by Wayne White
The Libyan Parliament’s abrupt dismissal last week of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan takes Libya another step closer to even greater confusion and instability. With an oil-starved central government also drifting closer to bankruptcy, Libya’s options going forward have become more daunting. If the international community continues to focus elsewhere [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The Libyan Parliament’s abrupt dismissal last week of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan takes Libya another step closer to even greater confusion and instability. With an oil-starved central government also drifting closer to bankruptcy, Libya’s options going forward have become more daunting. If the international community continues to focus elsewhere in the region while Libya merits high-level diplomatic attention, the prospects for finding a way to halt Libya’s decline will worsen.
The latest disruptive snit was triggered by the escape last week of a North Korean-linked tanker from the federalist rebel-controlled eastern Libyan oil terminal of Es-Sider with a cargo of unauthorized crude. Zeidan ordered the government’s puny navy to intercept it and bring it to a government-controlled port. The tanker was hit by Libyan naval gunfire, but eventually escaped amidst poor weather.
Eastern rebels claimed the cargo had reached its destination on March 14, but a Libyan government official said it was still in the Mediterranean on the 15th. Finally, late yesterday, US Special Forces, acting on the request of the Libyan and Cypriot governments, seized the tanker (the “Morning Glory”) from the few armed rebels guarding it just south of Cyprus.
Earlier, however, an angry parliament (despite the government’s weak navy), chose to blame Zeidan, and voted him out of office on March 11 — ordering him to remain in Libya pending charges. On the 12th, Zeidan fled to Europe. Zeidan was replaced by temporary Prime Minster and Defense Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, but only for two weeks while parliament, the General National Council (GNC), casts about for a more permanent figure. Al-Thinni had only been in his defense post since August 2013.
The tanker’s escape triggered such a flap because Tripoli has been trying to isolate and squeeze the shadow eastern government of former anti-Qadhafi rebel leader Ibrahim Jathran. Jathran has been facing rising discontent because the eastern government has been without enough cash to pay government officials, police, and even disaffected Libyan National Oil Corporations (NOC) workers stationed in the east and assisting in the terminal closures. If the illegally lifted crude had generated payments to new accounts established by Jathran & Co. instead of those of NOC in Tripoli, the funds would have reinforced Jathran’s position.
Meanwhile, on GNC orders, a small contingent of Libyan army troops and a larger force of battle-hardened, notoriously formidable pro-government militiamen from Misrata, Libya’s 3rd largest city, moved east to “liberate” rebellious oil ports and block further illicit shipments. This force compelled Jathran’s troops to fall back from the city of Sirte on the way to Jathran’s area of control on March 11th.
Nonetheless, on the 12th, GNC President Nouri Abu Sahmain, who still wields most of the authority over the military in Libya despite al-Thinni’s appointment, ordered a halt to the advance, giving the eastern rebels “two weeks at most” to restore normal operations at the oil ports before resuming the government’s military advance. The reasons for this reverse were unclear, but the GNC could be skeptical of a successful offensive 200 miles from Sirte to the nearest rebel terminal.
The halt, however, also probably relates to a rivalry between the two powerful militias typically called upon as the government’s military “firemen” (and the GNC factions with which they identify). In addition to the Misrata force, there is the powerful militia from the town of Zintan, south of Tripoli. The Zintani militia has been associated with the parliament’s secular parties. So far, the two militias have not squared off against each other. But that could change if Misrata’s fighters make major gains in the east that boost the power of the GNC’s Islamist wing that the Misrata militia generally supports.
Added to the central government’s own Islamic-secular rivalries that all too often have paralyzed parliament is the threat of going broke. With oil exports down to around 300,000 barrels per day (out of a normal 1.3 million), the government is running low on cash, losing $8 billion in oil revenues last year alone. Al-Thinni declared last week that the government needs an “emergency budget” to deal with its security challenges. Nonetheless, a GNC already unpopular for extending its own mandate last month and gridlocked over lesser matters might not respond despite the gravity of the situation.
Of concern to the international community is that as long as so much of the country remains beyond central authority, a large amount of arms from Qadhafi’s former arsenals will continue flowing across Libya’s borders. A panel of UN experts recently submitted a 97-page report to the Security Council stating that Libya has “become a primary source of illicit weapons.” The panel is investigating alleged shipments to 14 countries. A number of its findings relate to attempts to transfer particularly dangerous shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. One such shipment, stopped by Lebanon, was bound for Syrian rebels.
Moreover, especially lawless portions of Libya like the desert southwest and some areas in the east adjacent to Egypt serve as safe havens for Islamic extremist elements staging from Libyan territory into neighboring states or assisting foreign jihadists. This has been true of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (IQIM) elements lunging into Algeria and Mali, other groups supplying munitions to militant elements in Egypt following the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, and shipments into Tunisia aiding terrorist cells there.
In American minds especially, Libya is firmly associated with Muslim extremism, the result of the Benghazi attack of Sept. 2012. Despite the existence of such groups (like eastern Libya’s dangerous Ansar al-Islam), however, in the defining GNC July 2012 elections, the secular National Forces Alliance, a collection of likeminded smaller parties, and dozens of independents dominated, with Islamists coming in second. In fact, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya secured only 10% of the vote.
So, unlike the Brotherhood’s decisive electoral victory in Egypt, a majority of Libyans, at least the first time around, voted against an Islamist-dominated future (and, naturally, were horrified by the Benghazi attack and its adverse implications for ties with the US and the West).
With the GNC’s standing shaky because of its self-extended mandate and legislative paralysis, constitutional drafting to be completed in June, and votes on approving the constitution and a permanent parliament to occur this year, the next six months seems to be a make or break period for what is to become of Libya. There already has been a disturbing indicator. Turnout last month for the election of the constitutional drafting body was dismal, reflecting widespread cynicism toward the entire political process.
A conclave of mostly Western and Arab Gulf foreign ministers to discuss Libya did take place in Rome on March 6. Instability and arms smuggling topped the agenda. US Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that “Libya is at a pivotal moment,” adding that “Libyans did not risk their lives in the 2011 revolution just to slip backward into thuggery and violence.” Yet, little in terms of concrete measures aimed at stepping up the pace — and urgency — of foreign diplomatic engagement came out of the meeting.
Clearly, the international community is far more focused, in the Middle East at least, on halting the fighting in Syria, pursuing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and trying to push the Iran-nuclear negotiations to the finish line. Sadly, however, the prospects for real progress on the first two of those issues are exceedingly poor. In fact, with Western-Russian relations taking such a beating over the Ukraine crisis, the Russian-US led effort aimed at brokering a Syrian ceasefire — already pretty iffy — might collapse.
In any case, it’s time for Western and Arab governments that came together to support Muammar Qadhafi’s overthrow so robustly to make a strenuous effort to help salvage the mess that has developed since. Under the circumstances, without, say, bringing the various key players in Libya together at a neutral venue like Geneva, there is little reason to believe Libya’s domestic agenda in the coming months will play out as planned.
The interception of the “Morning Glory” could provide an important opportunity for such an initiative. Jathran’s so-called Prime Minister Ab-Rabbo al-Barassi said on the 15th that Jathran was ready to negotiate an end to the oil terminal blockade if the government would end its military threat. Now, with the prospect of his own illicit oil exports gone, an already financially desperate Jathran might be ready for serious talks.
]]>by Wayne White
When I first walked the streets of Algiers back in 1975, the city was decked out in banners heralding a visit from North Korean tyrant Kim Il Sung. Algeria’s foreign policy radicalism of those days shifted to a far more moderate pragmatism over 25 years ago, but surprisingly, little [...]]]>
by Wayne White
When I first walked the streets of Algiers back in 1975, the city was decked out in banners heralding a visit from North Korean tyrant Kim Il Sung. Algeria’s foreign policy radicalism of those days shifted to a far more moderate pragmatism over 25 years ago, but surprisingly, little parallel evolution has occurred domestically. Over 50 years since independence from France, Algeria retains a heavy handed, relatively socialist, military-dominated, exclusively secular ruling elite. Turnover in terms of those wielding power has been determined by ongoing rivalries within that privileged elite, as well as the limited life expectancies of its geriatric kingpins.
With a populace still traumatized over the bloodletting of the 1990s civil war pitting the authorities against armed Islamists, seeing chaos as near as neighboring Libya following the so-called “Arab Spring”, and harsh regime crackdowns on demonstrations in 2011, there has been great reluctance to mount a strong challenge since then. More sure of itself again, the regime remains notoriously resistant to outside criticism or diplomatic entreaties urging greater transparency and more restraint.
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999, just announced his intent to run for a 4th term. Early on, Bouteflika, another aging veteran of Algeria’s war of independence against France from the ranks of the National Liberation Front (FLN) party, had relatively limited power compared to the military. His election in 1999 and re-elections in 2004 and 2009 were tainted by manipulation, the withdrawal of other candidates, other political party and Berber boycotts, as well as considerable voter apathy.
In fact, for Bouteflika to run in 2009, the FLN-dominated legislature had to amend the constitution to allow for more than two presidential terms. Not surprisingly, his last victory, by a highly suspicious 90% of the vote, was characterized by one opposition party as a “tsunami of fraud.”
But Bouteflika accumulated more power, building alliances with key military factions behind the scenes. By the end of his 1st term, he succeeded in using his allies to defeat former army chief of staff, FLN Secretary General, and rival Ali Benflis in the election, and then forced the resignation of army chief of staff General Mohammed Lamari a few months later. Subsequently, senior military officers not aligned with Bouteflika were shuffled to less important posts or forced to resign. Even after returning last year from treatment abroad for a stroke, Bouteflika and his allies succeeded in weakening the chief of Algeria’s formidable Intelligence and Security Department (DRS), General Mohammed Mediene.
Still, the 77-year-old Bouteflika’s decision to run for a 4th term on April 17 came as a surprise to many. Since the stroke, he has been seen only rarely in public or on TV. Underscoring doubts about his health, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal has commented that Bouteflika does not need to campaign because there are others who could do so for him. The news sparked a protest in Algiers, broken up by club-wielding police. The Algerian newspaper El-Watan (operating despite past closures and harassment) ran a cartoon in which one Hollywood Oscar nominee for special effects was “The Fourth Term” from Algeria.
Yet, defeating Bouteflika seems near impossible, with opposition parties so weak, the FLN’s electoral machinery so formidable, and his allies in the military establishment on top. The latter probably hope to prolong overall stability by doing whatever is needed to keep Bouteflika in office, whether Bouteflika remains fully effective or not.
As one would expect, sustained authoritarianism with little transparency has bred an immense amount of official corruption and dysfunction. Within the military, even sales of soft drinks, cigarettes and other commodities have been divvied up by municipality so rake-offs can be assigned systematically. The judiciary is also subject to unwarranted official, business or individual interference. In 2004, Algeria established the National Body for Preventing and Combating Corruption, but Bouteflika failed to appoint its governing members for 6 years! Naturally, its impact has been nil.
Moreover, although Algeria has sizeable oil and gas exports, running up foreign exchange reserves of roughly $200 billion (3 years of imports), the plight of the average Algerian continues to stagnate. Despite well over $100 billion said to have been allotted to alleviate problems like Algeria’s appalling housing shortage, lagging education, and shoddy health care during Bouteflika’s presidency, actual performance has changed little.
The worst of its bloody civil war ended 15 years ago, but Algeria still trails its less wealthy neighbors Morocco and Tunisia in growth. Most recently, the World Bank ranked Algeria a rather poor 153rd out of 189 countries globally in ease of doing business. So, foreign investors largely shun Algeria as a locale for generating industrial, commercial, service or other enterprises. It is not surprising that unemployment — officially cited among youth as 21% — is far higher than admitted, a situation worsened by widespread underemployment.
Why then is Algeria relatively stable? First, there are the dark memories of the worst years of the Algerian Civil War (1992-1998) when as many as 200,000 Algerians may have perished. Not lost to those who lived through that horror, despite the overwhelming international focus on the savagery of Muslim extremist groups in the war’s closing years, was the brutality of regime forces in crushing the rebellion (ironically mirroring that of the French during the Algerian liberation war of 1954-1962).
The impact of the “Arab Spring” (which did in fact generate some hope for change in Algeria) has been tempered by the grim fate of Syria, Egypt and Libya — the last abutting Algeria’s borders. The January 2013 terrorist attack and hostage crisis at a southern Algerian gas facility near Ain Amenas was launched from Libya. Algerians know, however, that the origins of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (IQIM), and some related terrorist elements active in southwestern Libya, Mali, southern Algeria, and northern Niger stem from the last extremist spawn of the Algerian Civil War: the ruthless and fanatical Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (or GSPC).
Still, the Arab Spring was not without impact. Localized protests had occurred during 2007-2010 over various issues such as food, housing, and infrastructure. In 2008, US Ambassador Robert Ford described Algeria as an “unhappy country” in a leaked cable.
In January 2011, however, the pot boiled over with far larger demonstrations — including riots and attacks on government offices all over the country triggered first by a rise in food prices and then by Tunisian President Ben Ali’s resignation. Bouteflika temporarily cut in taxes on sugar and cooking oil, and security forces cracked down hard on larger protests.
Nonetheless, when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned, the opposition gained renewed vigor in February despite a promise by Bouteflika to end the 1992 “State of Emergency,” with the parliament doing so later that month. Security forces responded far more harshly, banned demonstrations, and in one instance arrested close to 10,000 in Algiers using possibly as many as 30,000 police. Occasional demonstrations continued through April, when Bouteflika promised on TV to seek constitutional amendments to “reinforce representative democracy.”
Despite the failure of the regime to follow through on some promises (like constitutional change, which Bouteflika also promised in 2006), the situation has settled down substantially since mid-2011. The continuation of harsh government crackdowns exhausted various opposition elements while ugly developments in Syria, Libya and Egypt doubtless alarmed many oppositionists too. In fact, Bouteflika & Co. publicly support the Assad regime’s struggle in Syria, though not materially. It did likewise toward Muammar Qadhafi until his overthrow, providing sanctuary for Qadhafi’s son Mohmammed and daughter Aisha.
Sad to say, no meaningful change is likely anytime soon in what has been a sort of governmental Jurassic Park. Even after President Bouteflika cannot be propped up anymore, only establishment stalwarts like Bouteflika allies Prime Minister Sellal or the national police chief, General Abdelghani Hamel, appear to wait in the wings.
Meanwhile, major world capitals wrestling with instability and uncertainty wrought by the “Arab Awakening” in other important regional states, along with their pervasive fear of terrorism, probably will not be too disappointed to see more of the same in Algiers so long as the country remains stable. The regime’s huge governmental failings will be reported, critiqued, and duly frowned upon. There will, however, be few adverse consequences from abroad for this self-serving cabal of heavy-handed old men who lead a country in which 70% of the population is now under the age of 30.
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