by Jim Lobe

It’s been a difficult annual policy conference for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its hopes of getting Congress to set the toughest possible conditions on any final nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany). As readers [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jim Lobe

It’s been a difficult annual policy conference for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its hopes of getting Congress to set the toughest possible conditions on any final nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany). As readers of this blog know, AIPAC entered the conference, which ran from Sunday through Tuesday, in a rather parlous state as a result of its worst foreign policy setback in a generation; specifically, its failure to muster nearly enough Democrats to gain a veto proof-majority in favor of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill that Obama had threatened to veto. Attacked by hard-line neoconservative groups on the right, notably the Emergency Committee for Israel (ECI) and the Republican Jewish Coalition (RJC) for sacrificing its devotion to Bibi Netanyahu’s jihad against Iran in the interests of bipartisanship — namely, not unduly alienating Democrats in Congress and thus bolstering J Street — the nation’s most powerful foreign policy lobby found itself in a seemingly dazed and unfamiliar defensive crouch, lacking until the very last moment a coherent lobbying agenda for the 14,000 attendees signed up for the proceedings.

That was bad enough. But the Russian takeover of Crimea made things worse. The event dominated the news throughout the conference, making it virtually impossible for AIPAC to break through the blanket TV news coverage of the Ukrainian crisis. Even Netanyahu’s belligerent remarks delivered to the conferees Tuesday morning, designed to psyche them up for their subsequent shleps up to Capitol Hill, were relegated to the inside pages of major national newspapers.

Even the weather refused to cooperate. The snowfall that blanketed the area Sunday night and Monday morning effectively shut down the government and downtown, closing Congressional offices, making it highly inconvenient — and, in many cases, impossible — for the usual overwhelming majority of members of Congress, who customarily make cameo appearances at the conference to ensure their good standing, to get to the convention center, and generally cast a wintry pall over the three-day proceedings.

(And then, as if to add insult to injury, on Tuesday, the same day that Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu keynoted the conference, The Hill newspaper, which basically ignored the proceedings throughout, featured a flattering full-page profile of Jeremy Ben-Ami, while the even more influential Politico published an op-ed entitled “Why AIPAC Needs to Get With the Peace Program” by the J Street founder and president. Ouch!)

Ultimately, aside from Netanyahu’s belligerence (a embarrassingly amount of which was directed against the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement), what did AIPAC get on the Iran front? Although the smoke has not yet completely cleared on that question, it seems they got some form of its Plan C (after losing on Plan A — the Kirk-Menendez bill — and never getting any lift from Plan B, a non-binding resolution laying out impossible conditions for a final agreement) — a Congressional letter that the group helped to draft.

There are now, however, two such letters that are being circulated in Congress for signature — one hard-line version supposedly co-written by Sens. Lindsey Graham and Robert Menendez that clearly AIPAC and Netanyahu would prefer; the second, a softer one co-authored by House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer. The question is, which version (both have been cleared by AIPAC) will get the most support on Capitol Hill?

As I’ve pointed out, both versions are ambiguous on key points, notably on the critical issue of whether Iran will be permitted — at least by Congress as a condition for lifting sanctions as part of any final agreement between the P5+1 — to maintain a limited uranium enrichment program on its own soil. The best analysis of the difference in both letters and the context in which they have been drafted and presented was provided yesterday in a statement by the National Iranian American Council’s (NIAC) policy director (and fellow-Seattle native), Jamal Abdi. Here it is:

…NIAC has serious concerns with the language in the Senate letter regarding demands for a final deal. NIAC outlined its position on what principles should guide Congressional action regarding U.S.-Iran diplomatic efforts in a recent letter to Congressional leadership that was signed by forty organizations. That letter urged that Congress uphold the JPOA [Joint Plan of Action agreed between the P5+1 and Iran last Nov 24], not issue demands on negotiations that contradict the interim terms or the terms outlined for a final deal in JPOA, and that Congress work with the Administration regarding the need to eventually lift sanctions.The House letter meets those standards. NIAC has minor concerns with the House letter, but will not oppose it and commends the efforts of those in the House who succeeded in securing a more balanced letter.

Unfortunately, the Senate letter does not meet those standards and NIAC therefore opposes the Senate letter.

The Senate letter uses new language to offer old ultimatums that will complicate ongoing negotiations, box-in U.S. negotiators, signal that the U.S. would violate the terms outlined in the JPOA, and serve as an invitation to hardliners in Iran to issue similar escalatory demands that will narrow options for compromise. Sections of the letter will be construed to rule out any final deal in which Iran retains a civilian enrichment program, in contradiction of the Joint Plan of Action. This, in combination with demands regarding dismantlement of infrastructure and facilities, and requiring the deal to have regional implications beyond its scope, can only interfere with the work of U.S. diplomats to resolve key concerns at the negotiating table.

NIAC urges that the Administration and Congress coordinate closely regarding ongoing negotiations and work towards the shared goal of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran and averting a disastrous war. NIAC urges that members of the Senate abstain from signing onto the Menendez-Graham letter and instead consider language that supports the ongoing negotiations towards a final deal instead of adding unnecessary complications.

Thus, in NIAC’s opinion, the House letter is preferable for understandable reasons, although the group doesn’t support it.

Now, the latest interesting development is that Senate Armed Services Committee Chair Carl Levin, who was among the first of the senior Democrats to speak out against the Kirk-Menendez bill, has endorsed the House (Cantor-Hoyer, or C-H) letter and proposed it as a substitute in the Senate for the (Menendez-Graham, or M-G) letter. My understanding is that Levin believes that, despite its ambiguity, the House letter gives the administration the room it needs to negotiate a final agreement that would presumably permit some limited enrichment. If, as expected, other Senate Democrats, such as Banking Committee Chair Tim Johnson and Intelligence Committee Chair Dianne Feinstein, follow suit, the chances are pretty good that he can get the backing of the majority caucus (although bringing around the 16 Democrats who co-sponsored the Kirk-Menendez bill will be a challenge). And, with Cantor as the chief Republican sponsor of the C-H letter, it’s almost certain that a majority of the House will sign onto that. Especially because, like the tougher M-G letter, the C-H letter has also been blessed by AIPAC.

Thus, as recently three weeks ago, AIPAC was still lobbying hard in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill, which was clearly designed by its drafters to sabotage the JPOA. When it failed to win at that, it tried briefly to get a resolution that would have set out conditions — known to be unacceptable to Tehran — that a final deal with Iran would have to incorporate, but the Democratic caucus would not go along. Twice rejected, it has been forced to settle for a letter and could very well wind up with the weakest one currently on the table. (See update below)

Moreover, the difference between Netanyahu’s maximalist position — no uranium enrichment, no centrifuges, no nothing — and the House letter endorsed by AIPAC is quite large, and Bibi must be rather upset by the gap. Indeed, his strongest supporters here are very upset.

Now, it bears mentioning that the White House, fearful of their effect on the negotiations and feeling perhaps a bit triumphant after frustrating AIPAC so badly over the last couple of months, opposes both letters, which could prove problematic if and when a final agreement with Iran is reached. While Obama can use his executive authority to ease or waive many sanctions, some sanctions can only be lifted by an act of Congress. Moreover, if Obama relies on his waiver authority, there’s no guarantee that his successor, who could even be a Republican, will continue waiving. As the NIAC statement warns “It is critical that Congress work with the Administration to ensure necessary authorizations are in place to enable nuclear-related sanctions to be lifted, as outlined by the JPOA. Those authorizations do not currently exist.” Thus, the administration’s opposition to Congress expressing its views on the subject could have the perverse effect of alienating key lawmakers whose support will eventually be required to fully implement a final agreement — a point made in an ironic tweet (“Pro-Israel and Pro-Iran Lobbies Agree: Iran Cannot Lift Sanctions Without Congress”) by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies’ (FDD) Mark Dubowitz, who has long favored waging “economic warfare” against Tehran.

UPDATE: In the battle of the two letters on the Senate side, I understand that the Menendez-Graham version has currently fetched more signatures by a margin of 34-11. The 34 on the M-G side consist of 25 Republicans and 9 Democrats, while the 11 signatories to the Levin (or Cantor-Hoyer) substitute are all Democrats. Two Democrats who did not co-sponsor the Kirk-Menendez bill have signed both letters. I’ve been told that AIPAC is now actively lobbying against the Cantor-Hoyer version, despite the fact that it cleared the letter before the co-authors circulated it. If you have a preference, you should probably call your senator’s office. 

by Jim Lobe

With the snow in Washington and Russian moves in Crimea diverting all national news attention away from AIPAC’s ongoing policy conference, I understand House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer are circulating their own AIPAC-approved letter among colleagues for signature. The tone seems [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jim Lobe

With the snow in Washington and Russian moves in Crimea diverting all national news attention away from AIPAC’s ongoing policy conference, I understand House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer are circulating their own AIPAC-approved letter among colleagues for signature. The tone seems a bit more congenial than the Senate version, but the House letter appears to suffer from some of the same ambiguities and uncertainties, notably its insistence that “enrichment-related… facilities” be dismantled as a condition for any deal — a non-starter if interpreted literally — as well as its explicit reference to Iran’s “nuclear weapons ambitions,” which makes an assumption that is not yet supported by the U.S. intelligence community.

It also raises other issues, such as alleged terrorism, and destabilization of Iran’s neighbors, human rights, and the fate of U.S. citizens believed to be detained in or by Iran, but does not relate them specifically to the nuclear negotiations. Also on the plus side is that it suggests there will be no House move to enact prospective automatic sanctions as in the Kirk-Menendez bill, S. 1881, by noting that if Iran violates the Joint Plant of Action or if no agreement is reached, Congress would have to “act swiftly to consider additional sanctions…”

On the other hand, unlike the Senate version, this one concludes by implicitly raising the military option by insisting that “we must keep all options on the table to prevent this dangerous regime from acquiring nuclear weapons.” Such language naturally raises hackles and strengthens hardliners in Tehran.

Here’s the draft in the event you want to weigh in with your congressperson.

Dear Mr. President:

As your partner in developing the broad-based sanctions that – in bringing Iran to the negotiating table – have played an essential role in your two-track approach to encourage Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program, we support your diplomatic effort to test Iran’s willingness to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions and satisfactorily resolve all critical issues concerning its nuclear program.

Iran’s history of delay, deception, and dissembling on its nuclear program raises serious concerns that Iran will use prolonged negotiations as a tool to secure an economic lifeline while it continues to make progress towards a nuclear weapon.  Iran’s leaders must understand that further sanctions relief will require Tehran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon and fully disclose its nuclear activities.

We are hopeful a permanent diplomatic agreement will require dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapons-related infrastructure, including enrichment-, heavy water-, and reprocessing-related facilities, such that Iran will not be able to develop, build, or acquire a nuclear weapon.  We do not seek to deny Iran a peaceful nuclear energy program, but we are gravely concerned that Iran’s industrial-scale uranium enrichment capability and heavy water reactor being built at Arak could be used for the development of nuclear weapons.

Because we believe any agreement should include stringent transparency measures to guarantee that Iran cannot develop an undetectable nuclear weapons breakout capability, Tehran must fully and verifiably implement its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, answer pending IAEA questions, and comply with the transparency measures requested by the Director General of the IAEA, as well as with any additional verification and monitoring measures necessary to ensure Iran is abiding by the terms of any agreement.  Such measures should include an agreement granting the IAEA necessary access to inspect all suspect sites, including military facilities, and providing an unfettered ability to interview Iranian scientists and personnel associated with Iran’s nuclear program.

As negotiations progress, we expect your administration will continue to keep Congress regularly apprised of the details.  And, because any long-term sanctions relief will require Congressional action, we urge you to consult closely with us so that we can determine the parameters of such relief in the event an agreement is reached, or, if no agreement is reached or Iran violates the interim agreement, so that we can act swiftly to consider additional sanctions and steps necessary to change Iran’s calculation.

Finally, although the P5+1 process is focused on Iran’s nuclear program, we remain deeply concerned by Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism, its horrendous human rights record, its efforts to destabilize its neighbors, its pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and its threats against our ally, Israel, as well as the fates of American citizens detained by Iran.  We want to work with you to address these concerns as part of a broader strategy of dealing with Iran.

We are hopeful your two-track strategy will convince Iran to change course and abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.  None of us desires military conflict, but as you yourself have acknowledged, we must keep all options on the table to prevent this dangerous regime from acquiring nuclear weapons.

by Marsha B. Cohen

Hours before the U.S. federal government shutdown, members of the House and Senate from both parties were with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a reception honoring outgoing Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren.

House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy, and Minority Leader Steny [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Marsha B. Cohen

Hours before the U.S. federal government shutdown, members of the House and Senate from both parties were with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a reception honoring outgoing Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren.

House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy, and Minority Leader Steny Hoyer spoke at the event, according to the Times of Israel. Others proudly gushed about their attendance to their constituents via e-mail. The office of Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-F), Chair of the House Subcommittee, sent out the following message at 10:34 pm last night:

Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, attended Ambassador Oren’s farewell event with Israel Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Daniel Shapiro and Miami Beach native, and incoming Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Ron Dermer. Ambassador Oren was honored by Members of Congress for his years of service to Israel and for his advancing of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

Ros-Lehtinen did not mention that she and her Republican colleagues would be shutting down the U.S. government in less than an hour and a half.

Ron Dermer, Israel’s new Ambassador to the U.S., was also introduced to the attending members of Congress at the reception. I discussed the likelihood of Dermer’s new position as far back as December 2012 when I wrote that Oren, who has been Israel’s top envoy to the U.S. since 2009, would be replaced by the American-born neoconservative who helped plan Mitt Romney’s 2012 visit to Israel prior to the U.S. presidential election. Dermer is believed to have convinced Netanyahu that Romney was going to win the election; his appointment is clearly a thumb in Obama’s eye. Not only has Netanyahu appointed another fellow Likudnik as Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S., he has also appointed a strongly partisan Republican to the diplomatic post.

But Netanyahu isn’t worried about offending Obama. Despite the fulmination in his UN General Assembly speech on Monday about Israel standing alone against Iran, Bibi’s Gang remains on his side.

The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee (SFRC) also hosted its own event with Netanyahu on Sept. 30. Members were photographed with Oren and Netanyahu in a “class photo.” Netanyahu thanked them, according to Julian Pecquet of The Hill, “for their support of bills sanctioning Iran for its nuclear program, and urging them to continue to pressure the Islamic Republic.” Senators from both parties basked in Netanyahu’s praise and reciprocated it with their endorsement of what he had to say:

“Diplomacy without pressure is probably a futile exercise,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC). “He believes the sanctions are working, and I agree.” Graham said there’s consensus in the Senate to move ahead with a new round of sanctions, which the Senate Banking Committee is expected to take up shortly. The House passed similar legislation by an overwhelming bipartisan majority in July.

“During the meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu, senators spoke with a unity of purpose, hopeful for a diplomatic outcome with Iran that leads to a verifiable termination of its pursuit of nuclear weapons program, but resolute that U.S. national security objectives can never be compromised,” Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ), the SFRC’s Chair, said in a statement following the meeting. “Our resolve to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability remains unchanged and we will not hesitate from proceeding with further sanctions and other options to protect U.S. interests and ensure regional security,” he said.

Graham and Menendez, two of the Senate’s most vociferous advocates of sanctions against Iran, jointly authored an op-ed in the Washington Post last week in which they declared, “In the coming days, we will be outspoken in our support for furthering sanctions against Iran, requiring countries to again reduce their purchases of Iranian petroleum and imposing further prohibitions on strategic sectors of the Iranian economy.”

(If only Graham and Menendez could apply their bipartisan resolve to convincing the hardliners in the House of Representatives to restore the functioning of the U.S. government.)

Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) the SFRC’s top Republican, said Netanyahu gave “very detailed” answers about his views at the meeting. “Like all of us, I don’t think he wants the negotiations to go on forever,” Corker said. He continued: “Obviously letting up on the sanctions is not something any us are interested in. And like all of us, he understands that if there is an agreement it needs to be a full agreement.” The senator declined to state whether Netanyahu requested that the Committee pass more sanctions: “I’m not going to answer that,” he said.

On Tuesday, the Senate Banking Committee, of which Corker is also a member, decided to delay the consideration of a new package of Iran sanctions until after the mid-month talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany). Reuters reports that the sanctions issue has been slowed by congressional wrangling over the government funding bill that has led to our government’s shutdown. Nonetheless, it occurred to members of the Committee that “deliberately delaying new sanctions” might improve the mood at the talks with Iran in Geneva later this month. Corker is quoted as saying, “There’s been some discussion about whether it’s best right now, while the negotiations are occurring, just to keep the existing ones in place.” Corker also reiterated that Congress remains deeply suspicious of Iran and supportive of tougher sanctions.

Right-wing news sites, and even some elements of the mainstream media, have been echoing the complaints of Tea Party members of the House who are responsible for the current government shutdown, asking why President Obama is so willing to talk to Iran but not to them. As satirist Jon Stewart of the Daily Show pointed out on Monday night, the “why Iran and not us?” talking point doesn’t exactly work in their favor:

You’re not helping yourselves.  If it turns out that President Barack Obama can make a deal with the most intransigent, hardline, unreasonable, totalitarian mullahs in the world but not with Republicans, maybe he’s not the problem.

Part of the problem may be the willingness of members of both Houses, and both parties, to spend the hours before a government shutdown hobnobbing with a foreign leader — any foreign leader — and deferentially reveling in his advocacy of a foreign policy prescription that demeans, and seeks to undermine, the  diplomatic efforts of their own president.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has his Revolutionary Guards to contend with; Obama’s got Bibi’s Gang in Congress. Which one will prove to be the bigger challenge?

by Mitchell Plitnick

Syria’s declaration that it would accept a Russian proposal to hand over its chemical weapons to an international body was the latest in a string of surprises around international concern over the ongoing, horrific civil war in that country. It is extremely premature, at this point, to declare the [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

Syria’s declaration that it would accept a Russian proposal to hand over its chemical weapons to an international body was the latest in a string of surprises around international concern over the ongoing, horrific civil war in that country. It is extremely premature, at this point, to declare the threat of a US escalation over, but the delay this proposal produced does go a long way toward lowering the heat on the crisis and, at minimum, stretching the timetable.

President Obama’s willingness to bring this idea to the U.N. Security Council opens the door to averting a U.S. strike and pushes back the likely strike date and a congressional vote on Obama’s decision. That has led to a collective sigh of relief, at least for the moment, throughout the country. And nowhere has that sound been louder than in the offices of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

The debate has been a difficult one in Washington. A hawkish minority see striking Syria as a necessary deterrent, both to Bashar al-Assad reusing chemical weapons and emboldening Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, a decision hawks think will be influenced by a perception that the U.S. is so reluctant to get involved in another military escapade that it will not back up threats of using force. That’s what is meant by “protecting U.S. credibility.” But the majority of the U.S. public and, at least for the time being, the House of Representatives seems to be opposed to Obama’s idea of hitting Syria.

In one of a series of surprises around this issue, AIPAC publicly dove in to the Syria debate in DC, and faced the most daunting challenge they had in many years. One of the things that gives AIPAC its air of invincibility is their astounding record of success on Capitol Hill. One of the reasons they have that record is that they rarely get into fights they are not sure they are going to win. This one was far from that.

A vote held immediately after the president announced he was going to request authorization from Congress would have likely been unsuccessful. Some, myself included, believed that a full court press by the president combined with hard lobbying by AIPAC and the Saudis would, over the course of time, sway enough votes to give the president what he wanted. I’m pretty sure the Senate, in any case, will support Obama. The House is certainly more questionable.

If the vote in either chamber went against the president, it would mean an unprecedented loss for AIPAC. They’ve lost before, but never when they were working with, rather than against, the president of the United States. That they got involved with such an iffy proposition can only be explained by an Israeli desire to see Obama win this one, but also for the Israeli government itself — which, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced unprecedented criticism for interfering in U.S. politics — to remain distant from the debate. In a most unusual development, it is Obama who keeps talking about Israel being a factor in his decision. AIPAC has adamantly refused to name Israeli concerns as a reason for their support of an attack on Syria.

Chemi Shalev, the very sharp Washington correspondent for the Israeli daily Ha’aretz wrote:

If AIPAC goes ‘all out,’ as Politico reported on Thursday, and ‘250 Jewish leaders and AIPAC activists will storm the halls on Capitol Hill beginning next week,’ but the House of Representatives nonetheless votes against the President, then the lobby’s image of invincibility, to which it owes much of its influence, will inevitably be jeopardized.

I’m not sure AIPAC’s air of invincibility would be jeopardized so much as it might be slightly diminished, another step on the unfortunately long road to normalizing the U.S. discussion of Middle East policy.

The other, younger and more moderate side of the Israel Lobby, J Street, had its own problems with the Syria issue. Internal debate in the organization had a stymying effect and left them without a position. While some were content with no stance from the “Pro-Israel, Pro-Peace” lobbying group, their silence can hurt them in the long term on the Hill.

Long-time DC observer Ron Kampeas has it just right when he says:

One of the most effective ways for lobbyists to accrue influence on the Hill is to convey to overwhelmed congresspersons and their staffers that the lobby has the expertise to help them arrive at an informed opinion. And if in addition to expertise, your lobby has a cadre of seasoned staffers who are able to shape a lawmaker’s concerns into legislative language that is likely to attract cosponsors and even achieve passage (the golden ring for a body that passes less than five percent of its proposed legislation), then you have influence.

J Street has been able to make some headway in recent years in campaign fundraising. But they have not been able to establish themselves as a reliable source of expertise on Capitol Hill. AIPAC remains a source for expert analysis, and that has a great effect on how members of Congress and their staffers, except for those few who actually have their own expertise on the Middle East, end up voting on Middle East matters. As Kampeas says, J Street wants influence, “…and answering ‘We dunno’ on Syria is not the way to go about earning it.”

J Street bills itself as the group that “has Obama’s back.” That involves giving him political cover to exert some moderate pressure on Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians, which, to date, they really have not been able to deliver (but they’re young — AIPAC also took a good number of years to build the sort of gravitas it has). J Street can also recover from the Syria crisis, as long as it doesn’t have more incidents where its own membership and leadership are so divided on an issue that they can’t take a stance.

But AIPAC has already taken a hit by openly lobbying, and declaring that it will flex serious muscle, in support of a military action that, for better or worse, is opposed by the majority of US citizens. If the issue does come to a vote, which still seems likely, and they lose one or both congressional chambers (which I don’t think will happen, but I hold a minority view), it will be a more serious blow. That’s reinforced by the fact that not only AIPAC, but also a lot of the more mainstream Jewish groups that tend to follow it, like the American Jewish Committee and World Jewish Congress, have come out forcefully behind a strike on Syria, and continued to press the point, even after the Russian proposal.

But I don’t think this will be as damaging as either Shalev or MJ Rosenberg think it will be. There is still no significant opposition to AIPAC’s lobbying power; this question was not directly connected to Israeli policy; and the most powerful tool in AIPAC’s arsenal — the public US misunderstanding of the Middle East, the Arab world and Israel, and especially the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict — is still in place, as is the perception that AIPAC speaks for, not the Jewish community as is often argued, but Jewish donors. US Jews make up a wildly disproportionate fraction of individual political gift givers, but while some large donors like Sheldon Adelson or Haim Saban are very clear about the decisive role Israel plays in where their money goes, it is far less clear how important Israel is in broader Jewish donations, and it’s virtually certain that the issue is not as prominent as is commonly argued.

Still, just by going so public with the Syria issue, AIPAC has suffered a setback, and this has not been lost on Israelis. Leaders and opinion makers in Israel from the liberal Ha’aretz to veteran Israeli diplomats are criticizing AIPAC for their actions on Syria. It’s not a huge hit, but AIPAC will feel it. If only someone, be it J Street or another group, would just take advantage of this opportunity…

by Farideh Farhi

Paul Pillar has aptly explained why the vote this week in the House of Representatives for even more sanctions against Iran (H.R. 850) is at odds with the stated US foreign policy objective of changing Iran’s nuclear policies. While the Senate is unlikely to go along, at [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Farideh Farhi

Paul Pillar has aptly explained why the vote this week in the House of Representatives for even more sanctions against Iran (H.R. 850) is at odds with the stated US foreign policy objective of changing Iran’s nuclear policies. While the Senate is unlikely to go along, at least for now, the vote brings into question the motives for such a move.

I do not know whether the folks in the House wanted to remain in the good graces of the pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, as Ali Gharib and M.J. Rosenberg suggest, or if they really do want to block any possibility of a deal with Iran to hasten regime change — which State Department folks keep telling me is not the official and stated policy of the US government. The bottom line is, however, that the motives are irrelevant to the chilling effect the vote’s outcome will have on negotiations and Iran’s skepticism about the Obama administration’s ability to “have the sanctions gone in a moment if it will substantively and constructively negotiate with the P5+1” as stated last month by Wendy Sherman, the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs.

The vote is undoubtedly a signal that members of Congress are more interested in making the Iranian government cry uncle than negotiating. That’s not a smart move if the US government’s objective and stated policy is to convince Iran to limit its nuclear program and subject it to a more robust inspection regime. And let’s be clear: the message is not only to the Iranian government; it’s also to the Iranian people.

There is really no going around it. The House’s vote also shows the proverbial middle finger to the Iranian electorate, who went to the polls on June 14 in large numbers to the tune of 73 percent — a significantly higher participation rate than in years of US presidential elections — and voted for someone who was an unlikely victor because of his stated desire to reroute Iran’s foreign policy and improve relations with the world. That same electorate then treated Hassan Rouhani’s victory as a reflection of its will by celebrating in the streets.

Just to reiterate, in addition to the systemic odds against him, Rouhani was elected by an Iranian public who refused inaction despite the results of the contested 2009 election and the repression that followed. Prodded by two former presidents, centrist Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and reformist Mohammad Khatami, Iranian voters forcefully entered the fray to support Rouhani’s key promises of “prudent” economic management, interaction with the world and a relaxation of the highly securitized political atmosphere.

The vote ensures that Rouhani will be actively involved in convincing his Western interlocutors as well as skeptics inside Iran that through diplomacy, an agreement that respects Iran’s sovereignty — as well as the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy in protecting that sovereignty — and addresses Western concerns regarding the potential weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program is possible.

It is true that Rouhani will not be the sole decision-maker and has to negotiate with Iran’s other centers of power. An agreement must also receive broad support inside Iran and could be torpedoed by domestic forces framing it as a disproportionate concession to Western “bullying”.

But the need to convince other domestic stakeholders should not be confused with Rouhani not being given room to pursue, at least for a while, a “fair” agreement that also addresses the P5+1′s concerns. The fact that Rouhani is being told by no less than Leader Ali Khamenei not to trust Western powers should be construed as Khamenei’s fall-back “I told you so” position in case of failure and not an inhibitor of the attempt to reach an agreement.

Both reformist Khatami and hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were given room to negotiate with Western powers during their presidencies. An agreement during Khatami’s presidency could not be reached because of the Bush administration’s insistence on “not a single centrifuge spinning.” A potential confidence-building agreement to transfer fissile material out of Iran during Ahmadinejad’s presidency was first rejected by a whole array of political forces inside Iran who were fearful that a deal with outsiders would pave the way for domestic repression in the tumultuous post-2009 election. Later, a similar agreement was rejected by the Obama administration, which did not want to abandon the success it was having in creating a willing coalition in favor of sanctions.

And herein lies the challenge for the folks who seem to have a voracious appetite for sanctions. In voting into office a reasonable face of Iran, the Iranian electorate is also counting on an encounter with the US’ reasonable face. Demanding significant confidence-building measures from Iran in exchange for vague promises of significant steps by Western powers in the future — promises that, given Congress’ stamp on many of the sanctions in place, are unlikely to be fulfilled soon — doesn’t seem all that reasonable.

The attitude and judgment of the Iranian electorate should not be taken lightly. In the midst of a region where hope about the positive impact of an Obama presidency has all but vanished, failure to reach an agreement with the reasonable face of Iran will be perceived as yet another clueless — and dangerous — US policy of heavy-handed demands without a clear understanding of the end game and the costs for achieving it.

With the Iranian government and electorate in the same corner, at least for now, it will be much harder to describe the sanctions regime as anything but a vindictive policy of collective punishment intended to not only bring down the Iranian government, but also destabilize the lives and livelihoods of the Iranian people. An academic who regularly visits Iran recently told me he was surprised by the extent of negative attitudes towards the US even in northern Tehran — the supposed bastion of secular and “westernized Iranians”. Things have really changed in a couple of years, he said.

I am not very keen on anecdotal evidence but the observation makes sense. Moves that reject the Iranian people’s efforts to change the course of their government’s policies and instead intensify policies of collective punishment will reap what they sow.

Photo Credit: Mona Hoobehfekr  

by Jim Lobe

Exactly three weeks ago, a confident Dennis Ross, President Barack Obama’s top Iran policy-maker for most of his first term, made the following assessments and predictions in an op-ed entitled, ironically, “Don’t Discount the Iranian Election:”

So now Ayatollah Khamenei has decided not to leave anything [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jim Lobe

Exactly three weeks ago, a confident Dennis Ross, President Barack Obama’s top Iran policy-maker for most of his first term, made the following assessments and predictions in an op-ed entitled, ironically, “Don’t Discount the Iranian Election:”

So now Ayatollah Khamenei has decided not to leave anything to chance. …If there had been any hope that Iran’s presidential election might offer a pathway to different policy approaches on dealing with the United States, he has now made it clear that will not be the case. His action should be seen for what it is: a desire to prevent greater liberalization internally and accommodation externally.”

…Clearly, the Supreme Leader wanted to avoid the kind of excitement that Rafsanjani would have stirred up had he continued making public statements, as he has over the last two years, about Iran’s need to fix the economy and reduce Iran’s isolation internationally (a theme he has emphasized in recent years). But the exclusion of Rafsanjani from the election is also an important signal to anyone concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. If the Supreme Leader had been interested in doing a deal with the West on the Iranian nuclear program, he would have wanted [former President Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani to be president.

I say that …because if the Supreme Leader were interested in an agreement, he would probably want to create an image of broad acceptability of it in advance. Rather than having only his fingerprints on it, he would want to widen the circle of decision-making to share the responsibility. And he would set the stage by having someone like Rafsanjani lead a group that would make the case for reaching an understanding. Rafsanjani’s pedigree as Khomeini associate and former president, with ties to the Revolutionary Guard and to the elite more generally, would all argue for him to play this role.

…(T)he fact that the Iranian media is lavishing attention on [Saeed] Jalili certainly suggests that he is Khamenei’s preference, even though he has the thinnest credentials of the lot.

If Jalili does end up becoming the Iranian president, it will be hard to avoid the conclusion that the Supreme Leader has little interest in reaching an understanding with the United States on the Iranian nuclear program.”

Three weeks later, we know not only that Jalili did not win the election, but that the candidate backed with enthusiasm by both Rafsanjani and former reformist president Mohammad Khatami — Hassan Rouhani — did. Moreover, during his campaign, Rouhani did exactly what, in Ross’s assessment, made Rafsanjani’s candidacy unacceptable to Ali Khamenei: he spoke “about Iran’s need to fix the economy and reduce Iran’s isolation internationally…” — themes which he repeated in his 90-minute post-election press conference. In addition, Rouhani — given his 15 years on the Supreme National Security Council — appears to be an excellent vehicle for creating “an image of broad acceptability of [an agreement on Iran's nuclear program] in advance” if Khamenei were interested in such an accord. And, although he isn’t a former president like Rafsanjani, Rouhani’s reputed ability to bridge differences between conservatives, pragmatists and reformists would help Khamenei “widen the circle of decision-making to share the responsibility” of a deal. He would also be well placed to “lead a group that would make the case for reaching an understanding.”

Thus, if we assume, as Ross did three weeks ago, that Khamenei leaves nothing to chance and has the power to do so — a very questionable assumption among actual Iran experts (see here and here for examples) — then we might also see Jalili’s defeat and Rouhani’s surprise victory on what was essentially Rafsanjani’s platform as clear signals that Khamenei is indeed “interested in doing a deal on the Iranian nuclear program.” The only missing element in this scenario was Rafsanjani who, as noted above, strongly backed Rouhani and helped rally the centrists and reformists behind him. In light of Ross’s previous assessments regarding how the supreme leader signals his intentions on nuclear negotiations, would it be unreasonable to expect that Ross would not only be somewhat humbler with respect to his understanding of Iranian politics, but also rather hopeful about prospects for a real deal?

On the question of humility, the answer is not really, at least judging by his latest analysis, entitled “Talk to Iran’s New President. Warily.” Ross doesn’t even mention Jalili, Khamenei’s previously presumed chosen one. And while Ross seems genuinely puzzled by why Khamenei “allowed Mr. Rowhani to win the election,” particularly in light of the fact that the president-elect had “run against current [Khamenei-approved] Iranian policies,” he still sees the supreme leader as all-powerful, implying that Rouhani would not have won had Khamenei not approved of his victory.

As to the meaning of Khamenei’s permitting Rouhani to win, Ross floats four possible options, none of which, however, admits the possibility that Khamenei is prepared “to do a deal” acceptable to the West (a possibility for which Ross, just three weeks before, believed could have been signaled by the Guardian Council’s approval of Rafsanjani’s candidacy). He does entertain the possibility that Rouhani gained Khamenei’s approval for reasons related to the nuclear issue, but strictly for tactical purposes — not to reach a final accord that would preclude Iran’s attaining “breakout capability” (as would presumably have been possible if Rafsanjani had won the presidency):

He [Khamenei] believes that Mr. Rowhani, a president with a moderate face, might be able to seek an open-ended agreement on Iran’s nuclear program that would reduce tensions and ease sanctions now, while leaving Iran room for development of nuclear weapons at some point in the future.

He believes that Mr. Rowhani might be able to start talks that would simply serve as a cover while Iran continued its nuclear program.

Ross, who has been arguing for several months now that Washington needs to drop its approach of seeking incremental confidence-building accords with Iran in favor of making a final ultimatum-like offer (backed up by ever-tougher sanctions and ever-more credible threats of military action) that would permit Tehran to enrich uranium up to five percent (subject to the strictest possible international oversight in exchange for a gradual easing of sanctions), goes on to reject any let-up in pressure on Tehran.

Even if he were given the power to negotiate, Mr. Rowhani would have to produce a deal the supreme leader would accept. So it is far too early to consider backing off sanctions as a gesture to Mr. Rowhani.

We should, instead, keep in mind that the outside world’s pressure on Iran to change course on its nuclear program may well have produced his election. So it would be foolish to think that lifting the pressure now would improve the chances that he would be allowed to offer us what we need: an agreement, or credible Iranian steps toward one, under which Iran would comply with its international obligations on the nuclear issue.”[Emphasis added.]

Now, I, for one, find this reasoning difficult to understand. Ross may be right that external pressure was responsible for Rouhani’s election, but I suspect that it was a good deal more complicated than that, and, in any event, one of the last people I would seek out for an explanation as to why Rouhani won would be Ross, given his assessments of Iranian politics just three weeks ago. But to assert that easing pressure on Iran once Rouhani takes office (as a goodwill gesture) would somehow reduce the chances that Rouhani would be allowed to make concessions on the nuclear issue just doesn’t make much sense, if, for no other reason, virtually all Iran experts agree that Khamenei (and presumably hard-liners in and around his office) don’t believe Washington really wants an agreement because its ultimate goal is regime change. (Just today, Khamenei, while insisting that “resolving the nuclear issue would be simple” if hostile powers put aside their stubbornness, noted, “Of course, the enemies say in their words and letters that they do not want to change the regime, but their approaches are contrary to these words.”) If Khamenei is to be persuaded otherwise, Washington should work to bolster Rouhani and the forces that supported him in the election.

Indeed, most Iran specialists whose work I read argue that Rouhani’s election has really put the “ball in President Obama’s court”, as the International Crisis Group’s Ali Vaez wrote this week. They say that the response should not only be goodwill gestures, such as a congratulatory letter on his inauguration, but far more generous offers than what has been put on the table to date. Vali Nasr, for example, made the point last week when he argued that Rouhani “will likely wait for a signal of American willingness to make serious concessions before he risks compromise.”

For the past eight years, U.S. policy has relied on pressure — threats of war and international economic sanctions — rather than incentives to change Iran’s calculus. Continuing with that approach will be counterproductive. It will not provide Rowhani with the cover for a fresh approach to nuclear talks, and it could undermine the reformists generally by showing they cannot do better than conservatives on the nuclear issue.

…There is now both the opportunity and the expectation that Washington will adopt a new approach to strengthen reformists and give Rowhani the opening that he needs if he is to successfully argue the case for a deal with the P5+1.”

Paul Pillar made a similar point in the National Interest last week:

Rouhani’s election presents the United States and its partners with a test — of our intentions and seriousness about reaching an agreement. Failure of the test will confirm suspicions in Tehran that we do not want a deal and instead are stringing along negotiations while waiting for the sanctions to wreak more damage. …Passage of the test …means not making any proposal an ultimatum that is coupled with threats of military force, which only feed Iranian suspicions that for the West the negotiations are a box-checking prelude to war and regime change.”

“The Iranian electorate has in effect said to the United States and its Western partners, “We’ve done all we can. Among the options that the Guardian Council gave us, we have chosen the one that offers to get us closest to accommodation, agreement and understanding with the West. Your move, America.”

And, in contrast to Ross, who believes that time is fast running out and the “multilateral step-by-step approach …has outlived its usefulness,” the Brookings Institution’s Suzanne Maloney argued in Foreign Affairs that

To overcome the deep-seated (and not entirely unjustified) paranoia of its ultimate decision-maker, the United States will need to be patient. It will need to understand, for example, that Rouhani will need to demonstrate to Iranians that he can produce tangible rewards for diplomatic overtures. That means that Washington should be prepared to offer significant sanctions relief in exchange for any concessions on the nuclear issue. Washington will also have to understand that Rouhani may face real constraints in seeking to solve the nuclear dispute without exacerbating the mistrust of hard-liners.

In spite of this advice, things are moving in the opposite direction. On July 1, tough new sanctions to which Obama has already committed himself will take effect. Among other provisions, they will penalise companies that deal in rials or with Iran’s automotive sector. The Republican-led House is expected to pass legislation by the end of next month (that is, on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration) that would sharply curb or eliminate the president’s authority to waive sanctions on countries and companies doing any business with Iran, thus imposing a virtual trade embargo on Iran. Other sanctions measures, including an anticipated effort by Republican Sen. Lindsay Graham to get an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution passed by the Senate after the August recess, are lined up.

It would be good to learn what Ross, who is co-chairing the new Iran task force of the ultra-hawkish Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, thinks of these new and pending forms of pressure and whether they are likely to improve the chances that Rouhani will be able to deliver a deal.

by Jamal Abdi

The notion that U.S. sanctions on Iran are supposed to act as diplomatic leverage to get a nuclear deal may be dispelled once and for all by a new Congressional action now in the works.

The House is poised to move ahead with a new round of [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Jamal Abdi

The notion that U.S. sanctions on Iran are supposed to act as diplomatic leverage to get a nuclear deal may be dispelled once and for all by a new Congressional action now in the works.

The House is poised to move ahead with a new round of Iran sanctions, and a slew of new sanctions proposals are set to be introduced in the Senate, even as a host of current and former senior U.S. officials — including Secretary of State John Kerry – have warned the body to hold off on new sanctions at the risk of imperiling a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear standoff.

For some in Congress, this seems to be precisely the point.

 Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL) is circulating a draft measure that would make regime change, not a negotiated solution, the official U.S. policy. Kirk promises to introduce that measure shortly, but first will introduce two smaller sanction measures to cut off Iran’s foreign exchange and block its natural gas deals, all building up to the grand finale. The first was introduced this week, S.892, which is designed to cut off Iranian access to euros. It would sanction any foreign entity that converts currency held by Iran’s Central Bank or other sanctioned Iranian entities into non-local currency. Blocking off Iranian access to euros will of course make it more difficult for Iran to purchase Western medicines and exacerbate the reported sanctions-induced medicine shortage now plaguing Iran.

Sen. Kirk hopes to attach these smaller bills to another sanctions package in the House before formally introducing his regime change bill. That bill will mandate that sanctions be kept in place until Iran transitions to a democratic government — a preposterous notion given the disastrous effect sanctions are having on Iran’s civil society and democracy movement. The bill would echo the Iraq Liberation Act, which was passed and signed by President Clinton in 1998 and cemented regime change as the official policy toward Saddam Hussein. That measure all but guaranteed Saddam would not comply with sanctions — what was the point if they would never be lifted? — and was cited by Congress as the basis for authorizing war with Iraq four years later.

In the meantime, the House is considering H.R.850, a measure that would sanction U.S. allies that conduct commercial transactions with Iran. Despite existing humanitarian waivers, this could affect transactions that include food and medicine as commercial entities and banks are becoming increasingly fearful of conducting any business transaction with Iran for fear of being penalized by the United States. Congress attempted to pass a similar measure last year as part of a previous sanctions package, but removed it at the last minute after intervention by the Obama Administration. A Congressional aide told Congressional Quarterly at the time that the measure “would be impossible to enforce and only make our allies really angry. They would have endangered their cooperation with the sanctions we have now.”

Nevertheless, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is looking to move H.R.850 in a matter of weeks. Next Wednesday, the committee will hold a hearing with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, the top U.S. negotiator conducting multilateral talks with Iran, and Treasury Under Secretary for Financial Intelligence and Terrorism David Cohen, who is in charge of implementing the Iran sanctions. Committee Chairman Ed Royce  ominously said the hearing was “a chance to press the Administration on critical questions surrounding U.S. participation in the P5+1 negotiations and its implications for the enforcement of sanctions.” The implication being that the U.S. could be implementing more sanctions if pesky diplomacy wasn’t getting in the way. The next step would be to move the sanctions bill.

Regardless of what Sherman and Cohen tell the chamber, it may make no difference. Secretary of State John Kerry implored the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April to hold off on further sanctions and to not interfere with diplomatic efforts to little effect. Congress has become increasingly bold in dismissing the White House’s requests when it comes to Iran. Congress has also thus far ignored reports from senior former officials like Tom Pickering, Dick Lugar, Ann Marie Slaughter warning that sanctions were outpacing negotiations and threatening to upend the diplomatic process.

The Kirk measure on foreign exchange introduced this week, in fact, circumvents the White House and doesn’t even require the President’s signature. It pronounces that, regardless of when the bill would actually be passed, the sanctions on foreign exchange would go into effect starting May 9. This means the U.S. will retroactively issue sanctions against any bank conducting a transaction after this date, so long as the bill passes at some point. It is essentially sanctions by Congressional decree. The threat of sanctions from the Hill is now so great that they do not even need to be passed to have a chilling effect. It is a stunning display of impunity by Iran hawks in Congress and groups like AIPAC and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies that are supporting these measures.

It’s little wonder, then, that the narrative in Tehran is that even if Iran complies with U.S. demands on its nuclear program, the sanctions will continue and the President can’t do a thing about it. While Kirk’s Iraq Liberation Act for Iran may not yet be introduced, he may not have to get his final bill passed in order to lock in the sanctions as regime change policy.

The dominant narrative in Tehran is already that, much like with Saddam’s Iraq, the sanctions on Iran will never be lifted. The President has no mechanism to formally lift many of the hardest hitting sanctions — he is dependent on Congress. And Congressional hawks have indicated that if Iran compromises, it will be proof the sanctions are working and instead of easing them in a quid pro quo, more sanctions should be passed. Tehran’s narrative is being reinforced by Congress, and unless the U.S. can convey that there is an offramp from sanctions, Iran’s nuclear program will likely continue apace.

– Jamal Abdi is the Policy Director of the National Iranian American Council, the largest grassroots organization representing the Iranian-American community in the US. He previously worked in Congress as a Policy Advisor on foreign affairs issues. Follow Jamal on Twitter: @jabdi

Photo: The Central Bank building in Tehran, Iran.

by Marsha B. Cohen

Today hundreds of buses packed with what organizers claim are about a thousand citizen advocates departed from various pick-up points in and around New York and  New Jersey for Washington, DC. They represent NORPAC (not an acronym for anything), a much smaller, localized grassroots [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Marsha B. Cohen

Today hundreds of buses packed with what organizers claim are about a thousand citizen advocates departed from various pick-up points in and around New York and  New Jersey for Washington, DC. They represent NORPAC (not an acronym for anything), a much smaller, localized grassroots version of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), whose annual policy conference brought an estimated 10,000 activists and students to the nation’s capital to lobby for pro-Israel legislation in March.

NORPAC’s annual Mission to Washington, DC lasts just one day, modeled on the climactic conclusion on the third day of AIPAC’s confabulation that dispatches busloads of attendees to their respective Senate and House members to thank them for their support for Israel and ask for more. Attracting little or no attention outside the  regional Jewish media, NORPAC markets its annual pilgrimage to the nation’s capital as a fun day of family togetherness where kids (minimum age is 12) can join their parents and grandparents in coming face-to-face with members of Congress (“MoCs”), armed with NORPAC Talking Points, and demanding to know — in unequivocal and uncompromising “yes” or “no” terms — whether they will co-sponsor and vote for pending legislation supportive of Israel and detrimental to Iran.

The NORPAC annual Mission is also a bargain. The non-discounted registration fee for AIPAC’s three day policy conference in 2013 was $599 per person, not including transportation from the participants’ home city and a 2-3 night hotel stay in pricey Washington, DC. NORPAC on the other hand charges $175 for adults and $125 for students and this fee includes bus transportation from pick-up points throughout New York and New Jersey, breakfast, lunch, dinner and a plenary meeting upon arrival. Since the Mission is accomplished in a single day, there’s no need for any hotel expense. Advocacy training prior to the Mission is also included.

NORPAC differs from its big brother AIPAC not only in size, but in actually being a PAC (political action committee), aggregating and disbursing financial contributions to members of Congress. Throughout the course of each election cycle, NORPAC members host both Democratic and Republican political candidates and office holders — Sen. Susan Collins of Maine was the guest of honor in Teaneck, NJ at a NORPAC event on April 28 – establishing personal relationships even with out of area members of Congress who receive the lion’s share of NORPAC’s largesse. Political donors contributing through NORPAC can earmark their political contributions to any candidate they choose, even if he or she is not officially endorsed. NORPAC never endorses a candidate who challenges an incumbent with a pro-Israel record, as Shmuley Boteach discovered. Nevertheless financial contributions to challengers are accepted and contributed in NORPAC’s name.

Contributions channeled through NORPAC are not huge, but, as the organization enjoys pointing out, the impact of relatively small contributions is magnified when they are aggregated. More importantly, pooling campaign contributions through NORPAC exaggerates the pro-Israel lobby’s unity, strength and influence.

The top donor through NORPAC in the 2012 election cycle contributed $7,500, with the rest of the top 25 donors contributing $4,000-$5,000. In that cycle, NORPAC disbursed $10,603 to House Democrats, $6,350 to House Republicans, $62,330 to Senate Democrats and $54,741 to Senate Republicans. Political donations to individual candidates are generally in the $2,500-$5,000 range for House members and typically in the $5,000-$10,000 range for Senators, according to Open Secrets’ database – not huge in the Super PAC era, but significant insofar as these sums, pooled and presented to politicians by NORPAC, have a greater impact than smaller ones by individual donors.

What do NORPAC’s Mission minions, rolling into the nation’s capital on their chartered buses, want? According to NORPAC’s website:

Each year NORPAC selects different issues to present to Members of Congress related to legislation in the U.S. House and Senate. Previously we have advocated for stronger Iran sanctions, continued foreign aid, increased military and strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Israel, and additional funding for the Iron Dome anti-missile defensive system. A talking points handout is supplied to all Mission attendees before the event to bring them up to speed on the latest, most pressing issues.

How are NORPAC’s Talking Points for 2013 ”different” from all other years? They aren’t. Senate and House members are being asked whether or not they support the $3.1 billion earmarked for US military assistance to Israel plus $221 million more to fund Israel’s Iron Dome program in the 2014 federal budget, the details of which are currently being negotiated. The busloads of Israel supporters on NORPAC’s Mission and at the conclusion of the AIPAC Policy Conference are there to persuade members of Congress that the political price of even nipping, let alone slashing, military aid to Israel is not one that they will want to pay.

Meanwhile, Defense News reports that Israel is slashing its own military budget, violating a 2007 understanding with Washington that incremental hikes in US annual military aid would not be used to compensate for proportionate cuts in Israel’s defense spending. While US House Speaker John Boehner has declared that repayment of loans to China should be a higher budget priority than paying active duty US troops, members of the Israeli Defense Forces will be receiving a 21% raise. Of course, NORPAC’s Talking Points won’t be mentioning that.

Besides preserving military assistance to Israel in the 2014 budget, NORPAC is asking House members to sign on as co-sponsors of House Resolution 850, which, as a New York Times editorial points out, “would pile on tougher sanctions [on Iran] just as the two sides are trying to create trust after decades of hostility.” Senators are meanwhile being asked to co-sponsor Senate Resolution 65, which makes it increasingly likely that the US will be dragged into a war with Iran if Israel initiates one, despite the disclaimer that the Resolution does not actually authorize military action. The language of the original bill, introduced in the Senate in late February by Democrat Robert Menendez and Republican Lindsey Graham, initially granted Israel full US support if it chose to attack Iran in “self-defense,” which some Senate staffers viewed with alarm as “a back door to war”, according to Ori Nir of Americans for Peace Now. But it  now includes the phrase “legitimate self-defense.” Even with the APN-approved language, concerns remain that the passage of S. 65 increases the likelihood that the US would not only support an Israeli initiated war with Iran but also be dragged into it.

The last item on NORPAC’s wish list is the demand that members from both houses of Congress sponsor and support H.R. 938 and S. 462 – The United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act — two parallel bills in the House and Senate that upgrade Israel to the unique status of a “strategic partner” of the U.S. Ironically, the authors of NORPAC’s Talking Points seem unaware that the hold-up in the passage of these bills comes from the Israeli side, not Congress.

One provision of the “strategic partnership” is the mutual waiving of visa requirements for Israelis entering the US and Americans entering Israel. Israel’s problem with this provision in what Lara Friedman calls the Best Ally with Benefits bills is that Israel wants the right to impose restrictions on Americans of Arab or Muslim descent or on anyone whose political views it deems questionable or undesirable.

Currently, the rate of rejection of Americans seeking to enter Israel exceeds 3%, the maximum allowing threshold for reciprocal visa-free agreements between the US and other countries. US senators are bending over backwards to accommodate the pro-Israel lobby’s efforts to help Israel evade the requirements of visa reciprocity in exchange for the “strategic partnership” proposed by AIPAC and advocated for by NORPAC.

The Senate bill sponsored by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) proposes that Israel be granted visa waiver status if the Secretary of State determines that Israel “has made every reasonable effort, without jeopardizing the security of the State of Israel, to ensure that reciprocal travel privileges are extended to all United States citizens.” According to Mike Coogan,“Attorneys for both individual members and committees privately advised that complying…would be a flagrant violation of certain U.S. laws barring discrimination, and would undermine the U.S. government’s call for the equal protection of all its citizens traveling abroad.”

Promoting the upcoming Mission in the New Jersey Jewish News last week, NORPAC President Ben Chouake called May 8 “a day to play an oversized role for Israel.”

The oversized role that a few determined and committed people can play in our nation is astounding. Going down to Washington with NORPAC is a leveraged way of making oneself heard. Our members have made compelling cases and been key players in promoting legislative initiatives. This year we will have about 475 meetings planned for small NORPAC groups. A sincere citizen advocate in Washington is far more compelling than the most sophisticated lobbyist. Each of you that attend the mission has more influence than the 10,000 that stay at home.

Chouake’s article elicited a reader comment by Sherry Rosen, which reads in part:

…my take-away is that the most important issue facing Israel today is the need to encourage Israeli leaders to the negotiating table for peace talks. In the last few days alone, the Arab League has endorsed the idea of a two-state solution based on “comparable” and “minor” land swaps. and the re-endorsement of the official Arab Peace Initiative by non-Palestinian Arab countries is remarkably similar to the American framework that has been put forth for these negotiations.

As a “determined and committed” American Jew myself, I believe that the “oversized role” we can best play in ensuring “the survival of the Jewish homeland and the Jewish people” is to seize the opportunity that this window of hope offers. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if thousands of similarly passionate American Zionists were to meet with Congressional leaders, on May 8 or any other day, and express our abiding desire for a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than confine our powerful voices to perpetuating concerns couched in the language of threats, defense, and funding sophisticated weaponry?  Who knows?  It might actually work.

NORPAC wants to make sure that their members of Congress never find out.

by Mitchell Plitnick

In an article published in The Hill, Mike Coogan reports that some of the key legislation that emerged from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) 2013 annual policy conference is running into significant difficulties in Congress. The bills, which Lara Friedman only half-jokingly called [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Mitchell Plitnick

In an article published in The Hill, Mike Coogan reports that some of the key legislation that emerged from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) 2013 annual policy conference is running into significant difficulties in Congress. The bills, which Lara Friedman only half-jokingly called the “Israel Best Ally With Benefits” bills, have not gained close to the overwhelming support that AIPAC has come to expect from Congress.

Indeed, more than five weeks after the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013 was introduced in the Senate, it has gathered only 18 co-sponsors. That’s a shockingly low total for a focal point of AIPAC lobbying. It has done better in the House of Representatives, with 171 co-sponsors, but given the more hawkish nature of the House, even that’s not a success by AIPAC’s standards.

While one shouldn’t make too much of this, it certainly seems like AIPAC reached a little too far with this bill. The main issue is a portion of the bill which, in the Senate version, would grant a US visa exemption for Israeli citizens without requiring a reciprocal arrangement from Israel. The US has visa exemption arrangements with 37 other countries, but all of them reciprocate.

Ron Kampeas quotes a staffer from a leading pro-Israel lawmaker in the US House of Representatives as saying that “It’s stunning that you would give a green light to another country to violate the civil liberties of Americans traveling abroad.”

The US concern is particularly profound after a Palestinian-American, who taught English at the Friends’ School in Ramallah, was barred by Israel in January from returning to her West Bank job after a trip to Jordan, despite having a visa that allowed her to leave and re-enter Israeli-controlled territory. Israel, undoubtedly, is concerned that a reciprocal agreement would compromise its ability to bar not only Palestinian-Americans, but also pro-Palestinian activists, from entering the country.

The House version of the bill does not exempt Israel from reciprocity, but merely calls on the Secretary of State to report to Congress on the extent of Israel’s compliance with the reciprocity requirement and “…what additional steps, if any, are required in order for Israel to qualify for inclusion in such program.” That may be one reason the House bill has done better.

The bill includes other troublesome aspects. Friedman points out that the Senate bill includes shockingly weak language in support of a two-state solution: “…language that disconnects the issue from U.S. national security interests and in doing so creates a formulation that inconsistent with the actual foreign policy of the Obama Administration or ANY previous administration.”

Even so, it remains surprising that a bill that emerged as a focal point from an AIPAC policy conference would have this much trouble. Coogan thinks this is a sign that AIPAC’s grip on Congress might be weakening.

It certainly adds to a sense that AIPAC might have reached a tipping point. Equally telling is what Coogan says about how AIPAC brought this bill to the Hill: “Numerous public reports and off-the-record accounts from legislators and staff signaled that the brazenness and late release of the Israel lobby’s legislative demands blindsided both individual members and various committees. Provisions appeared tone deaf and legally problematic, even among Israel’s strongest supporters.”

I haven’t been able to locate those “numerous public reports,” but my own sense from talking to people on Capitol Hill and other informed colleagues is that there is indeed some tension there. That’s on top of congressional bristling at AIPAC’s efforts to exempt aid to Israel from the sequestration cuts. Dylan Williams of J Street told The Forward that the possibility that AIPAC might try to lobby for exempting aid to Israel from the sequester “…seems a little tone deaf,” and that some Hill staffers were “surprised that some groups — that people from AIPAC — were asking for this.”

Does all this mean AIPAC is losing its grip? Probably not, but as members of Congress grow less enthusiastic about complying with AIPAC’s demands, the possibility that more politicians will test the widely-held but unproven maxim that opposing AIPAC is electoral suicide arises. That could make things very interesting.