Justice is a fiction in much of the Persian Gulf. Nowhere is this truer than in Bahrain, a place where torture and state terror have become the norm. The country’s political elites talk frequently about freedom and the need for legal and political order. The reality, however, is that Bahrain’s judicial [...]]]>
Justice is a fiction in much of the Persian Gulf. Nowhere is this truer than in Bahrain, a place where torture and state terror have become the norm. The country’s political elites talk frequently about freedom and the need for legal and political order. The reality, however, is that Bahrain’s judicial system is little more than theater. The courts are sites in which freedoms are not assured, but where they are subordinated to the whims of centralized tyranny. Over the last two years, Bahrain has blithely ignored almost all of its domestic and international commitments to refrain from torture, to protect free speech and to honor due process, all conventions that the country has ostensibly built into its “constitutional” order.
In the most recent instance, the country’s highest court upheld lengthy prison sentences for 13 prominent human rights and political activists, including life imprisonment in some of the world’s most brutal dungeons. Having already been subjected to late night abductions, military tribunals, torture, and false accusation, it is hardly surprising that the imprisoned were unable to find relief in Bahrain’s sham appeals process.
More remarkable is the unwillingness of Bahrain’s most important Western patron, the United States, to openly acknowledge that its partner and host to the 5th Fleet is not merely managing its way through a crisis, but building a regime of fear and violence all while claiming the opposite. In her comments yesterday at the State Department’s daily briefing, spokesperson Victoria Nuland offered what has become a familiar refrain — a mild rebuke dressed up in principle, but one that makes clear that the US is unwilling to say or do more.
The US position on Bahrain’s excesses, in ways that are eerily similar to the island country’s own theatrical posturing, is more histrionic than substantive. Clearly, in spite of their claims otherwise, American leaders are mostly content with the status quo. Nuland expressed “regret” and “concern” about Bahrain’s high court’s decision to uphold the convictions of key opposition figures yesterday. She added “that this decision further restricts freedom of expression and compromises the atmosphere within Bahrain for reconciliation.”
The reality is that there is nothing further to restrict. The only clear willingness for reconciliation has come from the country’s opposition, not the government. In also calling for further investigations into torture and accountability, Ms. Nuland asks her listeners to suspend disbelief and to consider seriously that Bahrain has any real interest in the pursuit of a meaningful resolution. It has been clear for two years that Bahrain’s leaders desire victory and vengeance, the total destruction of the democratic opposition.
While American leaders almost certainly would prefer a political resolution to Bahrain’s challenges, they have done little to help advance the cause. Bahrain’s leaders have learned that mild admonishment is a small price to pay while they consolidate a new era of authoritarianism. They understand that the American approach is feeble and feckless, if often justified, because of Bahrain’s strategic significance. Long a reliable partner in the US mission to police and patrol the Persian Gulf and to ensure the “flow of oil,” American unwillingness to come down too hard on Manama is also a sign of deference to Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has little interest in seeing Bahrain’s opposition enjoy political gain.
It is, however, well past time to think seriously about whether US strategy in the Gulf is working or, instead, whether it helps abet the very conditions of instability that threaten the region and prospects for more open and durable regional politics. The reality is that oil’s flow does not need protecting. Bahrain does not deserve a pass because it is home to American military facilities.
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According to Serwer, self-defense and foreign intervention are indeed “justified”, but that does not mean they are necessarily “possible or wise”. He ultimately concludes that “they do not appear to be”, citing as reasons the Free Syrian Army’s (FSA) inability to protect civilians against President Bashar al-Assad’s militarily superior forces and the decreased likelihood of Assad’s soldiers defecting if the FSA is violent. Serwer’s alternative to violent resistance follows:
There are a number of options, few of which have been tried. Banging pans at a fixed hour of the night is a tried and true protest technique that demonstrates and encourages opposition, but makes it hard for the authorities to figure out just who is opposing them. The Arab variation is Allahu akbar called out for 15 minutes every evening. A Libyan who helped organize the revolutionary takeover of Tripoli explained to me that their effort began with hundreds of empty mosques playing the call to prayer, recorded on CDs, at an odd hour over their loudspeakers. A general strike gives clear political signals and makes it hard for the authorities to punish all those involved. Coordinated graffiti, marking sidewalks with identical symbols, wearing of the national flag — consult Gene Sharp’s 198 methods for more.
I wondered how opponents of Assad would respond to Serwer’s urging of nonviolence, which he expands upon in his blog. According to Robin Yassin-Kassab, a Syrian-British author and frequent commentator on Mideast affairs, the arming of the FSA is “not a good thing” because “Syria is probably entering a period of civil war in which Iran and Russia arm the regime and the Gulf and Turkey arm the free people.” But he also argued that non-violent protestors will be “marginalized” and “the emergence and arming of the FSA is now inevitable and also, paradoxically, necessary.” Yassin-Kassab was adamant that “the people must, and will, defend themselves” and provided a grim outlook on the situation, stating that we’re unlikely to see a “democratic outcome” at least not until “some years of carnage have passed.”
Like Yassin-Kassab, Syrian blogger Maysaloon is based outside of the country. He agreed with much of Serwer’s arguments, in particular his recommendation that the FSA refrain from trying to match the Syrian army and limit itself to protecting civilians instead. “It would be foolhardy and counter productive if they start going around trying to be a conventional army – that would guarantee their destruction,” he said. But Maysaloon added that much of what Serwer is calling for “is already being done”:
The kind of non-violent resistance that he is calling for has been taking place since the first days of the revolution, and in tandem with the growing militarisation and violence. It is still happening: see the colouring of a fountain in Damascus to the colour red; the planting of independence day flags throughout Damascus; daily strikes and mini-protests throughout the night and all over the country.
I’m surprised that the author doesn’t seem aware of that and thinks he’s telling Syrians anything they don’t already know.
These are Syrian opinions of U.S. commentary about Syrian affairs. Other voices have also entered the debate, with arguments challenging the dominant narrative on Syria and for bargaining with Assad being published in the New York Times. Yesterday, Foreign Policy also published a scathing article by author and pundit, David Rieff, who criticized liberals for invoking the “so-called “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine” to justify “humanitarian war”.
But while analysts are debating policy and powerful government officials are expressing outrage, Syrians are enduring horrifying human rights abuses. How much is there left to add to this discussion, and is there really no end in sight for the people?
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