The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) ended on January 2 a fire that raged for days among tanks in Libya’s largest oil export terminal of Es-Sider, but the militia violence fed by the implosion of governance that caused it continues. Indeed, the levels of suffering, civilian casualties, refugees, and those internally displaced have increased steadily. The talks between Libya’s rival warring governments slated for today have been postponed. Meanwhile, extremist elements are taking greater advantage of the ongoing maelstrom.
The NOC managed to put the fire out, but three days of normal Libyan oil exports were destroyed. Of course, with Libyan crude exports already down to less than 400,000 barrels per day (only 1/3 of normal output), the fire’s impact on global markets was minimal.
Libya’s low exports since mid-2013 pose serious fiscal challenges for the country. The internationally recognized, relatively moderate House of Representatives (HOR), elected in June 2014, headed by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, and driven to take refuge in the small eastern city of Tobruk, is in fiscal crisis. The Libyan Central Bank, so far neutral between rival governments, has drawn down Libya’s currency reserves to cover spending. With two hostile governments, there is also no budget for the allotment of funds in 2015.
One might think government spending and a budget would be the least of Libya’s concerns. But beneath the government standoff and rule of local or extremist armed elements around the country, much of the Qadhafi-era’s largely socialist economy remains. If the Central Bank fails to pay government employees, those of the National Oil Corporation, personnel keeping most ports functioning, workers struggling to maintain the electric grid, civil police, and others life would grind to a halt. Goods would stop flowing, businesses would lose customers, and people would not be able to obtain goods and services at the most basic level. Fraud-ridden and often dysfunctional, presently there is an economy just the same.
Tripoli’s Power
Credit: NASA image by Jeff Schmaltz
The Es-Sider inferno was triggered by a rocket fired by Islamic Dawn (LD), the robust Islamist militia comprised of fighters from Libya’s third largest city of Misrata, near Tripoli. LD is the muscle behind the rival Tripoli government.
Since last August when it propped up the Islamist portion of the former parliament, the General National Council (GNC) as a “government,” LD has been gaining ground. Its ability to push nearly 400 miles eastward, to menace Libya’s twin oil ports of Es-Sider and Ras Lanuf plus their supporting oil fields to the south illustrates LD’s rising power at the expense of the HOR and its loyalist allies.
Likewise, 500 miles to the west, LD has been driving toward Libya’s other major oil and gas terminal of Mellitah, near the Tunisian border. Thinni has been struggling to halt this other LD drive using local tribal militias and air strikes. A NOC statement from late December, fearing the loss of Mellitah, said Libyan hydrocarbon production would fall below the levels needed to even meet Libyan domestic demand.
Bloody Benghazi
A severe impediment for the HOR and its loyalist allies is the more extremist militia grouping continuing to dominate much of Libya’s eastern second largest city of Benghazi. Led by the formidable al-Qaeda associated Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), a militant alliance— despite see-saw fighting—has managed to hold various Libyan military units and former General Khalifa Haftar’s polyglot secular forces allied with the HOR in check.
The commitment of so many HOR military assets to the military meat-grinder in Benghazi to prevent ASL from moving eastward toward Tobruk has weakened its efforts elsewhere. Eleven more died and 63 were wounded in Benghazi on Dec. 22. In fact, most killed in clashes across Libya die in Benghazi. Eastern Libyan jihadists car bombed the HOR’s Tobruk hotel on Dec. 30 wounding 3 deputies.
Human Toll
The UN Support Mission in Libya and the UN’s High Commission for Human Rights announced on Dec. 23 that nearly 700 hundred Libyan civilians have died as collateral casualties of Libyan violence since August; many times that have been wounded. Combatant casualties would likely push fatalities over 1,000. This death toll is lower than those emerging from Syria and Iraq from the regime-rebel civil war in the former and Islamic State-related violence in both. Still, the UN warned commanders of Libyan armed groups they could be charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) with criminal atrocities.
The refugee situation is far worse. By September, 1.8 million Libyan refugees had sought shelter in Tunisia. Added to those elsewhere, as in Egypt, refugees comprise approximately 1/3 of Libya’s entire population. Those in Tunisia have overwhelmed available humanitarian assistance, particularly now during the cold, rainy Mediterranean winter. Almost 400,000 Libyans are reportedly internally displaced.
No End in Sight
So far, diplomatic efforts seeking some sort of accommodation between Tripoli and Tobruk have been futile. Talks led by UN Envoy for Libya Bernadino Leon came to naught back in September. Leon tried to organize another round for Dec. 9, but this foundered due to more fighting triggered by a failed HOR effort to retake Tripoli. Leon reported to the UN Security Council on Dec. 23 that the two sides had agreed to meet today.
That initiative also collapsed. HOR airstrikes over the weekend against targets in Misrata (the home of the GNC’s “Libya Dawn” militia) came as a surprise. Two reportedly were wounded. An HOR military spokesman said the strikes were retaliation for renewed LD attacks against Es-Sider and Ras Lanuf where fighting has resumed. Yesterday a loyalist warplane struck a Greek tanker near the eastern port of Derna, killing two crewmen; a Libyan military spokesman claimed it was carrying militants.
Meanwhile, General David Rodriguez, head of US Africa Command, revealed on December 3 that “nascent” Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL or IS) training camps had been established in eastern Libya containing a “couple of hundred” militants. Fourteen Libyan soldiers were executed on Feb. 3 in southern Libya by a group calling itself the Islamic State of Libya. Even the more moderate Islamist GNC and LD, already hostile to ASL, condemned the killings. With Libya’s disarray and the grip of ASL and associated extremists over much of Benghazi plus areas nearby like militant-held portions of Derna, IS’s appearance at some point was inevitable.
Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Kharti in December chaired a meeting of his counterparts from Libya’s neighbors to express concern about the Libyan crisis’ regional impact. Weighing heavily on participants was the near conquest of Mali in 2013 by extremists, many staging out of and receiving munitions from Libya’s lawless southwest. There also has been arms smuggling from eastern Libyan militants to Egypt’s Sinai-based Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis jihadists, many of whom affiliated themselves with IS in Fall 2014.
Increasingly concerned about Libyan jihadist spillover, French President François Hollande urged the international community today to address Libya’s crisis. In a two-hour interview with France Inter radio, Hollande ruled out unilateral French intervention in Libya itself, but is establishing a base in northern Niger 60 miles from the Libyan border to help contain the menace. Last year, another French base was set up near the Malian border with Libya.
The longer Libya’s chaos remains on the global back burner, the nastier its impact will be in Libya and beyond. Crises left to fester sometimes find their own way to the front burner.
]]>via Gary’s Choices
In the avalanche of reportage and commentary on the nuclear deal with Iran, here are a few tiny facts that may have escaped your notice:
1. France’s President François Hollande made his triumphal trip to Israel (a hero because he put a speed bump in the way of an [...]]]>
via Gary’s Choices
In the avalanche of reportage and commentary on the nuclear deal with Iran, here are a few tiny facts that may have escaped your notice:
1. France’s President François Hollande made his triumphal trip to Israel (a hero because he put a speed bump in the way of an agreement); a few days later, France returned to the negotiations and quietly signed the text. Can he still wear his hero medal?
2. Opponents of the deal denounce the “shredding” of the United Nations Security Council resolutions (which demanded that Iran stop all enrichment) but fail to notice that all five Permanent Members of the Security Council negotiated and signed off on the text. These are the same countries that passed those resolutions.
3. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu just a year ago used a cartoon drawing of a bomb to illustrate that Iran was getting perilously close to a nuclear weapon; the agreement moves Iran far away from his famous red line. Is that a “historic mistake?”
4. Netanyahu in 1992 said that if no one intervened Iran would have a bomb within five years — and he has been saying the same thing ever since. He has been consistently wrong for more than two decades.
5. If you look carefully at the words of the opposition, you’ll see that they base all their objections on the supposition that Iran will renege on its commitments and the US will acquiesce. Do they have an alternative? Whining is not a policy.
6. The dog that didn’t bark: since the last Iranian election there has not been one peep from our old friend Ahmadinejad. Several American politicians who relish conflict in the Middle East have said they miss him. I don’t.
7. The other dog: the strangely silent Revolutionary Guards. Ditto.
8. Have you noticed how many of the people opposing the nuclear agreement are the same ones who thought invading Iraq was a nifty idea? War good; talk bad.
9. Iran is so determined to build a nuclear weapon that it renounces them under any and all circumstances, reduces its production of enriched uranium, and invites the largest group of inspectors in history to monitor its activities. Hmmmm…
10. Iran has been able to build a nuclear device for at least seven years and has not done so. In the eyes of some that is absolute proof of their deviousness.
– Gary Sick is a former captain in the U.S. Navy, who served as an Iran specialist on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He currently teaches at Columbia University. He blogs at http://garysick.tumblr.com.
Photo Credit: ISNA/Mona Hoobehfekr
]]>by Jim Lobe
After listening to the various statements, press conferences, and background briefings by “senior administration officials,” and initial reactions that followed tonight’s announcement about the interim accord between the P5+1 and Iran, it occurred to me that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may alter his recent course of repeatedly [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
After listening to the various statements, press conferences, and background briefings by “senior administration officials,” and initial reactions that followed tonight’s announcement about the interim accord between the P5+1 and Iran, it occurred to me that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may alter his recent course of repeatedly and quite publicly denouncing the agreement as a “bad” or “very bad deal.” Bibi certainly has shown a pragmatic side in the past, and I suspect we may see it again, particularly because the deal appears to be somewhat tougher than had been expected.
After all, when Jeff Goldberg tweets that “The Israeli government position that any Iran agreement is a bad agreement simply isn’t credible,” even Bibi’s new, hard-line ambassador here, Ron Dermer, has to assess seriously the implications.
So it would not surprise me, at this point at least, if Bibi says that this is not as bad a deal as he had expected and then tries to take credit for the tougher-than-exected terms that it appears to include. That’s the only way he can hope to get a serious hearing at the White House at this point. Moreover, Hollande’s endorsement of the deal has really painted him into a very tight corner. After all, he can’t claim so soon after giving the French president a hero’s welcome in Tel Aviv for Paris’s rejection of the proposed agreement two weeks ago that his “sincere” friend has just signed on to a “sucker’s deal.” And, as has been shown in recent months regarding his fears about the hardening of European opposition to — and increasing exasperation at – Jewish settlements on the West Bank, he has to be careful about giving offense to the EU3, as well as to the White House, however politically weak he may perceive Obama to be at the moment. Indeed, I suspect he may come under pressure from the Euros, Israel’s most important trading partners by far, to keep his mouth shut. Finally, this deal was made, as Wolf Blitzer put it tonight, between Iran and the “international community” in whose name Bibi often purports to speak. To continue to vehemently denounce the deal is to put himself outside that “community,” thus further exposing Israel’s international isolation. With Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain as virtually his only “allies” on this question, his position is not an enviable one.
Of course, none of this means that he won’t try to derail the deal by working with the Israel lobby (which must be very concerned about its own vulnerabilities given both the degree of public support for an Iran deal that the recent Washington Post and CNN polls have shown and comments like Goldberg’s) to get new sanctions legislation through Congress or by resorting to some kind of provocation (short of attacking Iran as he and his ministers have so often threatened to do). But, assuming Iranian compliance with the deal, including the significantly enhanced inspections provisions, I think he’s going to have to be much more discreet than he has been, at least for the time being.
On the other hand, he’s never been a particularly subtle guy.
We’ll see soon enough.
]]>by Wayne White
The Bush administration’s deception and irresponsible military action involving Iraq had a wide-ranging adverse impact on populations in countries critical to the enforcement of international standards regarding war crimes. Yesterday’s vote by the British parliament to oppose UK participation in military action against Syria illustrates just how deep that [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The Bush administration’s deception and irresponsible military action involving Iraq had a wide-ranging adverse impact on populations in countries critical to the enforcement of international standards regarding war crimes. Yesterday’s vote by the British parliament to oppose UK participation in military action against Syria illustrates just how deep that mistrust and anxiety still runs today. Yet, as British Prime Minister David Cameron has said, failure to act could give the Syrian regime a virtual “green light” to take even more brutal measures against the opposition and Syrian civilians. Nonetheless, the vote should warn the Obama Administration to slow down (and perhaps scale back) its plans for punitive military action considerably in order to address the serious concerns that surround it.
Five days after the August 21 attack, we have just learned, a regime attack was launched against an urban area in the vicinity of Aleppo using incendiary munitions that terribly burned scores of schoolchildren. This additional outrage took place even before Bashar al-Asad and his unconditional allies in Moscow and Tehran were buoyed by the news from London. Though not banned, the use of horrific flammable munitions against an urban area could offer yet another a foretaste of what is to come in the absence of a firm international response.
Official and public disquiet over the planned strike emanating from the UK, Germany, global media, and the US typically features concerns associated with the distortions of intelligence and military overreach of the Bush Administration ten years ago. Although wariness toward potentially deceitful government behavior is a healthy counterbalance overall, such concerns can be taken to extremes.
In the wake of the Bush Administration’s appalling abuses and their weighty negative consequences, a global mindset has developed in which practically all pronouncements out of Washington are subject not only to great scrutiny, but almost knee-jerk skepticism — even when pitted against assertions on the part of notoriously abusive and deceitful authoritarian governments like Syria’s that face virtually no domestic accountability whatsoever.
Consequently, there have been wide-ranging demands for a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate despite its futility in the face of a certain Russian veto because Moscow fully supports the Syrian regime in its war of internal repression and is incapable of viewing the facts of this case impartially. Similar Russian tolerance of atrocious war crimes in Bosnia on the part of another of Moscow’s allies in the 1990’s compelled a NATO coalition to act in lieu of the UNSC. But that was prior to the 2002-2003 episode of US (and UK) intelligence deception in support of a vastly more extensive military intervention.
Still, the Obama Administration must deal with the situation as it is. Barreling ahead with a “compressed” timeline for punitive strikes despite extensive pushback resembles in the eyes of many just the sort of brash behavior exhibited by the Bush Administration. And this is precisely what President Obama (and French President Francois Hollande) should avoid under the circumstances.
Personally, I believe some observers are exaggerating the potential fallout from limited military action in this case. In fact, much of the bluster from Damascus and Tehran probably consists mainly of scare tactics meant to play to nervous Western constituencies. However, to head off any regrettable consequences, allied punitive action against Syria must narrowly focus on the issue at hand—and not be expanded to include strikes meant to weaken the regime and play out over two to three days.
Critical to salvaging the situation and calming many of those now hesitant, the White House must patiently await the results of the UN inspection team. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has said the findings should be made available to the UN Security Council on Sunday.
Sunday is only two days away. The Syrian military is tied down holding various vital positions lest the rebels move in and seize them, so it cannot simply go away and hide in preparation for punitive strikes strikes — even if proper consultations require another week. And if the UN inspection results confirm the use of nerve agent against the affected Damascus suburbs, that information could reinvigorate the Western allies to act more as Washington hopes (even if, as expected, the Russians once again block UNSC consensus to serve their own craven interests in Syria).
]]>by Wayne White
Continuing extremist attacks in northern Mali are a reminder that this vast Saharan region, given to raiding and smuggling for more than a millennium, could remain an attractive haven even for a much weakened al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). Now that sweeping French and allied African military [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Continuing extremist attacks in northern Mali are a reminder that this vast Saharan region, given to raiding and smuggling for more than a millennium, could remain an attractive haven even for a much weakened al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). Now that sweeping French and allied African military operations have decimated AQIM’s larger forces and driven surviving AQIM bands to switch to localized terrorist assaults, concerned parties have shifted their priorities toward more enduring counterinsurgency operations and peacekeeping. Yet, for those seeking to deal further, lasting blows to AQIM must remain mindful of the ethnic complexity of the Malian Sahara.
Demonstrating it is still a force to be reckoned with, AQIM claimed responsibility for another attack on the northern Malian city of Timbuktu over the weekend. A checkpoint outside the city was bombed as a diversion to enable more than 20 fighters to infiltrate the city while defenders rushed first to the site of the bombing. A few infiltrators managed to gain brief access to the grounds of the Hotel Colombe (frequented by journalists and aid workers), possibly a prime target. The local Malian governor and his staff at the hotel had to be evacuated hastily amidst efforts to hunt down the infiltrators. One Malian soldier was killed; several Malian troops and one French soldier were wounded. A probable AQIM land mine placed on a road also recently inflicted casualties on African forces participating in operations in support of the Malian government.
Given the sheer size of the largely ungoverned northern third of the country, plus some of its forbidding terrain, most likely it would be impossible to fully eradicate AQIM, especially since small groups could take refuge in similarly trackless areas of neighboring Niger, Mauritania or Algeria from which they could continue such attacks. Consequently, all parties involved in addressing the problem are wisely shifting to more drawn out strategies.
French President Francois Hollande said late last week that French troops (originally slated for withdrawal after a few months) will now stay through the end of the year in limited numbers, and has offered 1,000 troops to stay even longer as part of a hoped for UN peacekeeping operation. He reiterated the latter on April 4. Meanwhile, the European Union has begun the first phase of a 15-month training operation under the guidance of military personnel from 7 EU countries with an initial contingent of Malian army trainees. The EU training mission eventually is slated to field 500 such trainers. On a mission to the Malian capital of Bamako on April 2, Senator John McCain said the US also would explore ways of providing equipment and training to assist the EU mission and technology to support the French efforts to help run down AQIM elements still at large. Intelligence sharing among the US, the UK, France and key EU governments on AQIM-related developments undoubtedly will expand.
Last week UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called upon the Security Council to authorize the transformation of the various African forces in Mali along with additional police assets into a UN peacekeeping force of over 12,000 (that the French could then bolster with troops of their own). Ban cited the challenge posed by AQIM’s “residual threat” as justification for the deployment of such a force in being. Clearly, statements by Hollande, Ban and McCain illustrate the international community has become more resigned to a continued presence in Mali to provide the Malian government a reasonable chance to bounce back from the recent AQIM challenge.
To head off potential trouble on a closely related front, however, both Malian authorities and their foreign allies must tread carefully around longstanding tensions between the Tuareg Berber population of the Saharan north and Mali’s dominant, sub-Saharan African peoples of the south. The Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (NMLA), although wary — even hostile — toward AQIM, vainly attempted to coexist with AQIM as the latter embarked on its offensive against Malian government forces last year. With the AQIM routed by the French, the more secular NMLA last week named its own civil administrator for the key northern regional capital of Kidal; the NMLA and its core Tuareg constituency remain deeply suspicious — even hostile — toward Malian troops and central governance.
Those hoping to bring as much stability as possible to the situation in northern Mali must bear in mind that not only was there a protracted Tuareg rebellion in both Mali and Niger during 2007-2009, but what morphed into the AQIM power grab in Mali late last year started with an NMLA revolt in northern Mali in January 2012. At least some AQIM cadres probably are Tuareg; other Tuareg who are not, but participated in the Libyan civil war, likely remain especially restive. Yet, the Tuareg are far more knowledgeable than any others about the wild Saharan terrain in which many AQIM cadres have sought shelter, and could assist foreign — and perhaps even Malian — forces root out AQIM remnants. But that may well require serious concessions, perhaps toward a measure of self-governance, to address longstanding northern grievances.
]]>I don’t know the answer to the question I’ve posted above, but today’s news may offer an indication:
The EU imposes new sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and reaffirms its said commitment to reaching a peaceful, diplomatic solution:
…the objective of the EU remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement, [...]]]>
I don’t know the answer to the question I’ve posted above, but today’s news may offer an indication:
The EU imposes new sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and reaffirms its said commitment to reaching a peaceful, diplomatic solution:
…the objective of the EU remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement, which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT, and fully taking into account UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors’ Resolutions.
Israel nods approvingly but doesn’t rejoice:
[Benjamin] Netanyahu, speaking Tuesday at the start of a meeting in Jerusalem with European Union member state ambassadors, called the sanctions “tough” and said Iran was “the greatest threat to peace in our time.”
“These sanctions are hitting the Iranian economy hard, (but) they haven’t yet rolled back the Iranian program. We’ll know that they’re achieving their goal when the centrifuges stop spinning and when the Iranian nuclear program is rolled back,” he said.
As does the former EU and US terrorist-designated organization the Mujahadeen-e Khalq (aka MEK, NCRI, PMOI) while reaffirming its commitment to regime change in Iran:
Therefore, although comprehensive sanctions are an essential and indispensible element to stop the clerical regime’s nuclear weapons project, the ultimate and definitive solution for the world community to rid itself of the terrorist mullahs’ attempt to acquire nuclear weapons is a regime change by the Iranian people and Resistance. Thus, recognizing the Iranian people’s efforts to overthrow religious fascism and to establish democracy in Iran is more essential than ever.
Iran complains loudly while tooting its resistance regime horn and allegdly hitting back against cyber attacks waged against its nuclear program.
And all the while average Iranians (and terminally ill ones) continue to carry the brunt of the weight:
]]>The measures come as Iran’s economy continues to reel in the wake of previous Western sanctions targeting the country’s crucial oil exports and access to international banking networks. Iranians are suffering economically amid inflation and the sharp devaluation of the Iranian currency against the dollar.
Shop owners in downtown Tehran said that prices had risen 50% since last month and that they were expecting things to only get worse.
Amir Mosayan, who sells watch batteries wholesale, said that immediately following the sanctions the price of his goods went up 70%.