by Peter Jenkins 

I was still a serving diplomat in Vienna when, in January 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had resumed uranium enrichment, suspended since November 2003. Like my Western colleagues, I feared the worst. I assumed that Iran was going to install as many centrifuges [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Peter Jenkins 

I was still a serving diplomat in Vienna when, in January 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had resumed uranium enrichment, suspended since November 2003. Like my Western colleagues, I feared the worst. I assumed that Iran was going to install as many centrifuges as it could as quickly as it could, and that within a very few years Iran’s production of enriched uranium would bring into existence an intractable nuclear deterrent capability (even then I doubted Iran wanted an offensive nuclear capability).

I would have been incredulous had someone assured me that seven years later Iran would only possess some 16,000 assembled centrifuge machines; that Iran would only be operating some 60% of these; that it would only just be starting to install some 3,000 machines of a more advanced and efficient design, which it first obtained in 1995; that it would only have produced 8,300 kg of enriched uranium; and that less than 30% of this production would have been enriched to the intermediate level of 20% U235.

Of course, there are people who say that Iran would dearly love to have built more machines and produced more enriched uranium since 2006. For all I know, these people are right when they tell us that a number of technical impediments, some contrived by the West, and procurement problems have slowed progress.

But the latest IAEA report (GOV 2013/6 of 21 February) makes me think, as some previous reports have, that this may not be the whole story. I sense that Iran is deliberately adopting a cautious, measured approach to the expansion of its nuclear program. I speculate below about possible reasons for this.

In this latest report, the headline grabber has been Iran’s declaration to the IAEA of plans to install 18 cascades (some 3,000 machines) of the more advanced IR2m type. This has been greeted with alarm in some quarters and with condemnation by Western governments.

That was predictable but is not strictly rational. These machines are being installed at the Natanz plant, not the less vulnerable (to aerial attack) Fordow plant. They are to be used, Iran has declared, to enrich uranium to 3.5%, not 20%. They are being introduced in modest quantities (Western enrichment plants contain tens of thousands of machines). Could Iran be signalling that the West should not be alarmed: Iran has no intention of using these machines for the rapid “breakout” that is the stuff of Mr. Netanyahu’s nightmares?

Equally noteworthy are two other IAEA findings. Iran is still only using 4 out of a possible 16 cascades at Fordow to enrich uranium to 20%. And of the 47 kg of 20% U235 produced since November at Fordow and Natanz combined, some 60% has been transferred to Isfahan and converted from gaseous to metallic form.

One consequence of this is that only 167kg of the 280kg of 20% U235 produced since early 2010 is still available in gaseous form for enrichment to weapon-grade, were Iran to start re-configuring the Fordow cascades in order to “breakout”. And of this it seems likely (the IAEA report is silent) that fewer than 100kg are located at Fordow, assuming that at least a portion of the 130kg produced at Fordow has been transferred to Isfahan.

Could this be a signal that Iran has no intention of giving Mr. Netanyahu a pretext for another bout of war fever by approaching his “red line” of 240kg of 20% U235 hexafluoride ready for higher enrichment?

Anyway, it would have been nice if Western governments could have come up with a more clever reaction to the IR2m declaration than to don their global policeman’s caps and issue a stern reprimand to a sovereign counterpart. If they are really alarmed that after 17 years Iran is at last installing a more advanced design of centrifuge, why not make the few, simple policy adjustments that are needed to draw Iran into a serious negotiation?

The rational response to the introduction of more efficient centrifuge machines is to seek to increase the timeliness of the IAEA’s detection capabilities. This can be achieved by persuading Iran to re-apply the Additional Protocol. Western negotiators will find their Iranian counterparts open to persuasion provided Iranian concerns are also addressed.

After all, one does not need to be a genius to surmise that Iran’s cautious expansion of its nuclear program aims in part at bringing the West to the negotiating table — just as Western governments aim at “bringing Iran to the table” by piling on sanctions. This would be an amusing irony were the mutual incomprehension not potentially so dangerous.

Photo: Ali Akbar Salehi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, meets IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano at the IAEA’s headquarters in Vienna, Austria on 12 July 2011.

Reuters: According to unnamed sources the U.S. is set to sanction Iran’s petrochemical industry. One source added that the U.S. was “reluctant to try to cut off the Iranian central bank entirely for fear this could drive oil [...]]]> News and views related to U.S.-Iran relations for Nov. 16 – Nov. 18

Reuters: According to unnamed sources the U.S. is set to sanction Iran’s petrochemical industry. One source added that the U.S. was “reluctant to try to cut off the Iranian central bank entirely for fear this could drive oil prices dramatically higher, potentially impairing the U.S. recovery.”

IPS News: Investigative historian Gareth Porter reveals information that seriously disputes the IAEA claim that Vyacheslav Danilenko was involved in building an alleged containment chamber for Iranian nuclear bomb tests. Porter also disputes the veracity of claims made by David Albright and his co-authors in their recent account of Danilenko’s alleged work in Iran which was seen as verifying the information in the IAEA report.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Iranian government insider Seyed Hossein Mousavian who served on Iran’s nuclear negotiating team before being arrested during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s term says pressuring Iran over its nuclear program without engaging in real diplomacy may lead to a serious clash. He says there are still ways to resolve concerns:

In one, the UN Security Council and Germany would work toward an outcome that allowed Iran to enrich uranium, but ensured none could be diverted for military use. On the other track, the United States and Iran would directly discuss a comprehensive package to address the “long list of grievances” that have separated the countries and frustrated attempts to resolve the nuclear issue.

The Daily Beast: Eli Lake writes that Israel has been developing electronic warfare methods to go along with an attack on Iran such as ways to block off “Iran’s electric grid, Internet, cellphone network, and emergency frequencies for firemen and police officer.” He notes that when the Israeli press is talking about an attack on Iran, an attack is “unlikely to be imminent” and that if Israel was going to attack, it likely wouldn’t consult with the U.S. first:

One American close to the current prime minister said, “When Netanyahu came into office, the understanding was they will not make the same mistake that Olmert made and ask for something the president might say no to. Better to ask forgiveness than to ask permission.”

The Weekly Standard: Lee Smith criticizes the Obama administration for its “failure” to deter Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions and claims the Israelis will stop just short of a “full-scale bombing campaign” to get the “international community” and the U.S. to wage war on Iran for them:

There are options short of a full-scale bombing campaign that Jerusalem might take: an aerial strike on one facility, or even a ground operation designed by a defense minister obsessed with commando raids​—​anything that might make the international community, and especially the United States, take the Iranian threat seriously. Israel may not be able to destroy the Iranian nuclear program in its entirety by itself, but it might settle for less than that in the hopes of inspiring others to finish the job.

U.S. Department of State: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton applauded a non-binding U.N. General Assembly resolution drafted by Saudi Arabia that “deplores” the alleged plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to U.S. while calling on Iran to investigate the allegations. The resolution was passed by a vote of 106-9, with 40 abstentions. U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice said it shows that “Iran is increasingly isolated.” Iran’s U.N. Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee said that he would support the resolution if all references to the Islamic Republic were stripped out and “categorically rejected the involvement of any Iranian officials or agencies in the alleged plot.”

New Yorker: Seymour Hersh who has been reporting on “Iran and the bomb” for the past decade cites the experts that I’ve cited here on Lobe Log since the release of the latest IAEA report on Iran and shares the experts’ conclusion that the information presented is not new:

The new report, therefore, leaves us where we’ve been since 2002, when George Bush declared Iran to be a member of the Axis of Evil—with lots of belligerent talk but no definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons program.