For months, top Israeli intelligence sources have been providing Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu with assessments that ought to make him welcome the progress being made at the most recent negotiations in Geneva, instead of, as one prominent Israeli journalist put it, a “party-pooper.”
Last month, days before his visit to [...]]]>
For months, top Israeli intelligence sources have been providing Prime Minister Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu with assessments that ought to make him welcome the progress being made at the most recent negotiations in Geneva, instead of, as one prominent Israeli journalist put it, a “party-pooper.”
Last month, days before his visit to the U.S., Netanyahu received a report from the head of Israel’s Military Intelligence (AMAN), Major General Aviv Kochavi. Kochavi’s assessment described the changes in Iran’s internal politics since Hassan Rouhani’s election as president not only as real, but “significant” and “strategic,” according to Barak Ravid of Haaretz: “In particular, Kochavi cited the increased strength of the moderate faction and the fact that 51 percent of the public voted for Rouhani, who was not the preferred candidate of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Kochavi also based his analysis on the stated intention of Rouhani and his cabinet to promote internal reform, increase the country’s openness to the West and end the economic sanctions on Iran.”
The position paper by Israel’s top military assessor stated that the process of change sparked by Rouhani’s victory s “cannot be ignored,” according to Ravid. Netanyahu ignored it. Although Netanyahu received Kochavi’s assessment a few days before he left for the U.S. in late September, the Israeli Prime Minister disregarded it entirely in his speech to the UN on Sept. 30, in which he vilified Rouhani as nothing more than a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” who was no different than his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the numerous interviews he gave during and after his visit to New York, Netanyahu complained that all Iranian presidents, whether hardliners or moderate, were all alike, since they served “that same unforgiving creed, that same unforgiving regime,” implicitly calling for regime change in Iran.
Kochavi didn’t question that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. According to Kochavi, the objective of that program has not changed: “Iran still seeks to reach the status of a nuclear threshold state,” in which it could manufacture a nuclear bomb fairly quickly, if and when it decided to do so.” That assessment, however, is a long way from Netanyahu’s hyperbolic insistence that “Iran is developing nuclear weapons.”
Even before the Iranian election in June, Kochavi had been much less histrionic than Netanyahu in his evaluation of the threat to Israel posed by Iran. Along with other Israeli top military and intelligence officials, Kochavi has thus far opposed Israel attacking Iran. Assessing Iran’s nuclear program in mid-March, Kochavi stated, “At this time 10,000 centrifuges are at work, mainly in Qom and Natanz, enriching 240 kilos of uranium, which is enough to produce between five and six bombs, should the Iranian leader decide to make them.” Nevertheless, when speaking at a security conference in Herzliya, Israel, Kochavi nonetheless pointed out that Iran was being careful not to cross any “red lines.” This differed sharply from Netanyahu’s accusations that Iran has been actively engaged in developing nuclear weapons, and had crossed numerous red lines.
Three months prior to Iran’s presidential election, Kochavi hinted that Israel’s intelligence sources inside Iran were reporting that Iranian strategy was under review.
Another top Israeli national security figure whose view diverges from Netanyahu’s hostile response to any diplomatic approach to Iran is Amos Yadlin, a former chief of Israeli defense intelligence and the currently the director of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies.
At the end of September, Yadlin issued a communique in which recommended that Netanyahu “adopt a ‘positive approach’ which welcomes effective dialogue and negotiations as tools that are preferable to a military solution to Iran’s nuclear program, but stressed that ‘dialogue is not a goal in itself, but rather a framework for the process, the goal of which is to neutralize the Iranian military nuclear threat’.”
In the Wall Street Journal on Oct. 15, Yadlin co-authored an op-ed which outlined four types of deals that could emerge from Geneva: ideal; reasonable; bad and phased. The “ideal” agreement approximates Netanyahu’s most minimal demands: an Iranian commitment to dismantle its nuclear program, beginning with the closure of its enrichment facility at Fordow and its yet-to-be-completed Arak reactor. Furthermore, Iran would be required to “ship out its entire stockpile of enriched uranium, which today is enough to produce five to seven bombs.” All sanctions would then be lifted against Iran.
Yadlin also outlines a “less good, but still reasonable, agreement” according to which Iran would retain its right to enrich uranium at a non-military level of 3.5-5%. It would also allow Iran to keep “a small, symbolic number” of centrifuges. Iran would have to re-sign and implement the Additional Protocol, which would enable the IAEA to carry out much more thorough oversight of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including suspected sites. Furthermore, all Iranian nuclear activities would be limited to Natanz; the Arak reactor would be rendered non-functional; and Fordow would be closed. Finally, transformation of enriched uranium to fuel rods would have to be done outside of Iran, just in case the Iranians change their mind about wanting to build a bomb at any time in the future.
While not dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, Yadlin insists a “reasonable agreement” would give the UN Security Council sufficient lead time to detect and prevent the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. “This compromise would prolong the Iranian breakout capacity timeline to years rather than months, and it may well be preferable to bombing Iran’s nuclear program or accepting an Iranian nuclear weapon.”
Yadlin’s idea of a “bad agreement”–easing of Western sanctions in exchange for Iran’s partial limitation of its nuclear program–is on par with the view of most hawks in the U.S. and Israel. Yadlin also doesn’t approve of a phased building of trust between Iran and the West, through a “process of reciprocal, partial steps” unless all current economic sanctions are maintained. “Only after Iran proves its resolve to abandon all the key elements in its military nuclear program should sanctions be lifted, and not a moment before.” Nonetheless, the fact that Yadlin can conceive of, and advocate, a “reasonable”agreement that falls short of “ideal” but nonetheless is not “bad” is worth noting: “Western diplomats in Geneva need to find their way to a reasonable deal if reaching an ideal agreement proves impossible.”
On Friday, Yadlin accused Netanyahu of “crying wolf” about the agreement with Iran. “It seems like he thinks that this is the final agreement — it is not,” Yadlin told The New York Times. “The real judgment of whether it’s a bad deal or an acceptable deal will be in the end of the negotiating period.”
Former Mossad Director Ephraim Halevy not only has publicly opposed an Israeli attack on Iran as anything but a last resort; he is a longstanding supporter of a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear issue. In September of 2012, Halevy told Haaretz‘s Ari Shavit that Israel needed to understand the Iranian perspective:
The basic feeling of that ancient nation is one of humiliation. Both religious Iranians and secular Iranians feel that for 200 years the Western powers used them as their playthings. They do not forget for a moment that the British and the Americans intervened in their internal affairs and toppled the regime of Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. From their perspective, the reason why, to this day, there is no modern rail network and no modern oil refineries in Iran is that the West prevented that. Thus, the deep motive behind the Iranian nuclear project − which was launched by the Shah − is not the confrontation with Israel, but the desire to restore to Iran the greatness of which it was long deprived. I believe that if the West could find a way to propose to Iran alternative methods to acquire that sense of greatness, Iran would forsake the nuclear road. If Iran were offered trains and oil refineries and a place of honor in regional trade, it would consider this seriously.
A month later, in an interview with al-Monitor‘s Laura Rozen just before the U.S. presidential election, Halevy defended President Obama’s willingness to negotiate with Iran as ” very courageous.” He also criticized Netanyahu for “invoking Auschwitz twice a week.” The interview was published amid rumors that the United States and Iran had agreed to hold direct talks on Iran’s nuclear program after the US presidential elections.
Halevy sees the “end game” of the negotiations with Iran as being of primary importance and urgency. In what appears to be an argument for a speedy wrap-up of an agreement, Friday’s New York Times quoted Halevy as saying, “The more you enter stages, the less you can be certain that you will get what you need in the end.” For Halevy, the desired end of the Iran negotiations would be an Iran without nuclear weapon capability that has reconciled itself to Israel’s existence. Halevy told Rozen in an interview last week:
“IF, if, the nuclear file is closed, and sanctions removed, it will bring economic relief…[and] a renewed view from Tehran of the opportunities the world is offering. And then, if there will be a desire to move beyond the nuclear issue, then the Iran regime will be able to turn to the public and say, ‘we should no longer be in the business of fear mongering. If we want to move forward with the US, it will be difficult while maintaining a state of belligerency against one of the US key friends and allies.’”
Ralph Ahrens of the Times of Israel reports that Doron Avital, a former commander of Israel’s elite reconnaisance unit Sayeret Makhal and more recently member of Israel’s Parliament (Knesset) from the Kadima party, discussed Iran’s nuclear program with a former general from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards at a a recent academic conference held at a French chateau.
“There’s been a serious shift toward the West,” Avital told The Times of Israel, “and if I take everything that he said and corroborate it with what I heard recently from [military intelligence commander Maj. Gen.] Aviv Kochavi and [newly retired national security adviser] Yaakov Amidror, then I think there has been a strategic shift and not just a tactical one.”
Avital implied that his attendance at the conference had been with the knowledge and tacit approval of Israel’s Ministry of Defense. “I have friends in the political and defense establishments and of course I updated them before leaving and after returning.” The Defense Ministry declined to confirm any knowledge–or interest–in Avital’s attendance at the event.
Another Times of Israel article by Lazar Berman on Oct. 31 reported that senior Israeli officials were said to have met “with representatives from an array of regional states — including Iran — and other major powers” in Switzerland. The topic of the meeting was the convening an international conference on making the Middle East a region free of weapons of mass destruction.” Israel’s Foreign Ministry refused to comment on the report.
Taken together, these under-publicized reports indicate that the views of Iran held by many well-informed Israelis in the military, defense and intelligence establishment are far more nuanced than Netanyahu’s harsh and histrionic opposition to any but the most maximalist “deal” with Iran would lead one to believe. Unfortunately these assessments seem to be unknown to members of Congress, as well as to spokespersons for “pro-Israel” organizations and think tanks who are determined to prevent any agreement with Iran or strangle it at its inception.
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2.) His speech also highlights the Obama administration’s total and complete blindness to the domestic politics, sociology, and economic dynamics within Iran. From Donilon, we get anecdotes of a “regime … increasingly divided within and under great stress”, yet without any context at all. It increasingly looks like the administration essentially surfs the Internet for Iran analysis and has no real “deep bench” on what is actually happening in the country. This may be a result of the Dennis Ross syndrome, but now that Ross has departed, the black hole on Iranian domestic dynamics has no sound reason to remain as such. For a better more nuanced picture of internal Iranian dynamics, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam’s latest piece in the Guardian is a timely read. Unlike some of the histrionics behind contemporary Iran analysis, Adib-Moghaddam actually uses facts and numbers – which unfortunately is a novel concept to the larger Iran debate. Money Quote:
But that narrative [Iran’s economic crisis] does not correspond to the facts. The World Bank set the economic growth of Iran at 3.0% in 2010, and the IMF says nominal GDP grew from $330.5bn in 2009 to $360bn in 2010. The IMF recently wrapped up a visit to Iran and commended the government for early successes with the subsidy reform programme and the advances in the financial sector, which is boosted by a buoyant stock market. The argument that Iran is economically isolated does not hold either. According to the most recent UNCTAD report, foreign direct investment to the country has increased exponentially from $1.6bn in 2008 to $3.6bn in 2010. This does not mean that there are no serious economic problems in the country; there are many and they range from corruption to structural inefficiency. It means that there is another side to the Iran story that is subdued for ideological reasons. Ultimately, the US and to a lesser extent the European Union are disqualifying themselves from the Iranian market during a period of intense economic calamity. China and Russia say “thank you”.
I would only add that Iran’s main economic dilemma for the short term is inflation control, which is currently quite onerous on society. Moreover, Donilon, in typical Washingtonian doublethink, does not understand that when you put pressure on a country, politically speaking, you help the far-right and reactionary forces and undermine reformists. Very seldom do governments, if ever, domestically reform, particularly in the realm of human rights and political participation, under sanctions and threats of war. If Donilon or the administration had one iota of concern for what Iranians “deserve”, they would do all they can to lessen tension over the country. Their opening to Burma (regardless of how some have described the move as a Machiavellian anti-China approach), has slowly but steadily opened the political space in the country, which has created the space and possibility for democratic reform. Like so many others, I find it implausible that US officials don’t understand this dynamic, and taken together with US support for regimes that surpass Iran in human rights abuses (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Yemen, etc.). Donilon’s crocodile tears for Iranians are foolish, cynical, and ultimately, self-defeating.
3.) Finally, and most worryingly, is the utter delusion of regional politics that Donilon, and by extension, the administration, seems to possess. Throughout his speech, Donilon kept referring to a crude zero-sum gain framework to regional politics (i.e. If Iran gains, US loses and vice versa), when in reality ‘losses’ and ‘gains’ to US and Iranian interests are quite intertwined, creating, at times, points of contention and convergence. While Donilon claims that the “regional balance of power is tipping against Iran”, all he offers to support this absurd claim is boilerplate jingoism. From claiming that Iran wanted to “shape Iraq into a client state in its own image”, to totally mischaracterizing Iran’s relations with the GCC, to the impact of the potential downfall of the Al-Assad government in Syria, to plunging again into anecdotal Arab public opinion on Iran, Donilon’s picture of Iran’s strategic situation can be summed up by mixture of triumphalism and wishful thinking.
However, unlike what administration officials think, the picture is far more nuanced. Did Iran really want to turn Iraq into a client state or were they more worried by the permanent presence of US bases, which could potentially be used to stage attacks inside Iran? An objective reading supports the latter notion. More so, while Iran’s relations with the GCC are not on the best of terms, to this day, Iranians and GCC citizens still trade and interact with each other, while their governments have formal relations at the highest levels. On Syria, Iran’s leaders, though traditionally supportive of Al-Assad, are not blind to the reality in that country. Obviously, they understand that the same pathologies that existed in Ben-Ali’s Tunisia, in Mubarak’s Egypt, and in Al-Khalifa’s Bahrain, also exist in Al-Assad’s Syria. What makes Syria accommodating to Iran is the fundamental structural conflict it has with Israel in the region, chiefly the dispute over the Golan Heights. As long as that dispute remains unresolved (a certainty considering the type of regime in Israel at the moment), the structural conditions will eventually force Syria, regardless of its political system, to have some type of understanding with Iran. And it is quite fanciful to think that Iran would not have reached out to the Syrian opposition by now, the same way that they reached out to the Libyan opposition – regardless of official denials.
Finally, the most comedic insinuation of Donilon’s speech were the references to Arab public opinion. While it is undeniable that Iran has suffered a major blow to its image, what Donilon does not talk about is the consistent negative opinion that Arab societies have of the US. Furthermore, under the Obama administration’s stewardship, Arab public opinion is actually more critical than during George Bush’s tenure, a mind-numbing achievement considering what the Bush doctrine did to the Middle East. Incoherent efforts by Donilon and other US officials to present the Arab Spring as an anti-Iran phenomenon is simply laughable, as the overwhelming majority of governments are now under pressure and/or are collapsing within the region as pro-US client regimes. Thus, if 2011 is really 1989 redux, it is the US that is playing the Soviet role, not Iran.
On wider Iran-US relations, whatever the Obama administration claims about reaching a diplomatic outcome, it is evident that the failure to consider Iran’s security concerns (which are deep and systemic in the region) while consistently putting pressure on the country, may eventually lead to a conflict that the US says it is trying to avoid.
Regardless of what one feels about the current political system in Iran, its human rights issues, economic efficiency, or regional behavior, nothing the US has done has actually alleviated the aforementioned for the better. On the contrary, it has directly and indirectly led to more negative effects.
“The administration is trying to buy off Congress, buy off pressure from Israel and make sure nothing will further erode the president’s chances for re-election,” Suzanne Maloney, an Iran [...]]]>
“The administration is trying to buy off Congress, buy off pressure from Israel and make sure nothing will further erode the president’s chances for re-election,” Suzanne Maloney, an Iran expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, told IPS.
If the latest measure was more of an attempt to appease and garner support from key voting blocs than to change Iran’s behavior, the political impasse between the two countries is likely to continue while the hawkish trend against Iran in Congress progresses. Slavin continues:
Maloney said, however, that the latest punitive measures would not be sufficient to change Iran’s posture, particularly at a time of fractious internal politics.
“If anything, this will reinforce paranoia in Tehran that this is all about regime change,” she said. She expressed concern that there is “no adult supervision” of Iran policy in the Obama administration and that “no one is thinking ahead” about the consequences of further weakening the Iranian economy.
Continuously implementing punitive measures against Iran that are unlikely to produce different results begs the question of whether sanctions are even effective. This Monday Secretary of Treasury Tim Geithner said that “intensification of sanctions by this Administration” with multilateral support “has inflicted substantial damage to the Iranian economy.” But how does the U.S. measure success and what is the strategy behind sanctions other than imposing maximum hardship upon the Iranian government?
Earlier this week Harvard University’s Stephen Walt and the National American Iranian Council’s Trita Parsi discussed the U.S.’s Iran sanctions policy on NPR. While noting that “there is in fact no reason to believe that Iran is actively seeking a nuclear weapon at this time,” Walt argued that the U.S. should be trying to “convince them not to cross that particular line” using different methods including the “diplomatic option” which has not been utilized effectively thus far. Painting Iran as a nuclear threat prematurely can be a self-fulfilling prophecy:
The thing that makes countries want to pursue some kind of nuclear deterrent is precisely the fact that they feel threatened. We’ve been trying these sort of sanctions and what I would call a sort of occasional not-very-enthusiastic diplomacy for over a decade now and with no apparent success. Maybe this is a time when we ought to be trying an alternative, and by that alternative I don’t mean going to war.
Parsi also said that U.S. sanctions against Iran are creating frustration toward the U.S. among Iranians who disagree with their government’s policies:
It’s not really differentiating between an activity undertaken by the revolutionary guard or an activity taking place by an ordinary citizen. So everyone is being hit by it. And it’s not led to the type of situation in which people will say oh, we have to rise up against the regime because these sanctions are so difficult. On the contrary, the effect that you’re starting to see is that people are saying you all know, the entire world know that we’re not happy with this government, so why are you putting pressure on the people? You should be putting pressure on the regime. Instead, the people are being punished, and now you’re starting to increasingly see that they’re starting to vent some of their frustrations towards the United States and not just towards the regime.
Both Walt and Parsi seemed to agree that if the U.S. really doesn’t want Iran to get nuclear weapons, it has to change it’s approach to the Islamic Republic sooner rather than later.
]]>Both Iran and the United States are playing an extremely dangerous game based on misperceptions. Each side seems to be misreading the strength and resolve of the other. In this game of chicken, small errors in [...]]]>
]]>Both Iran and the United States are playing an extremely dangerous game based on misperceptions. Each side seems to be misreading the strength and resolve of the other. In this game of chicken, small errors in judgment can result in military confrontation. And in game theory, the opponent that seems “irrational” or “crazy” can win. That perception in Tehran could heighten the danger.
For the Islamic Republic, this has been the underpinning of its approach since Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency in 2005. It is also one reason why the Iranian system did not try to contain him until recently. During my tenure at the State Department, it was unmistakable that Ahmadinejad’s image of being ideological and seeking to drive Iran into a war to expedite the Hidden Imam’s return had crystallized within the Washington policy-making community. Few could understand why the Islamic Republic did not contain him to the degree that it could, given how fragile the U.S.-Iran impasse had become.
Iran knows that it is playing a risky game, but its self-confidence vis-à-vis the United States has grown since it survived what it saw as eight years of antagonism and confrontation from the George W. Bush administration. Adding to that confidence is the widespread regional upheaval. Thus, Tehran will likely continue waiting for what it perceives as appropriate U.S. moves toward dialogue. These misperceptions and miscalculations will likely prevent the Iranian government from backing down in the current standoff because it believes that, if Iran does not give up, geopolitical realities will cause America to change course at some point in the foreseeable future.