by Jasmin Ramsey

The only certainty now about the talks between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program is that the negotiators have their work cut out for them. Other than occasional runaway comments to the press from France, and now China, the parties have remained tight-lipped about their [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

The only certainty now about the talks between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program is that the negotiators have their work cut out for them. Other than occasional runaway comments to the press from France, and now China, the parties have remained tight-lipped about their closed-door dealings. However, judging by the tone of the briefings by the US and Iran coming out of the 5-day session that ended in Vienna last Friday, the pressure has increased as the self-imposed deadline looms. The negotiations can certainly be extended, but as a senior US official noted in a background briefing to the press:

We are all focused on reaching July 20th.  As I’ve said before, if we get close and we need a few more days, I don’t think anyone will mind.  But we are very focused on getting it done now.  We have all agreed that time is not in anyone’s interest; it won’t help get there.  And if indeed by the time we get to July 20th we are still very far apart, then I think we will all have to evaluate what that means and what is possible or not.

What are the odds of the now formally titled “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” being signed by Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) at the end of July? Independent scholar and LobeLog contributor Farideh Farhi offered her take during a June 21 interview with Iran Review:

Two factors work in favor of the eventual resolution of the nuclear dossier and transformation of US-Iran relations from a constant state of hostility and non-communication to interaction, even if not necessarily in constructive ways at all times. One is the seriousness of the negotiations and the political will on the part of the current administrations in both countries to prevent the nuclear dossier from becoming a pretext for war or spiraling into something uncontrollable. And the second is the high cost of failure now that both sides have invested so heavily in the talks.

But there are also factors that inhibit confidence in assuming a point of no return to status quo ante. First, in both countries there are political forces that oppose any type of interaction and lessening of tensions, although at this point my take is that opponents, encouraged by regional players, have more significant institutional power in the United States than Iran. In other words, along with political power, they have extensive policy instruments – the most important of which are legally embedded in the sanctions regime – that can be relied upon to undermine or prevent political accord between the two countries.

The second factor is the unequal power relationship between the two countries, which has consistently led various US administrations to be tempted by the argument that economic, political muscle, and military threats will eventually pay off and force various administrations in Iran to give in irrespective of domestic political equations and the stances they have taken within their own political environment. Currently, this second factor is part and parcel of broader indecision or uncertainty in the US’ strategic calculus regarding whether to come to terms with Iran as a prominent regional player or continue its three decade policy of containing it and alternatively Iran’s commitment to being an independent and powerful regional actor irrespective of fears in the neighborhood.

This dynamic of one side always wanting more than the other can give and/or alternatively being unwilling or incapable of matching concessions with what the other side deems as comparable concessions has been the source of impasse in negotiations. This is not to suggest that inflexibility or lack of realism only comes from one side. During the previous administration, Iran also miscalculated in its assessment of the leverage the United States could build through its ferocious sanctions regime in the same way the United States miscalculated in its assessment of the extent to which Iran could expand its nuclear program in the face of sanctions. As such, Iran’s expectation for the sanctions regime that took years to build to be lifted quickly and permanently is as unrealistic as the US expectation for Iran’s enrichment program to be significantly scaled back.

As to the impact of Iran-US direct talks, it is still possible for the unprecedented high profile direct engagement between the two countries in and of itself to lead to some sort of transformation in the relationship irrespective of the results of nuclear talks. If indeed the two countries’ foreign ministers or even presidents can continue to pick up the phone and talk to each other over matters of common concern or for the sake of de-escalating tensions, that by itself is an important achievement of nuclear talks and its significance should not be under-estimated. But this also depends on how the potential failure of nuclear talks is managed by both sides.

Read more here.

This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.

Photo: The Iranian nuclear negotiating team headed by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif (center) and Deputy Foreign Ministers Abbas Araghchi (to Zarif’s right) and Majid Takht-Ravanchi.

by Jasmin Ramsey

Geneva – While Iran and 6 world powers known as the P5+1 are remaining secretive about the details of ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, the Nov. 7-8  talks here have kicked off with official statements that some “progress” has already occurred.

After describing the negotiations as “extremely complex,” the spokesman for [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

Geneva – While Iran and 6 world powers known as the P5+1 are remaining secretive about the details of ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, the Nov. 7-8  talks here have kicked off with official statements that some “progress” has already occurred.

After describing the negotiations as “extremely complex,” the spokesman for EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told reporters today that the discussions “are now heading into a serious phase.”

“We very much hope there will be concrete progress here over the next few days,” said Michael Mann.

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi meanwhile told Iranian State TV this afternoon that the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) has agreed to Iran’s ”proposed negotiation framework” and that discussions about the content can now begin.

Revised Schedule

Earlier today Iranian press had reported that Iran’s Foreign Minister and chief nuclear negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif would be meeting his Italian counterpart in Rome after his working breakfast meeting with Ashton, but that meeting has been cancelled.

Zarif will now remain in Geneva while the Iranians attend several bilateral meetings today with their U.S., Chinese and Russian counterparts; he is also scheduled to meet with Ashton at 6pm tonight.

Secretary of State John Kerry and Zarif made history when they met bilaterally in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. That meeting was followed by the historic 15-minute telephone conversation between Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and US President Barack Obama.

The seeds for those events were planted months in advance according to a Wall Street Journal report on behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the Obama administration that involved “secret meetings and telephone calls and convening an assortment of Arab monarchs, Iranian exiles and former U.S. diplomats to clandestinely ferry messages between Washington and Tehran.”

Potential stumbling blocks 

While developments have contributed at least in part to the clearly upbeat mood here now, reaching a mutual agreement on Iran’s insistence on what it considers its right to peacefully enrich uranium as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the extreme sanctions regime the Iranians have long been seeking relief from would be integral for a final deal.

Although the Obama administration has recently been lobbying for a temporary pause in the implementation of more sanctions on Iran while talks are in progress, key figures in Congress are resisting the effort.

A senior administration official told reporters yesterday that ”Our experts strongly believe that any forward progress on additional sanctions at this time would be harmful to and potentially undermine the negotiating process at a truly crucial moment.”

“In response to a first step agreed to by Iran that halts their program from advancing further, we are prepared to offer limited, targeted, and reversible sanctions relief.” said the official, who was speaking on the condition of anonymity.

That same day the top Republican senator on the Foreign Relations Committee said he was preparing legislation that would prevent the loosening of sanctions on Iran.

“We’ve crafted an amendment to freeze the administration in and make it so they are unable to reduce the sanctions unless certain things occur,” Sen. Bob Corker told the Daily Beast on Wednesday.

But some experts argue that adding more sanctions at this critical stage in the diplomatic progress with Iran could lead to counterproductive results.

“New sanctions passed before a true test of Iran’s intentions may result in a bleak future: a risky and costly war with Iran with no guarantee of success; or the acceptance of an increasingly embittered, isolated, repressive, and nuclear capable Islamic Republic,” wrote Alireza Nader, an Iran specialist at the Rand Corporation, in The Hill.

Majid Takht-e Ravanchi, another Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister who is part of the Iranian negotiating team here expressed a long-held Iranian view when he recently called all sanctions on his country “illegal”.

He added that some should be removed as part of an initial phase.

“We have frequently announced that to prove its goodwill, the opposite side can take steps to remove anti-Iran sanctions, even if sanctions removed in the first stages would not be so significant,” said Ravanchi in an Oct. 27 interview.

Photo Credit: European External Action Service

by Jasmin Ramsey

There’s an interview up on IRDiplomacy with Iran’s newly appointed foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, whose speech at the nomination hearings last week was so stunning that it “literally quieted the cacophonous parliament hall“. The initial news of Zarif’s nomination was received positively here in Washington [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jasmin Ramsey

There’s an interview up on IRDiplomacy with Iran’s newly appointed foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, whose speech at the nomination hearings last week was so stunning that it “literally quieted the cacophonous parliament hall“. The initial news of Zarif’s nomination was received positively here in Washington (where he’s well-known) among movers and shakers interested in a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Add to that the appointment of former FM Ali Akbar Salehi — known as an experienced pragmatist — as Iran’s nuclear chief and things aren’t looking too bad so far.

In Zarif’s answers, which should be considered in their entirety, there’s a clear emphasis on moderation and moving away from radicalism, which Hassan Rouhani promised during his campaign and which seems to be the new president’s preferred modus operandi. Whether that will be enough to effectively battle Iranian and US hardliners who want to see the stalemate between the US and Iran continue (or perhaps something worse) remains to be seen. For now, the US is at least hearing the right things from the Iranian side, even if the Iranians continue to insist on staying true to something else Rouhani promised to maintain — their dignity and principles. For the always insightful Gary Sick, an Iran expert at Columbia University where he became well-acquainted with Zarif during the latter’s five-year tenure at the UN, it’s the US’ turn to send a positive signal now given that “Unlike the bluster and belligerence of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who did incalculable damage to his own country during his eight years of misrule — a fact that is finally becoming clear even to the radicals in Iran who originally supported him — Zarif’s words demonstrate a determination to alleviate some of the many problems facing Iran and the Middle East.”

Q: The issue of “moderation” was one of the main mottos of the “Administration of Foresight and Hope.” How do you define moderation in the area of foreign policy?

A: I personally believe that moderation means realism and creation of balance among various needs of a country for the advancement of the foreign policy and pursuit of the foreign policy goals through plausible and rational methods and a suitable discourse. Moderation does not mean to forget about the values or discard the principles. Moderation neither means to fall short of materializing the country’s rights. In other words, as I said in my address to the Majlis (Iranian parliament), moderation has its roots in self-confidence. The people who confide in their own ability, power, possibilities and capacities will tread the path of moderation. But those who are afraid and feel weak mostly go for radicalism. Radicals in the world are cowardly people and although their slogans may be different from one another, there are close and good relations among them. The world of today needs moderation more than anything else and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a powerful country, can push ahead with a suitable foreign policy approach through moderation.

Q: In his first press conference after the inauguration ceremony, President [Hassan Rouhani] said resumption of the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1 group will be one of his priorities. Do you have any new plan or proposal for the resumption of these talks?

A: There have been discussions inside the administration with Mr. President about how to follow up on the country’s nuclear rights and reduce unjust sanctions which have been imposed against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The basis for our work is to insist on the rights of Iran and do away with logical concerns of the international community. As the Supreme Leader and the President have emphasized, it would be easy to achieve this goal provided that the main goal of all involved parties is to find a solution to the nuclear issue. We believe that finding a solution to the nuclear issue needs political will. On the side of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the election of Dr. Rouhani – in view of his past track records with regard to this case – proves that the Iranian people are willing for the nuclear issue to reach a final solution with power and strength and within a reasonable time frame. We wish the opposite side will also have the necessary political resolve for the resolution of the nuclear issue. In that case, we would have no concern with respect to assuring the world about the peaceful nature of our nuclear energy program because according to the fatwa [religious decree] issued by the Supreme Leader and based on the strategic needs of Iran, nuclear weapons have no place in our national security doctrine and are even detrimental to our national security.