by Jahandad Memarian
According to a recent special report on Iran in The Economist: “The revolution is over.” The article concludes by suggesting that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s approach to the country’s controversial nuclear program and international relations is a departure from that of his predecessors. While the piece makes several noteworthy points, it fails to mention some important nuances of Iran’s foreign policy paradigm shift, a movement three decades in the making.
Ruhi Ramazani, a veteran scholar on Iranian affairs, has long demonstrated that since Iran’s 1979 revolution, the country’s foreign policy-makers have broken away from a doggedly spiritual paradigm in varying degrees, at times acting directly in opposition to long-held religious, moral, and ideological values. Indeed, the intervening years since the Iranian Revolution have facilitated an evolution of the country’s foreign policy, which has culminated as a hybrid political construct framed by both pragmatism and spirituality, as Ramazani asserts in his book, Independence Without Freedom.
The leader of Iran’s revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, a super-idealist, led the charge toward a more aspirational foreign policy paradigm based on ideals rooted in what Ramazani describes as spiritual pragmatism. To achieve this, Khomeini, at times, allowed deviations from “his ideological line” (Khatti Imam) and adjusted his worldview in response to social and political circumstances. Whether in regard to declaratory or practical policies, no one altered Khomeini’s line more than Khomeini himself.
For example, after the 1979 American hostage crisis in in Tehran, which began the era of ever-increasing US sanctions on Iran, Khomeini declared, “We must become isolated in order to become independent.” Yet following the release of the hostages in 1981 and the liberation of the Iranian port city of Khorramshahr from Iraqi forces in 1982, Khomeini saw his power consolidated at home and turned the lens on his ardent followers. He placed the blame for Iran’s “hermit” status on the international stage squarely on their shoulders. In one markedly critical accusation of his hard-line supporters, Khomeini even went so far as to cite the prophet Muhammad as an example of someone who sent out ambassadors to establish conciliatory relations with the outside world. To demand that Iran permanently cut ties with other countries made no sense, said Khomeini, because for Iran “it would mean defeat, annihilation, and being buried right to the end.”
Perhaps the most salient example of Khomeini’s pragmatism was Iran’s decision to secretly purchase arms, for its defensive war against Iraq (1980-88), from both the United States and Israel in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair (1985-87). By striking a deal through intermediaries, American and Israeli military supplies were provided to Tehran in return for its cooperation and assistance in securing the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. In negotiating with his adversaries, Khomeini’s pragmatism proved he was focused on the bigger picture for Iran.
Many Iranian leaders have attempted following in Khomeini’s footsteps. Even president Sayyid Ali Khamenei, now the country’s Supreme Leader, adopted similar views under Iran’s “open door” foreign policy and declared, in the summer of 1986, that “Iran seeks a rational, sound, and healthy relations with all countries.”
What would these healthy relations look like for Iran? Consider the example of the high point in US-Iran relations that occurred during the two countries’ decision to cooperate in response to the war in Afghanistan. In late 2001, Iranian diplomats (and even some members of the Revolutionary Guard) domestically lobbied for working with the United States to deliver the mutual benefit of toppling the Taliban and implementing a new political order in Afghanistan. Ayatollah Khamenei conceded and as a result Iran offered airbases, search-and-rescue missions for downed American pilots, the tracking and killing of al-Qaeda leaders, and assistance in building ties with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. But this warming in relations was short-lived. Not long after taking advantage of Iran’s assistance, then-President George W. Bush declared Iran as part of an “Axis of Evil,” thereby instantly destroying the tenuous goodwill the two discordant countries had been working to build.
In another example, during his first two terms, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani pressed for military reconstruction and economic development as a means of emphasizing the country’s practical needs following the end of the Iran-Iraq war. During his time in office, Rafsanjani invited Conoco Oil, a US company, to bid for the Sirri oil field development project (the largest in Iran’s history at that time). With Khamenei’s approval, Rafsanjani worked to close the Conoco deal, understanding that this act would significantly increase economic relations between Iran and the United States. But not long after the $1 billion deal was awarded to Conoco, the Clinton administration blocked the contract as a “threat to national security.”
There are of course other events in the Islamic Republic’s history proving that from Ayatollah Khomeini to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, many Iranian leaders have genuinely attempted to—even in the face of powerful internal and external impediments—implement a hybrid paradigm, with each leader assigning different weights to practical and spiritual considerations. Considered with this history in mind, Rouhani’s efforts to facilitate compromises in regard to the Iran’s nuclear program are not, as The Economist suggests, a turning point in Iranian politics. They’re merely a continuation of an ongoing trend that should have been noticed by Western analysts long before now.
Jahandad Memarian is a research associate at the West Asia Council and a senior research fellow at Nonviolence International as well as a contributor to Al-Monitor and the Huffington Post. He holds an M.A. in Western Philosophy from the University of Tehran and was previously an Iranian Fulbright scholar at the University of California, Santa Barbara from 2010-11. Prior to that, Mr. Memarian was a researcher at the Iranian Parliament Research Center and worked as a journalist for the Iranian news daily, Hamshahri.
]]>by Shireen T. Hunter
Throughout the recent handwringing about how the US and other Western countries failed to foresee the emergence of ISIS, one factor has been totally ignored, either intentionally or inadvertently: the impact of Washington’s hostility towards Iran, especially its persistent tendency to treat any anti-Iranian movement or idea in the Middle East as either good or the lesser evil compared to dealing with Tehran. This attitude has been coupled with a consistent unwillingness to support positive forces for change and reform in Iran; indeed, actually undermining them by insisting on their meeting preconditions that the West knows can’t be met due to Iran’s internal political dynamics. Significantly, this Western and especially American attitude predated any dispute over Iran’s nuclear program.
The first Western mistake followed the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the coming to power of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989. Instead of taking advantage of Iran’s vulnerability at the time, as well as Rafsanjani’s efforts both to move Iran towards moderation and openness domestically and internationally and to reach out to the West to help him achieve these goals, the United States chose to put all of its eggs into Saddam Hussein’s basket and adamantly refused to acknowledge his many transgressions—against Iraq’s neighbors and own people—until his fateful 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
Nevertheless, with great difficulty—due to leftist opposition—Rafsanjani managed to secure Iran’s neutrality in the Persian Gulf War, a fact that facilitated US military operations. He also secured the release of the last of the Western hostages held in Lebanon. Yet, instead of encouraging the moderate political trends in Iran, the US under President George H. W. Bush embarked on a policy of containing Iran (soon to be replaced by the Clinton administration’s “dual containment” policy, which was then followed in 1996 by Congress’ enactment of the first oil sanctions against Iran at a time when Rafsanjani was actively encouraging American oil companies, notably Conoco, to invest). This policy of containment was first announced during a trip to Central Asia in 1992 by then-Secretary of State James Baker who declared containing Iran’s influence in the region would constitute a major goal of US policy.
Guided by this objective, the US subsequently bought into Pakistan’s argument that the Taliban would constitute a credible barrier to Iran’s influence in Afghanistan and, through it, in Central Asia as well. Hence Washington did not object to Pakistan’s arming and promoting the Taliban, a step that eventually led to the fall of the Afghan government of Burhaneddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood, two leaders who supported a version of Islam far more moderate than that of the Taliban. It is forgotten today that the Afghan civil war began with attacks by the Pakistan-based and more radical Islamists, first through Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and, when Islamabad judged him to be too difficult to control, through the Taliban.
Even after the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, followed by the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, which Iran directly and actively supported, Washington continued to rely on Pakistan as its key regional partner. Despite massive US aid, Islamabad actively—if covertly—undermined US strategy in Afghanistan while it scorned Iran’s offers to help stabilize the country.
Just as Washington ignored or rebuffed Rafsanjani’s efforts to moderate Iran’s domestic and international policies, it similarly declined to help his successor, President Mohammad Khatami, who promoted a tolerant and reformist Islam and a less confrontational approach to relations with the West and Iran’s neighbors. Thus, holding out for the best—namely, a secular, pro-western government in Tehran—the US lost the relatively good. And when Iran actively helped the US both to oust the Taliban and facilitate the transition that followed, it was rewarded by President George W. Bush with membership in the “axis of evil,” paving the way for new and ever more punitive sanctions.
After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Tehran quietly put forward an offer for a comprehensive deal with the US not only to cooperate on efforts to stabilize Washington’s latest conquest, but also to address all outstanding issues between the two countries, from acceptance of Israel and Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups to Iran’s nuclear program. The Bush administration did not even bother to respond. Moreover, fearful that Iran might become the unintended beneficiary of the Ba’ath regime’s removal, Washington essentially stood by as its regional Sunni allies worked to undermine the fledgling Shia-led government in Baghdad not only by denying it aid and formal diplomatic recognition, but also, in the case of some Gulf states, encouraging and supporting the burgeoning Sunni insurgency, including al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which did not hesitate to attack US personnel, as well as their Shia brethren. Ironically if predictably, Washington’s policy of ignoring Sunni extremists forced Iraq’s Shia government to move closer to Iran.
Of course, the unanticipated insurgency and the increasing sectarian violence that it fostered also derailed hopes by the Bush administration—especially its neoconservative faction—that its “success” in Iraq would lead to “regime change”—either through destabilization or an actual attack—as well. At the same time, however, the administration bought into the idea that the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict could also be used to curb Iran’s influence, notably by forging a de facto alliance between Israel and the Sunni-led states against Tehran and what Jordan’s King Abdullah ominously called the “Shia Crescent.” Of course, not only did Washington’s acceptance and even promotion of this idea contribute to rising sectarian tensions and extremism throughout the region, but it also failed to produce any progress toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Once again, rather than working with Iran to stabilize Iraq, which would have required exerting real pressure on its Sunni allies that were supporting the insurgency, containing Iran’s influence remained Washington’s overriding priority.
It was in this context that the so-called Arab Spring blossomed and, with it, renewed hopes in Washington to reshape the Middle East, if not by achieving “regime change” in Iran, then at least by weakening its regional influence, particularly in the Levant. Even as the Obama administration publicly depicted the movement as the dawn of open and democratic societies, its closest regional partners—to which Washington had so often and so counter-productively deferred in Iraq—saw it as a way to redress the region’s strategic balance that had been upset by the 2003 invasion and the empowerment of Iraq’s Shia majority.
As the movement progressed from Tunisia and Egypt to Libya and the (thwarted) pro-democracy movement in Bahrain, it eventually reached Syria and the minority Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s most important regional ally. While the Gulf states and Turkey led the charge against the regime, the US and much of the West were not far behind. Predictably, however, in its desire to see Assad overthrown and Iran weakened, the US and its allies largely ignored the steadily growing influence of groups such as al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, and similar foreign-backed Sunni extremist groups whose violence toward Syrian Shias, Alawites, Alevis, and Christians has been exceeded only by AQI’s successor, the Islamic State (ISIS).
Thus, for the past 25 years or more, the West—especially the United States—has made containing Iran its overriding priority in the Gulf and has too often seen the Wahhabi/Salafi version of Islam and its violent offshoots as an effective counterweight to Iranian influence. In doing so, it has unintentionally helped create monsters like Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and now Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi.
This critique by no means absolves Iran, Syria, Shia militias, or Iraq’s Shia-led government of their own mistakes and crimes. They have their own not insignificant share of responsibility in creating the region’s current problems and conflicts. And they have to do their part if the region’s problems are to be resolved. But as great powers that claim the world’s moral and political leadership with the power to intervene at will in other countries, the US and other Western countries must be judged by higher standards.At the very least, they need to offer a coherent and positive vision of a functioning Middle East and South Asia.
This requires going beyond the platitudes about wanting to advance democracy and human rights.
While the Western powers do not have a clear vision of what kind of Middle East they want and even less how to achieve it, ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Nusra have their own regional plans, based on ethnic and sectarian cleansing as we have already seen in both Syria and Iraq.
In short, until the US and the West admit at least to themselves that they have made mistakes in the region in the last few decades, particularly in their efforts to isolate and weaken Iran, and learn from those mistakes and change course, their efforts at defeating extremism and stabilizing the region are bound to fail.
The West cannot get all that it desires in the region, because political engineering has its limits. But if it embarks on a strategy of conflict resolution—fostering regional cooperation, instead of fighting it; and promoting compromise instead of complete capitulation by Iran or any other local power—its interests and those of the region will be better served. Until such a strategy is adopted and seriously implemented, however, every day that passes will make it that much harder to end the violence in the Middle East and encourage compromise and reconciliation. The same is equally true for the regional players. By pursuing maximalist goals they will all end up losers.
]]>by Shireen T. Hunter
For some time, the problems of Iraq and indeed of all of the Middle East have been blamed on Iran for its interference and meddling, especially for exporting its ideology and attempting to establish hegemony over the region.
Like any other state, Iran is not immune to the [...]]]>
by Shireen T. Hunter
For some time, the problems of Iraq and indeed of all of the Middle East have been blamed on Iran for its interference and meddling, especially for exporting its ideology and attempting to establish hegemony over the region.
Like any other state, Iran is not immune to the temptation of spreading its world view to neighboring areas and beyond, or to seeking as much influence as possible over both near and more distant environments. Other regional countries have acted similarly during different periods of recent history. Thus Egypt worked to spread Arab nationalism and socialism, as Iraq did with Baathism, and Saudi Arabia with its particular version of Wahhabi Islam. These states have also tried to increase their regional influence. States often behave in this way; competition for influence is a truth of international relations.
That said, since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988, and especially after Iran’s transition to the post-Khomeini period in 1989, for obvious reasons, Iran’s primary concern has been to maintain security on its borders and effectively shield itself from the disruptive effects of turmoil in its neighborhood. The main reason for this shift was the heavy human and material costs Iran incurred during the Iran-Iraq war, followed by the need to rebuild after wartime devastation.
Turbulent relations
Due to Iran’s turbulent history with Iraq, Tehran has become particularly concerned with stabilizing its relations with Baghdad.
Since Iraq emerged as an independent state after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Iranian-Iraqi relations have gone through several phases, mostly but not entirely characterized by tension. In the decades following Iraq’s indepedence, Iran’s relations with the country were dominated by the British presence in Iraq and broader British regional policies.
When the Iranian parliament refused to ratify the 1919 British-Iranian agreement, which would have made Iran a virtual British protectorate, Britain followed a pro-Arab and anti-Iran policy in Iraq and the rest of the Persian Gulf. Iraqi Sunnis were given dominant positions, Iranians residing in Iraq were prevented from properly registering and denied the rights granted to other foreign nationals, and, most importantly, Britain ruled in favor of Iraq in the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud) river on the Iran-Iraq border, after efforts through the League of Nations failed to resolve differences. On the basis of a 1937 agreement, Britain put the entire waterway under Iraq’s control, except a small area around Abadan in Iran’s Khuzestan province. According to this treaty, Iran had to pay tolls to Iraq when its ships used the waterway.
In Bahrain, meanwhile, from the 1920s onward the British began an Arabization policy that ultimately led to its quasi-independence from Iran.
At that time, Iran and Iraq were part of a Western-sponsored alliance, first under the British and later in the context of the 1955 Baghdad Pact, so these differences did not cause major conflicts in bilateral Iranian-Iraqi relations, although the status of Iraqi Shias and Iraqis of Iranian origin, along with the question of Shatt al-Arab, were always sources of concern for Iran and of tensions in bilateral relations.
That situation changed when the Iraqi monarchy fell in 1958, and Abdul Karim Qasim formed a revolutionary government. This development was frightening to Iran and its leaders. Already, the Nasserite revolution in Egypt, with its pro-Soviet tendencies, and the march of pan-Arabism, with its anti-Iran flavor, had created problems for Iran. Nasser, as is now well documented, supported a variety of anti-Shah groups, including Iran’s Islamists and leftists. Moreover, Egypt, later joined by Iraq, engaged in subversive activities in Iran’s Khuzestan province, forming groups such as the Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz. Iraq also referred to Iran as the “Persian occupier” and supposedly tried, with the help of the Iranian Tudeh Party, Egypt, and the Soviet Union, to bring about an Iraq-style coup in Iran. At the same time, the Arabs began campaigning to change the name of the Persian Gulf.
These tensions were reflected in military skirmishes between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab. Iran tried to change the status quo by declaring the 1937 treaty no longer valid due to changed conditions.
There was a brief thaw in relations when Adusalam Arif became Iraq’s leader in 1963, following a coup that brought down Qasim. However, broader Arab, regional, and Cold War politics interfered. After the Baathists took power in Iraq, relations with Iran entered their worst period. During the 1970s, Iran and Iraq fought a proxy war in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the US helping Iran. The result was Iraq’s capitulation and the signing of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, which resulted in Iraq having to share control of the waterway with Iran and seemed to resolve the Shatt al-Arab dispute based on the principle of thalweg.
The tables were turned in 1979 with the Islamic revolution. The Arabs got their wish and the Shah fell. But they soon discovered that Ayatollah Khomeini was a far more formidable foe than the Shah. His discourse of revolutionary Islam was much more dangerous than the Shah’s so-called imperial delusions.
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein had never forgotten or forgiven being bested by Iran, as exemplified by the Algiers Agreement. Sensing Iran’s turmoil and isolation, and possibly egged-on by regional and international actors, he attacked Iran in 1980. By calling this invasion another “Qadisiyya” — a reference to the decisive battle during the Arab invasion of Iran in 642 AD — he reminded the Iranians that no matter how pro-Islam and pro-Arab they become, they will never be accepted as legitimate players in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, the Iranian revolutionaries took hostage American diplomats in Tehran and were later implicated in similar activities in Lebanon. By this behavior, they antagonized the United States and a good part of Europe and exacerbated anti-Iranian sentiments in the Arab world.
Iran as a status quo power
Irrespective of Iranian government claims, Iran lost its war with Iraq. When the ceasefire agreement was signed in August 1988, Iraq still occupied Iranian territory and was unwilling to sign a peace agreement. Iran was only saved from further Iraqi threats by Saddam’s ceaseless ambitions, when he invaded Kuwait in 1991 and brought upon Iraq the wrath of America and its allies.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Iran was a net loser of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Had the Soviet Union not collapsed, the situation might have been different. But following the Soviet Union’s fall, the US became able to begin its policy of “dual containment,” which culminated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Saddam’s removal did not particularly improve Iran’s security environment. Indeed, a weakened Saddam would have been much better for Iran than living with US troops on its western borders after they had already closed in on Iran’s eastern borders following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. For several years, the goal of US policy in Iran, both stated and non-stated, became regime change in Tehran.
Iran’s relations with post-Saddam Iraqi governments have also not been easy. Even during times of relative calm in Iraq, some Shia leaders, like Muqtada al-Sadr, tried to woo other Sunni Arab states. The new Iraqi government also openly declared it would never reinstate the Algiers Agreement, and it stuck to traditional Iraqi nationalist policies. Relations between Iran and Iraq only improved after the latter’s Shia government was almost totally isolated by other Arab states and following the onset of unrelenting Sunni extremist attacks, the shock of events in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s intervention there, and the crisis in Syria since 2011.
Meanwhile, some Sunni members of the Iraqi government stated that Iran still remained the greatest security threat to Iraq.
In light of this history, Tehran anxiously desires non-hostile governments in Iraq. If it can, Iran will try to prevent the rise of an Iraqi government dominated by ex-Baathists or by those who harbor strong anti-Iranian sentiments. Even under perfect conditions, any independent and united Iraqi state will be in competition with Iran; hostility and competition are of course two different things.
Iran’s other primary interests in Iraq are economic and environmental. Iran has been subject to sandstorms that have been causing serious damage and endangering people’s health. To remedy this, Tehran needs the cooperation of Arab states where the sands originate. Thus far, Iraq has not done much to help; its many other problems have interfered with addressing this problem. Continued instability will further delay solving this problem. Meanwhile, by damming the Euphrates and consequently drying up the land, Turkey has exacerbated the sandstorm problem.
Iran, like Turkey, also wants a share of the Iraqi market and cooperation on transportation and energy. Tehran is also obviously concerned about the future of Shia holy sites in Iraq. However, in attempting to back up its claims to broader leadership in the Muslim world, Iran has not played a purely Shia card in Iraq. Iranian statements always pin blame on the “Takfiris” (Muslims who accuse other Muslims not agreeing with them of being unbelievers) and not the Sunnis for sectarian problems, while the Sunnis often equate the Shias with the so-called “Safawis”, referring to Iran’s Shia Safavid dynasty. Indeed, if Iran’s dialogue with the Sunnis has not developed, it has been because of the latter’s unwillingness.
In sum, because of its own vulnerabilities, fault lines and enormous domestic needs, Iran — despite its rhetoric — is essentially a status quo regional power. Iran, like all states, will try to capitalize on advantageous circumstances should they develop, but it has not been pursuing fundamental changes in the region’s makeup. Iran’s so-called regional gains, which are highly exaggerated, have not been the result of its own actions but of the policies of other states and their mistakes.
Policy options
What is to be done now, after Iraq has once again erupted into extreme violence? In dealing with Iraq and Iran’s role in it, Iraq’s realities must be kept in mind. Iraq’s post-Ottoman structure was both unfair and unrealistic and, hence, intrinsically unstable. It ignored Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian character. Any effort to restore that model would be dangerous and would fail. Like it or not, Iraqi Shias will want reasonable relations with Iran in order to balance the pull of the Sunni Arab world. But sectarian affiliation will not mean that Iraqi Shias will accept subservience to Iran; they are Arab and Iraqi and nationalistic.
Second, the Arab and Western policy of delegitimizing an Iranian role in the region, as was done both under the Shah and after the revolution, is not workable. In pursuing security in the Middle East, powers should acknowledge Iran’s security concerns instead of simply viewing Iran as a predatory actor. Achieving basic friendly relations with Iran and Arab states will serve Iraq’s interests and that of the entire region.
Lastly, Western regional policies centered on countering Iran, which have led to ignoring the disruptive actions of other actors, have harmfully distorted regional dynamics, just as excessive concern with the Soviet/Communist threat did during the Cold War. Yet these western policies have not helped resolve the region’s perennial problems, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is, therefore, an urgent need for a new paradigm to guide Western policies towards the region and Iran. Iraq could be a good starting point.
This article was published in LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook
]]>Shortly after President Obama’s startling telephone conversation with Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, a Saudi Arabian journalist wrote that “The phone call between Obama and Rouhani shocked the Gulf states, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and other countries.” No matter which president initiated the call, he wrote, “What is important to know is what stands [...]]]>
Shortly after President Obama’s startling telephone conversation with Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, a Saudi Arabian journalist wrote that “The phone call between Obama and Rouhani shocked the Gulf states, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and other countries.” No matter which president initiated the call, he wrote, “What is important to know is what stands behind the conversation and how deep the ties are between America and Iran.”
Never mind that there are no “ties” between Washington and Tehran, let alone “deep” ones. His article reflected concern among Saudis that the United States might negotiate some wide-ranging settlement of its issues with Iran and that any such deal would automatically be detrimental to Saudi interests.
Such anxiety has surfaced in Riyadh many times over the past two decades, dating to Madeleine Albright’s unsuccessful efforts to reach out to Iran when she was secretary of state in Bill Clinton’s second term. No doubt many prominent Saudis share the journalist’s sentiment, not just in the ruling family but in the Sunni religious establishment. In their short-sighted view, regional security is a zero-sum game: if it benefits Iran, it must be bad for Saudi Arabia. To this group, as the authors of a major RAND Corp. study noted in 2009, “the prospect of U.S.-Iranian rapprochement (or even near-term coordination on Iraq) would appear to jeopardize the privileged position Riyadh has long enjoyed in Gulf affairs.”
Since that study appeared, Saudi antipathy to Iran has only increased. Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, its all-out support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and for Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its perceived instigation of civil unrest in Bahrain have exacerbated Saudi anxieties and reinforced the kingdom’s determination to keep Iran isolated and economically constrained. At the same time, the Saudi perception that the United States abandoned Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, a longtime ally, and might do the same to them if regional circumstances changed, has led some Saudis to doubt the long-term reliability of the United States as anchor of the kingdom’s security. Their doubts were not alleviated when panelists at a Gulf security conference in Washington earlier this year projected a reversal of the regional alignment over the coming decade, with Iran emerging as more friendly to the United States and Saudi Arabia less so.
The Saudis have also been peeved about the inability of the United States to deliver on its commitment to a two-state solution that would end the Arab-Israeli conflict. That diplomatic stalemate has allowed Iran, which refuses to acknowledge Israel’s existence and openly supports Hezbollah, to present itself to the Arab world as the true champion of justice for the Palestinians, as opposed to the Saudis, who have offered a comprehensive plan for peace with Israel.
Furthermore, the Saudis went all-in to try to engineer the ouster of Assad, believing that they were in tune with U.S. policy. Now they may be feeling exposed as the United States and Russia appear to be pursuing a different course.
And it is certainly true that many of Saudi Arabia’s leading officials, including some diplomats in the foreign ministry, harbor a deep loathing for, and suspicion of, all things Shia. A softer U.S. line on Iran would not make those Saudis more comfortable in the bilateral relationship.
Moreover, the Rouhani initiative, assuming it is genuine rather than cosmetic, coincides with a growing realization in Saudi Arabia that the United States is becoming steadily less dependent on Gulf oil. Could the Obama administration’s announced shift of strategic resources to Asia presage a reduction of U.S. commitments in the Gulf? Senior U.S. officials say no: Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few months ago that “You can take it to the bank” that the U.S. will maintain its posture in the Gulf for the foreseeable future.
Thus, recent reports of anxiety in Riyadh about a possible shift in relations between Washington and Tehran were predictable, and may well have some basis in fact.
But there are also Saudis who understand that a better relationship between Washington and Tehran might actually benefit the kingdom. After all, the two countries shared a strategic alignment with the United States before the Iranian revolution. In that era, Iran was far more powerful than Saudi Arabia militarily and economically, but the Saudis did not perceive it as a strategic threat, partly because it was influenced by the United States and partly because Saddam Hussein’s Iraq provided a protective buffer — a buffer that the United States dismantled with its invasion of Iraq a decade ago.
Even during the past decade, when tensions were high over Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq and other issues, the Saudis and Iranians found ways to work cooperatively when it was in the interests of both countries. “Such calculations often take place independently of U.S. pressure or encouragement,” the RAND report noted, adding that in past times of tension with Washington the Saudis have been more flexible, rather than less so, in their regional rivalries.
“With the ‘moderation’ discourse strengthened during the presidency of recently elected Hassan Rouhani, pragmatism will be enhanced in Iran’s regional policy,” the columnist Kayhan Barzegar, an experienced analyst of Gulf affairs, predicted in the online magazine al-Monitor after Rouhani was inaugurated. “This development will weaken the existing ‘mutual threat’ perception between Iran and Saudi Arabia that is rooted primarily in the policies of both countries in response to regional issues. Such a development will also consequently strengthen relations between the two. Iran and Saudi Arabia are not interested in an intensification of sectarian or geostrategic regional rivalries. They are well aware that such rivalries will eventually be instrumentalized and used politically, draining energy from both sides. The result will be increased instability and growth of extremist trends in their backyard. Conflict between the two also provides an opportunity for other rival actors, such as Turkey and Qatar, to play an active role in regional issues at their expense, such as happened with the Syrian crisis, which is not currently welcomed by the Iranians or the Saudis.”
In fact, there are several ways in which a lessening of tensions between Iran and the United States could actually benefit Saudi Arabia. To achieve some form of rapprochement with the United States now, Iran would be required to forgo definitively any attempt to build or acquire nuclear weapons — a development that could hardly be depicted as detrimental to Saudi interests. The United States would also press Iran to curtail the aggressive policies that have destabilized the region for years. If Iran’s leaders truly want relief from international economic sanctions, they will have to persuade the countries that imposed them that they will be good neighbors to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states. Would that not assuage some of the security concerns that have prompted Saudi Arabia to spend tens of billions of dollars on new U.S. weapons?
If Iran were to curtail its support for Hezbollah in order to improve relations with Washington and the West, it might forfeit its position as “more Arab than the Arabs” on the issue of Israel, another development that could be to Saudi Arabia’s advantage.
And Saudi Arabia’s Gulf neighbors such as Qatar might no longer feel the need to hedge their bets by keeping some distance between themselves and Saudi Arabia and maintaining correct relations with Iran, thus facilitating Saudi Arabia’s desire to exert the regional leadership to which it feels entitled.
On a visit to South Asia when she was secretary of state, Albright chided the Pakistanis for opposing a U.S. initiative to expand economic ties with India. The initiative was not aimed at undermining Pakistan, she said, and might actually be helpful if an expanding Indian economy brought greater cross-border trade.
The Pakistanis didn’t buy it, but that did not diminish the validity of her message. It might be useful now for Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry to explain to the Saudis that any deal with Iran will be a long time in the making and will not damage U.S. ties with Riyadh unless the Saudis want it that way.
– Thomas W. Lippman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and author of Saudi Arabia on the Edge.
via USIP
Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So [...]]]>
via USIP
Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So Iran actually shares interests with the United States, European nations and the Arab League in opposing any use of chemical weapons.
But the Islamic Republic also has compelling reasons to continue supporting Damascus. The Syrian regime is Iran’s closest ally in the Middle East and the geographic link to its Hezbollah partners in Lebanon. As a result, Tehran vehemently opposes U.S. intervention or any action that might change the military balance against President Bashar Assad.
The Iran-Syria alliance is more than a marriage of convenience. Tehran and Damascus have common geopolitical, security, and economic interests. Syria was one of only two Arab nations (the other being Libya) to support Iran’s fight against Saddam Hussein, and it was an important conduit for weapons to an isolated Iran. Furthermore, Hafez Assad, Bashar’s father, allowed Iran to help create Hezbollah, the Shiite political movement in Lebanon. Its militia, trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, has been an effective tool against Syria’s archenemy, Israel.
Relations between Tehran and Damascus have been rocky at times. Hafez Assad clashed with Hezbollah in Lebanon and was wary of too much Iranian involvement in his neighborhood. But his death in 2000 reinvigorated the Iran-Syria alliance. Bashar Assad has been much more enthusiastic about Iranian support, especially since Hezbollah’s “victorious” 2006 conflict with Israel.
In the last decade, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have trained, equipped, and at times even directed Syria’s security and military forces. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims and tourists visited Syria before its civil war, and Iranian companies made significant investments in the Syrian economy.
Fundamentalist figures within the Guards view Syria as the “front line” of Iranian resistance against Israel and the United States. Without Syria, Iran would not be able to supply Hezbollah effectively, limiting its ability to help its ally in the event of a war with Israel. Hezbollah wields thousands of rockets able to strike Israel, providing Iran deterrence against Israel — especially if Tel Aviv chose to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. A weakened Hezbollah would directly impact Iran’s national security. Syria’s loss could also tip the balance in Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia, making the Wahhabi kingdom one of the most influential powers in the Middle East.
In the run up to a U.S. decision on military action against Syria, Iranian leaders appeared divided.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and hardline lawmakers reacted with alarm to possible U.S. strikes against the Assad regime. And Revolutionary Guards commanders threatened to retaliate against U.S. interests. The hardliners clearly viewed the Assad regime as an asset worth defending as of September 2013.
But President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted a more critical line on Syria. “We believe that the government in Syria has made grave mistakes that have, unfortunately, paved the way for the situation in the country to be abused,” Zarif told a local publication in September 2013.
Rafsanjani, still an influential political figure, reportedly said that the Syrian government gassed its own people. This was a clear breach of official Iranian policy, which has blamed the predominantly Sunni rebels. Rafsanjani’s words suggested that he viewed unconditional support for Assad as a losing strategy. His remark also earned a rebuke from Khamenei, who warned Iranian officials against crossing the “principles and red lines” of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s message may have been intended for Rouhani’s government, which is closely aligned with Rafsanjani and seems to increasingly view the Syrian regime as a liability.
Regardless, a significant section of Iran’s political elite could be amenable to engaging the United States on Syria. Both sides have a common interest: preventing Sunni extremists from coming to power in Damascus. Iran and the United States also prefer a negotiated settlement over military intervention to solve the crisis. Tehran might need to be included in a settlement given its influence in Syria. Negotiating with Iran on Syria could ultimately help America’s greater goal of a diplomatic breakthrough, not only on Syria but Tehran’s nuclear program as well.
– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
*Read Alireza Nader’s chapter on the Revolutionary Guards in “The Iran Primer”
Photo Credits: Bashar Assad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei via Leader.ir, Syria graphic via Khamenei.ir Facebook
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated.
Jim refuses to join Twitter, but today Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani provided him with another reason to reconsider:
Iran gives notice to international community to use all its might to prevent use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world, esp. in #Syria
— [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated.
Jim refuses to join Twitter, but today Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani provided him with another reason to reconsider:
Iran gives notice to international community to use all its might to prevent use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world, esp. in #Syria
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
An Iranian official criticizing the use of chemical weapons, which Iraq’s Saddam Hussein used (with US assistance) to kill hundreds or even thousands of Iranians during the bloody Iran-Iraq war, is nothing new. What’s shocking is that Iran’s president seems to be endorsing force to prevent chemical weapons-use at a time when the US is positioning itself to strike Iran’s only regional ally, Syria. And as Golnaz Esfandiari reminds us, he made a similar statement on Saturday.
Iran expert Suzanne Maloney tells me that while we shouldn’t interpret too much from one statement, Rouhani’s words could indicate a “remarkable shift in the official posture of the Iranian government on the role of the international community” and “even on the sensitive issue of Syria” — but let’s backtrack for a moment.
For starters, it doesn’t appear like Rouhani tweeted this message by his mistake. Look at the tweets preceding it:
Iran suffered chemical weapons attacks by Iraqi forces during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war 2/2
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
We completely & strongly condemn use of chemical weapons in #Syria because Islamic Republic of Iran is itself victim of chemical weapons 1/2
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
And consider his most recent tweet as of now, which appeared one hour after his “notice” to the international community:
In response to questions abt other accounts in @HassanRouhani‘s name; this is the only English-language Twitter account.
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
Nothing has since been removed, revised, or added to Rouhani’s English Twitter account. His Persian account doesn’t feature these tweets.
What’s even more fascinating about all this is that at least according to news reports, Iran’s position on intervention in Syria has been what it was when the disgraced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president: don’t do it. State-run and semi-official Iranian news sites are dominated with statements from Iranian officials warning against an outside military attack.
Rouhani also refrained from naming Syria’s rebels as the aggressors when he acknowledged chemical weapons-use in Syria on Saturday — the same day that Iran announced Syria would allow weapons inspectors into the site of the alleged attack. Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif did reportedly blame the rebels, which he called “terrorists”, for using the weapons in “escalating the crisis”, so why did Rouhani hold back?
While cautioning against reading too much into all this so soon, Maloney, a former State Department policy advisor, told me on the phone that all this made her recall Hashemi Rafsanjani’s first term when he “managed to persuade the leadership of the Islamic Republic to remain neutral to the UN-backed international military campaign to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.”
She continued, “This is obviously very different because of the alliance of Iran and Syria and if so, would be an even more dramatic gesture, but it appears that Rouhani is trying to track a more moderate course on Iran’s foreign policy and even on the sensitive issue of Syria.”
“The conventional wisdom is that Rouhani would not have enough wiggle room on Syria, that he would be forced to accede to a hardline position that Iran’s security forces advocate — whether or not the revelation of alleged chemical weapons usage alters that or if Rouhani is taking this opportunity to signal a different approach than what we’ve seen from Tehran over the years, we’ll have to see,” said Maloney, who can also be found on Twitter (I’m nudging Jim).
Maloney added that whatever was discussed in the conversation between Zarif and UN Undersecretary Jeffrey Feltman during his surprise visit to Tehran this week could also be indicative of why Rouhani has made these unusual statements. Though we shouldn’t rush to conclusions, Rouhani’s words are not “terribly subtle,” she said.
(Interestingly, while serving as US ambassador to Lebanon when its Prime Minister Rafic Harriri was killed, Feltman accused the Assads of being behind the assassination.)
There have been varying interpretations among analysts here about how Iran would respond to intervention in Syria, ranging from: it will almost certainly have a negative impact on the nuclear negotiations to, Iran has too much to lose on that front to sacrifice its own interests for its ally.
That debate may be concluded in the near future, but all this brings to mind Farideh’s post from July 2012, where she took a hard look at Iran’s Syria policy. At that time, she noted that Iran seemed to be toeing the Russian line on Syria: “The Iranian government is undoubtedly aware that Syria is in a mess. But in the coming months expect Iran’s response to be more reactive than proactive despite proclamations and posturing that suggest otherwise.”
Is her conclusion, written more than a year ago, still applicable today?
Update: Iranian journalist Omid Memarian tells me that Rouhani’s comments could be focused on the rebels. In other words, perhaps Rouhani is saying that the international community should use all its “might” to stop chemical weapons use by the rebels. If that’s true, Maloney’s suggestion that Iran could be changing its stance on the international community still rings true.
Update II: Some have questioned whether the Twitter account linked to here is operated by Hassan Rouhani or his staff. I base my take on the following: 1) he has never denied that it’s his account; 2) it seems to be in line with Rouhani’s official statements and his talks and appearances etc.; 3) Twitter is prohibited in Iran, which makes public acknowledgement problematic; 4) my Iranian contacts who are usually in-the-know about these things say they can’t see any reason to doubt it.
]]>by Henry Precht
US-revolutionary Iran relations were born in the aftermath of a heavy snowstorm in Washington. I was in charge of the Iran Desk in the State Department and was due in the office at eight am. Almost nothing moved on the unplowed streets in my neighborhood and I had [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
US-revolutionary Iran relations were born in the aftermath of a heavy snowstorm in Washington. I was in charge of the Iran Desk in the State Department and was due in the office at eight am. Almost nothing moved on the unplowed streets in my neighborhood and I had to hitch a ride to the office with a faithful church sexton on his way to tend to his church. In the biting cold, I gave little thought to the role that religion would play in our coming journey with Shia clerics.
When the snow was cleared, a meeting was held in the White House Situation Room to decide on policy towards the new regime in Tehran. I wasn’t there, but afterwards my boss, Hal Saunders, said to me, “You’ll be pleased. They decided to try to build a new relationship with Iran.”
“Pleased” wasn’t the right word; daunted was closer to it. Or dubious. But we were good soldiers…
The question under today’s clouded but snow-free skies is, might the 34-year journey have led to a better place. The answer seems to be, probably not — given the history, ideologies, internal politics and external pressures of both sides.
History. From Mossadegh through Nixon/Kissinger and Brzezinski to the Iraq War and current nuclear impasse, the Iranians have compiled a grudge list against us. During the halcyon days of 1979, our men in Tehran used to be asked almost weekly, “Do you really accept our revolution? REALLY, Really, really?” No protestation of affection could persuade. We persisted and had the impression from the Bazargan people that they too wanted to maintain ties but a very different relationship. We were okay with this.
On the American side there is the Hostage Crisis that won’t fade away and an ever-thickening file of alleged Iranian malfeasance and mischief.
Ideologies. The Iranian regime places high value on anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism and anti-Western values and pleasures.
We Americans seem to love the things they despise.
Internal Politics. Both sides court popular favor by flaunting the purity of their principles — from conservative US opposition to former Senator Chuck Hagel, to a [conditional) Iranian refusal of bilateral contacts. Very likely this kind of sloganeering has little interest or appeal to the broader populations which would just as soon avoid conflict and enjoy normal lives.
External Pressures. Hezbollah and Syria can pull heart strings in Tehran while Israel knows how to make Washington dance to its tune. Neither of the two principal antagonists is entirely independent in the exercise of its policy towards the other.
Still, looking backward, it might have been wiser in the beginning not to seek the “normal” bilateral relationship that was our goal. A period of living apart in mutual silence and minimal notice might have led in time to the healing of wounds. The wrong-headedness of our helping Iraq fight its unjust war and Tehran’s blind refusal to recognize power relationships in their region could have been avoided. A more acute, realistic and independent calculation of our separate interests would still help. As would a far deeper understanding of the other.
What might have been can probably still become — given good will and the courage of leaders.
- Henry Precht, a retired Foreign Service Officer, was in charge of Iranian Affairs in the State Department during the revolution and hostage crisis. His last assignment was as Deputy Ambassador in Cairo 1981-85.
Photo Credit: Marey’s Flickr photostream.
]]>via IPS News
NEW YORK, Nov 26 2012 (IPS) - I have never read a book quite like this. “Becoming Enemies” is the latest product of the indispensable National Security Archive, the Washington non-profit that has given new meaning to the Freedom of Information Act.
They not only use their [...]]]>
via IPS News
NEW YORK, Nov 26 2012 (IPS) - I have never read a book quite like this. “Becoming Enemies” is the latest product of the indispensable National Security Archive, the Washington non-profit that has given new meaning to the Freedom of Information Act.
They not only use their skills to get major U.S. policy documents declassified, but they take those documents and find innovative ways to illuminate important historical episodes. This book is a living example.
It covers the period of the Iran-Iraq war, during which U.S.-Iran relations hardened into the seemingly permanent enmity that has characterised their relations ever since. NSA assembled a group of individuals who were deeply involved in the making of U.S. policy during that time, backed up by a small group of scholars who had studied the period.
They provided them with a briefing book of major documents from the period, mostly declassified memos, to refresh their memories, and then launched into several days of intense and structured conversation. The transcript of those sessions, which the organisers refer to as “critical oral history”, is the core of this book.
No one can emerge from this book without a sense of revelation. No matter how much you may know about these tumultuous years, even if you were personally involved or have delved into the existing academic literature, you will discover new facts, new interpretations, and new dimensions on virtually every page.
I say this as someone who was part of the U.S. decision-making apparatus for part of this time and who has since studied it, written about it, and taught it to a generation of graduate students. I found little to suggest that my own interpretations were false, but I found a great deal that expanded what I knew and illuminated areas that previously had puzzled me. I intend to use it in my classes from now on.
Iranians tend to forget or to underestimate the impact of the hostage crisis on how they are perceived in the world. Many Iranians are prepared to acknowledge that it was an extreme action and one that they would not choose to repeat, but their inclination is to shove it to the back of their minds and move on.
This book makes it blindingly clear that the decision by the Iranian government to endorse the attack on the U.S. embassy in November 1979 and the subsequent captivity of U.S. diplomats for 444 days was an “original sin” in the words of this book for which they have paid – and continue to pay – a devastating price.
Similarly, U.S. citizens tend to forget their casual response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran, our tacit acquiescence to massive use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and the shootdown of an Iranian passenger plane by a U.S. warship, among other things.
The authors of “Becoming Enemies” remind us that, just as Americans have not forgotten the hostage crisis, Iranians have neither forgotten or forgiven America’s own behaviour – often timid, clumsy, incompetent, or unthinking; but always deadly from Iran’s perspective.
It is impossible in a brief review to catalogue the many new insights that appear in this book for the first time. However, one of the most impressive sections deals with the so-called Iran-contra affair – the attempt by the Reagan administration to secretly sell arms to Iran in the midst of a war when we were supporting their Iraqi foes.
This, of course, exploded into a major scandal that revealed criminal actions by many of the administration’s top aides and officials and nearly resulted in the impeachment of the president. The official position of the administration in defending its actions was that this represented a “strategic opening” to Iran.
Participants in this discussion, some of whom had never before publicly described their own roles, dismissed that rationale as self-serving political spin. President Reagan, they agreed, was “obsessed” (the word came up repeatedly) with the U.S. hostages in Lebanon and was willing to do whatever was required to get them out, even if it cost him his job.
Moreover, the illegal diversion of profits from Iran arms to support the contra rebels in Central America was, it seems, only one of many such operations. The public focus on Iran permitted the other cases to go unexamined.
Another striking contribution is the decisive role played by the U.N. secretary-general and his assistant secretary, Gianni Picco (a participant), in bringing an end to the Iran-Iraq war. This is a gripping episode in which the U.N. mobilised Saddam’s Arab financiers to persuade him to stop the war, while ignoring the unhelpful interventions of the United States. They deserved the Nobel Peace Prize they received for their efforts.
There are, however, some lapses in this otherwise exceptional piece of research. One of the “original sins” of U.S. policy that are discussed is the U.S. failure to denounce the Iraqi invasion of Iran on Sep. 22, 1980, thereby confirming in Iranian eyes U.S. complicity in what they call the “imposed war”. I am particularly sensitive to the fact that the discussion of the actions of the Carter administration in 1980 is conducted in the absence of anyone who was actually involved.
Those of us in the White House at the time would never have failed to recall that direct talks with the Iranians about the release of the hostages had begun only days earlier. So there was for the first time in nearly a year a high-level authentic negotiating channel with Iran.
My own contribution to the missed opportunities that are enumerated at the end of the book would, in retrospect, have been our lack of courage or imagination to use our influence with the United Nations Security Council to bargain with Iran for immediate action on the hostages. If we had taken a principled position calling for an immediate cease-fire and Iraqi withdrawal, the entire nature of the war could have been transformed.
To my surprise, Zbigniew Brzezkinski, my boss at the time, sent a personal memo to President Carter (which I had never seen until now) that argued for “Iran’s survival” and held out the possibility of secret negotiations with Tehran. This was a total revelation to me, and it was so contrary to the unfortunate conventional wisdom that Brzezkinski promoted the Iraqi invasion that even the authors of this book seemed at a loss to know what to make of it.
The other huge disappointment with this initiative, which is not the fault of the organisers, was the absence of any Iranian policymakers. Iranian leaders and scholars should read this book. Perhaps one day their domestic politics will permit them to enter into such a dialogue. That day is long overdue.
*Gary Sick is a former captain in the U.S. Navy, who served as an Iran specialist on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He currently teaches at Columbia University. He blogs at http://garysick.tumblr.com.
]]>The neoconservative hawk and deputy editorial page editor of the Wall Street Journal, Bret Stephens, has once again figured it all out. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with the United States since 1979, and no US president since then, including Ronald Reagan and George [...]]]>
The neoconservative hawk and deputy editorial page editor of the Wall Street Journal, Bret Stephens, has once again figured it all out. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with the United States since 1979, and no US president since then, including Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, has done anything but appease that evil regime for reasons that befuddle us all.
Hence, it is now of paramount importance to halt the current president’s “outreach” to Iran because all previous attempts motivated by Washington’s “excess of decency” have allowed “33 years of Iranian outrages” to go “unavenged” and “undeterred”.
Stephens, a former editor of the Jerusalem Post, was an avid supporter of the US invasion of Iraq and a fierce critic of the planned 2011 troop withdrawal, arguing that the US should have maintained a “serious tripwire force in Iraq as a hedge against Iran and other bad forces in the region” instead.
Now, again, he is amplifying his call to arms with fear mongering and a line that fellow neoconservative pundit Michael Ledeen has been using for years – Iran and the US are already at war, so the US should start acting like it:
Maybe the president thinks decency obliges him to give diplomacy another chance. But it is from an excess of decency that 33 years of Iranian outrages have gone unavenged, and Iran now proceeds undeterred. Sensible policy on Iran begins not with the question of how to avoid a war—that war was foisted on U.S. in 1979—but how to win it. Anything less invites further terror and dishonors the memory of Iran’s many American victims.
Following this line of reasoning requires diverting the conversation from how best to effectively engage with Iran in order to stop its nuclear program, to how to wage a successful war against an intractable and wicked enemy. Stephens’ conclusion is based on a litany of Iranian offenses (some of which remain questionable, let alone unproven) from the hostage crisis to bombings and kidnappings in Lebanon in the 1980s, the Khobar Tower bombing in Saudi Arabia, “thousands of U.S. troops killed by IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan” and the curious case of Mansour Arbabsiar, the Iranian-American who recently pleaded guilty to attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US in collusion with Iranian counterparts. This, according to our militarist pundit, has been the Iranian record against the United States.
And what of the US record against Iran? Why, an “excess of decency” of course! For reasons that Stephens doesn’t have time to get into or simply cannot explain, the US leadership from Reagan to Obama has repeatedly chosen the soft line with Iran. Perhaps the inherently peaceful character of the US has led to its impressive military hardware being reserved for only special occasions, which, in the case of the Middle East, Stephens forgets to mention, has somehow been deployed since the first 1991 Gulf War with no hiatus in between.
With this in mind, there really is no reason to waste time over the nuclear issue. Stephens wants a war to “avenge” the Islamic Republic’s 33-year long record of crimes and does not shy away from declaring his unhappiness regarding the direction of the Iran conversation in the US. The idea that sanctions are working unsettles him because it suggests that there is still time for serious and public diplomatic engagement with Iran to resolve the nuclear issue once and for all. (And no, I am not talking about a Reaganesque mission to secretly dispatch a national security adviser with a cake and bible to Tehran.) Even attempting peaceful conflict resolution is difficult for Stephens to accept because it “dishonors the memory of Iran’s many American victims.” For Stephens and many of his neocon colleagues, the real issue goes beyond the nuclear impasse; what we should really be concerned about is Iran’s history of “dishonoring” America since its Revolution.
Interestingly, this argument echoes talking points made by Iranian neoconservatives (which we often refer to as hardliners). Just read any column by Hossein Shariatmadari, the intractable editor of Kayhan Daily, and you will understand what I mean.
What are the similarities? First there is the victim mentality. Nothing the US or Iran has done can outdo the “bad” things that are done to them. From Shariatmadari’s point of view, the Islamic Republic has always been on the receiving end of Western “savagery” (a term also recently used by Leader Ali Khamenei to describe US conduct vis-à-vis Iran) because of its values, principles, and its daring resistance against US “arrogance.” From Stephens’ point of view, nothing the US has done – like siding with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and at a minimum engaging in a collusion of silence over Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran’s military and civilians, or shooting down, even if accidentally, an Iranian civilian airliner and then promoting the naval commander responsible for it – is even worth mentioning. Iranian conduct always occurs in a vacuum and is only worth noting in terms of the harm that is imposed.
From the neoconservative point of view — in the U.S. and Iran — correct values, “decency,” and the desire to be a beacon of goodwill, is the only mark of their respective countries. And the violent and disdainful conduct of the other side is the only conduct that needs to be noted. I am sure that, in the minds of folks like Shariatmadari and Stephens, that is indeed the only conduct noted.
This is why Stephens refers to the “crippling” sanctions that Governor Romney and President Obama referenced in Monday night’s debate as more of a “campaign prop than policy tool.” The notion that “unprecedented” sanctions that target the financial core of another country — not to mention killing nuclear scientists and sabotaging nuclear facilities — could also be considered an act of war is incomprehensible for Stephens.
Beyond feigned or actual feelings of victimhood, there is also a similarity in their avoidance of responsibility for the outcome of their proposed solutions. Neoconservatives in both Iran and the United States have had their chances at influencing their respective countries’ foreign and security policies. George W. Bush’s “muscular foreign policy” promoted by the likes of Stephens brought the US the debacle that has been Iraq — which, if anything, has actually strengthened Iran — and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s “aggressive foreign policy,” pushed by folks like Shariatmadari, has brought Iran crippling sanctions.
Do they take responsibility for any of their disasters? Absolutely not! Stephens’ push for another war in the Middle East is clear evidence that he does not see himself or his cohorts as responsible for the fiasco in Iraq. In fact, he has said so plainly. The war was not the “original sin,” he wrote in 2007. In fact, it was no sin at all. Things went wrong because of mistakes that occurred after the neoconservatives lost their influence in the Bush administration when Condoleezza Rice became Secretary of State (this being, by the way, the reason Stephens vehemently opposed Rice becoming Romney’s running mate).
A similar argument is now being parlayed by Iranian neoconservatives. Things always begin to go wrong when the Iranian government indicates a willingness to talk with the United States, they say. It exhibits weakness, and it is only through a show of strength and “will”– a favorite mantra of neoconservatives everywhere — that “bullies” like the US can be deterred.
Let me end by pointing out that despite the uncanny similarities of their worldviews, there is at least one critical difference between Iranian and US neoconservatives. This difference does not exist in their self-satisfied and belligerent poses; it relates to the location of their respective countries in the geopolitical and economic order.
It is the United States and its allies that are trying to strangle Iran economically, not the other way around. And of course it is the United States that will be engaging in yet another version of “shock and awe” if folks like Bret Stephens have their way, not the other way around.
]]>
By Leila Kashefi
As everyone knows, since the revolution of 1979, the United States and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) have been BEFs — best enemies forever. While the US occasionally offers its solidarity to the people of Iran and criticizes the regime’s human rights record, its [...]]]>
By Leila Kashefi
As everyone knows, since the revolution of 1979, the United States and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) have been BEFs — best enemies forever. While the US occasionally offers its solidarity to the people of Iran and criticizes the regime’s human rights record, its policy of sanctions and isolation actually strengthens regime hardliners. So it’s not surprising that on some days Iranians think: with an enemy like the US, why would the IRI need any friends?
Last Friday, September 21st, was one of those days. The State Department, under pressure from powerful but unknown powers, leaked the news that the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), a shady quasi-cultish group with a history of violence and intimidation, would be delisted from the US foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) list. Iranians inside and outside the country rarely agree about anything. They find common ground in their love of pomegranates, pride for Iranian athletes competing internationally, respect for Mohammad Mossadeq, the 1950s prime minister who nationalized Iranian oil before being ousted in a US-backed coup, and deep contempt if not hatred for the MEK.
Those who lived through the early years of the Iranian revolution remember the MEK’s violence, which was justified somehow by their curious mix of Islam and Marxism. But the real animosity for the movement arose when they went into exile, settling and supporting Saddam Hussein in the 8-year Iran-Iraq war. As a British-educated former Iranian senior civil servant once said to me: “During World War II siding with the enemy was treason and punishable by death. The MEK committed treason, and the Iranian public will never forgive them.”
The movement was never transparent. During the past 30 years it has spun out a myriad of different organizations across Europe, with headquarters in Paris. Its leader Maryam Rajavi proclaims herself as the democratic leader of Iran, with hardly any support from Iranians inside Iran. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the MEK slid into obscurity. But as the war drums against Iran started to beat more loudly in Washington, DC, the MEK took on a new lease of life.
It has been incredible to watch members of a designated terror group walk the halls of Congressional office buildings, mingling with Hill staffers and representatives. “The only Iranians we see are the MEK,” said one staffer not long ago. Given how notoriously apolitical the Iranian-American community is, the fact that the MEK is bankrolled to such an extent should have prompted questions long ago – but somehow those who know prefer not to talk.
Anyone claiming that the MEK has broad-based support was proven wrong in 2009 in the aftermath of the Iranian presidential elections. I remember standing among the thousands of American-Iranians who had traveled to New York to protest Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to the UN General Assembly amidst the Green movement’s post-election protests in Iran. We were a literal sea of green spilling across the streets and avenues of New York; thousands of Iranians, young and old from across North America, joined together in our outrage towards the regime’s election theft. The MEK and the Monarchists were also there, but their numbers were puny and their presence pathetic. The MEK was nothing and nobody either inside or outside Iran. In New York that day they packed up and left rather quickly.
But in Washington their political influence continued to grow. Indeed, soon after the 2009 events, the MEK was hobnobbing with former generals and senior diplomats, buying their endorsements with money that clearly had not come from the pockets of Iranians.
Pundits and policymakers in Washington may try to minimize the significance of the State Department’s move, suggesting that the MEK is too weak to be effective and that its organization will be dismantled. But that’s not the point. In Tehran, the State Department’s deal feeds directly into the regime’s narrative: that the US is backing the MEK to launch attacks against Iran and undermine the territorial integrity of the country. MEK affiliation will likely become even more of an excuse for the persecution of students and activists.
Its ironic that after thirty years, just as the regime’s narrative of the US as the evil empire bent on destroying Iran was heading into the dustbin, it is the US itself that has given the narrative a new lease on life.
As for the people of Iran, many are beginning to wonder why the US despises them so much. Already suffering under the regime’s boot, they are also subjected to US-led economic sanctions that are destroying the middle class while strengthening the hands of the system’s loyalists. Now comes the news that the despised MEK is free to operate outside the country and steal their voice. For the Iranian people it seems like President Obama’s inauguration promise of an outstretched hand has turned out to be a rude slap in the face.
- Leila Kashefi is a pseudo-name for the author of this article, a Washington-based Iranian-American civil rights activist.
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