by Wayne White
Sen. John McCain’s berating of former Sen. Chuck Hagel for “yes or no” answers as to whether the latter would support intervention in Syria or providing arms to anti-regime fighters reveals just how little McCain understands about how agonizingly complex these issues have been — and remain — [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Sen. John McCain’s berating of former Sen. Chuck Hagel for “yes or no” answers as to whether the latter would support intervention in Syria or providing arms to anti-regime fighters reveals just how little McCain understands about how agonizingly complex these issues have been — and remain — for the US and other Western governments. In fact, perhaps the most profoundly basic need confronting the US and most of its allies (finding a credible Syrian opposition counterpart with which to work) has been elusive.
The Syrian opposition remains in disarray. All along, there have been disconnects between the new National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (more commonly referred to as the Syrian National Coalition) in exile, and the older, now associated, Syrian National Council (SNC) as well as what seems to be quite a few of the various armed rebels operating against the Assad regime inside Syria. Indeed, the National Coalition and its predecessor, the SNC, who now purportedly represent the overall Syrian resistance to the outside world, appear to most experts to be somewhat more moderate than many of the armed elements of what has been collectively known as the Syrian Liberation Army (SLA) fighting within Syria. Consequently, governments considering options as serious as those backed by Sen. McCain lack confidence that they have a reliable partner in the new Coalition.
Late last year, the Istanbul-based SNC was pressured by the US, the West, and many moderate Arab states to formulate an expanded and more thoroughly representative organization (because even some groups in exile remained outside the SNC). Leaders of the various factions in exile met in Doha, Qatar in November 2012 to attempt just that, and a new line-up, the National Coalition, emerged from that conference. If the succession of names and acronyms for the Syrian opposition outside Syria seems a bit confusing to the reader, this comes as no surprise; the opposition remains a disparate, in some cases only loosely associated, and quarrelsome grouping. And most informed observers feel that genuine unity within the Syrian opposition in exile, let alone between its many and varied elements fighting within Syria, had not even been achieved in Doha. Consequently, the US, (which was a key party pressuring the opposition to meet and reorganize in the first place), ironically withheld its recognition.
Further divisions within the council became evident just this weekend when senior opposition leader Moaz al-Khatib not only conferred with Russian and Iranian representatives in Munich, but also agreed to meet with Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa if the Syrian regime would work with the opposition toward a peaceful exit of President Bashar al-Assad. The offer conflicted with the Coalition’s recently reiterated position rejecting talks with the Assad regime, naturally producing grumbling from within the opposition in exile. The reaction on the part of many FSA fighters inside Syria was even more strongly negative, even though al-Khatib told the Russians and Iranians about the anger within opposition ranks over their support for the Assads.
An extremely troubling tendency for practically all outside governments supporting the Syrian opposition more generally has been the rising radicalization of FSA fighters on the battle lines throughout Syria. Indeed, extremist elements such as the al-Nusra Front (strongly suspected of being composed largely of al-Qaeda fighters) reportedly have consistently been in the vanguard of much of the toughest fighting in recent months, although it cooperates with armed rebel groups of differing beliefs out of necessity. So, al-Nusra, although seemingly the most effective anti-regime military force in Syria, was designated a terrorist organization by Washington in December 2012. Al-Khatib, on behalf of the exile Coalition, has urged the US to reconsider, but a change in US policy toward al-Nusra is unlikely.
Consequently, with its external leadership in some measure of flux, some rebel fighters still little known, and other elements battling in Syria considered dangerous, providing a large amount of lethal assistance has become even more problematic for most potential donors. Moreover, military intervention would be a far more difficult, militarily taxing, and costly proposition than it was in Libya for a variety of reasons. And Russia and China’s obstruction in the UN Security Council of any meaningful UN-sanction action against the Assad regime has been yet another major problem. Finally, there is the wide-ranging issue of various uncertain (and several potentially unwelcome) post-Assad scenarios to further complicate decision-making by governments toward providing lethal assistance to an opposition movement with which they otherwise share the goal of toppling Assad & Co. and ending the ongoing bloodshed and destruction.
With 60,000 Syrians already dead and more dying by the day, providing robust military aid to the opposition would appear, at least at first glance, a proverbial “no brainer.” But this abbreviated tour through the complexities of US, Western and moderate Arab considerations concerning this far more vexing issue should underscore why demanding instant “yes or no” answers from Chuck Hagel as to whether the Administration should move boldly toward either military action in Syria or the arms supply business was so inappropriate.
Yet, although unrelated to Hagel, it may have been a mistake for key governments supporting the Syrian opposition not to have started at least supplying greater quantities of arms to the FSA well over a year ago, despite some of the risks at that time too. This could have hastened the fall of the regime while minimizing what has now become widespread anger within the FSA (and among many anti-regime Syrians in general) over the West’s failure to do so. Moreover, at that point, fewer extremist elements of the FSA had emerged as strongly as they are now as the ongoing, savage struggle has radicalized ever larger numbers of opposition fighters. Viewed in hindsight, although this was a very difficult call even back then, it might have been a missed opportunity.
]]>by Jim Lobe
As I noted in the piece published on IPS Friday, “It’s All About Israel,” Israel and the presumed threat posed by Iran to its security dominated Chuck Hagel’s confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Thursday. It was the one opportunity Committee members — [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
As I noted in the piece published on IPS Friday, “It’s All About Israel,” Israel and the presumed threat posed by Iran to its security dominated Chuck Hagel’s confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Thursday. It was the one opportunity Committee members — and, for that matter, the entire Senate — had to publicly probe the nominee’s basic beliefs about the myriad challenges confronting U.S. national security in what Robert Gates described, while he was still working for George W. Bush, as an increasingly “multi-polar world.” That the panel chose to focus almost exclusively on the challenges facing Israel, rather than the United States, speaks volumes about the influence of the Israel lobby on the U.S. Senate. It also speaks volumes about the very basic lack of seriousness or curiosity on the SASC’s part about the geo-strategic issues that one would expect to be at or near the top of the Pentagon’s agenda. As Chas Freeman put it to me, the whole scene made it look like senators were “busking for campaign dollars” rather than grappling with the multi-faceted problems the U.S. armed forces face around the world.
So I wanted to give some additional idea of just how negligent I think the Committee’s questioning was by compiling a list with some brief annotations or explanations of countries, non-state actors, and regions and the number of times each was mentioned in the hearing. (If someone has the software to create a map of the world based on the number of mentions a country gets based on this list, I’d love to publish it on Lobelog.)
I should mention at the outset, however, that one of the most surprising discoveries to me was this: Al Qaida — you know, the group and its affiliates that have supposedly been Public Enemy #1 since 9/11 and that Republicans have been arguing for several months now has still not been defeated and is now popping up all over the place, planning attacks on the American homeland — was mentioned a grand total of twice during the eight hours of testimony. That compares with 24 mentions of Hezbollah and 11 of Hamas, neither of which has been accused by the U.S. government of planning attacks on the U.S. homeland, let alone actually carrying any out. The disproportionate focus on these two non-state actors — contrasted with the virtually complete lack of curiosity about Al Qaida and its affiliates — is yet another manifestation of the degree to which the SASC appears to be far more concerned about Israel’s security than that of the United States. (I should note that SASC senators have submitted written questions to Hagel which no doubt cover a much broader number of issues than were raised at the hearing. But the hearing is the only opportunity to raise these issues in ways that get broader attention, and that’s what makes it so important.)
I have left out two countries that were mentioned numerous times: Vietnam (41 references) and Germany (9 references) because all mentions of those two countries were biographical; that is, they didn’t relate to current policy, but rather only to Hagel’s experience and relationship to them.
In any event, here is the partially annotated list. The number on the left refers to the number of mentions in the transcript:
178 – Israel
171 – Iran (threat to Israel)
30 – Iraq (where we just concluded a war in which nearly 4,500 U.S. servicemen and women were killed)
27 – Afghanistan (where we still have well over 60,000 U.S. troops deployed and the exit strategy remains unclear.)
24 – Hezbollah (threat to Israel)
23 – Russia (only other major nuclear power which also will have a major influence on U.S. policy toward Iran, Syria, and withdrawal from Afghanistan, among other issues.)
22 – Palestine or Palestinians (threat to Israel)
18 – Syria (a country torn by civil war and a possible threat to Israel.)
11 – North Korea (a nuclear power believed to be preparing another nuclear test.)
11 – Hamas (threat to Israel)
10 – Pakistan (a nuclear power whose cooperation is critical to U.S. Afghanistan policy.)
9 – Egypt (a country undergoing heavy turbulence to which the U.S. provides $1.5 billion a year in military aid; potential threat to Israel.)
6 – Asia (yes, the entire continent, consisting of over half the world’s population toward which our military is supposed to be “pivoting.”)
5 – China (critical to U.S. policy toward Iran and many other hotspots, not to mention its being the geo-strategic focus of the above-mentioned “pivot.”)
5 – NATO (Washington’s most important alliance and the one with which it conducted an aerial campaign in Libya, is still fighting in Afghanistan, and just set up Patriot missile batteries in Turkey close to the Syrian border.)
5 – European Union (all references were related to the EU’s refusal to put Hezbollah on its terrorism list.)
2 – Libya (the country where Republicans have complained that Obama’s “leading from behind” has led to disaster.)
2 – Yemen (the country where the Pentagon is working with the CIA to carry out drones strikes against suspected Al-Qaida militants)
2 – Bahrain (another country in turmoil which is also home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet)
2 – Somalia (another country in turmoil where the U.S. military has attacked suspected Al Qaida and Al Shabaab leaders)
2 – Al Qaida (in all its forms)
1 – Mali (where the U.S. just provided logistical and intelligence support for a French campaign against Al Qaida in the Maghreb)
1 – Jordan
1 – Turkey (NATO ally neighboring Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon)
1 – Japan (closest U.S. ally in Asia with which Washington has a mutual defense treaty. U.S. has 50,000 troops based there.)
1 – South Korea (second closest U.S. ally in Asia. U.S. has 28,000 troops based there.)
1 – France (U.S. NATO ally, permanent UN Security Council member, just carried out U.S. military-backed campaign in Mali. Actually the only reference was about President Clinton granting a waiver to a French oil company operating in Iran.)
So that’s the list. Now, consider those countries which did not get a single mention during the eight hours of the hearing despite their possible strategic importance to the United States. This is necessarily a partial list, but just contemplate what the SASC was not interested in:
India (a nuclear power, world’s second most-populous nation, neighbour to Pakistan and China, avidly courted by the U.S. military in the last decade.)
Indonesia (world’s fourth most-populous nation, world’s most-populous predominantly Muslim country, avidly courted by the Pentagon over the last decade.)
Brazil (world’s fifth most-populous nation, dominant power in South America.)
Mexico (with Canada, closest U.S. neighbor which is receiving U.S. military training as part of its drug war.)
Saudi Arabia (biggest U.S. arms customer by far; closest U.S. ally in Arab world with world’s biggest oil reserves.)
Qatar (home to giant U.S. air force base; aggressively supported rebels in Libya, Syria)
Nigeria (Africa’s most populous country; major oil producer; threatened by Boko Haram insurgency allegedly tied to Al Qaida in the Maghreb; Pentagon actively seeking ties with military,)
United Kingdom (Washington’s closest NATO ally and permanent member of UN Security Council).
In this context, it’s appropriate to remember what Hagel told David Aaron Miller in that fateful 2008 interview, to wit:
And this guy kept pushing and pushing. And he alluded to the fact that maybe I wasn’t supporting Israel enough or something. And I just said let me clear something up here, in case there is any doubt.
I said, ‘I’m a United States senator. I’m not an Israeli senator. I’m a United States senator.’ I support Israel, but my first interest is I take an oath of office to the Constitution of the United States — not to a president, not to a party, not to Israel. If I go run for Senate in Israel, I’ll do that. Now I know most senators don’t talk like I do.”
You bet they don’t, Chuck.
Photo: Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) questioning defense secretary nominee Chuck Hagel over an appearance the former senator made on Al Jazeera in 2009.
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