by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated.
Jim refuses to join Twitter, but today Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani provided him with another reason to reconsider:
Iran gives notice to international community to use all its might to prevent use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world, esp. in #Syria
— [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated.
Jim refuses to join Twitter, but today Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani provided him with another reason to reconsider:
Iran gives notice to international community to use all its might to prevent use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world, esp. in #Syria
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
An Iranian official criticizing the use of chemical weapons, which Iraq’s Saddam Hussein used (with US assistance) to kill hundreds or even thousands of Iranians during the bloody Iran-Iraq war, is nothing new. What’s shocking is that Iran’s president seems to be endorsing force to prevent chemical weapons-use at a time when the US is positioning itself to strike Iran’s only regional ally, Syria. And as Golnaz Esfandiari reminds us, he made a similar statement on Saturday.
Iran expert Suzanne Maloney tells me that while we shouldn’t interpret too much from one statement, Rouhani’s words could indicate a “remarkable shift in the official posture of the Iranian government on the role of the international community” and “even on the sensitive issue of Syria” — but let’s backtrack for a moment.
For starters, it doesn’t appear like Rouhani tweeted this message by his mistake. Look at the tweets preceding it:
Iran suffered chemical weapons attacks by Iraqi forces during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war 2/2
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
We completely & strongly condemn use of chemical weapons in #Syria because Islamic Republic of Iran is itself victim of chemical weapons 1/2
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
And consider his most recent tweet as of now, which appeared one hour after his “notice” to the international community:
In response to questions abt other accounts in @HassanRouhani‘s name; this is the only English-language Twitter account.
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
Nothing has since been removed, revised, or added to Rouhani’s English Twitter account. His Persian account doesn’t feature these tweets.
What’s even more fascinating about all this is that at least according to news reports, Iran’s position on intervention in Syria has been what it was when the disgraced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president: don’t do it. State-run and semi-official Iranian news sites are dominated with statements from Iranian officials warning against an outside military attack.
Rouhani also refrained from naming Syria’s rebels as the aggressors when he acknowledged chemical weapons-use in Syria on Saturday — the same day that Iran announced Syria would allow weapons inspectors into the site of the alleged attack. Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif did reportedly blame the rebels, which he called “terrorists”, for using the weapons in “escalating the crisis”, so why did Rouhani hold back?
While cautioning against reading too much into all this so soon, Maloney, a former State Department policy advisor, told me on the phone that all this made her recall Hashemi Rafsanjani’s first term when he “managed to persuade the leadership of the Islamic Republic to remain neutral to the UN-backed international military campaign to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.”
She continued, “This is obviously very different because of the alliance of Iran and Syria and if so, would be an even more dramatic gesture, but it appears that Rouhani is trying to track a more moderate course on Iran’s foreign policy and even on the sensitive issue of Syria.”
“The conventional wisdom is that Rouhani would not have enough wiggle room on Syria, that he would be forced to accede to a hardline position that Iran’s security forces advocate — whether or not the revelation of alleged chemical weapons usage alters that or if Rouhani is taking this opportunity to signal a different approach than what we’ve seen from Tehran over the years, we’ll have to see,” said Maloney, who can also be found on Twitter (I’m nudging Jim).
Maloney added that whatever was discussed in the conversation between Zarif and UN Undersecretary Jeffrey Feltman during his surprise visit to Tehran this week could also be indicative of why Rouhani has made these unusual statements. Though we shouldn’t rush to conclusions, Rouhani’s words are not “terribly subtle,” she said.
(Interestingly, while serving as US ambassador to Lebanon when its Prime Minister Rafic Harriri was killed, Feltman accused the Assads of being behind the assassination.)
There have been varying interpretations among analysts here about how Iran would respond to intervention in Syria, ranging from: it will almost certainly have a negative impact on the nuclear negotiations to, Iran has too much to lose on that front to sacrifice its own interests for its ally.
That debate may be concluded in the near future, but all this brings to mind Farideh’s post from July 2012, where she took a hard look at Iran’s Syria policy. At that time, she noted that Iran seemed to be toeing the Russian line on Syria: “The Iranian government is undoubtedly aware that Syria is in a mess. But in the coming months expect Iran’s response to be more reactive than proactive despite proclamations and posturing that suggest otherwise.”
Is her conclusion, written more than a year ago, still applicable today?
Update: Iranian journalist Omid Memarian tells me that Rouhani’s comments could be focused on the rebels. In other words, perhaps Rouhani is saying that the international community should use all its “might” to stop chemical weapons use by the rebels. If that’s true, Maloney’s suggestion that Iran could be changing its stance on the international community still rings true.
Update II: Some have questioned whether the Twitter account linked to here is operated by Hassan Rouhani or his staff. I base my take on the following: 1) he has never denied that it’s his account; 2) it seems to be in line with Rouhani’s official statements and his talks and appearances etc.; 3) Twitter is prohibited in Iran, which makes public acknowledgement problematic; 4) my Iranian contacts who are usually in-the-know about these things say they can’t see any reason to doubt it.
]]>I’ve been meaning to write about this report on the multifold human costs of militarily striking Iran’s nuclear facilities and am happy to find that it’s already been noted by Golnaz Esfandiari as well as Gordon Lubold, among others. (Marsha Cohen’s well-read Lobe Log post on [...]]]>
I’ve been meaning to write about this report on the multifold human costs of militarily striking Iran’s nuclear facilities and am happy to find that it’s already been noted by Golnaz Esfandiari as well as Gordon Lubold, among others. (Marsha Cohen’s well-read Lobe Log post on the same topic was the closest thing to such a study that I’ve come across so far.) “The Ayatollah’s Nuclear Gamble” is sponsored by Utah’s Hinckley Institute of Politics and was authored by Khosrow B. Semnani, an Iranian-American engineer by training and philanthropist. It will be featured this week at a joint event by the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Iran Task Force at the Atlantic Council. With the study Semnani endeavors to scientifically prove something which seems obvious: attacking nuclear facilities in Iran could have devastating effects on possibly hundreds of thousands of Iranians who would be exposed to highly toxic chemical plumes and even radioactive fallout. Case studies were conducted on the Iranian cities of Isfahan, Natanz, Arak, and Bushehr. In Isfahan, a military strike on the nuclear facility there “could be compared to the 1984 Bhopal industrial accident at the Union Carbide plant in India”:
In that accident, the release of 42 metric tons (47 U.S. tons) of methyl isocyanate turned the city of Bhopal into a gas chamber. Estimates of deaths have ranged from 3,800 to 15,000. The casualties went well beyond the fatalities: More than 500,000 victims received compensation for exposure to fumes.
The environmental consequences would also be wide-ranging:
With the high likelihood of soluble uranium compounds permeating into the groundwater, strikes would wreak havoc on Isfahan’s environmental resources and agriculture. The Markazi water basin, one of six main catchment areas, which covers half the country (52%), provides slightly less than one-third of Iran’s total renewable water (29%) (Figure 26). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the groundwater discharge in the basin from approximately 155,000 wells, 22,000 channels and 13,500 springs is the primary water source for agricultural and residential uses.106 It is almost certain that the contamination of groundwater as a result of strikes would damage this important fresh-water source.
The report also touches on the unintended consequences of militarily striking Iran, such as a “short or prolonged regional war” and explains, as reputable analysts have, why the Israeli strike on Iraq’s Osirak facility is a “false analogy”:
The Osirak analogy is the fantasy that there will be no blowback from strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. It discounts the complexity, severity, scale, consequences, and casualties such an operation would entail. Iran’s nuclear program is not an empty shell, nor is it a single remote target. The facilities in Iran are fully operational, they contain thousands of personnel, they are located near major population centers, they are heavily constructed and fortified, and thus difficult to destroy. They contain tons of highly toxic chemical and radioactive material. To grasp the political and psychological impact of the strikes, what our estimates suggest is that the potential civilian casualties Iran would suffer as a result of a strike — in the first day — could exceed the 6,731 Palestinians and 1,083 Israeli’s reported killed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the past decade. The total number of fatalities in the 1981 Osirak raid was 10 Iraqis and one French civilian, Damien Chaussepied.
According to Greg Thielmann of the Arms Control Association, the report makes a “valuable contribution to “colorizing” the bloodless discussions of the “military option.” Thielmann, who formerly worked on assessments of ballistic missile threats at the State Department’s intelligence bureau, told Lobe Log that he had not seen “a more serious look at the medical consequences for the Iranian population” than provided by this report.
While Thielmann calls the report an “impressive effort”, he also offered criticism. “I take strong exception to the author’s introductory assertion that diplomacy with the Islamic Republic “requires a willful act of self-deception,” and that regime change is the only way to achieve an acceptable resolution to the challenges of Iran’s nuclear program,” he said.
Thielmann was also “surprised” that the strike scenario analyzed in the study includes the Bushehr facility, “which is of much less proliferation concern than the other nuclear facilities mentioned, and which, because of the extensive use of Russian personnel in operating the reactor there, would carry high political costs to attack. ”
“Such an attack would also violate Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,” said Thielmann, who provided the following excerpt from Article 56 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I:
1. Works and installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
It will be interesting to see whether the report gets mainstream media attention following the Wilson Center event and if it will spark further examination of this integral — but otherwise barely mentioned — aspect of using the “military option” on Iran.
]]>Iran watchers are no doubt aware that recently Iran’s “Shabake-ye Khabar” news network of the Islamic Republic’s official “Seda va Sima” television and radio network, conducted an internet poll regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.
Respondents were asked whether Iran should cease uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. [...]]]>
Iran watchers are no doubt aware that recently Iran’s “Shabake-ye Khabar” news network of the Islamic Republic’s official “Seda va Sima” television and radio network, conducted an internet poll regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.
Respondents were asked whether Iran should cease uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. 58% of respondents called for the cessation of uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. A screen shot can be found here.
In a screen shot posted on Radio Free Liberty in any article by Golnaz Esfandiari, the percentage against nuclear enrichment exceeds 60%. No doubt due to the respective sites taking their screen shots at different times. According to Ms. Esfandiari, Radio Free Liberty took the screen shot shortly before the poll’s removal.
As the news site realised its bungle, and the story was picked up by international outlets, it replaced the nuclear internet poll, with another one, asking respondents whether they would support the Majles plan to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to the EU oil embargo. 89% of respondents stated that they were against the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Here’s the relevant screen shot.
After this second gaff, the network steered clear of the nuclear issue and sanctions altogether and instead posted a poll relating to Iranian football.
This wasn’t a scientific opinion poll, and according to the news site about 2,000 people participated. Iranian state media later and rather bizarrely accused BBC Persian service of hacking their site and doctoring the opinion poll. BBC Persian firmly rejected this charge.
That being said, I would not be surprised if many Iranians are questioning the wisdom of the current nuclear policy. Many are under immense pressure because of the currency crisis, rampant inflation and many other economic ailments, all exacerbated by economic and financial sanctions.
In Iran there has not been a genuine, frank and open discussion of the nuclear file and the costs involved with the government’s programme in the face of several UNSC resolutions and extreme pressure from the US and its European allies. If a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis were placed before Iranians in the public area, it would be most interesting to see and hear what they might conclude. That being said, we very rarely, if ever, see foreign, national security and nuclear energy policy considered in accordance with Iranian public opinion. Another debate for another time, no doubt.
–Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi is an Iran researcher at the Oxford Research Group and a third year doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford. He has published widely on Iran. His latest with Paul Ingram and Gabrielle Rifkind is “Iran’s Nuclear Impasse: Breaking the Deadlock”. Follow him on twitter: @essikhan
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