The last few months have gone rather well for the right-wing Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu, in the sense of advancing its prime objective of indefinitely extending the occupation and colonization of Palestinian territory by ensuring failure of any diplomatic efforts to end the occupation. Netanyahu’s success in this regard has been [...]]]> by Paul Pillar

The last few months have gone rather well for the right-wing Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu, in the sense of advancing its prime objective of indefinitely extending the occupation and colonization of Palestinian territory by ensuring failure of any diplomatic efforts to end the occupation. Netanyahu’s success in this regard has been due both to his own tactical skill and to the luck of outside events.

Netanyahu achieved failure of the latest U.S. attempt to revive a peace process worthy of that name partly through the preemptory demand for the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a “Jewish state.” He also successfully used the stratagem of striking a deal with the Palestinian Authority that involved release of Palestinian prisoners, reneging on that deal by construing its meaning differently than originally intended, and then blaming the P.A. for not proceeding anyway with substantive talks as if nothing untoward had happened. The Israelis had to take some mild off-the-record blame for the breakdown from the Americans, but nothing that wasn’t manageable.

More threatening to the Israeli government’s strategy than John Kerry’s diplomatic efforts was the latest effort by Hamas and Fatah to bridge their differences and jointly support a single Palestinian government. These intra-Palestinian acts of reconciliation have always been a problem for Netanyahu’s strategy because they involve creating a negotiating partner that can speak for the great majority of Palestinians and because they belie the Israeli allegation that Hamas wants nothing but the destruction of Israel. The Hamas-Fatah deal and subsequent creation of a cabinet of technocrats clearly involved Hamas moving toward Mahmoud Abbas’s position rather than the other way around. This latest reconciliation appeared even more threatening to Netanyahu’s approach than the previous ones because it showed more sign of sticking. Perhaps most disturbing to Netanyahu is that the Obama administration indicated it was willing to work with any jointly supported Palestinian government that emerged from the deal.

Netanyahu has given the same vehement and unyielding reaction he has given to the previous efforts at Palestinian reconciliation, such as withholding tax revenue that belongs to the Palestinians. What most enabled him, however, to sustain his strategy in the face of this latest challenge—and here is one place where the luck of events has helped him—was the kidnapping and murder of three Jewish Israeli teenagers in the occupied West Bank. Netanyahu immediately blamed Hamas and repeatedly promised evidence, which still hasn’t been forthcoming, that the group was responsible for the crime. Two men with ties to Hamas have been named as suspects. They are at large but their families’ homes have already been demolished. No proof of guilt was furnished beforehand, but Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes in the West Bank is an everyday occurrence anyway.

The crime provided the occasion for the Israeli government to strike back more broadly and forcefully than that. As Mitchell Plitnick has described it, “Under the cover of searching for the kidnapped youths, Netanyahu launched a massive operation to cripple Hamas in the West Bank, further humiliate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and punish the entire Palestinian population for calling for a halt to the charade of the ‘peace process’ and, worse, moving toward a unified leadership.” This forceful stirring of the pot by Israel, which has involved the detention of hundreds of Palestinians and the death of several of them at the hands of Israeli security forces, helps to put any peace diplomacy even farther out of reach. It enables American supporters of Netanyahu’s government to say for the umpteenth time that the time is not “ripe” for peace negotiations—and the government they support will do what it has to do to ensure that the time will never be ripe.

Netanyahu’s strategy has benefited recently from other distractions, which have diverted any energy and attention that might otherwise be directed toward establishment of a Palestinian state. The principal distraction that Netanyahu has relied on has been, of course, his demonization of Iran. Other events have helped him. The world’s attention was diverted greatly for a time by the crisis in Ukraine. Then came widespread alarm over the Sunni extremist group in Iraq and Syria that now calls itself the Islamic State. The latter scare has been even more useful for Netanyahu, who used it as another excuse to insist that Israeli troops must continue to occupy the Jordan River Valley indefinitely. Never mind that the chief of Mossad dismisses the notion of an Islamic State army marching across Jordan to invade Israel; the excuse still has a crude geographic appeal.

So Netanyahu has peace diplomacy right where he wants it: in the trash bin, but so far without having to shoulder unequivocal international blame for putting it there. His very success over the last few months in this regard, however, may over the next few months lead to reactions that will complicate further execution of his strategy. That the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation has gone as far as it has—farther than previous attempts—may lead many Palestinians to see it as a best shot at a genuinely comprehensive peace, one that would cover Gaza as well as the West Bank. Continued vehement Israeli rejection of this best shot may lead Palestinians to conclude that they have no shot—none, that is, at negotiating a bilateral accord with any Israeli government that looks at all like the current one. One resulting possibility—which the current volatility in the Palestinian territories shows is dangerously close to becoming a probability—is outbreak of a new full-blown intifada, an uprising with widespread violence.

Even without a new intifada, there are two other strategy-complicating possibilities. One is for the Palestinian Authority (presumably in the form of its Hamas-backed but non-party government) to drop its previous restraint in seeking the full involvement of international organizations in helping the Palestinians out of their plight and moving toward real statehood. The other is for the Palestinian Authority to dissolve itself, end the fiction that what exists in the West Bank is anything other than continued Israeli military occupation, and stop being an accessory to that occupation. Netanyahu in effect encourages Palestinians to reach that latter conclusion, and to realize that the P.A. is not really a government at all, when he does things such as disdaining Abbas’s attempts to help in finding the killers of the Israeli teenagers and berating the P.A. even though the crime occurred in a portion of the West Bank where the P.A. has no security functions at all.

But Netanyahu is always focused on the short term, and he probably is not worrying much right now about those possibilities. It also is because he is focused on the short term that success in his strategy in fending off Palestinian statehood is not at all success for Israel. In fact, it is quite contrary to the long term interests of Israel and damaging to its prospects for living as a peaceful, prosperous, liberal state. The Netanyahu strategy fails to recognize that clinging to all the land to the Jordan River makes it impossible for Israel to be both a Jewish and a democratic state.

The strategy is one that entails unending conflict and animosity. As Israel sinks ever more deeply into hard-core apartheid, a corrosive effect continues to be seen in the public attitudes and morality of many Israelis as well as many Palestinians, an effect that is disturbing to the many other Israelis who are still thoughtful and humane. The phenomenon in question has become increasingly apparent in recent years in an intolerance in Israel that has evolved into overt hatred and prejudice against Arabs, matching anti-Jewish hatred that can be found on the other side. (Anti-Semitism probably is not the appropriate term in this context, only because both Jews and Arabs are Semites.)

In this atmosphere, nonofficial acts of inhumanity and violence become more likely—such as the killing of the three Jewish teenagers and the subsequent killing, possibly after being burned alive, of a Palestinian Arab teenager. The atmosphere also infects official acts. Those acts include much of what happens in the West Bank every week, including all those demolitions of homes. It also has reportedly included in the past few days the brutal beating by Israeli police of another Palestinian teenager—a cousin of the one who was burned and killed.

The victim of the police beating is an American: a high school sophomore from Tampa, Florida who was visiting his relatives. If the reports about his beating are confirmed, this ought to be an occasion for the U.S. to pull its kid gloves off at least a bit more in dealing with Netanyahu’s government. When Israeli police are beating up U.S. citizens, the U.S. government ought to do more to steer the Israeli government off its disastrous path. Call it tough love if you prefer, but the emphasis needs to be on the toughness.

This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission.

by Mitchell Plitnick

There is a sure, although contemptible, way to get the attention of virtually the entire state of Israel. That is to kidnap some of its younger citizens. It worked with Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and it seems to be playing well again, this time with civilians (living in the settlements [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

There is a sure, although contemptible, way to get the attention of virtually the entire state of Israel. That is to kidnap some of its younger citizens. It worked with Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and it seems to be playing well again, this time with civilians (living in the settlements does not strip one of their civilian status under international law).

Israel, as a whole, is riveted on the fates of these three young men. There is a national outcry in Israel when kidnappings occur that is even louder than when Israelis, even young Israelis, are killed. There is a sense of urgency; that something must be done to free the captives before a worse fate befalls them. The attention is widespread and constant, in cases like Shalit’s, where the captive is kept alive, and in cases where the captives are believed or known to already be dead. Israelis press hard for a resolution to the situation, and political leaders respond, but sometimes, sadly, in self-serving ways.

Was it Hamas?

The outcry from the people of Israel over the fates of Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Sha’ar, and Naftali Frankel is very real. The bluster and finger-pointing from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is an insult. Netanyahu immediately laid the blame at Hamas’ feet, absurdly held the Palestinian Authority responsible, demeaned a very strong statement by Mahmoud Abbas denouncing the act and managed to defy all logic by suggesting that this event was the result of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas.

Beyond the visceral response, however, some perspective is needed. The media seems to have firmly latched on to the idea that Hamas is responsible for this crime. That is certainly possible, but the evidence thus far points away from that direction. Netanyahu has offered no concrete evidence for his statement whatsoever, expecting the world to simply take him at his word despite the obvious benefit for him. The media seems to have done just that, but others are more dubious.

The United States has thus far only conceded that some evidence may point to “Hamas’ involvement.” Hamas has sent out mixed signals, as they always do, but the official line has been that they had nothing to do with the kidnapping. Meanwhile the coordinator of government activities in the territories, Major General Yoav Mordechai has only said they have “a great deal of information” about the kidnappings, pointedly avoiding naming any group that might be responsible.

But whether it was Hamas or not is not really an issue for Netanyahu. The kidnapping has provided the pretext he needed to attack Hamas in the West Bank, and also hit the Palestinian Authority for their temerity in striking a unity agreement with the Islamist party against Israel’s wishes. Netanyahu quite reasonably believes he can drive a wedge between Hamas and Fatah and hasten the collapse of their unity pact, but if that fails, he very well knows that he can weaken Hamas’ presence in the West Bank through mass arrests and possibly deportations to Gaza. At the same time, he puts Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in a very difficult position; Abbas cannot be seen by the international community as supporting or being indifferent to the kidnapping, but he also can’t afford to be seen by his own public to be collaborating with Israel.

Palestinian prisoners

The problem for Abbas is deeply connected with the issue of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, an issue that has resurfaced recently as many of them have gone on hunger strike. Israel often holds Palestinians in so-called “administrative detention,” which means they are being held without charge or trial. It is supposed to last no longer than six months, but because the order can be renewed, some Palestinians are imprisoned in this fashion for years.

The other end of that spectrum, of course, is the controversial issue of Palestinian prisoners who have been convicted of violence against Israelis, especially civilians. These prisoners are often seen as heroes by the Palestinians, a source of intense friction for even the most liberal Israelis. The Israeli public, for its part, doesn’t often distinguish much between Palestinian prisoners; they are generally seen as terrorists by most Israelis, although this is not by any means universal. Many of the more liberal Israelis are not entirely comfortable with the practice of extended administrative detention, although most would acknowledge its utility if used sparingly. Most countries, it should be noted, have some system like this one when attempting to prevent violent crimes, and most have been known, on occasion, to abuse the practice; it’s just that democracies, on the whole, do not abuse it to nearly the extent that Israel does.

Currently, about 300 Palestinian prisoners, including both those that have been charged, indicted or convicted, and those who are held in administrative detention, are on a hunger strike. Israel, seeking to avoid the international embarrassment and the potential powder keg in the Occupied Territories that would result from the deaths of the strikers, is attempting to pass legislation to permit forced feeding, widely considered a grave breach of personal privacy and medical ethics.

For many Palestinians, the issues of Palestinian prisoners and Israelis being held illegally by Palestinians are intimately connected. Israel, of course, has reinforced this on several occasions by agreeing to prisoner exchanges, as they did with Gilad Shalit in 2011. So, as Israel cracks down hard on Palestinian prisoners, Palestinians, even if they object to the kidnapping of the three Israelis, are going to be frustrated if they see Abbas putting more energy and resources into finding the Israelis than dealing with the conditions of his own people in Israeli jails, many of whose lives are also currently in jeopardy.

Netanyahu’s agenda

I want to be clear, at this point, that nothing I say here should be construed as suggesting that Netanyahu does not want to find Yifrach, Sha’ar and Frankel; I’m sure he does. But Bibi is nothing if not an opportunist, and he knows from the Shalit experience that it is entirely possible that this could drag on for some time. He is not about to let the mere fact of human suffering get in the way of his political agenda.

And Netanyahu certainly has an agenda here; what he lacks, as always, is an endgame. His aim is to use the crackdown, legitimized at least for the Israeli public by the kidnapping, to punish Abbas for dropping out of the sham talks that John Kerry was piloting, and for finally coming together with Hamas to agree on a technocratic government charged with paving the way for Palestine’s first national election since 2006. Anticipating that Hamas will gain support in the West Bank, Netanyahu is also using this opportunity to weaken its infrastructure and leadership through mass arrests.

But where does he go from there? His actions will further weaken Abbas, who is already teetering on the edge of oblivion in the West Bank. And, while Hamas may be somewhat less powerful in the short-term, these actions are not going to do long-term damage.

Part of Netanyahu’s strategy here is also to try to make the case that this is the result of the Palestinian unity agreement and that the world needs to stand by Israel and, in essence, against the entire Palestinian body politic. The hope, for Bibi, is that international pressure can be brought down on Abbas to get him to agree to a deal that would appeal to Bibi’s coalition. Such a deal would include a non-contiguous Palestinian pseudo-state with virtually no Palestinian presence in Jerusalem, a continued Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley, Israeli control of Palestinian airspace… in short, the deal Bibi and Kerry were trying to force on Abbas before the talks broke down.

But it doesn’t seem to be working. The United States has dutifully expressed its outrage, but in tepid terms. The European Union took five days before condemning the kidnapping. The message to Netanyahu is that the world is indeed outraged by this act, but they don’t see it as fundamentally changing anything.

The media campaign the Israeli government orchestrated worked well within Israel, but less so outside. The attempt by the Israel Defense Forces to get a Twitter campaign going by grossly playing off the crimes of Boko Haram in Nigeria in abducting hundreds of girls to be sold into sexual or other kinds of slavery was rightly greeted outside of Israel as cheap and insulting. It was turned around by pro-Palestinian social media activists to reflect the large numbers of Palestinians held by Israel. And the timing of the whole campaign is poor, as attention is focused now on Iraq, among other, ongoing areas of tension.

That is not to say the world is unsympathetic. These are, according to all reports, three innocent young men, whose only crime was living and studying in a school in occupied territory. But that does not justify violence against them. They are certainly victims, and they are rightly seen that way in most of the world.

Sadly, the Netanyahu government cannot let such a plight speak for itself. Instead they must polish it and present it in a propaganda package that is more about demonizing all Palestinians than it is about finding the victims. The repeated references to “our boys” and calling the abductees “children” might later resonate in a way Israel doesn’t like. The young men are 19, 16, and 16 years of age, and you’ll be hard-pressed to find instances where Israel treats Palestinian youths of those ages like “children.”

The occupation does not justify an attack on civilians, not even on settlers, if they are not threatening anyone. But like every other occupation in history, it does inevitably lead to it, especially if the occupying power is putting civilians illegally into occupied territory. Such acts are criminal, but inevitable. This did not happen because Palestinians hate Jews, nor because Hamas and Fatah reached an agreement. It happened because of the occupation. When millions of people are treated unjustly, some number of them will act unjustly in response.

If people are truly concerned about young Jews like Eyal, Gilad and Naftali, they must stop playing petty politics, trumpeting extreme nationalism and valuing force over law. The only way to effectively prevent crimes like this in the future is to end the situation where millions of people are living their entire lives without rights…or hope.

This article was published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission.