by Robert E. Hunter

…we have reached the conclusion that there is not enough recent progress in our bilateral agenda with Russia to hold a U.S.-Russia Summit in early September…Russia’s disappointing decision to grant Edward Snowden temporary asylum was also a factor…

— White House Office of the Press Secretary, August 7, 2013

…Having in mind the great importance of this conference and the hopes that the peoples of all the world have reposed in this meeting…I see no reason to use this [U-2] incident to disrupt the conference…

— President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Paris, May 16, 1960

The cancelling of a projected summit meeting next month with Russian President Vladimir Putin by President Barack Obama has probably attracted more attention than anything substantive likely to have occurred in that meeting. Or at least anything that could not have been achieved through ordinary diplomatic means. In other words, the significance of this meeting was overrated from the beginning, like most other summits in modern history.

Summits involving the Russians have featured in world politics since Napoleon met Czar Alexander I in 1807 on a raft in the middle of the Neman River in the town of Tilsit. Notable were the three World War II summits wherein Marshall Stalin met with the US president in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam — with the British prime minister tagging along — that dealt with wartime strategy and the future of Europe. Not so much was at stake this time around.

Admittedly, Obama is not cancelling his attendance at the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, also in Putin’s Russia. But even the G-8 summits are not worth much in terms of substance, compared with what could be achieved, again, through so-called ordinary diplomatic means.

This is not the place to review the full history of modern summitry. In the main, they are held because publics (and politics) expect them and demand “results.” The invention of the airplane and global television, not the seriousness of the agenda, is the causative agent. Almost always, summit agreements, enshrined in official communiqués, are worked out in advance by lower-level officials, with perhaps an item or two — a “sticking point” or “window dressing” — to be dealt with at the top. To be sure, a forthcoming summit, like “the prospect of hanging” in Samuel Johnson’s phrase, “concentrates the mind wonderfully” or, in this case, provides a spur to bureaucratic and diplomatic activity. Issues that have been sitting on the shelf or in the too-hard inbox may get dusted off and resolved because top leaders are getting together with media attention, pageantry, ruffles and flourishes, state dinners and expectations. This is not something to be left to chance nor to risk a potential blunder by the US president or his opposite number, whether friend or foe.

This is not cynicism, it is reality. Yours truly speaks from experience, having been involved with more than 20 meetings of US presidents with other heads of state and government. I witnessed only two where what the president and his interlocutor worked out at the table made a significant difference: President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 White House meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Meacham Begin and (two weeks later) with Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat. Serious decisions were taken because the US president was the American action officer for Arab-Israeli peacemaking; he “rolled his own.”

Summits can also cause damage, as did the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, where European heads of state and government balked at the US president’s desire to move Ukraine and Georgia a tiny step toward NATO membership. Instead, they made the meaningless pledge that, in time, it would happen. Both the Georgian and Russian presidents read this as a strategic commitment. The upshot was the short Russia-Georgia war that set back Western and Russian efforts to deal with more important matters on their agenda.

Most notorious was the summit President John Kennedy hastily sought in 1961 with Nikita Khrushchev. Their Vienna meeting was represented as having set back the untested president’s efforts to establish himself with the bullying Soviet leader. Some historians believe this encounter encouraged Khrushchev to take actions that produced the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Even worse than the expectations of success that summits generate is the notion that good chemistry between leaders can have a decisive influence. Nonsense. Of course it is better for there to be positive relations, the ability to “do business” as Margaret Thatcher once said about Mikhael Gorbachev — provided, of course, there is “business” to be “done.” Indeed, assessments of chemistry or the lack thereof just get in the way when they obscure realities of power, the interests of nations and leaders’ domestic politics, which are the real stuff of relations between and among states. Many of history’s worst villains have been charming in person.

Cancelling the Obama-Putin summit has taken place over developments that in the course of history are relatively trivial, confirming that it was unlikely to have been significant. If something of importance was to be settled, ways would have been found to finesse the distractions.

Russian misbehavior included not handing over Edward Snowden, the master leaker of sensitive US information, and the Duma’s passing a law against gays and lesbians. US misbehavior included Congress’ condemnation of the Russian trial of a dead man, Sergei Magnitsky, who had been a thorn in Putin’s side. Notably, the reasons for cancelling this summit lean heavily on domestic politics, not matters of state.

What happened with Eisenhower in 1960, referred to above, was much more consequential. The leaders of the four major powers (the US, Soviet Union, Britain and France) were to meet in Paris, for the first time in years, to reduce misunderstandings between East and West that were making inherent dangers even worse.

Ironically, the triggering event then was also about intelligence; this time it is Snowden, that time it was Francis Gary Powers, the hapless pilot of a US U-2 Reconnaissance aircraft shot down over the Soviet Union less than two weeks before the summit. What then transpired — Obama cancelling in 2013 and Khrushchev displaying his patented histrionics in 1960 — fed into the domestic politics of each side. Just as Obama and Putin must both be wishing that Snowden had gone to Venezuela instead of Hong Kong and then Moscow, Khrushchev may well have cursed the Soviet Air Defense Forces for their untimely shooting down of an American spy plane that both sides knew reduced fears of an accidental nuclear war. Ike probably also cursed himself for letting the CIA launch a U-2 flight so soon before the Paris summit.

The comparison of 1960 and 2013 can be taken a step further. Then, at a particularly dangerous moment for the world, the Soviet Union was one of the two most powerful countries. Now Russia is a second-rate power whose greatest importance to the US lies in what it could well become in the future and its current impact, by facts of size and propinquity, on places and problems the US at the moment cares more about.

But a new Cold War? Again, nonsense. Rather, as political analyst William Lanouette has jibed, a “Cold-Shoulder War.”

To begin with, “Cold War” needs to be defined with precision. It refers to the period when the US and Soviet Union were psychologically unable to distinguish between issues on which they could negotiate in their mutual self-interest and those on which neither could compromise. They were so locked into their perceptions and rhetoric that they could not even fathom possible common interests. That is clearly not true, now, and will not be.

The US-Soviet Cold War began to end in the 1960s, when the two countries developed the weapons and doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which in practice meant that each side accepted responsibility for the others’ ultimate security against nuclear annihilation. This spawned détente, the eventual end of the Cold War, and the sinking of the Soviet Union and European communism through their internal contractions.

Do US-Russian relations matter? Certainly, but not like US-Soviet relations before 1989. The difference is visible in today’s elevation of US concerns over internal developments in Russia, although, for Russia to be fully accepted, respected and trusted on the world stage, it must conform to growing civilizing tendencies in international relations and state behavior within at least a fair amount of the globe. Far more importantly, there are US-Russian differences, both in view and national interests, which make relations difficult at times but must be sorted out in one way or another.

A key focal point of today’s differences exists in the Middle East. The US objects to Russia’s unwillingness to assist efforts to depose the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, which the US president called for before thinking through the means or implications. It is also not confident that Russia truly supports the US-led confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program.

But both US positions beg big questions: on Syria, what the consequences would be there and in the broader region if the US got its way with Moscow, given the unlikelihood of a good outcome in Syria, the slow-rolling Sunni-Shiite civil war underway in the heart of the Middle East, Washington’s lack of clarity over what it is prepared to do militarily and even what outcome would best serve US interests. Russia might thus be cut some slack over its temporizing.

Regarding Iran, the US wants Russia, China and Western powers to hold firm on sanctions (while Congress wants to ratchet them up, despite the inauguration of a new Iranian president who could be better for the US than his predecessor). But Washington has yet to demonstrate that it will negotiate seriously with Iran, and, as states do when there is a vacuum, Moscow is taking advantage.

In addition to dismantling some remaining Cold War relics, notably the excessive level of nuclear weapons both countries still deploy (some absurdly kept on alert), is the issue of when and how much Russia will regain a prominent role in international politics, how and how much the US will try to oppose that inevitable “rebalancing” while its own capacity to affect global events has diminished significantly and if Washington and Moscow can work out sensible rules of the road with one another in the Middle East, Southwest Asia and elsewhere. Russia needs us as partner in some areas; in others it will inevitably be our rival and vice versa.

As two great hydrocarbon producers with interests and engagements that touch or overlap — such as concerns about terrorism, desires that the Afghan curse not cause both of them further troubles in Southwest Asia and the need to influence the rise of new kids on the block (China and India) — the US and Russia have lots to talk about.

But Obama and Putin wining and dining one another has little to do with it.

Almost immediately after the bombing of a Bulgarian bus filled with Israeli tourists in the resort city of Burgas that killed at least 5 Israelis and injured dozens of people, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu identified the perpetrator(s) as having carried out the attack at the behest of Iran.

“All signs point to Iran,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said. “In just the past few months we’ve seen Iran try to target Israelis in Thailand, Indian [sic], Georgia, Cyprus and more. The murderous Iranian terror continues to target innocent people. This is a global Iranian terror onslaught and Israel will react forcefully to it.” The accusation was echoed by Israel’s president, Shimon Peres, and other Israeli officials.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Iranian Embassy in Sofia have denied that Iran was involved in a statement issued on Thursday that said, “The groundless statements of different statesmen from the Zionist regime accusing Iran for participating in the incident with the blown up bus with Israeli tourists is a well-known method of the Zionist regime pursuing its own political goals.” Iran also identified itself in the statement as a “victim of the Zionist regime’s terrorism, including the murder of nuclear scientists,” while stressing “the long-lasting friendship between the Islamic Republic and Bulgaria, which is based on mutual respect for their interests.” Hezbollah also denied involvement, claiming that it would not have targeted tourists.

Bulgaria, which maintains embassies in both Tel Aviv and Teheran and hosts embassies from both Iran and Israel in Sofia, has thus far abstained from casting blame on Iran. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nikolay Mladenov was quoted in Haaretz today saying that “it is wrong and a mistake to point fingers at this stage of the investigation at any country or organization”, adding that “We are only in the beginning of the investigation and it is wrong to jump to conclusions.” Mladenov emphasized that Bulgaria had “excellent cooperation with the Israeli security forces in matters pertaining to the investigation.”

The Israeli Line

Mainstream newswire coverage has largely followed the logic of the Israeli narrative, which situates the bombing in the context of a timeline of attacks on Israelis, many of them thwarted, that have been attributed to Iran over the past several months and go back years and even decades. Proof of direct Iranian responsibility in any of these attacks is scarce and speculative, although many, at one point or another, were blamed on Iran or its proxies.

Yesterday Andrew MacDowell of the Christian Science Monitor asked, “Why in Bulgaria, and Why Look to Iran?” without answering either part of the question satisfactorily. Following the Israeli line of reasoning, most media have suggested that the motive for the attack was the 18th anniversary of the bombing of the AMIA  Jewish community center in Argentina, for which Israeli sources insist Iran was implicated. Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near Easy Policy (aka WINEP or “the Washington Institute”), writing for Peter Beinert’s recently launched Open Zion website, opens with the question “Did  Hezbollah Do It?” and bases his unequivocally affirmative conclusion on the AMIA anniversary. On the same website, Trita Parsi, President of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) writes that although no evidence has yet been presented, the Iranian government “is a very likely suspect.”

Other terrorism experts are more cautious, however, telling Lobelog, “It’s too soon to know.”

What gives Israel’s accusation against Iran both punch and pungency is the apparent lack of alternative explanatory variables for journalists covering the unfolding story. But such variables do exist. What follows are some relevant aspects of the Bulgarian bombing case that have been largely overlooked or ignored in news reports thus far. None of these exculpate Iran or Hezbollah. Nor should the claim made by a jihadist group that Bulgaria is a “legitimate target” for terrorists be mistaken for the opinion of the author, who, does not “blame the victims,” be they Israeli, Bulgarian, or American. The only intent here is to shed light on the possibility that responsibility might li elsewhere and ought to be investigated before hasty retaliatory action is taken.

Where Israeli and US anti-terrorism priorities diverge

Since 9/11, there has been an inherent tension between US and Israeli anti-terrorism priorities. As Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman point out in their book Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars, while the focus of US anti-terrorism has been on Al Qaeda, Israeli leaders and intelligence analysts don’t consider Al Qaeda to be particularly interested in Israel, and regard Iran as far more worrisome to the Jewish state.

In the days after the horrific events that took down the World Trade Center, damaged the Pentagon and took over  3,000 lives, Israeli leaders called for retribution against Iran, even though Al Qaeda’s responsibility was quickly established and almost universally accepted. In most of the recent efforts to carry out attacks on Israelis abroad, Israeli insistence that Iran was responsible has distracted attention from the very real possibility that Sunni Islamic extremists linked to Al Qaeda might be behind the attack.

Why Bulgaria?

The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact offered numerous countries in Eastern Europe the opportunity to ally with the West. Bulgaria, which was part of the Multinational Force in Iraq from from December 2003 until May 2008, was granted NATO membership in April 2004, ten years after it had initiated the admissions process in March 1994. Bulgaria also applied for EU membership late in 1995 and was only admitted on Jan. 1, 2007.  Bulgaria signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US in 2006, agreeing to host American military bases and training exercises. The deal attracted relatively little publicity, remaining under the global radar until February 2011 when Wikileaks exposed the pressure on Bulgaria to modernize its military by purchasing advance aircraft and naval vessels from Western countries for NATO deployments. Attention was also drawn to US-Bulgarian military cooperation this past April, when a Bulgarian MIG 29 fighter jet crashed during joint drills with the US Air Force.

According to Ivan Dikov, writing for Sofia Speaking:

Ever since a decade ago Bulgaria became an unconditional ally of the USA and even enlisted in the first “Coalition of Willing”[sic] of George W Bush in Iraq, joining in Afghanistan shortly before that, and the Bulgarian medics were jailed in Libya as scapegoats in an affair with HIV-infected blood, numerous experts started warning that Bulgaria was threatened with terrorist attacks…this was a warning about a potential transfer of global and regional conflicts on Bulgarian soil. On July 18, 2012, this threat materialized…

In October 2010, Bulgaria’s Minister of Defense Anyu Angelov announced that in 2013, Bulgaria would send  700 combat troops to Afghanistan, supplementing its current 500 plus troops who largely do guard duty. Not long after the announcement, in an interview with the Bulgarian daily “24 Hours,” Sheikh Abu Sharif, speaking on behalf of the Al Qaeda-linked Sunni Islamist group Asbat al-Ansar, demanded that the Bulgarian government remove its troops from Afghanistan “before it is too late.” Sharif declared that Bulgaria was considered a legitimate target of Al Qaeda because it has sent its soldiers to support the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Sofia News Agency reported on Oct. 22, 2010:

Asbat al-Ansar is featured in the United States’ list of terrorist organizations for alleged connections with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. The leader of the group is Ahmad Abdel Karim al-Saadi, aka Abu Mahjan. After he went underground in 1999, his brother, Abu Tariq, has fronted the group.

The organization believes in a strict interpretation of Islam. It employs a “defensive jihad” to fight perceived attacks on Islam. As such, the group seeks to purge any Western influences or anything deemed un-Islamic from Lebanon.

In 2004, Asbat al-Ansar voiced vocal condemnation of the US presence in Iraq and urged insurgents to kill US personnel.

The group has also cooperated with another organization, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which was responsible for the beheading of the Bulgarian truck drivers Ivaylo Kepov and Georgi Lazov in July 2004.

Although Asbat al-Ansar is based in Lebanon and might not be considered much of a threat to a European NATO member, the Director of Bulgaria’s National Intelligence Service (NRS), Kircho Kirov, apparently took the threat seriously: “We have to be very vigilant when receiving a warning, coming from an extremist organization like this one.” Mohd Abuasi, an expert from the Bulgarian Center for Middle East Studies, also responded to the threat, noting that Bulgaria was not yet a priority for Al Qaeda or other Jihadist organizations because they did not know much about it, but that there is a “real possibility” that they might start paying attention to it:

“Some officials’ make statements that sound anti-Islam, like the statements by the minister of defense that Syria and Iran are a threat to the country. Also, the ridiculous police operations against Muslims in the Rhodopes are absolutely groundless and only create tension. If this continues, terrorist organizations will start looking at Bulgaria as a target,” Abuasi said.

A shortfall of Israeli intelligence agencies?

That Israelis visiting Bulgaria might be the target of terrorists was apparently recognized earlier this year when, according to Al Jazeera English, Israeli public television reported in January that Bulgarian authorities had foiled a bomb attack after they discovered an explosive device on a chartered bus that was to have taken Israeli tourists to a ski resort. Nonetheless, after the attack on the Israelis in Burgas on Wednesday, Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev said that the authorities had met with Israel’s Mossad a month earlier, during which there was no warning of an expected attack. Plevneliev stressed that Bulgarian and Israeli authorities were in close communication with one another and would have taken serious action had Bulgaria received any advance intelligence warning from Israel.

Considering the enormous resources that Israel devotes to the “Iranian threat,” the Israeli Mossad likely would have uncovered some clues that Iran or Hezbollah were planning an attack in Bulgaria, particularly on Israelis. Undoubtedly they would have shared the information with the highest levels of the Bulgarian government. That they did neither raises the question of whether Israel’s intelligence services might be too focused on the threat posed by Iran, while underestimating the threat posed by Al Qaeda-linked jihadist groups.

Allegations published earlier today on the Bulgarian website News.bg that identified the man believed to be the perpetrator — a long-haired Caucasian male (possibly in a wig) shown pacing in security footage one hour before the attack — as a former inmate of Guantanamo Bay, are being dismissed as false by the Bulgarian Ministry of the Interior. It is not yet clear whether any elements of the report, which was picked up by the Times of Israel, Atlantic Wire and the Canadian National Post, are accurate. Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov claims that the “ring around the perpetrator is tightening up,” adding that no details will be available until the investigation of the attack has been concluded.

The latest update we have at the time of this posting is that an unidentified “senior American official” has confirmed “Israel’s assertions” to the New York Times. These are the relevant half quotes and information attributed to the unnamed official:

• The official said the current American intelligence assessment is that the bomber was “acting under broad guidance” to hit Israeli targets when the opportunity presented itself. That guidance was given to Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group, by its primary sponsor, Iran, he said.

• The attacks, the official said, were in retaliation for the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists by Israeli agents, something that Israel has neither confirmed nor denied. “This was tit for tat,” said the American official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the investigation was still underway.

• The bomber was carrying a fake Michigan driver’s license, but there are no indications that he had any connections to the United States, the American official said, adding that there were no details yet about the bomber — his name, age or nationality. He also declined to describe what specific intelligence — intercepted communications, analysis of the bomber’s body parts and other details — that led analysts to conclude that the suicide bomber belonged to Hezbollah.

Is that enough to make the content of this post irrelevant? You be the judge.