by Henry Precht

A bunch of fanatic radicals is on the verge of inflicting grievous damage on the traditional states of the Middle East. Only sensible, but also radical changes in American policy can hope to arrest their advance. The first business is to understand what can’t be changed, what bits of [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Henry Precht

A bunch of fanatic radicals is on the verge of inflicting grievous damage on the traditional states of the Middle East. Only sensible, but also radical changes in American policy can hope to arrest their advance. The first business is to understand what can’t be changed, what bits of history can’t be rewritten:

• The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) cannot be caused to disappear. Its seizure of Mosul and other Iraqi and Syrian towns appears to be supported at least partially by their Sunni populations who bitterly resent their nation’s non-Sunni leaders. Their like has succeeded before in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
• President Bashar al-Assad’s hands are stained with too much blood of his countrymen. He must go, albeit with a measure of grace permitted in his exit. Elements of his regime might be combined with secular oppositionists in a new setup.
• Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also must stand aside. He, like other rulers (Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi) who were previously denied office, was too greedy and refused to share power with his competitors. Another Shia grandee willing to join with acceptable Sunni elders must replace him.
• The Kurdish occupation of Erbil should be ignored — especially if Peshmerga troops are to be helpful against ISIS.

Next we turn to changes that are essential if the ISIS uprising is to be managed:

• Washington must realize that it has been backing the wrong side in the Syrian civil war. We mistakenly thought that the moderate, free market democrats opposed to Assad could bring him down. They simply couldn’t compete and were outclassed by ISIS and like-minded Islamic extremists. Not so long before the strife began, Washington quietly applauded Assad’s struggle against al-Qaeda. As distasteful a dictator as he might be, he and we were brought together by a common enemy. Using an international front with Russia and others, the US ought to let it be known that Damascus deserves help in the fight against ISIS before a replacement government can be set up.
• Taking an even bigger bite of crow meat, the US should acknowledge Iran’s importance in bottling up ISIS with units of its armed forces. To secure further cooperation, Obama and Co. should accept a reasonable nuclear deal with Rouhani rather than insisting on deal-destroying, but unnecessary, terms favored by Israel.
• Egypt might also be enlisted in this effort.
• Saudi Arabia, which has supported Sunni fanatics against Shia across the region, should be told that such behavior is inconsistent with a close defense relationship. The same message should be delivered to other Gulf regimes and intended as well for their ISIS-funding private citizens.
• Turkey and Jordan must be led to see that their borders with Syria need to be closed to the movement of fighters and their armaments. Otherwise they could be future ISIS targets.
• Iraq and Syria should be strongly encouraged to move to a decentralized, federal system of government. Funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction must be mobilized with cash coming from the Arabian Peninsula.
• Israel and its friends in Congress would be briefed on plans in general, but not allowed to impede them.

An alternative US-led plan to defeat or contain ISIS would involve supplying arms to the Iraqi forces (which have been proved to be in no shape to employ them) or mounting drone attacks and other surgical strikes — with the same probable results as seen on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. If US planes or troops are used against ISIS, their retaliation against American targets can be expected.

The guiding principle for America in this crisis ought to be to stay out and to remain as far back as possible, leaving the heavy lifting to those regional states — however previously repugnant — to do the needful.

This article was first published by LobeLog.

Photo: President Barack Obama convenes an Oval Office meeting with his national security team to discuss the situation in Iraq, June 13, 2014. Credit: White House/Pete Souza

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by Mark N. Katz

The radical jihadist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL or ISIS), has seized much of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartland and reached the outskirts of Baghdad. The armed forces of Iraq’s US-backed, Shia majority elected dictatorship have not only failed to prevent this, but are also [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mark N. Katz

The radical jihadist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL or ISIS), has seized much of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartland and reached the outskirts of Baghdad. The armed forces of Iraq’s US-backed, Shia majority elected dictatorship have not only failed to prevent this, but are also fleeing as ISIS advances.

There is a real possibility that the government of Nouri al-Maliki will fall, and that ISIS will be able to reassert Sunni Arab minority rule over Iraq, which existed under Saddam Hussein and well before him. An ISIS in charge of Iraq will also be able to aid its beleaguered compatriots in Syria fighting the Assad regime, as well as help Sunni jihadists in other neighboring countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and perhaps even Iran (where there is indeed a large Sunni population believed to be highly disaffected from Tehran’s Shia rulers).

What is currently happening in Iraq does not serve the interests of America, its Western and Arab allies, or anyone except the jihadists. The Obama administration, however, is not going to re-intervene in Iraq now after only recently ending the long, costly, and inconclusive US-led intervention there, as well as winding down a similar one in Afghanistan. Congress and the American public are unlikely to support intervention anyway, as the widespread US domestic opposition to Obama’s 2013 request for congressional approval for a much more limited strike on Syria demonstrated.

Can anything, then, be done to stop ISIS from seizing more of Iraq, including Baghdad? Or, under the current circumstances, is that simply inevitable?

Nothing is inevitable. The rise of ISIS so far has less to do with its strength than with the weakness of its main adversary, the Maliki government. Right now, ISIS’s “control” is quite tenuous. Indeed, ISIS might be just as surprised as everyone else that the collapse of the Maliki government has created a vacuum allowing it to move in. Still, ISIS’ newfound gains also mean that its forces are likely stretched thin — and thus vulnerable — at present.

There are accordingly policy options for halting the spread of ISIS and even rolling it back that exist between US intervention on the one hand and doing nothing on the other. One of the most important of these arises from the fact that ISIS is not only opposed by the U.S., but also by neighboring states and important groups inside Iraq. Indeed, the rise of ISIS threatens these local and regional actors far more than it does the U.S., thus giving Washington opportunities to support those who are strongly motivated to resist this jihadist militia. These include:

The Kurds: While the Maliki government’s forces have fled from ISIS, the Kurdish Regional Authority has made clear that it intends to resist and has already seized control of the divided northern city of Kirkuk.

Shia Arabs: The Maliki government’s impotence notwithstanding, the Iraqi Arab Shia majority has a very strong incentive to oppose ISIS’ efforts to re-impose a Sunni minority regime upon them.

Anti-Jihadist Sunni Arabs: While Sunni Arabs initially resisted the American-led military intervention and supported ISIS’ predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), many Sunni Arab tribesmen later allied with the U.S. against AQI since it was increasingly attacking them. These Sunni tribes, whom Maliki alienated when America withdrew, have not forgotten how al-Qaeda treated them — and ISIS has not forgotten how these tribes fought with the Americans.

Iran: Despite the many differences between Washington and Tehran, one common interest (that is seldom recognized publicly) is that both fear the rise of radical Sunni jihadist movements, including ISIS.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan: Despite their fears of Iran and their support for the opposition to Tehran’s ally, the Assad regime, these Sunni Arab monarchies in particular have strong reason to fear that the rise of jihadist forces in Iraq will threaten them sooner or later (indeed, this will probably happen sooner rather than later).

There are, then, plenty of local and regional actors that are strongly motivated to resist the rise of ISIS that the US and others can either actively or (in Iran’s case) passively support. The problem, of course, is that these actors often distrust each other and act at cross-purposes. An American diplomatic initiative, though, could help minimize these differences.

Essentially, what everyone needs to understand is that Iraq is simply too fractious to be successfully ruled by a strong central government. Instead, it can either exist as a federation, in which each of its three main communities has autonomy within the area of the country where it is the majority, or co-exist as three de facto, or even de jure, independent states. And, even if the borders between these three regions cannot be completely agreed upon, the areas of disagreement can be minimized and arrangements made to accommodate contested mixed areas in particular.

Those who object to cooperation with Iran on the basis that they are anti-American should be reminded that despite their differences, the US and Iran were able to cooperate to some extent against the Taliban in the early stages of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, and that Iran gave more support to the US-backed Maliki government than any of Washington’s Sunni Arab allies. We have already proved, in other words, that we can cooperate pragmatically when our interests are at stake.

Those who object to cooperation with Saudi Arabia on the basis that it supported al-Qaeda elements in the past should be reminded that after al-Qaeda began launching attacks inside the kingdom in 2003, Riyadh well understood that Sunni jihadists will attack it when the opportunity arises.

Finally, those who object to cooperation with the Kurds on the basis that Turkey, among others, will object should be reminded that Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Authority in Northern Iraq have established a remarkable degree of economic cooperation, that Turkey has its own internal Sunni jihadist problem, and that a strong Kurdish government in Northern Iraq helps protect Turkey from ISIS or similar groups, which would probably attack Turkey from Iraq if they could.

ISIS will not prevail because it has suddenly grown much stronger. ISIS can prevail, though, if those who could work with one another to stop it fail to do so.

Photo: A screenshot from a video purportedly showing an execution of a man by ISIS.

This article was first published by LobeLog. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook