascus is that the Syrian regime is gaining momentum on the battlefield and can outlast the opposition, even if that means a decade or more of civil war. Without Iran’s commitment to a political transition, then, there is little end in sight.
Such a commitment is not a far-fetched idea any longer, either: Iran has good reasons to bring to a close the civil war in Syria, even if that means the removal of Bashar al-Assad. For one thing, the conflict has proved a significant drain on Iran’s own resources, as the Islamic Republic’s support for the Assad regime has required considerable expenditures in both money and manpower. While there is no clear sense as to the contribution Iran has made in terms of bodies on the ground, Iran has bankrolled a Syrian government that would have all but collapsed were it not for Iran’s financial benevolence. Further, the ongoing civil war has forced Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy, down from the mantle it once occupied in the Arab world following its July 2006 war with Israel. It is increasingly difficult to remember that, not long ago, Nasrallah, Assad, and Ahmadinejad were deemed the three most-admired world leaders in Arab public opinion. Clearly, the costs to Iran from a drawn-out conflict have been paid in blood, treasure, and reputation. Iran’s desire to staunch the bleeding should thus be obvious.
That is not to say that Iran is willing to sacrifice its interests in Syria, which are apparently deep enough to have warranted such costs in the first place. Whatever agreement is struck between the Syrian regime and its opposition will have to ensure that Iran maintains a healthy degree of influence in Damascus, or else Iran will undoubtedly favor the status quo, despite the overhead. But influence can come in many shades and certainly can be felt long after the passing of the Assad family’s reign.
In fact, by entertaining a political transition in Syria, Iran could well realize a broader set of interests. This includes the long-sought recognition that Iran is a regional power, armed with enough political influence to act as a broker between warring parties elsewhere. Should the U.S. overcome its stubborn refusal to permit Iran’s participation at Geneva II, the White House will have delivered to Iran what it has always sought: U.S. recognition that Iran cannot so easily be ignored. In doing so, however, the U.S. will turn the onus back on Iran, forcing it to live up to its promise and to deliver the political transition any deal to end the conflict requires. If Iran fails to do so, then it will have secured a narrow, perhaps fleeting victory in Syria, but lost the much larger battle for regional standing. Obviously, the pressure to deliver would be squarely on Iran’s shoulders.
Furthermore, at a time when the U.S. and Iran are speaking to each other, and the possibility exists for Iran’s reintegration into the world community after 34 years, Iran is incentivized to undertake such action as would reciprocate an American invitation to Geneva. Better than most, Iran appreciates the need to resolve the conflict in Syria. If doing so would likewise put Iran in the good graces of the U.S., then all the better, especially at such a sensitive point in the nuclear negotiations.
This all, of course, requires flexibility from the United States. As the International Crisis Group noted in a September statement, the U.S. needs to be “flexible with regards to timing and specific modalities [regarding Assad’s departure].” If Iran is willing to push Assad out, then the least the U.S. can do is accommodate the Iranians regarding the means by which the transition takes place. One possibility, entirely speculative, is that Assad depart office upon the end of his term, which, according to reforms he enacted early in the conflict, takes place next year. That would provide both the time for Geneva II participants to work out how exactly the transition will work, as well as a face-saving measure for Assad so that he can, however shamelessly, claim to be sacrificing himself to save a nation.
Is any of this, in fact, possible? That is entirely unclear. But until the U.S. includes Iran in the Geneva II process, one thing is absolutely certain: the Syrian civil war will continue on its interminable path.
– Tyler Cullis is a law graduate specializing in international law and U.S. foreign policy. Follow him onTwitter.
]]>With the boost from the chemical weapons deal now in the rear view mirror, the chilling picture of the brutal daily slugging match in Syria has remerged. The Assad regime’s offensive against rebel forces grinds on, but gains have been less of late, and the rebels have rebounded [...]]]>
With the boost from the chemical weapons deal now in the rear view mirror, the chilling picture of the brutal daily slugging match in Syria has remerged. The Assad regime’s offensive against rebel forces grinds on, but gains have been less of late, and the rebels have rebounded here and there. Islamist rebels of one stripe or another inside the country continue to gain ground within the armed opposition, and neither the moderate rebels, nor the opposition in exile currently support talks unless they are aimed at removing President Bashar al-Assad.
Heavy fighting has been raging over the past week in various sectors of the country. Rebel forces led by the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front in eastern Syria on Nov. 23 seized the country’s largest source of oil and gas, the Omar Field. The government has been unable to export oil since 2011 because of its inability to hold the entire route to the coast, but it has been using this oilfield for domestic consumption. Now the regime’s access to domestic oil supplies also has been disrupted with fuel shortages already evident in Damascus.
Rebels reportedly also launched an offensive last week to break the government siege against the opposition-held Damascus suburb of Ghouta. Fatalities on both sides were unusually high over the weekend, according to the UK-based “Syrian Observatory for Human Rights”: 100 rebels and 60 regime cadres. Government shelling of rebel-dominated suburbs has surged along with rebel return fire falling on the regime-held core of the capital.
Although claims by both sides are difficult to verify, so far there is no indication the rebels broke through to Ghouta, but the affiliation of the casualties on both sides is telling with respect to the sectarian and extremist nature of the struggle on the ground. Rebel dead apparently come mainly from the al-Nusra Front and the equally al-Qaeda linked Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL). Government dead so far reportedly included 20 fighters from the “Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade,” an Iraqi Shi’a militia that took the field this year in order to face off with the many Iraqi Sunni combatants in al-Nusra and ISIL. The collision of such fanatical elements doubtless explains, in part, the high rate of loss in this particular round of fighting.
The Assad regime’s most recent offensive has been aimed at seizing a key road in the mountainous Qalamoun area of central Syria linking Damascus to the city of Homs. Government troops had made significant gains in the Qalamoun area until Nov. 20 when rebel suicide bombers pounded a key frontline government position in the town of al-Nabak and rebels fighters moved against a nearby regime-held town not previously contested. ISIL and al-Nusra reportedly have shifted hundreds of fighters from elsewhere in Syria into the battle trying to halt the government drive (once again showing their prominence where the fighting has been toughest).
To counter the increased strength of al-Nusra and ISIL after these al-Qaeda affiliates wrested from other Islamists the town of Atma on the Turkish border through which many arms flow into Syria for the opposition, a group of relatively more moderate Islamist combatant groups last week united to form a new “Islamic Front.” Various more obscure Islamist groups like the “Suqour al-Sham Brigades,” “Ahrar al-Sham,” “Liwa al-Haq,” the “Islamic Army,” plus the better known “Tawheed Brigades” (in the forefront of the fighting in the large northern city of Aleppo), have banded together. The Islamic Front affiliates also seek a Sunni Islamic state in Syria, but they apparently have exhibited more tolerance than al-Nusra and ISIL.
Underscoring the disunity within rebel ranks, the Islamic Front’s reason for combining is not just to create a viable alternative to al-Qaeda associated rebel groups. Left unsaid, but rather obvious, is the Front’s determination also to confront al-Nusra and the ISIL when necessary. In fact, the Islamic Front has alleged ISIL colluded with the pro-Western and more secular “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) to take Atma from the “Suqour al-Sham Brigade.”
So, whereas the formation of the Islamic Front could weaken al-Nusra and ISIL, it also appears hostile to the FSA. And just as senior UN officials and UN Security Council members have revived efforts to cajole the Syrian National Council (SNC), the opposition’s exile leadership, into attending a second round of Geneva talks aimed at a peaceful transition, the FSA’s influence on the ground inside Syria (as well as the SNC, which is linked to the FSA) has further declined. All Islamist groups, now so dominant on Syrian battlefields, oppose SNC attendance at any conference that would not remove Bashar al-Assad (a notion again dismissed yesterday by the Damascus regime).
After failing to coax the SNC into attending a conference planned for last month, UN and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Western powers, and Russia yesterday postponed the “Geneva II” conclave until Jan. 22 (with a preparatory meeting on Dec. 20). Ban met with SNC representatives on the 24th who seemed to agree to attend, but Ban stipulated that SNC participation would have to be “credible and as representative as possible.”
Making such meaningful opposition attendance less likely, however, was push back today on the part of the SNC: Bashar al-Assad cannot be part of any transitional government, and the international community should “prove its seriousness” by establishing humanitarian corridors to besieged rebel-held areas (something attempted — in vain — for months). Worse still, the head of the FSA, General Salim Idriss, declared that rebels loyal to him would neither join the Jan. 22 conclave nor cease fighting during the conference. Probably trying to shore up the FSA’s waning status among rebels in Syria, Idriss emphasized that “what concerns us is getting needed weapons for our fighters.”
Given the iffy prospects that the SNC could fulfill Ban’s conditions (or the international community those of the SNC), it probably is appropriate that Ban has characterized the renewed effort to convene a conference as a “mission of hope.”
Photo: An FSA fighter has to look out on many fronts now. Credit: Shelly Kittleson/IPS.
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