Indeed, both of these concerns should be taken seriously as the hawkish Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) takes over as the new Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
A review of her statements from the past year would indicate that the Obama administration’s policy of sanctions, while keeping the door open for negotiations, will be challenged by Ros-Lehtinen.
In a December 14, 2009 op-ed in the LA Times, Ros-Lehtinen wrote:
The regime in Tehran knows only hardball, and nothing less than overwhelming and crippling sanctions could produce a reversal of its threatening programs and policies.
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But these sanctions must be coupled with action on all fronts. The U.S. must also specifically reject Iran’s claim to an inalienable right to produce nuclear fuel.
And, as The Cable’s Josh Rogin cautions, Ros-Lehtinen could cause significant problems for the Obama administration’s foreign policy if, as expected, she pushes the administration to punish Russian and Chinese companies doing business with Iran. She is expected to lead a congressional effort to demand more information about the U.S.-Saudi arms deal, which was widely seen by realists as an Obama administration plan to form a long-term containment and deterrence strategy against a nuclear armed Iran.
In this same article, Rogin quotes from a previously unreported letter obtained by The Cable. In it, Ros-Lehtinen and then House Foreign Affairs chair Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) demanded answers to their questions about the arms deal from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
They wrote:
We are writing to raise concerns and pose a number of strategic questions about the impact such sales would have on the national security interests of the United States and our allies.
It’s fair to ask how Ros-Lehtinen will view the Obama administration’s endorsement of “linkage”—a concept which is accepted at the highest levels of the U.S. military, that resolving the Arab-Palestinian conflict will forward the United States’ broader strategic interests in the region.
So far it appears likely she will oppose the Obama administration’s efforts to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on settlements, having been a vocal critic of the administration’s strained relationship with Israeli leadership.
Lynch concludes:h
]]>I’m gritting my teeth in anticipation of the next Congress becoming a platform for Iran war hawks, hyping the issue even further in anticipation of the 2012 elections… look for another round of sanctions and some kind of Iranian Liberation Act on the horizon, regardless of how things are actually going for U.S. diplomatic efforts. A GOP-controlled Congress may not go for the big $60 billion arms sale to the Saudis, what with that whole “sharia” thing.
He [...]]]>
He writes (my emphasis):
Sanctions invariably fail to achieve their goal if the majority of citizens in the sanctioned country support the objectionable policy, in this case, Iran’s nuclear-enrichment program. I believe that the majority of Iranians support this policy because of Iran’s isolation during the Iran-Iraq War and the shameful use of Western-supplied chemical weapons on Iranians. Thus, the focus on Iran’s nuclear policy has been doomed from the start. But if the United States shifts its focus to the regime’s human-rights abuses, corruption and failure to deliver economic prosperity, then success becomes more likely. This shift in U.S. policy should be carefully considered because an agreement with an Iranian leadership that had the interests of its people at heart would be much more likely to be honored.
His proposal to gain Iranian popular support of a U.S.-instigated overthrow of the regime is difficult to follow (my emphasis again):
Success can be further enhanced by two additional measures. First, as the central bank of Iran has filled, in part, the void left by the exclusion of its commercial banks from international transactions, sanctioning the central bank would close an important loophole. Second, in view of the recent depreciation of the rial, the United States could adopt one or two simple measures to initiate a run on the currency that could bring Iranians from all walks of life onto the streets to oppose the regime as never before.
It’s possible that collapsing the rial and destroying ordinary Iranian’s savings could bring people to the streets. But it seems extremely short-sighted to assume the Iranian public will jump to bring down their government, given the decades of animus between the United States and Iran that dates to the 1953 overthrow of the democratically elected Mohammad Mossadeq.
In his review of two recent books on the coup, James North wrote on Mondoweiss about how economic warfare, starting in 1951, was used to undermine Mossadeq’s government.
North wrote:
Mossadeq’s government fell mainly because the British had imposed a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil starting back in 1951, and British warships blocked exports. Most of the third world was still under formal colonial rule then, so Iran had to stand alone. Economic warfare, not the cunning Kermit Roosevelt outfoxing flustered and foolish Iranians, was decisive.
So while it’s possible that a strategy of economic warfare that would wipe out the country’s banks and destroys the currency could bring the Iranian public around to the United State’s side. More likely, they have a greater sense of history than Askari gives credit, and would consider such a plan a disaster.
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