by Jasmin Ramsey
The only certainty now about the talks between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program is that the negotiators have their work cut out for them. Other than occasional runaway comments to the press from France, and now China, the parties have remained tight-lipped about their [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
The only certainty now about the talks between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program is that the negotiators have their work cut out for them. Other than occasional runaway comments to the press from France, and now China, the parties have remained tight-lipped about their closed-door dealings. However, judging by the tone of the briefings by the US and Iran coming out of the 5-day session that ended in Vienna last Friday, the pressure has increased as the self-imposed deadline looms. The negotiations can certainly be extended, but as a senior US official noted in a background briefing to the press:
We are all focused on reaching July 20th. As I’ve said before, if we get close and we need a few more days, I don’t think anyone will mind. But we are very focused on getting it done now. We have all agreed that time is not in anyone’s interest; it won’t help get there. And if indeed by the time we get to July 20th we are still very far apart, then I think we will all have to evaluate what that means and what is possible or not.
What are the odds of the now formally titled “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” being signed by Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) at the end of July? Independent scholar and LobeLog contributor Farideh Farhi offered her take during a June 21 interview with Iran Review:
Two factors work in favor of the eventual resolution of the nuclear dossier and transformation of US-Iran relations from a constant state of hostility and non-communication to interaction, even if not necessarily in constructive ways at all times. One is the seriousness of the negotiations and the political will on the part of the current administrations in both countries to prevent the nuclear dossier from becoming a pretext for war or spiraling into something uncontrollable. And the second is the high cost of failure now that both sides have invested so heavily in the talks.
But there are also factors that inhibit confidence in assuming a point of no return to status quo ante. First, in both countries there are political forces that oppose any type of interaction and lessening of tensions, although at this point my take is that opponents, encouraged by regional players, have more significant institutional power in the United States than Iran. In other words, along with political power, they have extensive policy instruments – the most important of which are legally embedded in the sanctions regime – that can be relied upon to undermine or prevent political accord between the two countries.
The second factor is the unequal power relationship between the two countries, which has consistently led various US administrations to be tempted by the argument that economic, political muscle, and military threats will eventually pay off and force various administrations in Iran to give in irrespective of domestic political equations and the stances they have taken within their own political environment. Currently, this second factor is part and parcel of broader indecision or uncertainty in the US’ strategic calculus regarding whether to come to terms with Iran as a prominent regional player or continue its three decade policy of containing it and alternatively Iran’s commitment to being an independent and powerful regional actor irrespective of fears in the neighborhood.
This dynamic of one side always wanting more than the other can give and/or alternatively being unwilling or incapable of matching concessions with what the other side deems as comparable concessions has been the source of impasse in negotiations. This is not to suggest that inflexibility or lack of realism only comes from one side. During the previous administration, Iran also miscalculated in its assessment of the leverage the United States could build through its ferocious sanctions regime in the same way the United States miscalculated in its assessment of the extent to which Iran could expand its nuclear program in the face of sanctions. As such, Iran’s expectation for the sanctions regime that took years to build to be lifted quickly and permanently is as unrealistic as the US expectation for Iran’s enrichment program to be significantly scaled back.
As to the impact of Iran-US direct talks, it is still possible for the unprecedented high profile direct engagement between the two countries in and of itself to lead to some sort of transformation in the relationship irrespective of the results of nuclear talks. If indeed the two countries’ foreign ministers or even presidents can continue to pick up the phone and talk to each other over matters of common concern or for the sake of de-escalating tensions, that by itself is an important achievement of nuclear talks and its significance should not be under-estimated. But this also depends on how the potential failure of nuclear talks is managed by both sides.
Read more here.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.
Photo: The Iranian nuclear negotiating team headed by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (center) and Deputy Foreign Ministers Abbas Araghchi (to Zarif’s right) and Majid Takht-Ravanchi.
]]>by Charles Naas
Following months of positive reports about the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its substantial nuclear program, the mood has turned somewhat pessimistic, despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has met its commitments under the November 2013 Join Plan of Action.
The negotiating teams have been unusually [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
Following months of positive reports about the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its substantial nuclear program, the mood has turned somewhat pessimistic, despite verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran has met its commitments under the November 2013 Join Plan of Action.
The negotiating teams have been unusually disciplined in terms of leaks but official briefings have indicated that some major technical issues are on the way to being settled. Encouraging? Yes, but from the beginning of the talks it was realized, or should have been, that the day would come when Iran’s long term plans for a sizable nuclear energy program and the need for large amounts of enriched uranium would be front and center.
The past is prologue. Roughly 5 decades ago, we negotiated for several years with Iran over future nuclear cooperation until there was little hope left and went aground for some time over who would control the possible reprocessing of spent fuel from the US supplied enriched uranium. In the reprocessing of spent fuel, small quantities of plutonium could be separated and used in power plants or nuclear bombs.
The US side offered a variety of solutions, such as a bilateral plant; buy-back of the fuel; shipping the spent fuel for reprocessing to European facilities; and multi-national enrichment and reprocessing firms. Iran, however, refused all such ideas until President Jimmy Carter and the Shah directly reached a compromise agreement. The president was able to satisfy the Persian monarch’s personal and national pride that Iran would not be treated unfairly. The success of the Iranian Revolution in February of 1979 prevented the legal enactment of that treaty.
Now the concerns over reprocessing have been replaced by deep concerns over enrichment. The present Iranian government, like its royal predecessor, has planned a substantial civilian power program that has tentatively selected 16 areas for the construction of 1000 MW reactors. None, it is believed, has had a shovel of earth removed as yet, however in the view of the lengthy construction time and the vast expenditures required for reactors, issues such as security and supply for sufficient enriched uranium are vital.
At present Iran has 9,000 first stage and 10,000 second stage — IR2 — centrifuges. In all the years that some of them have been operating, Iran has been provided a little over 11,000 kilograms — roughly 5 tonnes — of enriched uranium. This supply is sufficient for 5-7 bombs if further enriched but is totally insufficient for civil reactor needs.
For example, Iran’s one completed reactor at Bushehr needs roughly 21 tonnes of enriched uranium as yearly replacement fuel that will be sold by Russia. The new reactors — which are at least a decade away — will require roughly 70-80,000 tonnes of fuel to start power production, and annual replacement fuel of about 21-25,000 tonnes per reactor. Iran’s negotiators have proclaimed that to meet its future requirements, Iran will need at least 100,000 advanced centrifuges. If in fact Iran pursues its civilian objectives, that figure is modest.
So far Iran has insisted that its future needs must rely on domestic production and depending on imports would make Iran highly vulnerable to political differences and crises. This position is given added weight by the fact that the six powers across the table have been imposing sanctions for a decade.
The position of the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) has been that Iran should reduce its current centrifuges to a number that can only provide enriched material for medical research and isotopes, and depend on imports from reliable producers for future reactor fueling.
The parties are an ocean apart. In response to the negotiating crisis, emergency bilateral sessions took place between Iran and each of the P5+1 members to examine whether there is enough “give” to hold out the hope that compromises can emerge. (Unhappily, as with Carter and the Shah, we do not have leaders who understand or trust each other.) The bilateral talks also give Iran opportunities to test whether cracks are possible within the six. If each side holds to its position, the negotiating effort could be extended for at least a six month period or end.
One potential way forward that requires careful study would be to stipulate that a specific number of additional centrifuges may operate and that the enriched uranium should be put aside under especially rigorous security for a particular future reactor. Whether the US Congress, Israel and Iran’s conservative cabal, not to mention the other five powers, could live with this kind of solution is questionable. But each leader, especially Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, have put great effort into this possible opening of modest relations after three decades of mistrust.
Presumably neither views failure with equanimity, although Obama has consistently said that success was no more than 50% likely.
If failure seems likely, there are many questions that have to be addressed now and not await a crisis:
These are parlous times. Are we doing every thing possible to strengthen our hand?
This article was first published by LobeLog.
Photo: US President Jimmy Carter and Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi share a drink in 1977, two years before the monarch would be overthrown by a popular revolution.
]]>by Peter Jenkins
An article in the latest issue of the International Security journal goes to the heart of US and European nuclear non-proliferation policy. The author, Scott Kemp, an Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, raises a fundamental question: is proliferation best prevented by supply-side measures [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
An article in the latest issue of the International Security journal goes to the heart of US and European nuclear non-proliferation policy. The author, Scott Kemp, an Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, raises a fundamental question: is proliferation best prevented by supply-side measures (attempts to restrict the availability of certain technologies) or by influencing the demand side (the national interest calculations that underpin decision-making on nuclear weapon acquisition)?
The question has divided the US nuclear community since 1945 and is unlikely to be resolved by this one article, well-researched and highly intelligent as it is. Nonetheless, Kemp’s conclusion merits substantial debate, not least in the wider foreign policy community. It is that a rebalancing of nuclear non-proliferation policy is advisable, away from over-dependence on supply side restrictions and towards greater reliance on influencing states’ motives and calculations.
Kemp justifies his conclusion by surveying the extent to which controlling one type of nuclear technology — the use of centrifuges to enrich uranium — can be relied on to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and by demonstrating that controls have been and will be porous and permeable.
Technological and industrial developments since 1945 have moved the proliferation-potential boundary outwards to where the building of a uranium enrichment plant lies within the reach of many states. The required information has long been in the public domain. The tools and equipment needed to build rudimentary centrifuge machines are unsophisticated. The risk of remote detection of a small clandestine plant is small. Thirteen of the twenty states that have built enrichment facilities have done so without recourse to outside help — and several others could have gone it alone.
Kemp is careful to distinguish between over-reliance on technology controls and denying that controls have any merit. He is not advocating the elimination of controls. On the contrary, he recognises that controls can make the task of building and operating centrifuges more arduous by forcing states to develop the technology indigenously and to spend time troubleshooting the challenges that will inevitably arise. Controls can also limit the ability of states to build high-performance centrifuges.
But where centrifuge technology is concerned, Kemp’s sympathies clearly lie with Niels Bohr, Robert Oppenheimer, and other Manhattan Project scientists who warned that controls could only provide a temporary hurdle, not an insurmountable barrier. Like them, he also believes that enduring protection “can only come from the political organization of the world”.
Mercifully, much of that political organization now exists, thanks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. Early doubts about how effective a barrier the NPT would be have been confounded. All but the four nuclear-armed states (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) and South Sudan, which has had more pressing priorities, are parties to it. Only nine states are known or suspected of having engaged in clandestine nuclear activities after becoming parties; and all but two of those (Iraq and Syria) have chosen or been persuaded to abandon their clandestine activities well short of nuclear weapons acquisition.
Why has the NPT been so effective? Kemp leaves that question to be answered by others. My sense is that NPT parties see mutual security benefits in maintaining this regime for as long as possible, certain grievances notwithstanding, and have no appetite for engaging in a nuclear arms race with their neighbors. An element of deterrence may also enter into the equation: latecomers to the nuclear-armed clubhouse cannot be sure of getting in unscathed.
But I hope someone more qualified than I will undertake the thorough assessment Kemp calls for at the end of his article:
While the specific causes of proliferation abstinence lie beyond the scope of this article, the subject clearly merits deeper analysis by both policymakers and academics as such factors are probably the most viable basis for the future of the non proliferation regime.
More immediately, Kemp’s conclusion begs important questions in relation to the current negotiations between Iran and the P5+1: if technology restrictions can never be more than a hurdle to centrifuge-based nuclear weapon acquisition, is it essential that the US and EU insist on a dramatic cut in the number of operating centrifuges at Iran’s disposal during the interim phase of a comprehensive solution?
Would the US and EU be wise to walk away from the negotiation if, for domestic political reasons, Iran were to refuse to dismantle any of its 19,000 centrifuges and to operate any fewer than 9,000 at any one time?
Should the US and EU be ready to close the deal if Iran can demonstrate convincingly that it has no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons — with no motive for incurring the near-universal condemnation that a nuclear “break-out” would trigger — and backs up the demonstration by accepting that verification of its nuclear program can remain at current levels indefinitely?
I know what I think. But what, I wonder, do the US administration’s “counter-proliferation” experts think, and what advice are they giving to the US secretary of state and president? I fear they may be on the other side of the post-1945 divide.
This article was first published by LobeLog.
Photo: The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland on April 1, 1974. Credit: UN
]]>by Derek Davison
The three key timelines at the center of the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program were the subject of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center today. Jon Wolfsthal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies spoke about the duration of a hypothetical comprehensive [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
The three key timelines at the center of the negotiations between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program were the subject of a panel discussion at the Wilson Center today. Jon Wolfsthal of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies spoke about the duration of a hypothetical comprehensive agreement, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association (ACA) discussed Iran’s “breakout” period, and Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center talked about possible timeframes for sanctions relief.
While there may be flaws in the P5+1’s (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) decision to make “breakout” their primary focus, it is that timeline, and specifically its uranium enrichment component, that dominates the negotiations and related policy debates. Uranium enrichment capacity is, according to Kimball, the “key problem” in terms of coming to a final agreement, given that more progress seems to have been made between the two parties on limiting the Arak heavy-water reactor’s plutonium production, and on more intensive inspection and monitoring mechanisms. He also discussed the contours of a deal that would allow Iran to begin operating “next generation” centrifuges, which enrich uranium far more efficiently than the older models currently being operated by the Iranians.
Kimball’s suggestion mirrored a new piece in the ACA’s journal by Princeton scholars Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Hossein Mousavian, and Frank von Hippel. They proposed a two-stage process for modernizing Iran’s enrichment technology and eventually finding a stable consensus on the enrichment issue. In the first stage, to last around five years, Iran could begin to replace its aging “first generation” centrifuges with more advanced “second generation” centrifuges so long as Iran’s overall enrichment capacity remains constant, and it would be able to continue research and development on more modern centrifuge designs so long as it permitted inspectors to verify that those more advanced centrifuges were not being installed. That five year period would also allow Iran and the international community time to work out a more permanent uranium enrichment arrangement, which could take the form of a regional, multi-national uranium enrichment consortium similar to Urenco, the European entity that handles enrichment for Britain and Germany.
As the authors note, Iran is one of only three non-nuclear weapon states (Brazil and Japan are the others) that operate their own enrichment programs, so the global trend seems to be moving in the direction of these multi-national enrichment consortiums. It is unclear if Iran would agree to this kind of framework, but this piece was co-authored by Mousavian, who has ties to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, suggesting that it could become acceptable to the Iranian government.
One major hurdle in the talks remains Iran’s desire, as noted by Kimball, to be able to fully fuel its Bushehr reactors with domestic enriched uranium by 2021, the year when its deal with Russia to supply fuel to Bushehr runs out. Fueling the Bushehr reactors alone would require vastly more enrichment capacity than the P5+1 would be able to accept, and Iran has plans for future reactors that it would presumably want to be able to fuel domestically as well. The P5+1 negotiators, and well-known non-proliferation organizations including ACA, argue that Iran can simply renew its fuel supply deal with Russia and thereby reduce its “need” for enriched uranium substantially. But from Iran’s perspective, domestic enrichment is its only completely reliable source of reactor fuel. Indeed, Russia has historically proven willing to renege on nuclear fuel agreements in the name of its own geopolitical prerogatives. Any final deal that relies on outside suppliers to reduce Iran’s enriched uranium requirements will have to account for Iranian concerns about whether or not those outside suppliers can be trusted. It’s possible that the kind of enrichment consortium described in the ACA piece will satisfy those concerns.
The other timelines in question, the overall duration of a deal and the phasing out of sanctions, spin off of the more fundamental debate over enrichment capacity, and both revolve around issues of trust. Wolfsthal argued that the P5+1 may require a deal that will last at least until Rouhani is out of office, in order to guard against any change in nuclear posture under the next presidential administration. In his discussion of sanctions relief, Litwak pointed to an even more fundamental question of trust: is Iran willing to believe (and, it should be added, can Iran believe) that the United States is prepared to normalize relations with the Islamic Republic and to stop making regime change the paramount goal of its Iran policy? If the answer is “yes,” then Iran may be willing to accept a more gradual, staged removal of sanctions in exchange for specific nuclear goals, which the P5+1 favors. If the answer is “no,” then Iran is likely to demand immediate sanctions relief at levels that may be too much, and too quick for the P5+1 to accept.
]]>With bilateral US-Iran talks taking place in Geneva today, notably topped for the US by Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns, who led earlier secret exchanges, negotiations between Iran and world powers might be entering their final phase — or not.
Such is the nature of difficult negotiations, involving countries that, in [...]]]>
With bilateral US-Iran talks taking place in Geneva today, notably topped for the US by Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns, who led earlier secret exchanges, negotiations between Iran and world powers might be entering their final phase — or not.
Such is the nature of difficult negotiations, involving countries that, in the case of the United States and Iran, have a 35-year history of bad relations. Such is also the nature of negotiations where the stakes are so high.
Should the negotiations fail, at the extreme Iran might move toward developing nuclear weapons, though it stoutly denies this intention. To keep it from doing so, the US has pledged that the military option “remains on the table,” though it devoutly prefers not to use it or to have its hand forced by Israel.
The qualifier “or not” is necessary because the actual negotiations have been conducted more privately than one would have expected; because the notional deadline of July 20 isn’t a true deadline at all; and because, as happens with such hotly contested and highly complex issues as are involved here, there can be “many a slip ‘twixt cup and lip” even when everyone is acting with the best of intentions.
Counters to skepticism that this round of talks will produce a final agreement include the fact that just about every issue that could be raised has been talked virtually to death. A host of experts has been engaged. The finer points of all issues have long been on the table and have been masticated by all sides “from here to Sunday.”
Indeed, if there are any points where the interests of the parties are not crystal clear, it is not from lack of trying. That doesn’t mean that the different parties — perhaps all of them — have not held back that one last point in hopes of getting a slightly better deal at the 11th hour, in particular to be able to argue to critics back home, of which there is a plethora, that, in the end “we showed them [fill in the blank] that we are tough bargainers.”
Shades of the Cold War
This is not the first time that negotiations of this importance have come down to the wire in this fashion. During the Cold War, this was typically part of every set of US-Soviet arms control talks, which were just as abstruse, just as contentious to the last niggling detail, and just as freighted with the political need for each side to argue that it had obtained the best deal that was humanly possible.
The parallel is apt. In both cases, long before the negotiating end-game, the people sitting at the table across from one another have understood the terms, both great and small, of the deal that will best suit all claimants and can produce a diplomatic solution. But in both cases, US-Soviet arms control negotiations and talks on the Iranian nuclear program, the devil is very much not “in the details,” but in the politics, and not even in the last little compromises that each side needs in order to counter the critics back home.
The politics are about the nature of the basic relationships between the contending parties. In US-Soviet relations, the need was for both sides to be able to claim that they were equals, that the nuclear symbols of relative power were finely balanced. Whether one side or the other had a few more missiles or warheads or “throw weight” had no strategic significance in the event of conflict: utter destruction to both sides was guaranteed. But the symbols of “equality” or, more prosaically, of “face,” were critical.
Of course, Iran cannot represent itself as the equal of any of its interlocutors, by any relevant measure, but both it and its negotiating partners need to emerge from the talks with a clear sense that they have preserved what is politically essential to them.
There is a second parallel between the Cold War and now. Arms control talks between the US and Soviet Union were only partly about weapons themselves and being able to represent to publics and other countries that “parity” — a stand-in for perceptions of power — was achieved. At least as important was the experience of both sides in getting to know and understand one another in terms of interests, expectations, ambitions, hopes, and fears. The fact that US-Soviet arms control negotiations took place was as important as the results produced, and they played a central role in developing détente and eventually making possible the end of the Cold War.
That positive political result may not result from the P5+1’s (US, UK, France, China, Russia + Germany) negotiations with Iran, but it should not be ruled out. Already, with new leadership in both the United States (President Barack Obama) and Iran (President Hassan Rouhani, generally supported by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei) the possibilities for détente and perhaps an end to the US-Iran Cold War are being developed at the bargaining table. This is much to be hoped, given that, outside of contention over nuclear matters, there is a good deal that can move Iran and the West in similar directions, not least regarding Afghanistan’s future, possibly also Iraq’s, shared opposition to al-Qaeda and its ilk, and other interests like counter-piracy and freedom of navigation, especially through the Strait of Hormuz.
There is also a third parallel. In its arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, US presidents faced intense domestic political opposition to reaching agreements with the enemy. In retrospect, no American in his right mind can still declare his opposition to the détente with the Soviet Union pursued by several presidents. At the time, however, critics abounded, leaders were excoriated, and nay-sayers in Congress did their best to undercut the efforts of the White House.
The domestic politics factor
It is far from clear that President Rouhani can surmount opposition in Iran to reaching a deal with the “Great Satan,” even though, at last count, he seems to have the support of the Supreme Leader. Meanwhile, many powerful Iranians, especially in the clerical establishment, fervently hope that the current talks will collapse. Indeed, they would welcome the West raising the stakes so high in the diplomatic end-game that Rouhani will fail.
That is also true in the United States, and this may ultimately result in the undoing of a potential agreement, whatever proves to be possible at the bargaining table.
President Obama is under intense pressure, especially from a significant part of Congress, to be unyielding on a range of matters — the details of which are less relevant than their use to cause him to flounder. Indeed, he has struggled to keep Congress from pressing for increased economic sanctions against Iran, at the very moment when US bona fides are being tested in regard to implementing last November’s Joint Plan of Action and to offering sanctions relief indispensable to a final agreement.
The interests of others
The key to this struggle over the president’s capacity to act in the US national interest is the fact that, unlike the case of US-Soviet arms control negotiations, he must also consider the perspectives of a range of countries in the Middle East, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia.
It’s not just that the US has to be certain that Iran cannot retain a capability at some point in the future to “break out” and move toward a bomb –which is also very much in the American interest. It is also that both Israel and most of the Gulf Arabs oppose, on any terms, potential reconciliation between Iran and the West and especially the United States. This element of their concern is not about security, per se, but about power, and especially Iran’s potential regional role, post-sanctions and post-isolation.
These states are concerned in particular by the prospect of normalized US-Iran relations. It is no surprise therefore, that several of America’s Middle East partners are, at best, ambivalent about signs of possible success in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. From their perspective, they would welcome the trammeling of Iran’s possible nuclear ambitions; but they oppose Iran’s remerging as a full-fledged competitor for power and influence in the region, potentially a collateral product of success in the negotiations.
The implications of such a development obviously need to be considered by the United States, as leader among Western states, both in the Middle East and beyond, as the possibility emerges of an end to the Iranian-Western Cold War.
As much as they would like the status quo to continue, some local states, notably some Gulf Arabs, are not sitting on their hands. They are already exploring the possibility of changed relations with Iran, as demonstrated by recent high-level exchanges of visits with Tehran. Egypt is also adjusting, symbolized by its invitation to Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei for President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s inauguration this week (Iran is sending its deputy foreign minister). China and Russia are meanwhile ready to step up economic and other ties; and the private sector throughout the West is restlessly waiting at the starting gate.
In the final analysis, if President Obama and his Iranian counterparts can weather domestic opposition to an agreement — where Obama faces congressional opposition that is heavily influenced by Israel — we will witness the beginning of fundamental change in the Middle East. It is far from clear, however, that the US government has begun to think through the consequences of this and started to plan accordingly.
Photo: Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman photographed here during last years negotiations in Geneva, will be among the top-level diplomats meeting for bilateral talks in the Swiss city today. June 9-10. Credit: ISNA
]]>One of the most famous zingers in American political history is Lloyd Bentsen’s “you’re no Jack Kennedy” line in his 1988 vice presidential candidates’ debate with Dan Quayle. Quayle’s preceding remark in the debate actually had not made any overall claim to comparability with Kennedy. Instead [...]]]>
One of the most famous zingers in American political history is Lloyd Bentsen’s “you’re no Jack Kennedy” line in his 1988 vice presidential candidates’ debate with Dan Quayle. Quayle’s preceding remark in the debate actually had not made any overall claim to comparability with Kennedy. Instead he was responding to a question about his relative youth and perceived inexperience, and about his ability to take over the presidency if necessary, by observing that his length of service in Congress was already comparable to that of Kennedy when the Massachusetts senator had been elected president. But nobody remembers that context — only Bentsen’s immortal jibe.
A somewhat similar forced effort to be more comparative than a comparison being criticized comes from Ali Alfoneh of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, which these days endeavors not so much to defend democracies as to frustrate diplomacy of the most important democracy. His target is a recent piece of mine that, according to Alfoneh, makes an incorrect analogy between China and Iran and thus between Richard Nixon’s opening to China and any thawing of U.S.-Iranian relations in connection with the nuclear deal currently under negotiation. I was in turn criticizing an op ed by Eric Edelman, Dennis Ross, and Ray Takeyh that argued for involving Congress earlier and more heavily in the nuclear negotiations. Edelman, et al. were the ones who mentioned Nixon’s China policy, while contending that U.S.-Soviet strategic arms negotiations, in which there was significant Congressional involvement, was the most instructive precedent for how the Iran talks ought to be handled. I suggested instead that the China opening, which was prepared in great secrecy and did not involve Congress at all, was a more apt comparison for any rapprochement with a previously distrusted and ostracized regime, which is what Nixon’s diplomacy in the 1970s was about.
Alfoneh says nothing about secrecy or Congressional involvement, and gives no clue that this was the subject of my essay. Instead he presents a catalog of various ways in which China differs from Iran, and Mao Zedong differed from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He could have mentioned many more differences. Chinese leaders, for example, speak Mandarin, while Iran’s leaders speak Persian. Khamenei is a slender man, whereas Mao was rather corpulent. And so on. But Alfoneh does not explain how any of the differences, including the ones he mentions, have any significance for whether striking a nuclear deal is wise, or whether a larger rapprochement stemming from a deal with Iran would be wise, let alone implications for Congressional involvement or other aspects of how the Obama administration is handling Iran diplomacy.
One can read between the lines about what is going on here. The folks at FDD do not want any agreements with Iran, they want Iran to continue to be ostracized, and they are trying to torpedo the nuclear negotiations. The China opening is today widely and rightly seen as a significant and positive achievement by Nixon. So FDD endeavors to beat back any tendency to think of agreements or rapprochement with Iran in the same light as the China opening.
Okay, if they want to do full-blown comparisons between Iran and China, let’s do that. But our friends at FDD ought to be careful what they wish for. There are, for one thing, Alfoneh’s factual errors — such as saying Henry Kissinger was secretary of state at the time of the China opening, when in fact he was not. The man who was — William Rogers — was cut out of preparations for the initiative just as much as Congress was.
Then there is this interesting paragraph from Alfoneh:
“It’s also worth noting that the U.S.-China rapprochement came at a time when the Communist regime already possessed the nuclear bomb, and its military ambitions would not clash with American policies for nonproliferation. In the case of Iran, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions are likely to remain a constant source of tension between the two states.”
So an improved relationship with Iran would be less of a problem — and more similar to the favorable U.S.-China rapprochement — if Iran did have nuclear weapons than if it did not? Are we to conclude that we thus should condone the Iranians building such weapons or even encourage them to do so, and then we could talk about a better relationship afterward? (Of course, removing the issue as a source of tension by keeping the Iranian nuclear program peaceful is part of the purpose of the current talks.)
Alfoneh tells us, as another item in his catalog of differences, that Khamenei is less powerful than Mao was. Interestingly, this seems to go against the thrust of what FDD’s fellow opponents of an agreement habitually assert about internal Iranian politics, which is that we are foolish to be negotiating with President Hassan Rouhani because it is the supreme leader who really calls the shots. Alfoneh’s picture of Iranian politics with contending factions and with a supreme leader who is far from an absolute dictator is a much more accurate description—and is all the more reason to be sensitive to how the nuclear negotiations will affect those politics. Successful conclusion of a deal will significantly help Rouhani’s side of that political contest, and will tend to push the supreme leader and the rest of the regime more in Rouhani’s — and our preferred — direction.
Alfoneh also wants us to know that Khamenei sees the United States as the biggest threat to Iran (supposedly another difference with Mao’s China, which he says saw the USSR as a bigger threat). That statement about Khamenei’s perceptions is undoubtedly true, and would make Iranian acceptance of a better relationship with the United States all the more of a strategic change for both countries (although Alfoneh wants us to believe that for Iran it would be only “tactical.”) Most conspicuously missing from Alfoneh’s treatment is any explanation of whyKhamenei and other Iranian leaders see the United States as a threat. It is not because hatred or suspicion of the United States is embedded in Iranian DNA. It is because the United States has given Iran ample reason to see it as a threat. Siding with the aggressor Iraq in an extremely bloody war, imposing years of debilitating economic sanctions, making repeated threats of military attack, making shows of force in Iran’s immediate neighborhood, talking frequently about regime change, and tacitly condoning an anti-Iranian assassination campaign have a way of doing that.
In his piece Alfoneh says I have something to learn from National Interest editor Jacob Heilbrunn, who, citing the late British historian A.J.P. Taylor, warned against erroneous historical analogies. I can’t claim to have known A.J.P. Taylor personally (although when I was at Oxford a friend of mine was writing his dissertation under Taylor’s supervision). I do know Jacob Heilbrunn. Jacob Heilbrunn is a friend of mine. Mr. Alfoneh, you’re no Jacob Heilbrunn.
This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission.
]]>by Peter Jenkins
The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), issued on May 23, suggests a determined and so far impressive effort by Iran to dispel suspicion of its nuclear intentions.
Tehran is complying fully with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards obligations — both de facto and, [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), issued on May 23, suggests a determined and so far impressive effort by Iran to dispel suspicion of its nuclear intentions.
Tehran is complying fully with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards obligations — both de facto and, with one small exception, de jure. It is implementing fully the “voluntary measures” it undertook in the context of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) Iran signed November 24, 2013 with the US and five other powers in Geneva. It has also implemented thirteen “practical measures” pursuant to its November 11, 2013 Cooperation Framework agreement with the IAEA. (Five additional practical measures were announced on May 21, 2014.)
The IAEA continues to certify that all the nuclear material declared to it by Iran is in peaceful use. The Agency mentions no evidence for Iranian possession of undeclared nuclear material, but cannot yet say with confidence that there is no undeclared nuclear material in Iran. That is a logical consequence of the incomplete nature of the IAEA’s information of Iran’s nuclear program; the November 11, 2013 agreement will help the IAEA round out its knowledge.
Since 2008, the stoking of suspicion as to Iran’s nuclear intentions has relied heavily on fragmentary indicators of what the IAEA refers to, more or less interchangeably, as “a possible military dimension” (PMD) or “nuclear-related activities”. So, arguably, the most interesting paragraph in the latest report is paragraph 56. There the IAEA states that Iran has “shown” the Agency that simultaneous test firings of Explosive Bridge Wire (EBW) detonators (one of the above indicators) took place for a civilian (and not a nuclear weapon) application.
This explanation is credible. There is widespread use of EBW technology in the mining industry, for example. But paragraph 57 makes clear that we must not expect the Agency to pronounce the explanation credible until they have obtained clarifications in relation to the other fragmentary indicators in their possession.
What the Agency says in paragraph 57 is that it needs to be able to conduct a “system assessment” of the outstanding [PMD] issues. That suggests a comprehensive but protracted process.
Also of particular interest is Iranian submission of preliminary design information for a 10MW reactor that will burn low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The reactor is to be situated near the city of Shiraz. It seems likely that it is the first of four medical isotope-producing reactors of which the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Ali Akbar Salehi, has spoken.
A 10 MW LEU reactor will probably be of less concern to Western counter-proliferation experts than the 40 MW natural uranium reactor under construction at Arak, since the plutonium content of spent LEU fuel is smaller and lends itself less to weaponization purposes. Indeed, one of the options under negotiation pursuant to the JPOA involves modernizing the Arak design to lower the reactor’s output and allow it to burn LEU.
Furthermore, the fuel needs of the newly announced reactor (and of a modernized Arak reactor) can provide Iran with a “practical needs” justification for retaining a limited LEU production capacity at its Natanz enrichment plant. Fuelling indigenously designed research reactors is a far more credible need than the oft-asserted need to fuel Russian-designed power reactors, since Russia will want to supply fuel for the latter throughout their operating lives, and since there could be proprietary data obstacles to Iran’s fabricating fuel for them.
Finally, the latest report confirms that, in fulfilling its JPOA commitments, Iran ceased producing 20% U235 UF6 on January 20 and has reduced its 20% UF6 stockpile to 8% of total production up to that date. Iran is now far from being in a position to use 20% U235 material as feed in the “break-out” scenario that some people, such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, assume Iran’s leaders are secretly conceiving.
The IAEA’s next report will be due in late August. Between now and then falls the deadline for the conclusion of negotiations pursuant to the JPOA. It would be nice if the reassuring picture of Iran’s nuclear program in this latest IAEA report were to influence downwards the demands made of Iran by US negotiators.
In reality, the reassuring picture is more likely to be discounted, cynically, as an indicator that Iran is making a show of cooperation to obtain better terms — and US demands are more likely to be influenced by unshakeable mistrust, and fear of Israeli displeasure, despite all the indicators that Iran’s leaders do not want nuclear weapons and believe NPT-compliance to be in Iran’s interest.
Photo: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano (left) and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Abbas Araghchi shake hands October 28, 2013 at IAEA headquarters in Vienna. Credit: Veysel Kuecuektas/IAEA
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
When the history of pro-Israel lobbying in Washington is fully written, it may well be that the push for conflict with Iran will be seen as a major turning point. On Monday, a consistently hawkish, pro-Israel Democrat, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), withdrew the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act from the [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
When the history of pro-Israel lobbying in Washington is fully written, it may well be that the push for conflict with Iran will be seen as a major turning point. On Monday, a consistently hawkish, pro-Israel Democrat, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), withdrew the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s docket. Menendez made the surprise move because a Republican member of the committee, Bob Corker (R-TN), was going to add an amendment intended to undermine the Obama administration’s efforts to reach an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program.
Judging from news reports in mainstream and far-right outlets, it seems the amendment was Corker’s idea. It would have required the U.S. president, upon reaching a deal with Iran, to submit a report to Congress within three days. Congress would then have a non-binding “vote of disapproval.” But AIPAC, the powerful pro-Israel lobbying group, stood by the amendment, and one has to think that Corker would not have introduced it if he knew AIPAC would oppose it. AIPAC eased up on its pressure against negotiations with Iran earlier this year, but it has remained steadfast in its distrust of the diplomatic process, as has, of course, the right-wing Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu. AIPAC’s decision to support the Corker amendment, coupled with a ratcheting up of the rhetoric coming from Netanyahu against the negotiations in recent days, suggests a renewed campaign to derail Obama’s efforts to resolve the dispute with Iran diplomatically.
Perhaps even more notably, this episode marks another step in the increasing polarization of Israel as a domestic U.S. political issue. The Republicans have been working hard ever since Barack Obama got elected to “own” the issue of Israel. In this case, however, they and AIPAC may have overplayed their hand, just as it did at the beginning of the year with S. 1881, when it lined up with Republicans to try to strangle the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between world powers and Iran in its crib.
The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act had already generated some controversy, especially over a provision that would have allowed Israel to participate in the U.S.’ visa waiver program, which would make it easier for Israeli citizens to obtain American visas. The House of Representatives ended up amending the bill to address the initial objections to admitting Israel into that program program. The objection centered on Israel’s unwillingness to reciprocate in granting visas to U.S. citizens, a standard expectation of the program. The bill now addresses this with language that requires Israel to treat U.S. citizens (including Arab Americans) as it wishes the U.S. to treat Israelis and satisfy all other requirements of the visa waiver program. Many believe that other objections, specifically revolving around Israel’s espionage activities in the U.S. (which Israel vehemently denies but are well known in the U.S. intelligence community), are the reason for a recent spate of leaks to Newsweek magazine on the subject.
But aside from that piece, the legislation is a pretty standard piece of pro-Israel fluff, which would provide only a modest, small boost to existing cooperation between the United States and Israel in military, security and scientific arenas. Yet it appears quite possible that AIPAC helped Corker kill it, however unintentionally. Why did that happen?
This seems to have been a miscalculation on AIPAC’s part. If this amendment originated with Corker and not AIPAC, as seems likely, then it was clearly an attempt by the Tennessee Republican to drive a wedge between the “pro-Israel community” and the president. AIPAC backs the idea, but they surely treasure bi-partisan support for their initiatives in Congress much more, as indicated by their decision to back down on S. 1881 in February, especially after it ran up against a solid wall of Democratic opposition. Yet AIPAC has been remarkably passive in the face of Republican efforts to make Israel a partisan issue. Of course, Republicans have gotten a lot of help from Netanyahu (and now his new ambassador, Ron Dermer) on that score in recent years. But the alienation of liberal Democrats from pro-Israel sentiment is growing as a result. This amendment and its result constitute one more step in that direction.
AIPAC, and probably Corker as well, did not expect Menendez to pull a popular pro-Israel bill from the Senate docket. But Menendez appears to have recognized the difficult position this amendment would put Senate Democrats in. They cannot credibly oppose Obama on negotiations with Iran because their constituents support the talks and are deeply opposed to military action against Iran. Once Obama, in his State of the Union Address no less, declared that he was standing firm on negotiating seriously with Iran and then prevailed in the fight over S. 1881, it was clear that most Congressional Democrats would not challenge the president so long as the talks continued. So, if the Corker amendment was brought, Senate Democrats would either have to vote against their president or against AIPAC. Neither prospect held any appeal to Menendez. So he pulled the bill.
In many ways, Menendez and other Senate Democrats who are particularly close to AIPAC just want to keep their heads down for the next two years. If Obama can work out a viable deal with Iran, that’s great. If not, they are probably hoping that a more hawkish leader, like Hillary Clinton, who will be more in line with AIPAC on Middle East policy, will win in 2016. Until then, they are going to have to walk a tightrope.
Republicans, meanwhile, are likely to continue their efforts to “own” the issue. Corker will probably back down on his amendment eventually so that the rest of the bill can go through. But that will mean that the Republicans can claim that Menendez, well-known as among the most pro-Israel Democrats in Congress, thwarted AIPAC’s plans.
If, as AIPAC surely hopes, the next president, from either party, is more in tune with the Netanyahu government than Obama, then a rightward move of the Israel issue serves it well in the long-term. Indeed, in such a case, AIPAC would probably prefer a Democrat again in the White House, reinforcing the group’s bipartisan image and influence, while Israel gets framed in Washington in a more comfortable way than it is now.
Still, this could backfire. Aggressive Republican efforts to make Israel a partisan issue — and AIPAC’s acquiescence in that strategy — are alienating a lot of Jews and a lot of Democrats. Most of those groups want a secure Israel, to be sure. But they also want to avoid war with Iran and an end to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land. AIPAC is working against both of the latter goals.
AIPAC will have no problem keeping Republicans in their camp, unless more radical groups, such as Bill Kristol’s Emergency Committee for Israel (ECI), the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), and, of course, the Republican Jewish Coalition, that criticized its capitulation on S. 1881 persuade its wealthiest donors to desert it. But Democrats might find it increasingly difficult to toe the AIPAC line, even with a more hawkish figure like Clinton in the White House. AIPAC has come a long way by justifiably touting its bipartisanship. Should “pro-Israel” become a Republican label, however, they stand to lose a great deal in the long run. And maybe that’s not a bad thing.
]]>by Mark N. Katz
U.S.-Russian relations have sharply deteriorated, to put it mildly, over Ukraine in recent months. There has been widespread talk about the re-emergence of a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, some have even argued that Moscow does not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted because [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
U.S.-Russian relations have sharply deteriorated, to put it mildly, over Ukraine in recent months. There has been widespread talk about the re-emergence of a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, some have even argued that Moscow does not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted because this would allow Iran to compete with Russia in exporting petroleum to the West and elsewhere. Yet Russia appears willing to cooperate with the U.S. on several issues, including the Iranian nuclear file. What could explain Moscow’s reasoning? At least four possible explanations stand out.
1) The government of President Vladimir Putin is willing to compartmentalize foreign policy issues. Dramatic disagreement with the U.S. on some issues does not preclude Moscow from cooperating with Washington on others where common interests are involved. Both the U.S. and Russia — as well as many other states — want to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, so it makes sense for Moscow to continue working with Washington in pursuit of this aim.
2.) Moscow is working toward a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue in part to both limit and ameliorate international opposition toward Russian policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. There are quite a few governments that are far more concerned about the prospect of a nuclear Iran than about what Russia does in Ukraine. These include Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even some West European members of NATO. Moscow’s continued serious efforts toward a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue may provide these states with a convenient rationale to avoid joining U.S.-led efforts to criticize Putin over Ukraine.
3) Moscow’s actual ability to scuttle a nuclear agreement with Iran might be limited. Washington and Tehran, of course, have never lacked reasons for disagreeing with each other in the past. But if a final agreement between the U.S. and Iran over its nuclear program is indeed attainable, neither of these states is going to back away from it at Moscow’s behest. Indeed, any Russian effort to prevent a nuclear accord reached by Iran on the one hand and America and its European partners on the other could backfire and result in Moscow looking weak and ineffective — exactly what Putin wants to avoid.
4.) Finally, Russia could make substantial profits following a final nuclear deal with Iran. While it is true that a final agreement and the reduction (if not elimination) of U.S. and international sanctions against Tehran would mean increased competition from Iran for Russia in exporting petroleum, reduced UN sanctions on Iran would allow Russian firms to invest more in the Iranian petroleum sector. Indeed, just like the Shi’a majority government that the U.S. helped bring to power in Baghdad, Tehran may actually see doing business with Russian petroleum firms as advantageous. A wealthier Iran would also be able to purchase far more nuclear reactors, weapons, and other goods from Russia than it can pay for now.
Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Moscow may continue to work toward a resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue for any or all of the reasons listed above. Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on Ukraine, then, does not mean that Russia will stop cooperating with America on Iran.
*Any republication of this article must be authorized with IPS consent and sourced back to the original source link at www.lobelog.com
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Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (center) share a laugh at the signing ceremony of the interim nuclear deal reached with Iran on Nov. 24, 2013 in Geneva, Switzerland.
by Adnan Tabatabai
With the July 20 deadline for reaching a final deal on Iran’s nuclear program looming, Tehran and world powers will resume negotiations on May 13 in Vienna.
While the talks could theoretically be extended, efforts by Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia [...]]]>
by Adnan Tabatabai
With the July 20 deadline for reaching a final deal on Iran’s nuclear program looming, Tehran and world powers will resume negotiations on May 13 in Vienna.
While the talks could theoretically be extended, efforts by Iran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) to strike a final deal soon will be strong, given the considerable domestic pressure faced by the negotiating parties, particularly Iran and the United States.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif do not want to risk providing domestic hard-liners, the arch-conservative clerics and far-right principlist members of Parliament (MP) who have criticized the government’s negotiating strategy, with another target by asking for their patience until the end of 2014 or early 2015.
Hence, the Islamic Republic is well on track in complying with the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), the historic interim deal reached in Geneva on November 24, 2013. But consequently, and as a dialectic effect, this progress has also stirred up anxiety among Iranian sceptics.
Hard-line opposition taking center stage in Iran
A public conference, entitled “We’re concerned” (“delvaapasim”), was held at the former U.S. Embassy in Tehran on May 3. The panellists included conservative and far-right leaning parliamentarians, former government officials and think-tankers.
The venue of the conference was obviously symbolic. The choice illustrates the ideological nature of the agenda, notwithstanding the actual substantial concerns raised by the participants.
For the most part, Iranian hardliners argue that Foreign Minister Zarif’s negotiating team is giving away too much, too soon and therefore risks selling out Iran’s national interests.
A joint statement issued by the conference’s key speakers includes specific demands for the negotiations that can be grouped into the following: preserve Iran’s rights to an independent, peaceful nuclear program according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); sanctions — particularly banking sanctions — must be lifted within a clear-cut timeline; and the negotiations should be transparent and opened to the public before the final agreement is signed as well as subject to approval by Iran’s Parliament and the Supreme National Security Council.
These demands indicate a sense, experienced by hard-liners, of being left in the dark about the details of the negotiations. Thus, not only are these influential stakeholders highly sceptical of the strategies adopted by the P5+1, but also of Iran’s very own negotiating team.
“What we are saying is that this [negotiating] team is entering the talks with a soft position and a diplomacy of smiling, which is not appreciated in a country like Iran that has given martyrs and struggled many years for the victory of its Islamic Revolution,” Mohammad Hossein Karimi-Ghadoosi, a parliamentarian and leading figure of the hard-line Islamic Endurance Front (Jebhe-ye paaydaari), told LobeLog.
Karimi-Ghadoosi also believes Iran might be perceived as weak with such a reconciliatory approach.
“Even though the spell of [failed] talks has been broken after eight years, we cannot see any meaningful progress if we look at all this rationally,” he said.
“Some disoriented media and those supporting the government are creating this positive atmosphere,” added Karimi-Ghadoosi, who is also a member of the important parliamentary committee for National Security and Foreign Affairs.
The concerns of critics like Karimi-Ghadoosi regarding the framework of the agreement may, in fact, be settled depending on how transparently and responsively Zarif’s team conducts the remaining negotiating sessions. With regard to Iran’s overall approach, however, these deeply conservative currents will be hard to satisfy.
Resistance as an intrinsic value
The political ideology promoted by this far-right conservative faction constantly reinvigorates the revolutionary spirit of the late 1970s. Enmity towards the West and the United States in particular is a raison d’être that will not be abandoned.
In order to flourish, this political spectrum needs tensions with the West and its allies. Isolation and segregation, rather than dialogue and integration, are what these groups prefer in Iran’s grand foreign policy strategy, which should be oriented towards furthering Iran’s status as a respected regional power.
“Negotiations on behalf of the system of the Islamic Republic must follow the path of Islamic ideals,” said Karimi-Ghadoosi in reply to my question about what negotiation strategy he prefers.
Hence this faction’s glorification of Saeed Jalili, Iran’s former lead nuclear negotiator under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Jalili was the recalcitrant figure preferring to lecture his negotiating partners on core Islamic values rather than emphasizing the importance of reaching common ground for resolving this conflict.
In contrast, Zarif’s reconciliatory approach, in the far-right principlists’ view, does not only lead to selling out on Iranian interests, but also contradicts the fundamentals of the nezaam — the system of the Islamic Republic.
One media outlet affiliated with the Endurance Front described the May 3 conference as an illustration of how various “revolutionary currents” are able to turn core ideals and concerns into “operational directives”.
This article also explicitly mentioned that “this gathering will not have matched the taste of reformists,” underlining the event’s purposefully factional nature.
Is Rouhani’s government responsive?
A successful Rouhani presidency depends on many factors, including the way it chooses to respond to these waves of criticism.
Warning remarks by political heavy-weights such as Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, add to on-going internal pressure for Rouhani to conform.
Anticipating more pressure by the P5+1 on Iran to dismantle its ballistic missile capacity, Boroujerdi recently declared that “Iran’s missile power is not an issue for negotiations,” in comments posted on the hard-line Fars News Agency.
One of the shortcomings of former President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) was the failure of his reformist camp to integrate and address public criticism from conservative factions — a phenomenon that was performed in reverse by the Ahmadinejad government in an even more distinct fashion.
President Rouhani, a centrist through and through, tried to reach out to critics during a recently televised live interview. It seemed, in fact, that this media appearance was used for an overall — though soft-toned — rebuttal against his adversaries.
“We have not kept and will not keep anything secret,” stressed Rouhani during the April 29 TV appearance.
The “red line”, the president held, “is the right of the nation,” which will be preserved by the “thoroughly experienced” negotiating team.
Rouhani also said that bold slogans alone would not lead to political outcomes.
“From the beginning we have said that our approach in the negotiations is that of a win-win approach,” he added.
There’s no indication as of yet that the president’s remarks will tame any of his most outspoken critics, such as Ruhollah Hosseinian, Mehdi Kouchakzadeh, Seyed Mohamad Nabavian or Hamid Rasaei, all parliamentarians who were key speakers at the May 3 conference. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s support for Rouhani is well recognized in those circles, but the hard-liners’ scepticism remains.
Rouhani and Zarif must effectively respond to these figures to avoid further radicalizing their positions. Since increasing pressure on the government would simultaneously lead to increasing pressure on the Supreme Leader, the latter’s support for the government could also become less vocal. Khamenei, too, must ultimately respond to his most loyal followers.
Photo: Participants of Tehran’s May 3 “We’re concerned” conference, which was held at the former U.S. embassy. Credit: SNN/Ali Mokhtari
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