via IPS News

From Tehran’s perspective, the current negotiations between Iran and the United States may be best described as a wrestling match.

Before President Hassan Rouhani’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), his boss, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke of “heroic leniency” toward the United [...]]]> by Alireza Nader

via IPS News

From Tehran’s perspective, the current negotiations between Iran and the United States may be best described as a wrestling match.

Before President Hassan Rouhani’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), his boss, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke of “heroic leniency” toward the United States. Subsequently, Khamenei’s office issued a telling graphic that depicted a set of guidelines for negotiations. The graphic also called to mind an Iranian zoorkhaneh, or house of strength, where men perform traditional weightlifting and wrestling, one of the most popular sports in Iran.

According to Khamenei, the Islamic Republic is willing to engage its enemy, or show “flexibility,” in order to win the overall competition. However, Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards have also laid out clear red lines for Rouhani. He is to demonstrate no weakness or “humility” with the opponent, the United States. And he should not weaken Iran’s ties and alliances with Islamic and resistance groups, especially Hezbollah.

Rouhani’s recent charm offensive has greatly raised expectations amongst those wishing for U.S.-Iran reconciliation. However, this is not Rouhani’s mandate; rather, the Islamic Republic has tasked him with negotiating the nuclear crisis away and alleviating pressures faced by the regime. Although this may not seem the perfect outcome, it nevertheless presents a unique opportunity for the United States.

It is unlikely that Khamenei and his supporters will ever change their fundamental views of America. Suspicion of the United States may be motivated by religious and cultural values, but only to a limited extent. The regime’s revolutionary ideology and geopolitical interests play a bigger role.

Khamenei sees the global order as tilted in the West’s favour. The United States is the latest of a long line of imperialist powers that have attempted to dominate the Middle East. He views his regime, which replaced Iran’s last monarch, as the focal point of resistance to Western domination.

This has meant an Iranian policy of containment with limited engagement in which Iran limits and rolls back Washington’s influence while pursuing diplomacy when it suits regime “expediency.” (The United States has also pursued a similar policy of containment).

Khamenei has said that he does not oppose negotiating with the United States in principle as long as it does not violate Iran’s interests.

For a long time, his policy seemed to work. Iran carved out a sphere of influence from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, and could count on its allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond to help maintain its interests. Iran’s economy, while never great, functioned and at times prospered until the imposition of the most punishing sanctions.

Iran earned an estimated 500 billion dollars from oil and natural gas sales during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, while its nuclear programme progressed in the face of Western opposition. Khamenei was willing to engage the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to enhance Iran’s influence, and no more.

But Ahmadinejad’s monumental incompetence made Iran the loser, not the champion. Iran’s economy is in the dumps, the people are unhappy, and Tehran’s regional influence is in decline. Khamenei needed a new wrestler, and Rouhani appears more than capable. He can manage the economy, negotiate away sanctions, and give the Iranian people a bit more freedom, but not too much.

It is not too surprising that Rouhani did not shake President Obama’s hand during the United Nations General Assembly confab. He may have a mandate to negotiate, but he cannot appear to be weak in the face of the enemy. Khamenei’s “heroic leniency” means a well-defined set of red lines and parametres, rather than gestures that call into question the very purpose of the wrestling match.

However, this does not mean that Rouhani’s diplomacy is false or that Khamenei is merely buying time. In the past, U.S. engagement with Iran has produced results. Iran’s support was crucial in establishing the government of Hamid Karzai after the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Limited engagement with Iran focusing on the nuclear programme and perhaps even Syria can work.

Real U.S. wrestlers have competed with Iranians, and have always been greeted in Iran with open arms. However, no one should expect Rouhani to change the dynamics between Iran and the United States, or apparently, to even offer his hand in friendship. The wrestling match is not over, but for now some flexibility from both sides can ensure a managed rivalry, rather than a bloody mess between a beleaguered superpower and its frustrated but determined regional rival.

– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

via IPS News

On the eve of a possible – if seemingly accidental – encounter between U.S. President Barack Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in the corridors of the U.N. Secretariat building Tuesday, speculation over the possibility of détente between Washington and Tehran has become rampant.

A [...]]]> by Jim Lobe

via IPS News

On the eve of a possible – if seemingly accidental – encounter between U.S. President Barack Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in the corridors of the U.N. Secretariat building Tuesday, speculation over the possibility of détente between Washington and Tehran has become rampant.

A series of conciliatory statements and steps taken by both sides in recent weeks has fuelled the imaginations of foreign policy mavens here, with some warning against possible U.S. “appeasement” of what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called, in a reference to Rouhani, a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”, and others giddy with the possibilities of ending 34 years of mutual hostility.

So far, the former group, which has clearly been spooked by the remarkably successful public relations offensive conducted by Rouhani and his less-than-two-month-old government, is more vocal, particularly in the Congress where the Israel lobby enjoys its greatest influence.

But among the traditional foreign policy elite and Iran specialists, the optimists appear dominant, encouraged and very pleasantly surprised by developments on the Iranian side of the past few weeks.

Not only did Khamenei call for “heroic flexibility” in negotiating a resolution to the long-running stand-off with the U.S.-led West over Tehran’s nuclear programme in a joint appearance with Rouhani. He also backed up the new president in reminding the IRGC, long regarded as a potential spoiler in any détente strategy, that the Islamic Republic’s founder, the revered Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had warned against its involvement in politics.

“To the best of my knowledge, the Supreme Leader has never made a statement like that; nor has anybody at a senior level made a public reference to Khomeini’s injunction. I don’t think you’ll ever get a clearer statement,” according to Gary Sick, an Iran expert at Columbia University who served on the National Security Council during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations.

“To me, that sounded like an endorsement of what Rouhani was doing and warning …that, ‘if you’re thinking about a spoiling operation, think again’,” he told IPS.

The current speculation goes beyond a possible resolution of Iran’s nuclear programme to include possible cooperation on regional security issues, including Syria and Afghanistan.

It comes as both Obama and Rouhani prepare to address the U.N. General Assembly Tuesday, a coincidence that has already sparked debate over the pros and cons of the two men “accidentally” meeting and exchanging greetings or more as they pass through the building’s hallways.

Republican leaders generally opposed the idea, while Democrats offered wary support Monday. At the same time, half a dozen activist groups, including MoveOn.org and Win Without War, submitted on-line petitions with nearly 111,000 signatures calling on Obama to meet with Rouhani, while the neo-conservative Wall Street Journal warned that such a move would confer on Iran’s “dictatorship new international prestige at zero cost”.

While such a rendezvous would undoubtedly carry considerable symbolic importance, of more practical significance may have been the announcement after a bilateral meeting Monday between Rouhani’s foreign minister, Javad Mohammad Zarif, and his European Union counterpart, Catherine Ashton, that Zarif, a U.S.-educated former U.N. ambassador, will take part in a meeting of the so-called P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Russia, and China plus Germany) on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly this week.

Secretary of State John Kerry is also expected to attend the meeting, a prelude to a long-awaited negotiating session to take place in Geneva next month and the highest-level meeting of the two countries since the 1979 U.N. General Assembly when then Secretary Cyrus Vance met with Provisional Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi seven months after the Islamic Revolution, according to Sick.

Meanwhile, however, speculation about the possibility of détente continues apace. Of central importance, according to experts here, will be whether the two sides can agree relatively quickly on interim confidence-building measures (CBMs) surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, at the very least – something that is likely to be touched on in the P5+1 meeting later this week and explored more fully next month.

At issue here is whether and to what extent the U.S. and its partners should offer sanctions relief – or pile on more pressure – in exchange for Iran’s implementation of CBMs. Most Iran experts here believe that there should be a reciprocal process and that Washington should be prepared to offer more relief than it has tabled in the past.

But Netanyahu, who will address the General Assembly later this week and meet with Obama next week, argues that the West should actually tighten existing sanctions and add new ones until Iran effectively abandons its nuclear programme altogether. In the meantime, he is demanding that Obama take steps to make more credible his pledge to take military action, if necessary, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Lawmakers close to the Israel lobby from both parties are urging much the same line. One letter to Obama from Republican Sen. John McCain and Democratic Sen. Charles Schumer released Monday said there should be “absolutely no relaxing of pressure on the Iranians until the entirety of their nuclear situation has been addressed” and warned that “(r)emoval of any existing sanctions must depend on Iran’s halting of its nuclear program.”

Apart from the nuclear front, speculation about U.S.-Iranian cooperation on regional issues has grown quickly in the wake of the U.S.-Russian accord on placing Syria’s chemical weapons under international control, particularly since Rouhani and Zarif have endorsed it.

Obama himself has hinted that he is prepared to lift U.S. opposition to Iran’s participation in a Geneva II conference to end the civil war in Syria, while Washington’s chief envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Amb. James Dobbins, suggested to IPS last week that Iran could play a useful role in the transition in Afghanistan as U.S. and NATO troops withdraw their combat forces next year as it did at the Bonn Conference 10 years ago.

Both moves, but particularly its involvement in Syria peace talks, would offer Iran something it has long sought: de facto recognition of its importance in a revised regional security structure – a move to which U.S. allies Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel have long been opposed.

“Obama will face potent opposition from Israel, its supporters in the United States, and countries like Saudi Arabia,” wrote Harvard international relations professor Stephen Walt on his foreignpolicy.com blog Friday. “These actors would rather keep Washington and Tehran at odds forever, and it’s a safe bet that they will do everything they can to run out the clock and thwart this latest attempt to turn a corner in the troubled U.S. relationship with Iran.”

Nonetheless, “(t)he opportunity for a breakthrough with Iran after 34 years of isolation is tantalizing for Obama and his foreign-policy team,” wrote David Ignatius, a columnist with excellent access to senior administration officials and whose views often represent those of the senior foreign-policy elite, in Sunday’s Washington Post.

by Rod Mamudi

In its nuclear program, [Iran's] government enters with full power and has complete authority. I have given the nuclear negotiations portfolio to foreign ministry. The problem won’t be from our side. We have sufficient political latitude to solve this problem.

Such were the words of Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani, [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Rod Mamudi

In its nuclear program, [Iran's] government enters with full power and has complete authority. I have given the nuclear negotiations portfolio to foreign ministry. The problem won’t be from our side. We have sufficient political latitude to solve this problem.

Such were the words of Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani, last Wednesday, speaking to both domestic and foreign audiences by way of NBC News. They came one day after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei spoke of the virtues of “heroic flexibility” in negotiations. Since then speculation that Presidents Obama and Rouhani could meet at this week’s UN General Assembly (UNGA) — and in doing so, transform relations between the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran — has been flourishing.

Unsurprisingly, Israeli concerns over this possibility are dovetailing with their reported dissatisfaction over the Syrian chemical weapons-transfer. Their key complaint was alluded to by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu last weekend when he repeated his call for a “credible military threat” in the US’s dealings with Iran. Tehran insists that its nuclear program remains geared towards peaceful purposes, but Netanyahu argues that the perceived military climb-down over Syria will embolden Iran in its alleged nuclear-weapons pursuit while it stalls for more time.

But Israel stands to gain the most from a peaceful resolution to this issue.

A non-nuclear Iran is a clear security imperative for the Israel. But this is just one component in the Israeli calculus. More broadly, Israel has a serious interest in maintaining the current Middle Eastern nuclear status quo, in which Israel is tacitly acknowledged as the sole regional state with a nuclear arsenal.

A negotiated resolution to Iran’s nuclear dossier can preserve this overall objective. A military strike on the other hand, while the most direct short-term route to a non-nuclear Iran, could endanger Israel’s nuclear monopoly.

Meeting with US Chief of Staff General Martin Dempsey last month, Netanyahu stated that Iran “dwarfs” all other security challenges. In July, Netanyahu said on US television that Iran was now pursuing both uranium and plutonium routes to weaponization, and working on inter-continental ballistic missiles. A credible threat of force against Iran is therefore necessary, according to Netanyahu, because it is “the only thing that will get their attention”.

But Netanyahu has described the threat of force as necessary, not force itself. The Israeli position, vividly illustrated at last year’s UNGA, could be the “bad cop” to the US’ “good cop”; a method to harness both stick and carrot.

At some point, however, not delivering on a threat starts to become dangerous. Some speak confidently of Israel’s ability to conduct a surgical strike and eliminate an immediate threat of nuclear weaponization. But Iran is not Iraq or Syria. Either way, few argue this would keep Iran from a bomb indefinitely. In fact, striking Iran could speed up Israel’s worst nightmare as a cornered Iran rushes to defend itself.

There are, however, three possible alternatives to war: a continuation of the regional nuclear status quo; a proliferation of weapons in response to escalation; or a renewed drive to establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, which I will focus on.

Normally a NWFZ treaty will seek to prohibit the acquisition, testing, and use of nuclear weapons in the region. It will involve some kind of framework for the treaty’s monitoring and implementation, and, importantly, positive and negative guarantees from the five nuclear-weapons states (NWS) including security assurances in the event of an attack from outside the Treaty-area and on the non-use of nuclear weapons against the treaty’s signatories. There have been various reservations to these norms, but this is the pattern.

Currently there are five NWFZ Treaties across the world. A treaty was applied in the Caribbean and Latin America in 1969. Costa Rica had made a proposal as early as 1958, but the reaction was cool. But by 1963, a few months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico joined Costa Rica’s call. By February 1967, despite outright hostility from some quarters, a Treaty was prepared for signature. Cuba was the last to ratify in 2002.

The geostrategic situation post-Missile Crisis was ostensibly the same as that of the pre-Missile Crisis. The warheads had been removed, but the nearest countries had received a rude awakening; the crisis had thus served as a catalyst.

Prospects for a NWFZ in the Middle East are slim now for a number of reasons. But the idea is there. Iran and Egypt called for one in 1974. In 1990, Hosni Mubarak called for a weapons-of-mass-destruction free zone. UNSC Resolution 687, which terminated the 1991 Gulf War, described Iraqi disarmament as one of “steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction”. The UN’s 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference called for a meeting on this subject by 2012 (yet to occur).

Political flux further complicates the issue. Outside powers may yet decide such changes require a stronger commitment framework.

A crisis, coupled with the many complications arising from an arms race, may begin to drive momentum on a NWFZ in the Middle East. None of this means Israel would disarm, but it could make its position extremely politically complicated. And however remote this prospect may seem today, the tides of change hardly look like they’ve receded in the Middle East. Indeed, how many could have guessed six months ago that much of the buzz ahead of the 68^th annual UNGA would be around a potential US/Iran meeting?

Using the “military option” on Iran could see off an immediate threat to Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly, but it could also trigger a crisis that compromises Israel’s currently favored status quo. But a negotiated settlement — the seeds of which could be planted at this week’s UNGA — bypasses this dilemma altogether, not to mention the many pitfalls of using force against Iran.

– Rod Mamudi is a recent graduate of the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po Paris, where his research focused on Iranian foreign policy.

- Photo Credit: United Nations

Foreign Affairs