by Mohammad Ali Kadivar

In a historic letter to President Barack Obama, 55 Iranian political prisoners describe the effect of the crippling sanctions regime on the Iranian people and plead for a new approach to the nuclear issue. They write:

Mr. President! We believe it is time to replace sanctions [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mohammad Ali Kadivar

In a historic letter to President Barack Obama, 55 Iranian political prisoners describe the effect of the crippling sanctions regime on the Iranian people and plead for a new approach to the nuclear issue. They write:

Mr. President! We believe it is time to replace sanctions with an effort to achieve a mutually acceptable resolution of the nuclear issue. To achieve such an end and given the chronic nature of the deep-rooted conflict, all sides concerned should strive for a dignified solution in which no party will be considered the loser. Such a solution should be based on genuinely addressing international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program by the Iranian government on the one hand and acknowledging the legitimate rights of Iran to peaceful nuclear energy, in compliance with international legal standards, by the US and the West on the other.

For the last four years, Iran’s political prisoners have operated as a visible and influential actor in a severely repressed political atmosphere. They are now becoming an important voice in Iranian foreign policy by sending messages to politicians in Tehran and Washington.

The letter’s cosigners are politicians, journalists and democracy activists who were imprisoned during and after the government’s crackdown on the 2009 uprising against the fraudulent re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The heavy-handed response suddenly increased the number of political prisoners in Iran to hundreds — at times even thousands. Many of them included prominent figures in Iran’s political and civil society.

In Iran, imprisonment operates as a conventional method of silencing political dissidents, but many of these prisoners continued their oppositional activities from the beginning of their sentences. What made this new round of prison activism more effective was the Iranian opposition movement’s strong Internet presence. When the Green Movement emerged in Iran, many analysts pointed to the activists’ innovative use of digital technology in initially organizing the electoral campaign and then publicizing information about protest events and regime atrocities.

The government’s crackdown attempted to stifle the public presence of Iran’s democracy movement, but the activists turned the Internet into an oppositional space. This included sharing updates about political prisoners’ situation and actions and spreading open letters smuggled from the prisons.

Sociologists refer to “abeyance structures” as spaces and communities through which social movements continue to exist in periods of repression and public inactivity. Ironically, prisons were a major abeyance structure for Iran’s Green Movement after the 2009 crackdown. During the years of the Green’s decline, Iranian prisoners sustained activity both through direct actions, such as hunger strikes, as well as adopting positions on issues through individual and collective open letters.

In addition to individual strikes against the abuse of prisoners’ rights, hunger strikes were also organized in solidarity with other prisoners and against regime atrocities conducted outside prison walls. In the most stunning example, 12 political prisoners went on hunger strike in 2011 after fellow prisoner Hoda Saber died after prison guards beat him while he was hunger striking against the tragic death of another activist on the outside, Haleh Sahabi. This collective action led to a burst of solidarity among Iranian dissidents inside Iran and among those in exile.

Prisoners also engaged in radical political positions in a country where political activists fear hosting meetings in their homes. In one of the boldest examples, political prisoner Abulfazl Ghadiani publicly accused Leader Ali Khamenei of despotism and compared him to Iran’s pre-revolutionary autocratic monarchs.

In other open letters, prisoners reflected on Iran’s political landscape and offered strategic analyses of Iranian politics and proposed courses of action. In discussions about boycotting or participating in the recent presidential election, Zia Nabavi, an exiled student sentenced to 10 years in prison, argued that Iran’s civil society needs active citizenry who won’t be easily discouraged by destructive authoritarian actions and will act with hope and rationality. He endorsed Hassan Rouhani in that letter and encouraged all democracy supporters to actively participate in the election. As with other letters by political prisoners, that letter became part of the pragmatic wave that resulted in Rouhani’s electoral victory.

During his campaign, Rouhani suggested his election could result in the release of political prisoners. That was one of the major demands that Rouhani’s supporters made during his electoral campaign and in celebrations of his victory. This will be one of the major tasks of the new president’s first term.

All these factors have provided political prisoners with a unique place in Iran’s political landscape. They are, after all, the people who have paid the highest price in fighting for freedom and equality for the Iranian people. A year before the election, Hamid Reza Jalaeipour, a prominent reformist sociologist, stated that political prisoners are even more important than reformist organizations. For all these reasons, the prisoners’ recent letter to President Obama contains significant ramifications for politicians in Washington and Tehran.

The message to Washington is clear. Regardless of whether the goal of sanctions or calls for military action is to empower the Iranian people, a suffering element of Iran’s democracy movement is stating that sanctions have been disempowering and should end.

Iran’s political prisoners are also teaching all of us an important lesson: one should not sacrifice the people’s wellbeing and interests for personal revenge. These prisoners had many reasons to ask for more sanctions on a government that has illegally imprisoned them for unjustifiable reasons, deprived them of their most basic rights and tortured them and their families. But they prioritized the Iranian peoples’ interests and asked both Iran and the US to engage in constructive diplomacy rather than blind hostility.

Let us hope that Iran’s leaders, especially Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, learn this lesson and facilitate the release of these prisoners while starting a new era in Iran’s foreign policy.

- Mohammad Ali Kadivar is a sociology PhD candidate and teaching fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He studies global democratization and popular mobilization and writes about Iranian politics in Farsi and English.

Photo Credit: Nima Fatemi

Beginning with a reference to a contentious report by the AP that used an alleged Iranian document provided by an “unnamed country” to suggest “that Iran is working on a bomb,” Mark Hibbs, a senior associate in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, writes that increasing reliance by the International [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Beginning with a reference to a contentious report by the AP that used an alleged Iranian document provided by an “unnamed country” to suggest “that Iran is working on a bomb,” Mark Hibbs, a senior associate in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, writes that increasing reliance by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) on third-party data can compromise the agency’s political credibility:

The true significance of this document is that it landed in our e-mailboxes in the midst of renewed internal debate about how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should determine whether member states are in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. Beginning two decades ago, the IAEA started relying less on information it gathers during its own field inspections alone and more on information that others provide, most of which is open-source, but some of which is not. This third-party data has become central to the IAEA’s work, and it is about to become even more so. The leak of the graph to the AP underscores that if this data isn’t rigorously vetted and handled carefully, the IAEA’s technical and political credibility will be seriously compromised.

Meanwhile the Guardian reports that the IAEA has attempted to tighten internal security by “narrowing the circle of officials and analysts who deal with the most sensitive material.” The measures apparently include prohibiting any Persian speakers from working in the safeguards department to fulfil the imperative task of analyzing documents about Iran’s nuclear program.

Foreign Policy’s Stephen Walt highlights a chart by Belfer Center fellow Matt Waldman showing that as the US-led 2009 “Surge” in Afghanistan proceeded, US casualties increased. The pace in 2012 is also roughly similar to the toll from the previous two years:

Equally important, the final column (based on figures [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Foreign Policy’s Stephen Walt highlights a chart by Belfer Center fellow Matt Waldman showing that as the US-led 2009 “Surge” in Afghanistan proceeded, US casualties increased. The pace in 2012 is also roughly similar to the toll from the previous two years:

Equally important, the final column (based on figures reported by Simon Klingert) suggests that the Taliban’s ability to inflict casualties on Afghan security forces (ANSF) remains undiminished. Given that U.S. hopes of a “soft landing” following withdrawal depend on the ANSF taking up the fight themselves, this does not augur well for Afghanistan’s post-American future.

Michael Cohen meanwhile argues in the Guardian that General David Petraeus’s fatal flaw was not his extramarital affair (which he will forever remembered for) but his surge strategy in Afghanistan:

Petraeus was wrong – badly wrong. And more than 1,000 American soldiers, and countless more Afghan civilians, have paid the ultimate price for his over-confidence in the capabilities of US troops. And it wasn’t as if Petraeus was an innocent bystander in these discussions: he was working a behind-the-scenes public relations effort – talking to reporters, appearing on news programs – to force the president’s hand on approving a surge force for Afghanistan and the concurrent COIN strategy.

But when he took over as commander of the Afghanistan war in 2010, Petraeus adopted the harsh military strategy that he’d claimed the new, more civilian-focused COIN military plan would eschew. He ramped up airstrikes, which led to more civilian deaths. He increased the use of special forces operations. Perhaps worst of all, he sought to hinder the implementation of a political strategy for ending the war, seeking, instead, a clear military victory against the Taliban.

The greatest indictment of Petraeus’s record is that, 18 months after announcing the surge, President Obama pulled the plug on a military campaign that had clearly failed to realize the ambitious goals of Petraeus and his merry team of COIN boosters. Today, the Afghanistan war is stalemated with little hope of resolution – either militarily or politically – any time soon. While that burden of failure falls hardest on President Obama, General Petraeus is scarcely blameless. Yet, to date, he has almost completely avoided examination for his conduct of the war in Afghanistan.

Amidst reports that Great Britain has denied the US military use of important British bases for an assault against Iran, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little told reporters on Friday that whenever the DOD considers military action “we do it within the legal confines…of this country.” The US [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Amidst reports that Great Britain has denied the US military use of important British bases for an assault against Iran, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little told reporters on Friday that whenever the DOD considers military action “we do it within the legal confines…of this country.” The US has been contemplating military action against Iran’s nuclear program since at least 2006, but the legality of a unilateral attack has evidently not been a major consideration in Washington. It should be, as should the likely tactical complications of British (and potentially broader) non-cooperation.

In dramatic contrast to apparent US assumptions of legality concerning preventative military action against Iran is the statement the Guardian obtained from a UK government source that “’The UK would be in breach of international law if it facilitated what amounted to a pre-emptive strike on Iran.’” In fact, reportedly based on legal advice from the UK’s attorney general, the UK has denied the US use of important British bases on Ascension Island, Cyprus, and Diego Garcia. The UK position should be of legal interest in Washington because Great Britain would not be the attacking nation, merely a government assisting the attacker. If UK legal instincts are so extraordinarily cautious about even passively aiding an attacker, one wonders how the US, in the role of the attacker, could muster such confidence about being on legal solid ground.

Most of all US resort to force over the past 20-odd years has been in response to direct attacks on the United States or US interests (post-9/11 anti-terrorist military action aimed against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, cruise missile attacks against al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan in response to the East Africa embassy bombings and the attack against the USS Cole, etc.). Even with the iffy — and later debunked — Bush Administration case for war against Iraq, the US maintained that by sustaining a supposed arsenal of WMD, Iraq was in violation of international law tied to red lines laid down in UNSC resolutions linked to Chapter VII enforcement (use of force) concerning very specific requirements levied on Iraq in the immediate wake of the 1991 Gulf War.

So, even in an alleged worst case scenario in which, for sake of argument, Iran was believed to be in the midst of developing nuclear weapons that it planned to meld to an enhanced ballistic missile capability, that in and of itself would not constitute a direct attack on the US (out of range) or US interests (American bases or embassies in the Middle East/South Asia region). Indeed, the presumed threat posed by any such Iranian capabilities primarily would be against US regional allies such as Israel, most notably, and potentially others such as the GCC states, Turkey and so on. It has, however, not been historic US policy to launch preventative attacks against assumed — not active — threats against its allies.

On another, tactical level, the reported UK refusal of basing cooperation could be quite significant with respect to any US attack against Iran (even more so if other key US NATO allies were to follow suit). The potential loss of transit, staging, refueling and basing rights through the UK, Cyprus and particularly the basing of US heavy bombers at Diego Garcia, could complicate considerably the US ability to amass desired support for an attack on Iran (or sustain the preferred pace of military operations) in the robust manner outlined in the leaked 2006 US military operations plan reportedly briefed to President Bush.

Thus, the tactical problems associated with this apparent UK decision might give pause to US policymakers mulling over any massive knockout blow against Iran’s greatly dispersed nuclear infrastructure, as well as the many and varied Iranian military assets available to defend it.

- Wayne White is a Scholar with Washington’s Middle East Institute. He was formerly the Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia (INR/NESA) and senior regional analyst.

The Guardian is reporting that a ”reformulated” proposal including “limited sanctions relief” will be launched by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (p5+1) after the US presidential election.

Earlier this week Al-Monitor reported along the same lines and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made via Lobe Log

The Guardian is reporting that a ”reformulated” proposal including “limited sanctions relief” will be launched by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (p5+1) after the US presidential election.

Earlier this week Al-Monitor reported along the same lines and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made similar general comments. But according to Reza Marashi, a former Iran-desk State Department staffer, we’ll have to wait and see if the comments result in substantial changes on the part of the negotiating powers.

“The rhetoric we’re hearing from these unnamed U.S. and EU officials is positive, and it should be both praised and reinforced,” Marashi told Lobe Log. “But as we’ve learned over the past four years, actions speak louder than words for officials in Washington, Brussels and Tehran.”

Marashi noted that Western officials had already recognized the need for offering Iran a deal that it could sell at home “but domestic political realities forced the U.S. to move the goalposts.” If there is to be any real progress, it will happen after the US presidential election on November 6th. According to Marashi, “until then both sides recognize the need for better PR. We’re already seeing this on Iran’s end with Foreign Minister Salehi.”

“Both sides are spending political capital to shape the narrative in case talks fail, rather than spending the necessary political capital to ensure talks succeed,” he said.

Ever since negotiations resumed and began heading downhill this year, analysts have been saying that a successful deal requires sanctions relief to also be on the table. In July, former top CIA analyst Paul Pillar explained why the “Nothing-But-Pressure Fallacy” is doomed to fail if an acceptable deal for both sides is the objective:

 …And the story of stasis in the nuclear talks is also pretty simple. The Iranians have made it clear they are willing to make the key concession about no longer enriching uranium at the level that has raised fears about a “break-out” capability in return for sanctions relief. But the P5+1 have failed to identify what would bring such relief, instead offering only the tidbit of airplane parts and the vaguest of suggestions that they might consider some sort of relief in the future. The Iranians are thus left to believe that heavy pressure, including sanctions, will continue no matter what they do at the negotiating table, and that means no incentive to make more concessions.

But success from the declared US perspective (that is, verifiable moves from Iran showing that it will not build a nuclear weapon) also depends on what kind of, as well as how much sanctions relief is offered (consider George Perkovich’s comment at the end of Chris McGreal’s report); Iranian acceptance of the notion that the US will not seek regime change once Iran makes serious concessions; what Iran is willing and able to do to prove good and true intentions; and who is running the show in Iran and the US when the new deal is offered.

Regarding the last two points: sources say that this SPIEGEL interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi where he implies that Iran could halt 20% enrichment (a major p5+1 requirement) in exchange for a guaranteed fuel supply echoes previous statements that Iranian officials have been making for quite some time. Iran-watchers have also been speculating that the country’s hardline leaders will not allow Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to achieve any diplomatic successes while he is in office and any deal is therefore only possible following his exit in June 2013.

Meanwhile, Jim reports for IPS News that earlier this week Republican Sen. Lindsay Graham said he is working on a new Congressional resolution which he hopes to pass in any lame-duck session after the Nov. 6 elections that would promise Israel U.S. support, including military assistance, if it attacks Iran. And after the new Congress convenes in January, Sen. Graham suggested he would push yet another resolution that would give the president – whether the incumbent, Obama, or his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney – broad authority to take military action if sanctions don’t curb Iran’s nuclear programme.

Not to mention the fact that while Iran’s economy and people continue to struggle under the weight of sanctions, the US and EU are piling more on, making the Iranian hope of an end to sanctions and the domestic suffocation at home, seem like a far away dream.

The front page of the 13 July edition of the Daily Telegraph caused a stir in Britain. The headline, amplified by that morning’s BBC News, read: “We foiled Iranian nuclear weapons bid, says spy chief”. Referencing a speech by the Chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) to [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The front page of the 13 July edition of the Daily Telegraph caused a stir in Britain. The headline, amplified by that morning’s BBC News, read: “We foiled Iranian nuclear weapons bid, says spy chief”. Referencing a speech by the Chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) to 100 civil servants, the article begins with these two sentences:

Sir John Sawers said that covert operations by British spies had prevented the Iranians from developing nuclear weapons as early as 2008.

However, the MI6 chief said it was now likely they would achieve their goal by 2014, making a military strike from the US and Israel increasingly likely.

Later in the day The Guardian’s Julian Borger reported on his blog that Whitehall (British government) sources were saying that the point Sawers was trying to make was that without the combined work of Western intelligence agencies, Iran would have been even closer to obtaining the capacity to make a nuclear weapon.

That seems to be a likelier account, not least because it’s consistent with what the US intelligence community has been saying since 2007. (Over the years I’ve noticed a SIS weakness for exaggeration when it comes to trumpeting their achievements, despite their attachment to secrecy “in the national interest” when blunders have to be veiled).

So, it’s striking that Borger’s piece was not followed by an official clarification of what Sawers had said or meant. Instead, millions of Telegraph readers and BBC listeners who do not read Borger’s blog have been left with the impression that Iran is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and will do so by 2014.

To my mind this failure is symptomatic of a Western reluctance to acknowledge that the balance of probability has shifted since 2003: the evidence suggests that Iran switched that year from the goal of possessing nuclear weapons to the goal of possessing a “threshold” capacity – and to adjust policy accordingly.

Yet, legally there is a significant distinction between seeking weapons and seeking a threshold capacity: one is outlawed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the other is not.

As far back as 1968, US State Department officials were aware that under the freshly-minted NPT it would not be unlawful for a non-nuclear-weapon-state to achieve what they termed “nuclear pregnancy”. (Since 1968 several such states have done just that. If Iran acquires and is allowed to retain a nuclear weapons capacity, it will be in good company.)

It can even be argued that seeking “nuclear pregnancy” is for certain states a logical corollary to being an NPT party. Those who are familiar with the NPT will know that it includes a provision for withdrawal in the event that “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests” of a party.

Nuclear-weapon-state lawyers have doubtless strained to interpret this splendid example of diplomatic obscurantism in ways that favour the possessor states. The natural meaning, though, is that if a party feels that its security is threatened by a state possessing nuclear weapons, it may withdraw from the treaty.

It can be inferred that the drafters of the NPT could envisage without blanching that certain states might want to acquire a latent capacity to produce weapons quickly in certain extreme circumstances; they recognised that withdrawal would serve no useful purpose to a threatened party if that party had to embark from scratch on weapons research and the production of fissile material.

Morally, practically, politically and psychologically, too, the weapons/capacity distinction is important.

There is no double standard involved in objecting to Iran becoming nuclear-armed; refusing to tolerate an Iranian “pregnancy” is a double standard.

A nuclear-armed state may reasonably be thought to present a “clear and present danger” to other states (though in practice the reality of the threat is usually questionable), whereas a threshold state cannot.

None of Iran’s more respectable friends — it has more of these than Western propaganda admits — want Iran to get nuclear weapons. But they are philosophical about Iran attaining threshold status.

Iran’s leaders know that crossing the line separating capacity from possession would be fraught with consequence.  As Frederick the Great once observed, one can get away with one breach of faith (in this case Iran’s NPT safeguards violations prior to 2004) but not two.

Yet Western leaders have failed to take a consistent stand on the high ground offered by this distinction.

One reason for this may be that our leaders believe that tolerating an Iranian weapons capacity — and acknowledging tacitly that “nuclear pregnancy” is not unlawful — could trigger proliferation. The same Telegraph reporter claims that earlier this year Sawers warned Ministers about a potential threat to Britain from a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. I shall address this possibility in a future piece.

According to Iranian-Israeli Middle East analyst Meir Javedanfar: “[t]he moment [...]]]> As the Syrian government’s brutal crackdown on anti-regime protestors intensifies and President Bashar al-Assad faces increasing criticism from allies, many are watching Iran’s response. Will the isolated Islamic Republic support its important friend until the end or distance itself from the Syrian regime’s sinking ship?

According to Iranian-Israeli Middle East analyst Meir Javedanfar: “[t]he moment the Iranian leader realises that Assad’s situation is not salvageable, he will leave him.” Javedanfar says that the break will happen behind the scenes while the Iranian government continues its supportive posturing publicly.

In an August 14 Guardian article Javendanfar writes:

Khamenei will not commit political suicide by staying with Assad until the last moment. Doing so would be very damaging for the regime’s interests. Iran is becoming more isolated every day. It does not need a new enemy in Damascus in the event of Assad’s fall, especially when this could impact on its ability to supply weapons to Hezbollah through Syrian territory (not to mention relations with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which it conducts through its offices in Damascus). It could also lose access to its economic interests in Syria.

Read the entire piece here.

Let’s get caught up with [...]]]> Does the selection of Iran’s nuclear czar as its new (interim) foreign minister say anything about nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West? We don’t really know, and given that the next round of talks is only a month away, we might not know until news breaks from Istanbul.

Let’s get caught up with Iran: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sacked Manoucher Mottaki — widely seen as a political figure — on Monday in a surprise move. The outgoing FM, who had long been known to be at odds with Ahmadinejad, was quickly replaced in the interim by the now-former head of Iran’s nuclear agency, Ali Akbar Salehi. Salehi, who was partly educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), is known as a technocrat.

Laura Rozen at Politico does Iranian “Kremlinology” with analysis from experts in D.C.. Trita Parsi told Rozen:

“The fact that Salehi, a longtime hand in the nuclear program, replaces [Mottaki] may indicate the nuclearization of Iranian foreign policy,” Iranian analyst Trita Parsi said. “While Mottaki was never central to the nuclear program, the person replacing him and taking over the entire foreign policy machine is a person that for decades has been instrumental to the program.”

“This may indicate, if not renewed seriousness on the part of the Iranians, at least a recognition that the parties recognize that they are close to crunch time and they are fielding their best players as a result,” he said.

I reached out to Iran expert and University of Hawaii professor Farideh Farhi, an expert on Iran’s byzantine politics, who told me both the sacking and the new hire remain a mystery to her. She emphasized that the appointment is an interim one, so Ahmadinejad could have simply put off a more controversial pick that would have aroused opposition in the Majles, or Iranian parliament. We don’t yet know, however, what the pick means for Ahmadinejad’s relationship with the Supreme Leader. Farhi (the links are mine):

Some people are speculating that it may have something to do with [this month's Iran-P5+1 talks in] Geneva and the portrayal of success by the negotiating team inside Iran, giving Ahamdinejad the confidence to do this. One other analyst in Tehran suggested that the presidential advisor [Esfandiar Rahim] Mashaie’s visit this week to Jordan and King Abdullah’s positive response to Ahamdinejad’s personal letter might have given Ahmadinejad motivation to do this. There is indeed a possibility that Ahmadinejad sacked Mottaki the same way he sacked Ali Larijani as nuclear negotiator, without prior approval from [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei. If this is the case then it bespeaks a confident Ahmadinejad since, as I mentioned above, it was merely a month or so ago that Khamenei supported Mottaki by name. If indeed Ahmadinejad did this without Khamenei’s prior approval, it means the game is not yet over.

It sounds like, once again, with Iran and the U.S. inching closer together, uncertainty will hang over the proceedings. If the U.S. comes through on hints, a confidence-building measure could be in the works, so the U.S. will likely be busy no matter what.

“Between now and January,” wrote Robert Dreyfuss on his Nation blog, “the United States is going to have to engage in some spirited, behind-the-scenes talks with Iran to make the negotiations work.” Dreyfuss noted, and focused on, that amid all the the action in Tehran, the U.S. seems to be ready to offer up a fuel swap agreement that, for the meantime, would allow centrifuges to keep spinning in Iran. It’s just the sort of “first step” deal, as Rozen noted, that Salehi hammered out with the Brazilians and Turks in the run-up to the last round of U.S. led UN Security Council sanctions.

Julian Border, at the Guardian, has a good piece covering the optimistic take on Salehi. Just after he pulls a few WikiLeaks docs to show several takes of Western diplomats on Salehi — he speaks good English and is a preferred interlocutor, but seems to not wield much influence in the halls of power — Border summed up the ever-ambiguous “Western diplomat” reaction:

Western diplomats, however, are generally cheered by the appointment because it might mean that their contacts with the foreign ministry will now have more substance. During the prolonged sparring between Mottaki and Ahmadinejad, the ministry increasingly became an empty shell, bypassed over major decisions, and irrelevant on the nuclear dossier.

Rozen, again, has a great observation, via Suzanne Maloney from the Brookings Institution, that Salehi is subject to an EU travel ban. Earlier, it had been reported that Salehi was named in the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution, but apparently this was not right (though the agency which he formerly headed was). Had the UNSC bit turned out to be true, my reaction was that the move could be a provocation. Given that it’s only an EU ban and, as Rozen points out, it gets waived for higher-ups in foreign governments, I don’t really think so.

As I said, could it mean something for nuclear negotiations? Looks like we’ll have to wait for next month’s talks to find out.

Late-breaking: Inside Iran‘s Arash Aramesh has the take of a recent Iranian diplomatic defector. It’s worth checking out for the opinions of someone who was very recently, indeed, on the inside.

Ramadani, in the Guardian‘s Comment Is Free section, takes a crack at [...]]]> Sami Ramadani, a professor at London Metropolitan University who fled Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, writes that Iranian influence in Iraq is ‘highly exaggerated’. These overstated allegations, he implies, are especially rich coming from the United States, which Ramadani calls “the foremost foreign influence” in Iraq.

Ramadani, in the Guardian‘s Comment Is Free section, takes a crack at some of the motivations for overstating Iranian influence. The historical allusions are worth noting. He writes:

The reality is that though Iran does have influence there – born of US failure to subdue Iraq – the extent and potency of that influence is nowhere near that which is being claimed.

Iranian influence is highly exaggerated for a number of distinct but convergent reasons. First, the US is still considering a military strike against Iran in order to cripple its economic and military infrastructure. A glance at a political map of the Middle East shows that Iran is the only major power that actively opposes US and Israeli policies in the region. But the map also shows that the US has Iran encircled with formidable firepower, including nuclear missiles aboard the US fleets roaming the seas near Iran. Indeed, the Bush administration was only discouraged from attacking Iran after the mission in Iraq was sucked into the quicksands of resistance.

The truth is that, 31 years after the overthrow of one of its closest allies and the rise of a new political order in Iran, successive US administrations have been at a loss as to how to regain a foothold there. They backed Saddam’s war against Iran in 1980 and are still hoping to use Iraq as a military and political base to destabilise or attack Iran. There are credible reports that Iraq’s long borders with Iran are being used to smuggle in arms and spies. Most Iraqis are opposed to Iran’s manoeuvrings with corrupt Iraqi politicians, but a close examination of Iranian policies reveals that they are guided by an intense fear of being crippled by a US or Israeli attack.

Second, there are other players, Iraqi and regional, who are keen on exaggerating Iran’s influence in Iraq. Saddam loyalists, for example, who insist that Iran is a greater danger to Iraq than American occupation. Or the myriad Iraqi politicians who believe that hostility to Iran is their ticket to gaining US backing. Even the Islamic Supreme Council, a sectarian party led by the Shia cleric Ammar al-Hakim – whose forces were stationed in Iran before 2003 – have been drawn into the realities of US domination and been distancing themselves from the more anti-US Iranians, led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.