Last week, I met her again. This time, she was carrying something entirely different: a school bag that belonged to her four-year-old daughter Amlu. Lakshmi was a free citizen and Amlu was going to school for the first time.
Separating our two meetings is a story that was published by IPS entitled ‘No Choice but to Work Without Pay’. It was this article that stirred action on the ground, paving the way for Lakshmi’s release.
Here is how it all happened:
Sri Lakshmi, a recently released forced labourer, and her four-year-old daughter Amlu. Credit: Stella Paul/IPS
Though I hadn’t reported on the issue before, I was excited about a series IPS was putting together on the growing menace of forced labour worldwide.
I began by reaching out to activists in my region who work with daily wage labourers and rescue many forced workers. I spoke with people employed in brick kilns, on paddy farms and in individual homes as domestic help.
My own neighbourhood of Huda Sainagar, close to Vanasthalipuram, had been witnessing a construction boom, with over a dozen buildings being constructed every day. Every now and then I would see groups of people being brought in trucks and ‘unloaded’ – like cargo – at the construction site.
There were men, women and small kids. Some of them went back quickly, while others built makeshift tents out of polythene sheets and lived there. Usually, these were the forced labourers who had no fixed ‘work hours’ and toiled all day, from dawn to dusk.
Once day I saw a very small child washing plates near a shack. The next day, she was washing clothes. Her hands were so small she couldn’t hold the soap in her hands. This was Amlu, daughter of Lakshmi, a Dalit woman who worked in a nearby building.
I had to wait until it got dark to speak with Lakshmi, as her employer didn’t allow her to take a break or speak with anyone. When we did speak, she told me that she was working against her will and that she wasn’t paid any money for her labour.
Though the focus of my story was forced labor, I was also equally drawn to its consequences. It was clear to me that if Lakshmi continued to labour in this way, Amlu would not go to school and would soon become a child labourer herself.
This really distressed me. So I did what I usually do in such situations: reminded myself that I was a storyteller who gave a voice to unheard people. And I filed a story.
Being a huge fan of the reach of social media, I always track the impact of IPS stories, which often travel far and wide across countries.
As this particular story traveled on twitter, it reached a local journalist in Hyderabad, capital of the South Indian state of Telengana, who shared it with his friend, who is a doctor and a human rights activist named Veerappa Naidu.
Last week, I received an email from Naidu, in which he confessed to being greatly disturbed to hear of Lakshmi’s plight. So he, along with two of his local friends, sought out Lakshmi’s employer – a real estate developer – and confronted him.
The result was better than could have been expected: the employer released Lakshmi from forced labour and paid her 10,000 Indian rupees (approximate 200 dollars). Naidu and his friends then helped Amlu get into a government school, where she can study for free.
Since being released, Lakshmi has found a job as a nanny in the same neighbourhood. Amlu’s hands haven’t grown much in the few months since I first met her, but they are now holding books and pencils. “I love to draw,” she told me, holding up a coloured pencil.
Lakshmi has used part of her 10,000 rupees to buy Amlu a uniform, a pair of shoes and a school bag. And every day, at nine a.m., she takes Amlu to school – a place she never had the opportunity to go before.
“I am thankful to everyone who has helped me get out (of forced labour) and has helped my daughter to attend school,” she told me.
As a journalist, I have always believed that media can be an effective tool to bring about social change. This story has just deepened my faith.
(END)
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Indian school girls. Credit:IPS
Jointly sponsored by UNDP and OECD, the High-Level Meeting intended to demonstrate progress towards truly global partnerships between governments, business and civil society in making development co-operation more effective and sustainable. But opening remarks by leaders of the two sponsoring agencies and the plenary panel discussion seemed largely focused on ‘aid effectiveness’. Concepts of risk management, improving public finance management and procurement systems of recipient countries, predictability of aid flows and monitoring results to report to donor countries’ parliaments were the main discussion points. Progress on these aspects seemed to be the dominant concern of sponsors and panellists.
In break-out groups, aid continued to be the focus around which issues of ownership, transparency and partnerships were being constructed and realised.
As a delegate from India –now a large middle-income country (MIC) with high levels of poverty, despite its rapid economic growth during the past decade– these conversations seemed to me somewhat irrelevant and dated. Instead, critical issues of malnutrition, violence against women, social inclusion and sustainable livelihoods need to be tackled in India through improved democratic governance, transparency and accountability. Domestic resources are adequate for addressing these issues in my country, but they are not deployed in an efficient and productive manner.
This significant gathering in Mexico of over 1,500 delegates from around the world raised important questions for the future of development co-operation. Is a new global partnership being constructed around the old issues of ODA? Are lingering concerns of aid effectiveness from Paris and Accra still unresolved 30 months after Busan? Will a new age of development co-operation be able to break free from previous ODA (Official Development Aid) frameworks? Will new actors in the development arena — large emerging economies such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other middle income countries– find resonance of their principles and aspirations in future debates? How will local level ground-up partnerships define contextually appropriate development effectiveness, without reference to global actors?
Various focus sessions and plenary presentations during the two-day conference demonstrated several shifting trends. First, emphasis on effective development co-operation was reiterated as an important shift away from Busan. But it was not clear how the effective co-operation framework and indicators would differ from the old ‘aid effectiveness’ paradigm in practice.
Second, inclusive multi-stakeholder partnerships involving governments, civil society, business and thinktanks were agreed to be crucial to achieveing effective development co-operation. What remains ambiguous is how unequal power relations between stakeholders can be handled for meaningful co-operation.
Third, speakers acknowledged the distinctive and unique nature of South-South co-operation, while also aspiring for triangular North-South-South co-operation approaches.
Finally, there was welcome attention to the strengths and development challenges of the MICs. As the president of Mexico reminded the audience, countries like his are both recipients and providers of development assistance and hence able to better empathise with other developing countries.
Non-state actors are becoming more relevant in promoting development effectiveness and civil society organisations from many larger MICs have long worked in solidarity with their counterparts in other developing countries. Now, businesses and thinktanks are also becoming important non-state actors in promoting South-South development co-operation.
The Rising Powers in International Development Programme, hosted by the UK Institute of Development Studies (IDS), is working to build an evidence base around the role of rising powers in international development, producing new thinking and practical guidance on engagement and mutual learning.
The programme’s global delegation attended the Mexico meeting to share lessons from non-state actors’ contributions in the emerging Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and we will continue to strengthen civil society contributions through the new Future International Co-operation Policy Network.
Beyond demanding transparency and accountability around the aid that their own countries still receive, we’ve found that civil society organisations from MICs can add significant value to other countries’ development cooperation. From the four case studies we presented at the High-Level Meeting, we derived four important lessons for taking forward principles and mechanisms of civil society-led South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC).
Firstly, solidarity and trust between cooperation partners can lead to more focused civil society-led South-South cooperation and mobilise broader coalitions for common causes.
Secondly, because civil society-led South South cooperation aspires to be more flexible and adaptable than traditional North-South donor realtionships, it avoids intrusive conditions and creates space for innovation.
Thirdly, a multi-stakeholder approach is essential to ensuring sustainability.
Finally, new methods of measuring SSDC need to be explored to capture the complex effects of civil society-led transnational initiatives.
Alongside governments and businesses, CSOs have been developing innovative practices to contribute to the global struggle against poverty. They have considerable experience and great potential of sharing these practices internationally as well as at home, and their important contributions should not get lost in the state-to-state negotiations that can often become the focus of global initiatives such as the Global Partnership.
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Rajesh Tandon is the Founder and President of Indian civil society organisation Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) and a member of the Future International Cooperation Policy Network.
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by James A. Russell
Russia’s storming of the Ukrainian naval base in Crimea just as Iran and world powers wrapped up another round of negotiations in Vienna earlier this week represent seemingly contradictory bookends to a world that some believe is spinning out of control.
It’s hard not to argue that the [...]]]>
by James A. Russell
Russia’s storming of the Ukrainian naval base in Crimea just as Iran and world powers wrapped up another round of negotiations in Vienna earlier this week represent seemingly contradictory bookends to a world that some believe is spinning out of control.
It’s hard not to argue that the world seems a bit trigger-happy these days. Vladimir Putin’s Russian mafia thugs armed with weapons bought with oil money calmly annex the Crimea. Chinese warships ominously circle obscure shoals in the Western Pacific as Japan and other countries look on nervously. Israel and Hezbollah appear eager to settle scores and start another war in Lebanon. Syria and Libya continue their descent into a medieval-like state of nature as the world looks on not quite knowing what to do.
The icing on the cake is outgoing Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai’s telling the United States to get stuffed and leave his country — after we’ve spent billions dollars of borrowed money and suffered thousands of casualties over 13 years propping up his corrupt kleptocracy. Karzai and his cronies are laughing all the way to their secret Swiss banks with their pockets stuffed full of US taxpayer dollars. Why the United States thinks it needs to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan remains a mystery — but that’s another story altogether.
In the United States, noted foreign policy experts like Senator John McCain, Lindsey Graham and Condoleeza Rice have greeted these developments with howls of protest and with a call to arms to reassert America’s global leadership to tame a world that looks like it’s spinning out of control. They appear to believe that we should somehow use force or the threat of force as an instrument to restore order. Never mind that these commentators have exercised uniformly bad judgment on nearly all the major foreign policy issues of the last decade.
The protests of these commentators notwithstanding, however, it is worth engaging in a debate about what all these events really mean; whether they are somehow linked and perhaps emblematic of a more important structural shift in international politics towards a more warlike environment. For the United States, these developments come as the Obama administration sensibly tries to take the country’s military off a permanent war-footing and slow the growth in the defense budget — a budget that will still see the United States spend more on its military than most of the rest of the world combined.
The first issue is whether the events in Crimea are emblematic of a global system in which developed states may reconsider the basic calculus that has governed decision-making since World War II — that going to war doesn’t pay. Putin may have correctly calculated that the West doesn’t care enough about Crimea to militarily stop Russia, but would the same calculus apply to Moldova, Poland, or some part of Eastern Europe? Similarly, would the Central Committee in Beijing risk a wider war in the Pacific over the bits of rocks in the South China Sea that are claimed by various countries?
While we can’t know the answer to these questions, the political leadership of both Russia and China clearly would face significant political, economic, and military costs in choosing to exercise force in a dispute in which the world’s developed states could not or would not back down. These considerations remain a powerful deterrent to a resumption of war between the developed states, events in Crimea notwithstanding– although miscalculations by foolhardy leaders are always a possibility. Putin could have chosen some other piece of real estate that might have led to a different reaction by the West, but it seems unlikely.
The second kind of inter-state dispute troubling the system are those between countries/actors that have a healthy dislike for one another. Clearly, the most dangerous of these situations is the relationship between India and Pakistan — two nuclear-armed states that have been exchanging fire directly and indirectly for much of the last half century. By the same token, however, there is really nothing new in this dispute that has remained a constant since both states were created after Britain’s departure from the subcontinent.
Similarly, the situation in the Middle East stemming from Israel’s still unfinished wars of independence remains a constant source of regional instability. Maybe one day, Israel and its neighbors will finally decide on a set of agreeable borders, but until they do we can all expect them to resort to occasional violence until the issue is settled. Regrettably, neither Israel nor its neighbors shows any real interest in peaceful accommodation.
The third kind of war is the intra-national conflicts like those in Syria, the Congo, and Libya that some believe is emblematic of a more general slide into a global state-of-nature Hobbesian world in which the weak perish and the strong survive. If this is the case, what if anything can be done about it?
Here again, however, we have to wonder what if anything is new with these wars. As much as we might not like it, internal political evolution in developing states can and often does turn violent until winners emerge. The West’s own evolution in Europe took hundreds of years of bloodshed until winners emerged and eventually established political systems capable of resolving disputes peacefully through politics and national institutions. The chaos in places like Syria, the Congo, Libya, and Afghanistan has actually been the norm of international politics over much of the last century — not the exception.
This returns us to the other bookend cited at the outset of this piece — the reconvened negotiations in Vienna that are attempting to resolve the standoff between Iran and the international community. These meetings point to perhaps the most significant change in the international system over the last century that has seen global institutions emerge as mechanisms to control state behavior through an incentive structure that discourages war and encourages compliance with generally accepted behavioral norms.
These institutions, such as the United Nations, and their supporting regulatory structures like the International Atomic Energy Agency have helped establish new behavioral norms and impose costs on states that do not comply with the norms. While we cannot be certain of what caused Iran to seek a negotiated solution to its standoff with the international community over its nuclear program, it is clear that the international community has imposed significant economic costs on Iran over the last eight years of ever-tightening sanctions.
Similarly, that same set of global institutions and regulatory regimes supported by the United States will almost certainly impose sanctions that will increase the costs of Putin’s violation of international norms in Russia’s seizure of Crimea. Those costs will build up over time, just as they have for Iran and other states like North Korea that find themselves outside of the general global political and economic system. As Iran has discovered, and as Russia will also discover — it’s an expensive and arguably unsustainable proposition to be the object of international obloquy.
For those hawks arguing for a more militarized US response to these disparate events, it’s worth returning to George F. Kennan’s basic argument for a patient, defensive global posture. Kennan argued that inherent US and Western strength would see it through the Cold War and triumph over its weaker foes in the Kremlin. As Kennan correctly noted: we were strong, they were weaker. Time was on our side, not theirs. The world’s networked political and economic institutions only reinforce the strength of the West and those other members of the international community that choose to play by the accepted rules for peaceful global interaction.
The same holds true today. Putin’s Russia is a paper tiger that is awash in oil money but with huge structural problems. Russia’s corrupt, mafia-like dictatorship will weaken over time as it is excluded from the system of global political and economic interactions that rewards those that play by the rules and penalizes those that don’t.
As for other wars around the world in places like Syria, we need to recognize they are part of the durable disorder of global politics that cannot necessarily be managed despite the awful plight of the poor innocent civilians and children — who always bear the costs of these tragic conflicts.
We need to calm down and recognize that the international system is not becoming unglued; it is simply exhibiting immutable characteristics that have been with us for much of recorded history. We should, however, be more confident of the ability of the system (with US leadership) to police itself and avoid rash decisions that will only make these situations worse.
Photo: A Russian armoured personnel carrier in Simferopol, the provincial capital of Crimea. Credit: Zack Baddorf/IPS.
]]>“Operation West End“ – a sting carried out by two young journalists commissioned by the [...]]]>
“Operation West End“ – a sting carried out by two young journalists commissioned by the news site Tehelka (which literally means ‘sensation’) – changed the landscape of investigative journalism in India.
One hundred hours of footage and nearly $23,000 worth of bribes later, the public became privy to the rot at the core of the country’s political sphere: where high-level officials allowed themselves to be caught on tape accepting wads of cash in exchange for arms deals with Tehelka’s fictitious Regent Street-based weapons manufacturer ‘West End’.
Among those exposed by the sting operation were Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) President Bangaru Laxman, Samata Party President Jaya Jaitley, and Brajesh Mishra, who at the time was serving as the National Security to then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
Those familiar with the politics of the Hindu right wing recognized that these were not men who would take criticism lightly. Death threats came thick and fast to the doorstep of founding editor Tarun Tejpal. Tehelka’s investors were put behind bars. Police officers dug through the website’s coffers in search of any anomaly that would justify silencing the outspoken crew.
An office of 104 was reduced to just four in a matter of months.
But the ramparts of India’s free press held strong. The website re-launched as a magazine and became one of the loudest voices in the shrinking space of liberal, left-of-center debate.
Though the politicians were eventually forced to suspend their attack on Tehelka, the magazine’s insistence on exposing corruption and criminality within the ranks of the BJP kept the old grudge alive.
Today, 13 years after Operation West End – with Tejpal incarcerated in a Goa prison and the magazine whittled down to about 1/8 its former size – India’s media world is seeing just how deep the vendetta goes.
If your questions lies in the realm of “how and why” this happened, the answers can only be found in the worrying currents that are lapping at the foundation of the country’s fourth estate: the power and influence of the Hindu right.
Tejpal today stands accused of sexually assaulting a colleague at an event hosted annually by the magazine in the Western state of Goa. The case is based on several emails leaked to the press by the alleged victim, and Tejpal’s own decision (also leaked to the press) to step down from his position as editor-in-chief following the accusation.
The facts surrounding the case are heavily disputed. Tejpal has denied the allegation, while his former colleague stands firm that the incident amounted to rape under India’s revised penal code. CCTV footage from the night in question has yet to be released to the public.
Activists of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), linked to India’s main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), shout slogans during a protest against Tarun Tejpal, editor-in-chief of India’s leading investigative magazine, Tehelka, in New Delhi, Nov. 22, 2013. Credit: Adnan Abidi/Reuters
What cannot be disputed is the Indian government’s swift reaction to this case, with the police breaking rest until Tejpal was behind bars.
But in the hubbub of the high-profile sex scandal, few have asked how a country usually so slow to respond to violations of women’s health and safety (let us never forget Jyoti Singh Pandey, who lay naked and battered on the side of a Delhi highway for several hours before anyone came to her aid) has been roused from its stupor to tackle this particular incident
Those who do ask are finding, as “Operation West End” found, the rot.
Arun Jaitley was the first person to name the incident a rape – not the alleged victim, not a judge nor medical officer, but a prominent politician with the BJP.
The first public address calling for Tejpal’s arrest was arranged by Meenakshi Lekhi – not a women’s rights activist, nor a police representative, but the spokesperson for the BJP.
Who first gloated, before Indian national media, that this incident would spell the end of Tehelka? Not media analysts or experts, but Bangaru Laxman, former BJP president, and the very same man who was caught on tape during Operation West End.
Meanwhile, Jaya Jaitley, whose name you will recall from the beginning of this piece, has used the media scandal as a platform from which to denounce the validity of Operation West End and its findings.
Few newsrooms have stitched these details together in a coherent narrative. Most are either reporting from outside the courtroom or from the lofty platform of women’s rights, where Tejpal has been branded guilty until proven innocent.
If the BJP’s crusade against Tehelka has been lost in the headlines about the entire episode, the Goa police have had an even better deal. Save for a lone article in the Times of India, no mention has been made of the hundreds of unsolved crimes simmering in the very state that hastened to open the gates of its Vasco jail to Tejpal.
Ironically, it was here, in Vasco, where a schoolgirl was raped in early 2013. The perpetrator, though identified, got away scot-free, joining the ranks of scores of thieves, rapists and gangsters who have evaded the local police force all year. Even the murders of local tourists and foreign nationals did not elicit the prompt police action that followed the case against Tejpal.
Goa’s Chief Minister Manohar Parrikar, otherwise known as the man holding the state’s purse strings and prison keys, also heppens to be a proud member of the BJP.
Pundits have painted what is now dubbed the ‘Tejpal/Tehelka Scandal’ as a victory for Indian women. A young journalist makes a stand for her rights, and presto – the accused is clapped in a cell. The world is safe once more.
But when politicians are able to seize upon and manipulate an incident of this nature to fulfill forgotten ends, the world is not safe. A magazine that was once a beacon is singing a swan song, and no one is asking about the hooded figures dancing on the freshly dug earth of its grave.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
Press reports about medical supply shortages in Iran, some of which have described devastating consequences, have been surfacing in the last two years, while debate rages on about who’s responsible — the Iranian government or the sanctions regime. Siamak Namazi, a Dubai-based business consultant and former Public Policy [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Press reports about medical supply shortages in Iran, some of which have described devastating consequences, have been surfacing in the last two years, while debate rages on about who’s responsible — the Iranian government or the sanctions regime. Siamak Namazi, a Dubai-based business consultant and former Public Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, admits the Iranian government shares responsibility but says sanctions are the main culprit. Humanitarian trade may be exempted from the sanctions, says Namazi, but that isn’t enough when the banking valve required to carry out the transactions is being strangled. “[I]f [sanctions advocates] maintain the sanctions regime is fine as it is, then how come they try to promote substitution from China and India?” asks Namazi. The following Q&A with Namazi was conducted in Washington, DC.
Q: You recently authored a policy paper published by the Woodrow Wilson Center where you essentially blame medical shortages in Iran on Western sanctions. How did you reach this conclusion?
Siamak Namazi: We concluded that the Iranian government deserves firm criticism for mismanagement of the crisis, poor allocation of scarce foreign currency resources and failing to crack down on corrupt practices, but the main culprit are the sanctions that regulate financial transactions with Iran. So, while Tehran can and should take further steps to improve the situation, it cannot solve this problem on its own. As sanctions are tightened more and more, things are likely to get worse unless barriers to humanitarian trade are removed through narrow adjustments to the sanctions regime.
My team and I reached these conclusions after interviewing senior officers among pharmaceutical suppliers, namely European and American companies in Dubai, as well as private importers and distributors of medicine in Tehran. We also spoke to a number of international banks. None of us had any financial stake in the pharmaceutical business, whatsoever, and we all worked pro bono.
Q: What is your basis for this claim given the humanitarian exemptions to the sanctions regime that allow for the trade of food and medicine?
Siamak Namazi: The US Congress deserves kudos for passing a law making it abundantly clear that humanitarian trade in food, agricultural products, medicine and medical devices are exempted from the long list of sanctions against Iran. This law is the reason why the Western pharmaceuticals can do business in Iran. I sincerely applaud that gesture.
Unfortunately, what we see is a case of what lawyers refer to as “frustration of purpose.” Iran can in theory purchase Western medicine, but in practice it is extremely difficult to pay for the lifesaving drugs it needs. Despite the Congressional directive, a number of Executive Orders that restrict financial transactions with Iran remain in place, making it all but impossible to implement that exception.
Sanctions also limit Iran’s access to hard currency. The country’s oil sales are seriously curtailed and have effectively been turned into a virtual barter with the purchasing country, mainly China and India.
Q: Not all Iranian banks are blacklisted by the US and there is a long list of small and large international banks that could carry out humanitarian transactions. Why can’t Iran use these channels for importing the medicine it needs?
Siamak Namazi: The non-designated Iranian banks are small and lack the international infrastructure required to wire money from Tehran to most foreign bank accounts. They rely on intermediary banks to process such transactions. Unfortunately, it’s extremely difficult, if not outright impossible, for these Iranian banks to find such counterparts, even when they are trying to facilitate fully legal humanitarian trade.
In the end, Iran needs to go through many loops and plays a constant cat and mouse game, creatively trying to find a channel to pay its Western suppliers of medicine. Not only does this increase the costs of medicine for the Iranians, it also causes major delays. In the meanwhile, pharmacy shelves run empty of vital drugs and the patient suffers.
Q: Isn’t that just a reflection of the international banks being too cautious rather than shortcomings in US sanctions laws? In a recent testimony to the Senate, US Treasury Undersecretary David Cohen was clear that no special permission is required to sell humanitarian goods to Iran and foreign financial institutions can facilitate these permissible humanitarian transactions.
Siamak Namazi: What Mr. Cohen actually said is that all is fine “as long as the transaction does not involve a U.S.-designated entity,” meaning a sanctioned Iranian bank.
How, exactly, does an international financial institution guarantee that none of Iran’s main banks, all of which are blacklisted, were involved in any part of the long chain involving a foreign currency transfer from Iran? Recall that foreign currency allocation for pharmaceutical imports start with the Central Bank of Iran, which is blacklisted. Maybe the CBI wired these funds to the non-designated Iranian bank from monies it holds in say, Bank Tejarat or Bank Melli, potentially adding further layers of banned banks to the chain.
Given the severity of the risk involved — fines that have reached nearly $2 billion in recent months — international banks seek clear indemnity. They want legal clarification that basically says, “You will not be fined for clearing humanitarian trade with Iran, period.”
So far Treasury has refused to grant such a measure, though recent comments by senior officials suggest that the US government has sent out delegations reassuring the banks, without actually making any changes to the letter of the law. While this is a welcome move, and indeed one of the recommendations in the report published by the Wilson Center, it is far from sufficient.
Q: You say that Iran has a hard time finding a banking channel to pay for Western medicine. At the same time, for the first time in many years, Iran purchased $89 million in wheat from the US in 2012. Why were they able to find a banking channel to pay for wheat, but have difficulty purchasing medicine?
Siamak Namazi: My claim is supported by recent US trade statistics showing that exports of pharmaceuticals to Iran dropped by almost 50 percent, but these numbers are ultimately misleading. My understanding is that US trade data only reflects exports from an American port, directly entering an Iranian port, which is a thin slice of the overall trade. This is while most companies send their goods to Dubai, Europe or Singapore and cover the entire Middle East, including Iran, from these hubs. So, when the statistics refer to a drop of sales of medicine from around $28 million in 2011 to half that figure in 2012, the figure grossly misrepresents the scale of the problem.
Let me stress this point again: the loss of $14 million in American-made drugs does not make for a crisis. The real problem is exponentially bigger than this. We are talking about the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of American and European medicine.
You must also keep in mind supplier power in trade. Wheat is a perfectly substitutable good, so Iran is bound to find one supplier that is willing to sell its wheat with extended credit terms, until it secures the hard currency and banking channel to pay for it. A vital drug is often perfectly un-substitutable; meaning that a single company — most often American or European in the case of the most advanced medicines — enjoys a 20-year patent to manufacture it. So if Iran cannot find a banking channel to reimburse the manufacturer for it, it will have to do without that medicine until it can pay.
Q: Why can’t Iran procure its medicine from China, India or Japan — the countries it’s selling oil to?
Siamak Namazi: Iran has already increased its purchase of medicine and medical equipment from all the countries you listed. However, as I stated earlier, due to the highly regulated and patented nature of the pharmaceutical business, vital drugs are often un-substitutable.
Even when there is an alternative drug made by the Chinese, Indians or Japanese, there is an additional barrier. Medicine has to be registered before its importation is permitted. Just like the US has the Food and Drug Administration, Iran, like most countries, has an equivalent body that must approve the medicine. The specific molecule must be registered after thorough testing. In Iran, this process takes an exceedingly long time and should no doubt be improved, though recently they have taken steps to expedite it by making exceptions. The Ministry of Health sometimes allows a drug that was approved for sale in another country to also be imported and sold in Iran. But this rushed process has had major consequences in terms of side-effects. There are even press reports of deaths when substandard drugs were imported.
To be honest, I don’t understand the logic of the advocates of this solution. They argue that the existing humanitarian waivers are sufficient and claim any shortage of medicine in Iran is the consequence of Tehran’s own mismanagement. I have even heard accusations that Iran is intentionally creating such shortages to create public outrage against the US. But if they maintain the sanctions regime is fine as it is, then how come they try to promote substitution from China and India? Besides denying Iranian patients their right to receive the best treatment there is, aren’t they also rejecting the American pharmaceutical companies’ right to conduct perfectly legitimate business?
Q: To be fair, Iran’s own former health minister, Marzieh Vahid Dasjerdi, also accused the government of failing to allocate the necessary resources and lost her job after doing so.
Siamak Namazi: I actually commend the former health minister for her courageous intervention and have also voiced my concern about the misallocation of hard currency in various forums.
That said, I am not in a position to know or comment on the exact nature or circumstances of her dismissal. I can only reference our direct research and findings. We found and verified ample cases where Iran had allocated hard currency for vital medicine, yet the purchase fell through because they could not find a banking channel. This includes the sale of an anti-rejection drug needed for liver transplants by an American pharmaceutical that ultimately failed. Can you imagine waiting years for a donor and when your operation time arrives, being told that you cannot have it because the drug you need is missing?
You need not take our word for it. It is very easy for the US government to verify our claims by talking to the American pharmaceuticals that do business with Iran, or even by reviewing some of OFACs own files. In fact, the US industry lobby USA*Engage recently wrote a letter refuting Undersecretary Cohen’s claims that American companies have no problems dealing with Iran. In their own words: “Despite … clear Congressional directive and long-standing policy, the U.S. Treasury implements Executive Branch unilateral banking sanctions in a manner that blocks the financial transactions necessary for humanitarian trade.”
Q: So is there a solution to all this?
Siamak Namazi: Absolutely, and I have spelled it out in my op-ed in the International Herald Tribune and also in the Wilson Center report. It simply makes no sense to say humanitarian trade is legal, but the banking channel needed to facilitate the trade is restricted. In the case of medicine, the solution is arguably simpler than other humanitarian goods. With fewer than 100 American and European companies holding patents to the most advanced drugs needed, we can craft narrow, but unambiguous exemptions to the banking restrictions, essentially allowing these companies to sell medicine to Iran without undermining the sanctions regime overall.
To address the shortage of hard currency, Iran should be allowed to convert some of its current holdings in Chinese, Indian and other banks around the world into hard currencies for the exclusive purpose of buying medical supplies. Alternatively, the US could revisit its earlier decision on the matter and allow European companies that owe billions of dollars to Iran to settle this debt by paying a pharmaceutical company on Iran’s behalf.
US policymakers are reminded that medicine is highly subsidized in Iran. Imported drugs receive hard currency allocations at a greatly subsidized rate and are again supported through government-owned insurance companies. That means that the Iranian government ultimately gains far fewer rials for every dollar it allocates to an importer of medicine than it does selling its hard currency to importers of most other goods.
– Siamak Namazi, a Middle East specialist whose career spans the consulting, think tank and non-profit worlds, is currently a consultant based out of Dubai. His former positions include the managing director of Atieh Bahar Consulting, an advisory and strategic consulting firm in Tehran. He has also carried out stints as a fellow in the Wilson Center for International Scholars, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the National Endowment for Democracy. A frequent contributor to international publications and conferences, he has authored chapters in six books and appeared regularly as a commentator in the international media. He holds an MBA from the London Business School, an MS in Planning & Policy Development from Rutgers University, and a BA in International Relations from Tufts University.
]]>by Sara Vakhshouri
In the last week of April, the US Energy Department issued a report showing that Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports have dropped to their lowest level in the past 26 years. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that Iran’s net oil export revenue in 2012 was $69 [...]]]>
by Sara Vakhshouri
In the last week of April, the US Energy Department issued a report showing that Iran’s crude oil and condensate exports have dropped to their lowest level in the past 26 years. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that Iran’s net oil export revenue in 2012 was $69 billion, down from $95 billion in 2011.
In 2012, the average export of crude oil and condensate declined to around 40 percent, from 2.5 million barrels a day (mb/d) in 2011 to about 1.5 mb/d in 2012. Due to the substantial drop in exports and a lack of sufficient storage capacity, the EIA estimates that Iran had to reduce 17 percent of its crude oil and condensate production. Iran was, on average, the second largest producer of OPEC in 2012. But for some months, its production fell below Iraqi levels for the first time since 1989, moving it from second to third place.
This dramatic drop in oil production and exports are the result of the US and EU sanctions implemented since late 2011 that targeted Iranian oil income, which makes up 80 percent of Iran’s total export earnings and about 60 percent of the government’s revenue.
The new sanctions ban European insurance companies from offering any coverage to refineries that process Iranian crude oil. Although a tight market combined with higher prices has made up for some of Iran’s income losses, it is believed that these sanctions have hurt Iranian oil exports in an unprecedented and significant way.
The new sanctions also present a major challenge for Iran to sell its oil to major customers, particularly India, Japan and South Korea. According to the US Energy Department, Iran’s crude oil export to India and South Korea is particularly going to be influenced by these sanctions as their refineries rely mainly on European insurance companies. Previously, Iran could skirt the EU ban on insurance by offering its domestic insurance. But the new sanctions make this impossible. This means Tehran is going to have an even harder time marketing and selling its crude oil: its major customers have to start searching for alternative supplies in the market.
The refinery overhaul season is also going to make it harder for Iran to sell its oil. The second quarter of each year is the period for maintenance overhaul for refineries in the Northern Hemisphere that results in a seasonal decline in demand. It is expected that the spike in Iranian crude oil from the last quarter of 2012 will drop once again due to the new EU restrictions on refinery insurance and seasonal demand.
It is not expected that Iranian crude oil production will rise soon. According to the EIA report, Iran’s oil production in 2012 was around 700 thousand b/d, lower than in 2011. The natural production decline of Iran’s matured fields is playing a major role in curbing its crude oil production. Iran needs to invest in its oil fields in order to maintain its production but the large scale of prohibitions on investments in the country’s oil and gas fields imposed by the US and EU prevents any further increase of the country’s production.
]]>No sooner had it been announced that the Senate was preparing to vote for cloture on Chuck Hagel’s nomination as Secretary of Defense than the Washington Free Beacon‘s Adam Kredo unleashed yet another attack on the former Nebraska senator. After spending two and a half months battering Hagel with specious accusations that [...]]]>
No sooner had it been announced that the Senate was preparing to vote for cloture on Chuck Hagel’s nomination as Secretary of Defense than the Washington Free Beacon‘s Adam Kredo unleashed yet another attack on the former Nebraska senator. After spending two and a half months battering Hagel with specious accusations that he was “anti-Israel” and harbored negative views about Jews, Kredo’s new credo is that Hagel has “an Indian problem.”
According to Kredo’s latest anti-Hagel screed:
The U.S. has long viewed India as a key ally in its fight against terrorism in the porous border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tensions have arisen between India and Pakistan over the latter’s failure to stymie terrorist activities.
Hagel appears to accuse India of fueling tensions with Pakistan, claiming it is using Afghanistan “as a second front” against Pakistan.
“India for some time has always used Afghanistan as a second front, and India has over the years financed problems for Pakistan on that side of the border,” Hagel says in the speech. “And you can carry that into many dimensions, the point being [that] the tense, fragmented relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been there for many, many years.”
The controversial comments mark a departure from established United States policy in the region and could increase tensions between the Obama administration and India should the Senate confirm Hagel on Tuesday, according to experts.
Well, actually just one “expert”, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Dhume uses his AEI perch to bemoan that two thirds of the nearly three million Indian-Americans who vote Democrat (84% voted for Barak Obama in 2008) and the fact that only one in five identifies with the Republican party, which they should regard as their “natural home.” Dhume claims that the view Hagel expressed (at least as presented to him by Kredo) is “both over-the-top and a sharp departure from a U.S. position that has seen democratic India as a stabilizing influence in Afghanistan and Asia more broadly.”
As with nearly all of the Free Beacon’s “revelations,” there is more to the story, and far less cause for outrage…
For one thing, the setting for Hagel’s talk from which the quote about India was ripped was a triennial Academic Festival at Cameron University in Lawton, Oklahoma, “a dynamic, privately funded, year-long symposium which explores a topic worthy of in-depth study.” The topic of the 2011-2012 Academic Festival was “Afghanistan: Its Complexities and Relevance.” Guest speakers, campus-wide activities, seminars, special events and cross-curricular events during the academic year were strategically planned to support the study of the Festival’s topic, and to provide “numerous opportunities for Cameron students and the public to gain an understanding of this central Asian country” at no charge. Hagel was one of five guest speakers who came to Cameron’s campus between August 2011 and March 2012.
Hagel is a Distinguished Professor of National Governance at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service as well as a Distinguished Centennial Visiting Professor at the University of Nebraska-Omaha’s College of Public Affairs and Community Service. He is the author of “America: Our Next Chapter: Tough Questions, Straight Answers” in which he examines foreign policy problems, including China’s growing economy, India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, and Iran’s aggressive political, ideological and nuclear stances. During his two terms in the U.S. Senate, Hagel was a member of the Committee for Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence, among other appointments.
The other guest speakers during the Academic Festival were Khaled Hosseini, author of The Kite Runner; Steve Coll, Pulitzer Prize winner and the president of the New America Foundation; journalist and foreign policy analyst Robin Wright; and Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the chief of staff of military operations in Afghanistan 2002 who assumed command of all international forces in Afghanistan in June 2009.
Hagel’s main focus during his talk was Afghanistan, not India. It follows that his comments were intended to explain how the involvement of various regional state and nonstate actors in Afghanistan complicates the situation there. Pakistan’s involvement is well known to American viewers of the nightly news, India’s much less so.
A 2008 report by the Council on Foreign Relations – which the Free Beacon‘s Bill Gertz points to as “one of the most elite foreign policy organizations in the United States with a membership of some 4,700 officials, former officials, journalists, and others” — makes it quite clear that claims about Indian involvement in Afghanistan are neither new nor unfounded:
India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has long faced allegations of meddling in its neighbors’ affairs. Founded in 1968, primarily to counter China’s influence, over time it has shifted its focus to India’s other traditional rival, Pakistan. RAW and Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), have been engaged in covert operations against one other for over three decades. The ongoing dispute in Kashmir continues to fuel these clashes, but experts say Afghanistan may be emerging as the new battleground.
Citing a former RAW official by the name of B. Raman, the CFR report, written by Jayshree Bajoria, also notes that Indian concern about Pakistan was a key aspect of this involvement:
Since its inception in 1968, RAW has had a close liaison relationship with KHAD, the Afghan intelligence agency, due to the intelligence it has provided RAW on Pakistan. This relationship was further strengthened in the early 1980s when the foundation was laid for a trilateral cooperation involving the RAW, KHAD, and the Soviet KGB. Raman says RAW valued KHAD’s cooperation for monitoring the activities of Sikh militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Sikhs in the Indian state of Punjab were demanding an independent state of Khalistan. According to Raman, Pakistan’s ISI set up clandestine camps for training and arming Khalistani recruits in Pakistan’s Punjab Province and North West Frontier Province. During this time, the ISI received large sums from Saudi Arabia and the CIA for arming the Afghan mujahadeen against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. “The ISI diverted part of these funds and arms and ammunition to the Khalistani terrorists,” alleges Raman.
In retaliation, in the mid-1980s, RAW set up two covert groups of its own, Counter Intelligence Team-X (CIT-X) and Counter Intelligence Team-J (CIT-J), the first targeting Pakistan in general and the second directed at Khalistani groups. The two groups were responsible for carrying out terrorist operations inside Pakistan (Newsline), writes Pakistani military expert Ayesha Siddiqa. Indian journalist and associate editor of Frontline magazine, Praveen Swami, writes that a “low-grade but steady campaign of bombings in major Pakistani cities, notably Karachi and Lahore” was carried out. This forced the head of ISI to meet his counterpart in RAW and agree on the rules of engagement as far as Punjab was concerned, writes Siddiqa. The negotiation was brokered by then-Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan bin-Talal, whose wife, Princess Sarvath, is of Pakistani origin. “It was agreed that Pakistan would not carry out activities in the Punjab as long as RAW refrained from creating mayhem and violence inside Pakistan,” Siddiqa writes.
In the past, Pakistan also accused RAW of supporting Sindhi nationalists demanding a separate state, as well as Seraikis calling for a partition of Pakistan’s Punjab to create a separate Seraiki state. India denies these charges. However, experts point out that India has supported insurgents in Pakistan’s Balochistan, as well as anti-Pakistan forces in Afghanistan. But some experts say India no longer does this. As this Backgrounder explains, Pakistan is suspicious of India’s influence in Afghanistan, which it views as a threat to its own interests in the region. Experts say although it is very likely that India has active intelligence gathering in Afghanistan, it is difficult to say whether it is also involved in covert operations.
Hagel’s analysis in his lecture at Cameron University was substantively supported by the CFR report three years earlier, although he did not take it that far. As the You Tube clip indicates, contrary to Kredo’s claim, Hagel never used the phrase “sponsored terrorist activities”. Furthermore, in posting the 54-second excerpt from Hagel’s speech online, great care was apparently taken to avoid providing the context of Hagel’s India remarks, which no doubt would make them even less “controversial” than they already are.
After being contacted by Kredo for comment, a spokesperson at the Indian Embassy seems to have been rather skeptical of his take on Hagel’s expressed views. “Such comments attributed to Sen. Hagel, who has been a long-standing friend of India and a prominent votary of close India-U.S. relations, are contrary to the reality of India’s unbounded dedication to the welfare of the Afghan people,” the spokesperson reportedly told Kredo in an email. Her statement clearly leaves room for the possibility that the attributed remarks were not quite what Kredo interpreted them as.
Chuck Hagel doesn’t have an Indian problem. The Washington Free Beacon has a Chuck Hagel problem.
]]>by Charles Naas
On the Washington Post’s front page February 2 there is a photo of Mrs. Clinton departing the State Department surrounded by admiring staff members with a big smile on her face. She already looks five years younger. And why not? The burden of the Secretary of State is [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
On the Washington Post’s front page February 2 there is a photo of Mrs. Clinton departing the State Department surrounded by admiring staff members with a big smile on her face. She already looks five years younger. And why not? The burden of the Secretary of State is exhausting, generally thankless and terribly complex; each day a new challenge arises or one that you hoped had been put on the back burner reappears. Secretary Kerry, may you age well.
Yet Secretary Kerry’s problems are enhanced by the continued absence of a consensus among prominent politicians on what the United States’ role in a vastly changing world should be. Some are desperately defending actions and policies of the Bush period, many others view “bipartisanship” as a dirty word or a call for surrender of their views and values. Others are locked into one issue, which prevents them from seeing larger schemes of interrelationships — and then we have our neo-isolationists. “Leading from behind” is an implicit recognition of the grave, perhaps insurmountable, problems we face abroad as well as on the Hill. Added to all this, despite President Obama’s sweeping electoral victory, some want to make sure that he fails in whatever he does to ensure that he will be the only black president.
During his first term, Obama tried to pivot US policy and recognize the increasing importance of China and its surrounding countries in East Asia, as well as address new tensions with Russia and the muscular Vladimir Putin who is enjoying his return to preeminence. But, no matter how much Kerry might like to spend more time on the these issues and respond to the urgings of important lobby groups on Africa, Latin America, or even Europe, the Middle East will intrude each day. I Promise. Let’s take a brief overview.
Recently, India and Pakistan were engaging in talks to see what could be done to reduce tensions and look to future relations, but, it seems that every time they get to that point — with US encouragement — something fouls the nest. This time firing across the line of control in Kashmir has been as usual followed by instant charges of blame and perfidy from politicians of both sides. However, even when local peace is regained, the tensions of 55 years and three wars and terrorist actions are almost certain to prevent significant cooperation. Both nations have extreme religious movements and each has substantial nuclear arms with multiple delivery systems. Afghanistan poses an area of special importance for both. Pakistan has posited that Afghanistan is its defense in the event of a war in which India’s superior-sized forces sweeped eastern Pakistan and nuclear war was to be avoided. Both countries are looking ahead to the American departure and trying in advance to out-influence the other. India has opened consulates in important Afghan cities, has increased trade, and offered considerable training and aid.
Afghanistan is looking ahead with both trepidation and hope. The rulers from the heights of Kabul realize that many Afghans are simply weary of the American presence, but are not yet ready to take on the Taliban and strong tribal raiding forces that span the border with Pakistan. Al Qaida may have remaining influence but much of that organization’s appeal has shifted to the Yemen and east and North Africa. Our deadline for ending combat presence is December 2014 but we have continuing huge responsibilities to retire, having done every task possible to give the Afghans a chance to survive as a unified nation with a degree of stability. Talks in Qatar to test possible political detente between the Taliban, Kabul and the US have apparently died on the vine. Iran has strong security and historical interests in whatever happens in western Afghanistan as do the former Soviet nations in the north.
What is there to say about us and Iran? The hostage taking 34 years ago and the victory of the conservative clerics in the post-Shah struggle for control, the chanting even today of Marg ba Amrica (“Death to America”) have left strong negative feelings about that country. From the Iranian point of view, the tenacious beliefs that the US was responsible for the Shah’s every action and that our policy aim is the overthrow of the regime and the institution of a “green” movement in power has made some degree of normality impossible. Israel’s expressed fear of Iran’s nuclear power program reverberates powerfully in a Congress that has imposed rigorous economic and financial sanctions. The so-called P5+1 negotiating team — the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany — is scheduled for another negotiation early in Kerry’s term to ascertain whether extended talks are possible to begin to resolve the great differences that divide us. Any success until after Iran’s elections later this year is highly unlikely and looking further into the future is probably beyond hope unless Israel lowers its concerns and even then Kerry would have to gain a Congressional consensus and untangle the sanctions. The threat of conflict hangs over us.
We will find out some time in the future whether our invasion of Iraq was a great military/political success or a serious strategic mistake. That question remains a very bitter one on the Hill as we have seen in the nasty and contentious interrogation of Chuck Hagel. It will remain a continuing sore between the Republicans and the Obama security team. We were lucky when the Iraqi government would not sign a Status of Forces Agreement with us that would have given American troops legal immunity. A continuing military presence would have made our non-involvement in the on-going Sunni-Shi’a conflict near impossible. As a result of Nouri al Maliki’s decision, we could with honor pull out our forces and let the Iraqis address their problems without us. However, the civil conflict flows over the Kurdish questions, control of petroleum seeps into Iranian Kurdistan, affects substantial Iranian trade, Iranian sympathy for the Shi’a government, and concern over travel to the key religious shrines.
No one is very sure what the US should be doing in Syria. The tens of thousands who are fighting the Assad regime are a collection of secular, democratically-inclined young people perhaps inspired by the Arab spring. Also very much engaged are extreme Salafis, remnants of al Qaida, Sunni fighters from all the neighboring Sunni countries intent on overthrowing Syria’s quasi-Shi’a government, thugs and just about every thing else. Kerry will be under increasing pressure from leading liberal, pro-Israel media, neo-con intellectuals and even a number in his own party “to do something”. Do what is proving to be argumentative and we are nowhere near domestic political agreement. The fighting could spread to Turkey, various Kurdish groups, Jordan and Israel
US and Israeli relations are about as intimate as two nations can have. Disagreements, sure, but usually cleared up quickly. We share ideals and convictions on the need for Israel to be superior militarily and certain of its regional security. The problem for Kerry and past Secretaries is that this very closeness affects one way or another every relationship in the region.
Finally, Egypt again. Tahrir Square is aflame, significant deaths are occurring, the army is probably warming the tanks, and questioning where their loyalties lie. A year or so ago, we were disturbed by the prospect of an elected Muslim Brotherhood, but wisely accepted the decision of the Egyptian people and tried to get along. Mohamed Morsi’s overreach for greater powers than the law permits reopened the fears of the large secular democratic parties and we are now in the middle of a counter reaction and the extensive use of force. We have depleted influence in the country but the importance of Egypt will make our efforts to calm matters inevitable.
So, good morning, Mr. Secretary, good luck and God speed. You assume office at a time that is described by historians as post-Cold War, or post-Colonial, or perhaps post-Ottoman or, simply, the next stage in continuing tension between West and East. Take your pick.
]]>Iran is unlikely to agree to curb its nuclear programme unless the U.S. and its Western allies are prepared to ease tough economic sanctions imposed against the Islamic Republic over the past decade, according to a major new report signed by more than three dozen former top U.S. foreign-policy [...]]]>
Iran is unlikely to agree to curb its nuclear programme unless the U.S. and its Western allies are prepared to ease tough economic sanctions imposed against the Islamic Republic over the past decade, according to a major new report signed by more than three dozen former top U.S. foreign-policy makers, military officers, and independent experts.
While recent sanctions “may well help bring Iran to the negotiating table, it is not clear that these sanctions alone will result in agreements or changes in Iranian policies, much less changes in Iran’s leadership,” the report, “Weighing Benefits and Costs of International Sanctions Against Iran”, concludes.
“If Iran were to signal its willingness to modify its nuclear program and to cooperate in verifying those modifications, Iranian negotiations would expect the United States and its allies, in turn, to offer a plan for easing some of the sanctions,” according to the 86-page report.
But, “(a)bsent a calibrated, positive response from the West, Iran’s leaders would have little incentive to move forward with negotiations,” it stressed, noting that the administration of President Barack Obama should have a plan at the ready that would make clear how and in what sequence Washington might ease sanctions in exchange for Iranian cooperation.
The new report, which is signed by 38 foreign policy luminaries, including three Republican former cabinet secretaries, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and half a dozen retired Army and Marine Corps generals with substantial Middle East experience, comes at a particularly sensitive moment.
On the one hand, Congress, prodded by the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), is moving to enact as part of the 2013 defence bill tough new sanctions against foreign companies and individuals still doing business in several key Iranian economic sectors.
The final bill, which may seek to reduce Obama’s ability to “waive” such sanctions, could also include policy language adopted by the House urging the administration to build up its military presence in the region to make the threat of an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities more credible.
On the other hand, the administration, which opposes the pending sanctions package and any limitation on the president’s waiver authority, has been meeting with its partners in the P5+1 group -the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany – to forge a common negotiating position in preparation for a new round of talks with Iran that will probably take place next month.
In the clearest statement to date, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last week said Washington was also willing to engage Tehran on a bilateral basis in order to gain an accord.
She and other officials have said in the past that Washington is willing to ease sanctions in return for Iran’s cooperation, but the administration has been vague about the timing, suggesting it would consider taking such steps only after Tehran took specific concrete steps.
These include shipping its stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium out of the country, closing its Fordow enrichment plant, and clearing up long-pending questions by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about Tehran’s possible past research into the military applications of nuclear energy.
“So far, neither the United States nor the UN Security Council has stipulated the precise criteria that Iran must meet to trigger the lifting of sanctions, or the sanctions that would be lifted in exchange for Iran’s actions,” noted the new report, which was also signed by more than a dozen retired top-ranked diplomats, including former U.N. ambassador Thomas Pickering. “There is no action-for-action plan that all parties understand.”
Given the prominence and bipartisanship of the signatories, who also included Michael Hayden, a retired four-star Air Force general who served in top intelligence positions under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush and advised Mitt Romney in his unsuccessful election bid against Obama, the new report could well influence both the debate in Congress and within the administration.
The Iran Project’s first report – on the costs and benefits of a possible U.S. or Israeli military attack on Iran – received considerable attention here after its release in mid-September.
That report, which concluded that even a massive U.S. assault would set back Tehran’s nuclear programme by only four years at best, highlighted the growing concern in establishment foreign-policy circles about the beating of the war drums by the right-wing government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and its supporters here.
Like its predecessor, the latest report, does not advocate a particular policy.
But it notes that the benefits of U.S. sanctions against Iran “have often been taken as a given,” in part because they offer an alternative to military action. The costs of sanctions, on the other hand, have not been “routinely addressed in the public or policymaking debate”.
Moreover, it said, “sanctions alone are not a policy,” and their effectiveness “will depend not only on the sanctions themselves, but also on the negotiating strategy associated with them.”
Assessing the costs, as well as the benefits, of sanctions, it said, should “enhance the quality of debate about the sanctions regime and the role of sanctions in overall U.S. policy toward Iran.”
Among the benefits sanctions have provided, according to the report, have been a slowdown in the expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme; a relative weakening of its conventional military capabilities; growing concerns in the regime about public unhappiness with the economy which “appears to have been significantly weakened” as a result of these measures.
It also cited “some indications of a greater willingness on the part of the Iranian leadership to negotiate seriously” over its nuclear programme, although the report also expressed doubt “that the current severe sanctions regime will significantly affect the decision making of Iran’s leaders – any more than past sanctions did – barring some willingness on the part of sanctioning countries to combine continued pressure with positive signals and decisions on matters of great interest to Iran.”
On the costs side of the ledger, on the other hand, the report cited tensions between the U.S. and Russia, China, India, Turkey, and South Korea, among other countries, which have been pressed to comply with Washington’s increasingly comprehensive sanctions.
It also noted increased influence by hard-line factions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), over the cash-strapped economy; the political empowerment of those same factions which can depict the sanctions as U.S.-led aggression; and the sanctions’ potential negative humanitarian impact as U.S. and foreign companies and groups that sell or provide food and medicine to Iran find the licensing procedures too burdensome and the banks needed to provide credit for such transactions increasingly unwilling to do so.
Insofar as the sanctions lower the quality of life for the average Iranian, they may also contribute to long-term alienation between the two countries.
In addition, the sanctions are creating “new international patterns of trade” that are resulting in increased market share for Chinese and Indian goods in Iran at the expense of Western products, while the “rapid expansion of unofficial, black-market trade between Iran and Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey is distorting and undermining the economies of those states and the region,” according to the report.
]]>via IPS News
Graphic: The figures signify the number of times each country was mentioned in the Oct. 22 presidential debate. Credit: Zachary Fleischmann/IPS
U.S. strategy in the Greater Middle East, which has dominated foreign policy-making since the 9/11 attacks more than 11 years ago, similarly dominated the third and last debate between [...]]]>
via IPS News
Graphic: The figures signify the number of times each country was mentioned in the Oct. 22 presidential debate. Credit: Zachary Fleischmann/IPS
U.S. strategy in the Greater Middle East, which has dominated foreign policy-making since the 9/11 attacks more than 11 years ago, similarly dominated the third and last debate between President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney Monday night.
The biggest surprise of the debate, which was supposed to be devoted exclusively to foreign policy and national security, was how much Romney agreed with Obama’s approach to the region.
His apparent embrace of the president’s policies appeared consistent with his recent efforts to reassure centrist voters that he is not as far right in his views as his primary campaign or his choice for vice president, Rep. Joe Ryan, would suggest.
The focus on the Greater Middle East, which took up roughly two-thirds of the 90-minute debate, reflected a number of factors in addition to the perception that the region is the main source of threats to U.S. security, a notion that Romney tried hard to foster during the debate.
“It’s partly because all candidates have to pander to Israel’s supporters here in the United States, but also four decades of misconduct have made the U.S. deeply unpopular in much of the Arab and Islamic world,” Stephen Walt, a Harvard international relations professor who blogs on foreignpolicy.com, told IPS.
“Add to that the mess Obama inherited from (George W.) Bush, and you can see why both candidates had to keep talking about the region,” he said.
But the region’s domination in the debate also came largely at the expense of other key regions, countries and global issues – testimony to the degree to which Bush’s legacy, particularly from his first term when neo-conservatives and other hawks ruled the foreign-policy roost, continues to define Washington’s relationship to the world.
Of all the countries cited by the moderator and the two candidates, China was the only one outside the Middle East that evoked any substantial discussion, albeit limited to trade and currency issues.
Romney re-iterated his pledge to label Beijing a “currency manipulator” on his first day in office, while Obama for the first time described Beijing as an “adversary” as well as a “partner” – a reflection of how China-bashing has become a predictable feature of presidential races since the end of the Cold War.
With the exception of one very short reference (by Romney) to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and another to trade with Latin America, Washington’s southern neighbours were completely ignored by the two candidates, as was Canada and all of sub-Saharan Africa, except Somalia and Mali where Romney charged that “al Qaeda-type individuals” had taken over the northern part of the country.
Not even the long-running financial crisis in the European Union (EU) – arguably, one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security and economic recovery – came up, although Romney warned several times that the U.S. could become “Greece” if it fails to tackle its debt problems.
Similarly, the big emerging democracies, including India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia – all of which have been wooed by the Obama administration – went entirely unmentioned, although at least one commentator, Tanvi Madan, head of the Indian Project at the Brookings Institution, said Indians should “breathe a sigh of relief” over its omission since it signaled a lack of controversy over Washington’s relations with New Delhi.
Another key emerging democracy, Turkey, was mentioned several times, but only in relation to the civil war in Syria.
And climate change or global warming, which has been considered a national-security threat by U.S. intelligence agencies and the Pentagon for almost a decade, was a no-show at the debate.
“There was no serious discussion of climate change, the Euro crisis, the failed drug war, or the long-term strategic consequences of drone wars, cyberwar, and an increasingly ineffective set of global institutions,” noted Walt.
“Neither candidate offered a convincing diagnosis of the challenges we face in a globalised world, or the best way for the U.S. to advance its interests and values in a world it no longer dominates.”
Romney, whose top foreign-policy advisers include key neo-conservatives who were major promoters of Bush’s misadventures in the region, spent much of the debate repeatedly assuring the audience that he would be the un-Bush when it came to foreign policy.
“We don’t want another Iraq,” he said at one point in an apparent endorsement of Obama’s drone strategy. “We don’t want another Afghanistan. That’s not the right course for us.”
“I want to see peace,” he asserted somewhat awkwardly as he began his summation, suggesting that it was a talking point his coaches told him he must impress upon his audience before he left the hall in Boca Raton, Florida.
“Romney clearly decided he needed to head off perceptions of himself as a throwback to George W. Bush-era foreign policy adventurism, repeatedly stressing his desire for a peaceful world,” wrote Greg Sargent, a Washington Post blogger.
So strongly did he affirm most of Obama’s policies that, for those who hadn’t been paying close attention to Romney’s previous stands, the president’s charge that his rival’s foreign policy was “wrong and reckless” must have sounded somewhat puzzling.
As Obama was forced to remind the audience repeatedly, Romney’s positions on these issues have been “all over the map” since he launched his candidacy more than two years ago.
“I found it confusing, because he has spent much of the campaign season in some ways recycling Bush’s foreign policy, and, at least for one night, he seemed to throw the neo-cons under the bus,” said Charles Kupchan, a foreign policy specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations.
“Whether it was accepting the withdrawal timetable in Afghanistan, walking back a more aggressive stance on Syria, or basically agreeing with Obama’s approach on Iran, he seems to be stepping away from a lot of the positions he was taking just a few weeks ago,” he noted. “At this point, it’s impossible for voters to actually know what he thinks because he spent most of the campaign embracing a platform that was much further to the right.”
That Obama, who took the offensive from the outset and retained it for the next 90 minutes, won the debate was conceded by virtually all but the most partisan Republican commentators, with some analysts calling the president’s performance as decisive a victory as that which Romney achieved in the first debate earlier this month and which reversed his then-fading fortunes.
A CBS/Knowledge Networks poll of undecided voters taken immediately after the debate found that 53 percent of respondents thought Obama had won; only 23 percent saw Romney as the victor.
Whether that will be sufficient to reverse Romney’s recent gains in the polls – national surveys currently show a virtual tie among likely voters – remains to be seen.
Foreign policy remains a relatively minor issue in the minds of the vast majority of voters concerned mostly about the economy and jobs – one reason why, at every opportunity, Romney Monday tried, with some success, to steer the debate back toward those problems.
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