by Robert E. Hunter
Twenty-five years ago, on July 3, 1998, the USS Vincennes, operating in the Persian Gulf, shot down an Iranian commercial airliner, killing all 290 people on board. Debate continues about why this happened. Misidentification of the Iranian aircraft? A series of mistakes by senior officers on [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
Twenty-five years ago, on July 3, 1998, the USS Vincennes, operating in the Persian Gulf, shot down an Iranian commercial airliner, killing all 290 people on board. Debate continues about why this happened. Misidentification of the Iranian aircraft? A series of mistakes by senior officers on board the Vincennes? Iran Air Flight 655 being in the wrong place at the wrong time given that a (minor) skirmish was then taking place between some US and Iranian surface vessels?
One explanation, to which I personally subscribed at the time (having, of course, no direct information) was that the psychology of demonizing all things Iranian had taken hold of those responsible on the Vincennes for the decision to shoot. I reasoned that the drumbeat of anti-Iranian sentiment that was affecting the general American public had spilled over to the Vincennes, leading to the expectation that Iran’s forces would act in a hostile manner — thus, when its radars lit up, a threat was on the horizon.
This debate will no doubt carry on (for a detailed point-counterpoint, see here). But the same climate of demonizing all things Iranian continues to hold much of the US government in its grip, virtually to the very top, as well as a large fraction of the “commentariate” in Washington and elsewhere.
This assessment is certainly accurate regarding a large fraction of responses, from inside and outside the Obama administration, to the June 14 election of Hassan Rouhani as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A chorus of US skeptics have predictably dismissed even the slight possibility that Rouhani’s win might produce a shift in Iranian behavior or its nuclear negotiating stance. The initial White House response was at best lukewarm, if not downright back-handed, though three days later, President Obama did express “cautious optimism that with a new election there, we may be able to move forward on a dialogue that allows us to resolve the problems with Iran’s nuclear program.”
Striking, however, has been the heavy emphasis in US commentary on maintaining all the current sanctions imposed on Iran, if not making them stronger — with nary a nod to the potential of the new Iranian president, however problematic at this point, by marking his surprising election with even tiny sanctions relief. Dennis Ross, Middle East advisor to the last three presidents, counseled in the New York Times “…it would be foolish to think that lifting the pressure now would improve the chances that [Rouhani] would be allowed [by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei] to offer us what we need.”
Meanwhile, the House Foreign Affairs Committee called for even tougher sanctions, urging Obama “…to increase the pressure on Iran in the days ahead.”
So much for trying to test the new Iranian president or showing the Iranian people that the US understands the stress that US-led sanctions have put them under, along with any hope that the US will try something different to see if the long-running impasse with the Iranian government can be broken.
Policy thus confounds the White House spokesman’s “[congratulation of the Iranian people] for their participation in the political process, and their courage in making their voices heard.”
Of course, the negative — or at best indifferent — US government response to Rouhani’s election might just be tactics preceding any future negotiations as well part of the reality that the new Iranian president must respect the wishes (read: veto) of the Supreme Leader. But as a way of making successful talks with Iran more difficult, if not impossible, it’s hard to imagine a better deal-breaker than the cacophony of dismissals of Rouhani’s election and the calls for more sanctions.
Given what else is happening in the Middle East, it is also surprising that the Obama administration is not looking for at least some way to ease its regional problems.
Syria is in civil war, as part of a growing conflict across the region that is pitting Sunnis against Shias (politics and religion), with Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Israel in a many-cornered tug-of-war for regional predominance (geopolitics). The first stage of the post-Mubarak era in Egypt has collapsed in violence and, while its peace treaty with Israel has not yet been called into question, what is happening in Cairo is not confidence-inspiring in Jerusalem. The US Secretary of State doggedly pursues the faint hope of significant progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front instead of tending to the other, more insistent crises, while US standing in the region and its reputation for effective leadership has not taken such a blow since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
A major part of the problem is that the Obama administration, like its two predecessors, has not yet adjusted to the consequences of the Cold War’s end: the (relative) diminution of US power and influence, the rise of cultural, regional and religious factors that were largely suppressed during the US-Soviet confrontation, and the rising expectations of a new generation. It seems unable to consider all the elements of this complex region together and develop coherent policies that have a chance of succeeding.
For Washington and the US think-tank community, victory over the Soviet Union seemed to mean that there was less need to think strategically, when in fact, the opposite has proved to be true. A similar lesson has not yet been learned regarding the need for the US government, beginning in the White House, to recruit and employ a top-class team of experts, analysts, strategists and diplomats.
Until George W. Bush described Iran as part of an “axis of evil” in January 2002, the US and Iran had a common interest in trammeling the Taliban in Afghanistan. They could again, as the US and its allies now head towards an exit. Both countries have an interest in protecting the flow of oil in and from the Persian Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz, as well as in stopping piracy in the Arabian Sea. No one can benefit from a war involving Iran over its nuclear program or for any other reason. And, whether we are prepared to realize it or not, a large majority of Iranians, all of whom are literate and a large fraction of whom are middle class and well-educated, are sick of the Islamic Revolution and would like to find an alternative so they can get on with their lives and be part of the outside world, including the Western world, with all its attractions.
The “first law of holes,” the old political saying goes, is that “when you are in a hole, stop digging.” The US is in a hole in the Middle East that is getting deeper by the day. While the Iranian election may not usher in — yet — an era when that corner of the region can be less of a headache for Washington, the US must “stop digging”. It’s time to explore what can happen with Iran’s next president instead of simply working to make matters worse with more of the same sanctions, isolation, opprobrium and once again reflexive demonizing of all things Iranian.
]]>by Jim Lobe
I guess that’s one of the things that occurred to me when I received this Press Release and the letter to the president (reproduced below my post) from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) yesterday. All but one of the 47 members of the Committee signed on.
The [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
I guess that’s one of the things that occurred to me when I received this Press Release and the letter to the president (reproduced below my post) from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) yesterday. All but one of the 47 members of the Committee signed on.
The letter, which, normally reliable sources tell me, was initially drafted in the offices of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) calls for a whole new round of sanctions to be imposed against companies and countries doing business with Iran, notably in its mining, engineering and construction-based sectors, as well as other measures that will “increase the pressure on Iran in the days ahead.” While noting that president-elect Hassan Rouhani was “widely perceived as the most moderate of the candidates” running in last month’s election and that its outcome “reflected considerable dissatisfaction by the Iranian people with an autocratic and repressive government that has internationally isolated Iran,” it stressed that the election “unfortunately has done nothing to suggest a reversal of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capacity.” “[T]here appears nothing ‘moderate’ about [Rouhani's] nuclear policies…”
“Our diplomatic goal,” it continues, “must be to reach a negotiated settlement in which Iran agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program.”
Now that last phrase is particularly provocative because, as everyone who has paid the slightest attention to intelligence community (IC) estimates and statements over the last five-and-a-half years knows, Iran suspended what the IC had previously believed was a nuclear-weapons program in 2003 and the country’s leadership, including Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has not made a decision to produce a weapon. So what we see in this letter is deliberate disregard by 46 of the 47 HFAC members — both Democrats and Republicans — of the conclusions of the 17 agencies that make up Washington’s Intelligence Community. This is the same IC for which Congress last year approved nearly 54 billion dollars (not counting some $18 billion dollars more for military intelligence). Do you hear any echoes from Iraq here?
I’m prepared to believe that Iran is seeking a capability to build and deploy weapons relatively quickly; that is the same kind of capability as, say, Japan or Brazil has. Indeed, given the threats (and the pressure) to which it has been subject, seeking such a capability is hardly an unreasonable thing to do. In fact, it may even be possible that the expansion of its nuclear infrastructure, as cited by the letter, is a direct response to that pressure. If so, it would follow rather logically that reducing the pressure just might induce a reciprocal gesture on the part of Tehran. Conversely, ratcheting up pressure, as AIPAC and the HFAC members appear determined to achieve, may result in a further expansion and acceleration of the nuclear program, a result that would obviously be counter-productive to their professed goal of reaching a “negotiated settlement in which Iran agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program [which the $54-billion-a-year IC says does not exist].”
But let’s return for a moment to AIPAC’s and HFAC’s analysis of the meaning — or lack thereof — of Rouhani’s election last month. The letter points out that Rouhani “indicated his support for Iran’s nuclear ambitions [implying he wants nuclear weapons although he has explicitly disclaimed that goal -- please note the vagueness of "ambitions"] in his first post-election press conference” and contends that there “appears nothing ‘moderate’ about his nuclear policies…” But that’s a rather tendentious interpretation of what Rouhani said at that press conference. Here’s what he said when asked about the nuclear program:
By God’s grace, we will have more active negotiations with the P5+1. This is the main point. And we are of the opinion that the nuclear issue can only and only be resolved through negotiations. Neither threats, nor sanctions are effective. The solution lies in holding negotiations and reaching a mutual trust. The solution of reaching a mutual trust is possible. This was done before. We will benefit from previous experiences. The fact is that the Iranian nation’s undeniable rights will always be considered by the future government. And it [future government] will constantly make efforts to save the people from the cruel sanctions step by step, and to be able to build better relations with the countries of the world, particularly the neighboring states, as I emphasized before.
And this is a quote about the nuclear program from his last televised debate with the other presidential candidates — the same debate in which Ali Akbar Velayati quite publicly ripped hard-line nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili for the latter’s inflexibility in negotiations with the P5+1 over Iran’s nuclear program:
It’s nice for the centrifuges to run, but people’s livelihoods have to also run, our factories have to also run.
And here’s what he said about relations with the U.S. in his post-election press conference:
The issue of relations between Iran and the United States is a complicated and difficult issue. It’s not a simple issue. After all, there is an old scar. Prudence has to be adopted to cure this scar. Of course, we will not pursue continuing or expanding tensions. We will not pursue adding to tensions. It would be wise for the two nations and countries to think more of the future. They should find a solution to the past issues and resolve them. They should think of the future. But any talks with the United States have to take place based on mutual respect, mutual interests, and mutual stances. It definitely depends on certain conditions. And those conditions have to be fulfilled. First, as stated in the Algiers Accord [brokered by the Algerian government between the United States and Iran to resolve the Iran hostage crisis in 1981], the Americans have to confirm that they will not interfere in Iran’s internal issues ever. Second, they have to officially recognize the Iranian nation’s rights, including the nuclear right. Third, they should avoid unilateral or bullying policies against Iran. And of course, under such circumstances, the grounds [for holding talks] would be ready. If we feel there is goodwill involved, then the grounds [for talks] would be different. But everyone should know that the future government will not ignore the rightful rights of the Iranian nation under any circumstances. And on this basis, we would be ready for the tension to become less, and even if we see goodwill, it would be possible to take steps toward building trust within a framework that the Islamic Republic of Iran has. And I have pointed out the framework.
Rouhani also actually referred to “Israel” by its chosen name, forgoing the traditional aversion to pronouncing the name of the “Little Satan.”
These statements may, of course, disguise much more sinister and radical designs, but they sound pretty “moderate”, at least by Iran’s standards of the last eight years or so. And it’s worth remembering that they were made publicly in front of a large domestic audience whose votes appear to have actually been counted and who probably formed certain expectations that his words could translate into policy. That the AIPAC/Royce/Engel letter takes absolutely no account of any of this demonstrates the extent to which the 46 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee are actually paying the slightest attention.
Of course, in the event that any attention was paid to Rouhani’s words and the circumstances in which he offered them, the letter falls back on the familiar old chestnut that, of course, it is Khamenei, not Rouhani, who will decide the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, so the president-elect doesn’t really count (despite the fact that (a) Khamenei supposedly “allowed” Rouhani to win, and (b) he’s served on the Supreme National Security Council for some 15 years, many of them as Khamenei’s representative). And here we are reminded that Khamenei “has recently reiterated his view that Iran has no reason to normalize relations with the United States.” Well, he may indeed have said that recently (although I can’t find a recent quote to that effect, but it should be pointed out that Iran doesn’t have to normalize relations with the U.S. in order to reach an agreement over its nuclear program with the P5+1. Indeed, the whole issue of normalization in the context of the nuclear program is pretty much a non sequitur.
But let’s look more closely at what Khamenei has been saying. Here’s what he said on June 26, according to a Reuters dispatch:
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday the dispute over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme could easily be resolved if the West were to stop being so stubborn.
While accusing the West of being more interested in regime change than ending the dispute, Khamenei did express a desire to resolve an issue which has led to ever tighter sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and the wider economy.
“Some countries have organised a united front against Iran and are misguiding the international community and with stubbornness do not want to see the nuclear issue resolved,” Khamenei’s official web site quoted him as saying.
“But if they put aside their stubbornness, resolving the nuclear issue would be simple,” he said, without setting out what specific concessions he wanted Western nations to make.
…”The Islamic Republic has acted legally and transparently in the nuclear debate and offers logic in its arguments, but the aim of the enemies is through constant pressure, to tire Iran and change the regime and they will not allow the issue to be resolved,” Khamenei said.
…”Of course the enemies say in their words and letters than they do not want to change the regime, but their approaches are contrary to these words,” he said.
Again, this may all be deception, or “taqiyya”, as neo-cons who fancy themselves expert in matters Shi’a love to invoke when insisting that you can’t trust anything a Shiite tells you. But it certainly doesn’t preclude the possibility of reaching a deal based on such unimperial concepts like “mutual respect,” reciprocity, and international law.
As to relations with the U.S., there’s this other Reuters report that may be of interest to the 45 congressmen and women from June 12:
NEW YORK/ANKARA (Reuters) – Five months ago Iran’s foreign minister sent an unusual letter to the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It was time, Ali Akbar Salehi wrote according to two sources who read the letter, to reach out to Tehran’s arch foe by entering into “broad discussions with the United States.”
The supreme leader, though cautious about the prospect, sent a reply to Salehi and the rest of the Cabinet: he was not optimistic but would not oppose them if they pursued the initiative.
The fact is, public debate about direct negotiations with the U.S. was more or less a taboo in Iran as recently as 18 months ago. But it is now openly talked about, even in public debates by candidates close to Khamenei, and it appears that the Supreme Leader himself is not necessarily averse. In light of the results of last month’s elections and Rouhani’s own words on this question, why are those 46 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee so certain that nothing has changed in Iran and that more pressure is the only solution, particularly when so many actual Iran experts agree that the election has created a major opportunity that Washington would be foolish to squander. Maybe it’s time for the Committee to consult with the IC’s analysts to see what they think. And maybe it’s time for members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to stop reflexively signing onto letters because they’re told AIPAC drafted them. It’s almost as embarrassing as giving Bibi Netanyahu 29 standing ovations.
Meanwhile, here’s a letter that has begun circulating in the House that offers a different approach (compare it to the one that follows):
Dear Colleague:
On June 14, the Iranian people elected Hassan Rouhani president, overcoming repression and intimidation by the Iranian government to cast their ballots in favor of reform.
This is not the first time that Iran has elected a president on a platform of moderation and reform, and history advises us to be cautious about the prospects for meaningful change. The Iranian government’s actions in the months ahead will certainly speak louder than Dr. Rouhani’s words.
Even so, given the stakes involved for the United States, Israel, and the international community, it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani’s election represents a genuine opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We must also be careful not to foreclose the possibility of such progress by taking provocative actions that could weaken the newly elected president’s standing relative to Iran’s hardliners, who oppose his professed “policy of reconciliation and peace.”
We invite you to join us in sending the attached letter to President Obama urging him to reinvigorate U.S. diplomatic efforts to ensure Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The letter does not take a position on whether current sanctions should be strengthened or relaxed, nor does it take a position on the potential use of military force by the United States or its allies. We know our colleagues hold different views on these sensitive issues, but we should all be able to agree on the need for a renewed diplomatic push as part of our broader strategy toward Iran.
If you would like to sign or have questions about this letter, do not hesitate to contact George McElwee with Rep. Dent (5-6411) or Asher Hildebrand with Rep. Price (5-1784).
Sincerely,
CHARLES DENT
Member of CongressDAVID PRICE
Member of Congress
[gview file="http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf"]
]]>IPS News: Further to Jim’s post yesterday is his article about the approval of two bills calling for “sweeping sanctions” against Iran by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. Lobe quotes the two bills’ leading [...]]]>
IPS News: Further to Jim’s post yesterday is his article about the approval of two bills calling for “sweeping sanctions” against Iran by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. Lobe quotes the two bills’ leading sponsor and committee chairperson Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen saying that she hopes the House and the Senate enact them quickly to “hand the Iranian regime a nice holiday present”. Lobe notes that regardless of if or when the bills are passed, the “draconian legislation” will further stoke tension in the region while giving leverage to Israel lobbyists who are pushing for more militant sanctions against Iran by the U.S.
According to some observers here, the war talk in Jerusalem may be intended primarily to encourage lawmakers here to support the strongest possible sanctions legislation, which Netanyahu has repeatedly called for over the last several years.
Haaretz: Lending support to the idea that Israel’s recent military chest-banging is actually posturing intended to pressure the U.S. to pass more militant sanctions against Iran are comments by Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff in an Israeli daily. The authors argue that Israel stands to benefit from the recent increase in war talk about Iran as long as the plan doesn’t backfire:
But this is a dangerous game. A few more weeks of tension and one party or another might make a fatal mistake that will drag the region into war. Barak, the brilliant planner, should know this. More than once in the past his complex plans have gone seriously awry.
Jerusalem Post: Despite considerable doubts raised about the U.S.’s controversial allegations about an “Iranian plot” to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, Benjamin Weinthal of the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies (also a Jerusalem Post correspondent) urges for “crippling” sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) in response. Weinthal cites a 2007 New York Times article quoting an Iranian-German exile to support his linking of the CBI to Iran’s revolutionary guards. He adds that the U.S. will need to ”strongly twist Europe’s economic arm” to get the EU to support the U.S.-led initiative against Iran. Weinthal’s odd focus on Germany in the article was likely inspired by his recent attendance at an Israel lobby conference in Frankfurt which he wrote about here. His other quote about why the CBI needs to be sanctioned comes from an “expert” at the FDD’s Brussels’s branch.
Huffington Post: Former George W. Bush advisor Frances Townsend writes an article with the president of United Against Nuclear Iran (where she serves on the advisory board), Mark D. Wallace, urging the U.S. to “isolate Iran further” through its financial sector and support anti-regime forces inside the country. They end by arguing that Iran refused the “olive branch” that the Obama administration apparently offered it and that the U.S. should respond to alleged Iranian aggressions with “swift and effective financial and military action.”
]]>Among the new provisions that appear intended to ensure that the Iranian public, including the Green Movement, will rally behind the regime and perceive the United States as an existential enemy, if not the “Great Satan,” is one that would make it illegal for
any U.S. person employed with the United States Government [to] contact in an official or unofficial capacity any person that—
(1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the Government of Iran; and
(2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated with terrorist organizations…
Lest you think this too draconian, Ros-Lehtinen and her allies have added a presidential waiver provision whereby the president can waive the ban on contact if he
“determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees 15 days prior to the exercise of waiver authority that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national security interests of the United States.
As Paul Pillar comments on his blog:
If enacted, this legislation certainly would have practical effects. It would prevent any exploration of ways to resolve disagreement over that Iranian nuclear program that we are supposedly so intensely concerned about. It would prevent soliciting Iranian cooperation in areas, such as Afghanistan, where some Iranian and U.S. interests run parallel, and the Iranians could be helpful rather than causing trouble. It would preclude discussion of miscellaneous matters of interest to Americans such as the recent return of those captured hikers. And it would prevent any diplomacy to keep U.S.-Iranian incidents or crises—the kind that retired joint chiefs chairman Admiral Mullen expressed concern about—from spinning out of control, unless the crisis conveniently stretched out beyond the fifteen-day notification period. (By way of comparison, the entire Cuban missile crisis lasted thirteen days.)
A second provision included in the proposed bill really got to me, if only because it’s hard to imagine anything that would alienate Iranians more easily given the infamous USS Vincennes shootdown over the Strait of Hormuz of Iran Air Flight 655 on July 3, 1988, in which 290 people, including 66 children, were killed. This provision would revoke the president’s authority to permit the export of civilian aircraft parts and repairs for Iranian civilian aircraft to ensure flight safety for humanitarian reasons.
In contemplating the wisdom of this provision, consider that, over the past decade, more than 1,000 Iranian and foreign travelers have died in civilian airplane crashes in Iran believed to have been caused by worn-out equipment that would have been replaced but for U.S. sanctions against Iran’s civilian aviation industry. As noted by the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), the regime has cited these crashes as evidence that the U.S. is the enemy of the Iranian people. “[E]liminating the humanitarian waiver authority for civilian aircraft parts and repairs only plays into this propaganda,” according to NIAC. That’s an understatement.
Now consider a not-altogether-inconceivable scenario as the Obama administration yields to pressure to build up its naval assets in the Strait of Hormuz to make the threat of military action “more credible.”
A civilian airliner — remember: both Iran Air and Mahan Air, the country’s two biggest commercial airlines have already been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for their alleged ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force — takes off from an Iranian airport headed for Dubai (as Iran Air Flight 655 still does) or some other destination that takes it over the Strait. Due to the lack of a spare part, that could have been sold to the airline had the proposed sanction not taken effect, or some other problem (like a simple delay), the plane strays from its regular course and approaches a U.S. warship that perceives or misidentifies it as a possible and imminent threat.
If Ros-Lehtinen’s version becomes law, the ship’s captain couldn’t even radio Iranian naval vessels, or air traffic controllers, or airline officials (including the pilot) to identify the plane without 15 days’ notice by the president. And if that captain, not willing to take chances with the lives of his crew then orders the aircraft shot down…. What then?
]]>For a glimpse into this view, particularly in terms of staunch pro-Israel Democrats, read what the archetype of this group, outgoing chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee California Rep. Howard Berman, has to say. Berman gave an interesting interview to the Israeli daily Haaretz where, at times getting combative (literally), he reveals some of the thinking behind the even timid support of U.S. President Barack Obama’s Iran policy.
Let’s start with a minor quibble, but a big picture one. Seeking something to praise in U.S. foreign policy, Berman cites engagement with the Muslim world:
By and large, I think that to have a war with a billion Muslims is not a viable policy. We have to engage with the forces of modernity in the Muslim world. We have to separate moderates from extremists, and engagement that is designed to achieve that makes compelling sense to me.
The “separate” stuff is pure imperial divide-and-conquer strategy. For many of the hardline pro-Israel types, the idea that U.S. policy plays any role in creating enmity toward the U.S. is sacrilegious. In their view the U.S. must, therefore, consolidate its supporters, rather than alleviate legitimate grievances among those who don’t. And the qualifier “by and large,” which means “generally,” is troubling: it implies there could be specific situations where going to “war with a billion Muslims” would conceivably be sound policy.
But never mind my harping on tragically misplaced turns of phrase, let’s look at what Berman had to say about Iran policy. First and foremost, of course, is that the “military option” — let’s call it ‘attacking Iran’ — is “on the table” (interviewer Natasha Mozgovaya’s questions are bolded by me):
Israeli politicians are wondering why the U.S. administration took the military option off the table, even if they didn’t say so explicitly.
The military option is not off the table. It’s on the table.
The Iranians apparently don’t think so.
Who knows what they really think?
Berman goes on to discuss why he thinks that the international diplomacy and the posture of engaging Iran is useful: because it builds “international support”:
We don’t know if the current strategy is going to work. We do know that two years ago we had the most limited, worthless set of multilateral sanctions on Iran that were not enforced, and all the U.S. efforts to make them stronger were to no avail. And the U.S. position on Iran was not the international position, the U.S. was isolated and everyone wrote that Iran is rising in influence.
Two years later we have tough sanctions at the Security Council, and the U.S. and Europeans imposed more far-reaching sanctions. We have evidence it’s causing pain in Tehran inside the regime, Iran feels the pressure and is isolated, and the U.S. position as a result of this administration’s policies has developed international support.
What we don’t know yet is if it will change the regime’s behavior on the nuclear issue. But we are in a much better position to create that change than we were two years ago. And we need to stay very resolved on this, we need to impose sanctions on companies that are undermining our efforts, and we need to build even more international support. This is an example of this administration’s effective use of diplomacy.
One might be forgiven for thinking that an effective use of diplomacy would be to negotiate a deal with the Iran to resolve the nuclear impasse. But for Berman, the focus of diplomacy seems only to serve the cause of isolating Tehran with sanctions. This ambiguity is something U.S. Institute of Peace expert Daniel Brumberg and the Stimson Center’s Barry Blechman took issue with in a recent article on Foreign Policy‘s website:
If, as administration officials insist, sanctions are a “means rather than an end,” we need to define that end far more clearly. If it is stopping Iran’s nuclear program, then let’s be clear: sanctions may be slowing that program down, but by themselves they will not compel Iran’s leaders to comply with the International Atomic Energy Commission or the UN Security Council. To get the attention of Iran’s current leaders, we must decide whether the goal of sanctions (or for that matter, engagement) is to set the stage for war or for sustained peace negotiations.
Clearly for Berman, sanctions — including diplomacy aimed at more rigid sanctions — are an end in and of themselves, though they could be the prelude to something far more daunting: the prospect of war with Iran. Most experts, including Brumberg and Blechman, agree that sanctions and isolation are unlikely to end the nuclear impasse with Iran. The only way to do that, one might surmise, is a negotiated deal, which will require concessions that we can be sure Congressional Iran hawks will balk at.
Berman’s perspective only lends credibility to those critics who questioned whether engagement was ever earnestly tried by the Obama administration. If the Obama foreign policy is based on Berman’s line, it’s likely those critics correctly analyzed the administration’s position.
]]>AIPAC is circulating a letter (PDF), drafted by the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) and Illeana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) and addressed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that asks:
We would like you to explain the rationale for a sale of such magnitude. What U.S. policy goals and interest are advanced by this sale and have we placed any conditions on it? What is the threat or threats that this sale is intended to address? Do the Saudis share our assessment of those threats, and will they be amenable to, and capable of, carrying out these missions?
Much attention has already gone to the motivations behind the arms sale, with realists concluding it is a clear attempt by the Obama administration to prepare the ground for a containment and deterrence policy against a nuclear armed Iran.
AIPAC’s support of the questions on the arms sale may well signal the increased pressure the Obama administration’s Iran policy will face both inside and outside of Congress, especially with a House Foreign Affairs Committee chaired by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL).
]]>Indeed, both of these concerns should be taken seriously as the hawkish Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) takes over as the new Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
A review of her statements from the past year would indicate that the Obama administration’s policy of sanctions, while keeping the door open for negotiations, will be challenged by Ros-Lehtinen.
In a December 14, 2009 op-ed in the LA Times, Ros-Lehtinen wrote:
The regime in Tehran knows only hardball, and nothing less than overwhelming and crippling sanctions could produce a reversal of its threatening programs and policies.
[…]
But these sanctions must be coupled with action on all fronts. The U.S. must also specifically reject Iran’s claim to an inalienable right to produce nuclear fuel.
And, as The Cable’s Josh Rogin cautions, Ros-Lehtinen could cause significant problems for the Obama administration’s foreign policy if, as expected, she pushes the administration to punish Russian and Chinese companies doing business with Iran. She is expected to lead a congressional effort to demand more information about the U.S.-Saudi arms deal, which was widely seen by realists as an Obama administration plan to form a long-term containment and deterrence strategy against a nuclear armed Iran.
In this same article, Rogin quotes from a previously unreported letter obtained by The Cable. In it, Ros-Lehtinen and then House Foreign Affairs chair Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) demanded answers to their questions about the arms deal from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
They wrote:
We are writing to raise concerns and pose a number of strategic questions about the impact such sales would have on the national security interests of the United States and our allies.
It’s fair to ask how Ros-Lehtinen will view the Obama administration’s endorsement of “linkage”—a concept which is accepted at the highest levels of the U.S. military, that resolving the Arab-Palestinian conflict will forward the United States’ broader strategic interests in the region.
So far it appears likely she will oppose the Obama administration’s efforts to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on settlements, having been a vocal critic of the administration’s strained relationship with Israeli leadership.
Lynch concludes:h
]]>I’m gritting my teeth in anticipation of the next Congress becoming a platform for Iran war hawks, hyping the issue even further in anticipation of the 2012 elections… look for another round of sanctions and some kind of Iranian Liberation Act on the horizon, regardless of how things are actually going for U.S. diplomatic efforts. A GOP-controlled Congress may not go for the big $60 billion arms sale to the Saudis, what with that whole “sharia” thing.