Once upon a time, it seemed that the Obama administration had held off opponents in Congress as well as pressure from Israel in order to press forward with negotiations with Iran. It seemed that President Barack Obama’s penchant for diplomacy was finally bearing fruit and that the United States and Iran were coming to the table with a sense of determination and an understanding that a compromise needed to be reached over Iran’s nuclear program.
These days, the story is different. Almost halfway through the four-month extension period the parties agreed to in July, the possibility of failure is more prominently on people’s minds, despite the fact that significant progress has been made in the talks. Right now, both sides have dug in their heels over the question of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities. Iran wants sufficient latitude to build and power more nuclear reactors on their own, while the United States wants a much more restrictive regime.
Part of the calculus on each side is the cost to the other of the failure of talks. Iran is certainly aware that, along with escalating tensions with Russia, the U.S. is heading into what is sure to be a drawn-out conflict with the Islamic State (IS). The U.S. and its partners would clearly prefer to avoid a new crisis with the Islamic Republic, especially when the they need to work with Iran on battling IS forces, however independently and/or covertly they may do it.
The U.S. certainly recognizes that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani staked a good deal of his political life on eliminating the sanctions that have been crippling the Iranian economy. But both sides would be wise to avoid a game of chicken here, where they are gambling that the other side will ultimately be forced to blink first.
On the U.S. side, there are many in Washington who would not be satisfied with anything less than a total Iranian surrender, something the Obama administration is not seeking. Those forces are present in both parties, and, indeed, even if Democrats hold the Senate and win the White House in 2016, those voices are likely to become more prominent as time goes on.
But many believe that on the Iranian side, this is a life-or-death issue politically for the reform-minded Rouhani, and that may not be the case. It is certainly true that conservative forces in Iran, which had been ascendant under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are lying in wait to pounce on Rouhani if he doesn’t manage to work out a deal that removes U.S.-led sanctions against Iran. It is also true that Rouhani deals with a Supreme Leader who is highly skeptical not only of Washington’s sincerity, but of the kind program Rouhani’s reform-minded allies wish to pursue on the domestic front. Rouhani’s support derives most reliably from an Iranian public fed up with the failure of the conservatives to improve their lives. He dare not disappoint them.
But if Washington policy-makers believe that this amounts to a political gun to Rouhani’s head, they are mistaken. In a just-released paper published by the Wilson Center. Farideh Farhi, the widely quoted Iran expert at the University of Hawaii Manoa (and LobeLog contributor), points out that Rouhani does have options if the negotiations fall apart.
“To be sure, Rouhani will be weakened, in similar ways presidents in other countries with contested political terrains suffer when unable to deliver on key promised policies,” according to Farhi.
But he will continue to be president for at least another three, if not seven, years. The hardliners will still not have their men at the helm of the executive branch and key cabinet ministries. Given their limited political base for electoral purposes, they will still have to find a way to organize and form coalitions to face a determined alliance of centrists, reformists, and moderate conservatives—the same alliance that helped bring Rouhani to power—in the parliamentary election slotted for early 2016. And, most importantly, Rouhani will still have the vast resources of the Iranian state at his disposal to make economic and social policy and will work with allies to make sure that the next parliament will be more approving of his policies.
Farhi’s point is important. Rouhani has options and he need not accept a deal that can be easily depicted by conservatives as surrendering Iran’s independent nuclear program. As pointed out in a recent survey of Iranian public opinion we covered earlier in the week, this issue is particularly fraught in Iran. It has been a point of national pride that Iran has refused to bend to Western diktats on its nuclear program, diktats that are seen as hypocritical and biased by most Iranians. That estimate is not an unfair one, given previous demands by the U.S. (and one still insisted upon by Israel and its U.S. supporters) that Iran forgo all uranium enrichment. Such a position would force Iran to depend on the goodwill and cooperation of other countries — Russia, in the first instance — whose reliability in fulfilling commitments may depend on how they perceive their national interest at any given moment. Other countries are not held to such a standard, a source of considerable resentment across the Iranian political spectrum.
Rouhani has wisely chosen not to challenge the public on this point, but rather commit himself to finding an agreement that would end sanctions while maintaining Iran’s nuclear independence, albeit under a strict international inspection regime. This is far from an impossible dream. The Arms Control Association published a policy brief last month with a very reasonable outline for how just such a plan which would satisfy the needs of both Iran and the P5+1.
In principle, both sides could live with such an outcome if they can put domestic politics aside. But of course, they cannot.
Still, the consequences of failure must not be ignored. With Barack Obama heading into his final two years as President, it is quite possible, if not probable, that his successor — regardless of party affiliation — will be much less favorable toward a deal with Iran. In that case, we go back to Israeli pressure for a direct confrontation between the United States and Iran and escalating tensions as Iran feels more and more besieged by the Washington and its western allies.
Rouhani, for his part, may be able to continue his path of reform and re-engagement with the West, but the failure of these talks would be an unwelcome obstacle, according to Farhi.
Rouhani and his nuclear team have had sufficient domestic support to conduct serious negotiations within the frame of P5+1. But as the nuclear negotiations have made clear, the tortured history of U.S.-Iran relations as well as the history of progress in Iran’s nuclear program itself will not allow the acceptance of just any deal. Failure of talks will kill neither Rouhani’s presidency nor the ‘moderation and prudence’ path he has promised. But it will make his path much more difficult to navigate.
All of this seems to amount to sufficient incentive for the two sides to bring themselves toward the reasonable compromise that both can surely envision. At least, one hopes so.
]]>The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is primarily known for its role as the agency charged with enforcing Iran sanctions. This summer, however, the agency came out with a series of actions aimed at mitigating the effect of sanctions on the Iranian people. Most recently, OFAC has issued two [...]]]>
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is primarily known for its role as the agency charged with enforcing Iran sanctions. This summer, however, the agency came out with a series of actions aimed at mitigating the effect of sanctions on the Iranian people. Most recently, OFAC has issued two new general licenses authorizing certain humanitarian related activities by nongovernmental organizations with Iran, as well athletic exchanges between Iran and the United States. According to the Treasury Department’s press release, the new general licenses, which provide a standing authorization to conduct the activities described therein, are “designed to support longstanding U.S. Government efforts to encourage humanitarian and goodwill activities between the Iranian and American people.”
General License F authorizes “the importation of Iranian origin services into the United States or other dealings in such services, and the exportation or reexportation of services, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a United States person related to professional and amateur sporting activities and exchanges involving the United States and Iran.” It covers activities such as the sponsorship of players, coaching, refereeing, and training. One caveat is that any payments related to these activities must comply with 31 CFR § 560.516 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), meaning that payments must either be deposited into a third-country bank account or passed through a third-country financial institution before being deposited in an account at certain authorized Iranian financial institutions.
This authorization also reflects the sensitivity of OFAC to allegations that its action have had an adverse effect on matters unrelated to the Iranian government’s illicit activities. Those pushing for the new general license likely received a boost following the recent case where an Iranian tennis referee was initially prevented from participating in the U.S. Open. While some were quick to blame sanctions, the larger problem was that the referee received a visa not covered by § 560.505, which authorizes activities related to certain visa categories. The fact that OFAC felt compelled to respond to an issue that was somewhat inaccurately blamed on U.S. sanctions policies is indicative of the role the agency plays in the public relations war between Iran and the United States.
While General License F is fairly limited in scope, General License E could have a far broader impact. Contained within the license are standing authorizations for a range of humanitarian and human rights-related activities designed to help the Iranian people. These include activities related to humanitarian projects in Iran such as the operation of orphanages, the provision of relief services and non-commercial reconstruction projects related to natural disasters, donations of items intended to relieve human suffering, and activities related to environmental and wildlife conservation projects. Prior to General License E, U.S. persons were required to seek specific licenses on a case-by-case basis from OFAC to conduct the above activities, or in the case of natural disasters such as the August 2012 earthquake in northwest Iran, wait until the release of a time-limited general license.
Most important, however, are the provisions in § (a)(4) of General License E that focus on the activities of NGOs in Iran. These include authorization for activities related to human rights and democracy building projects in Iran such as the sponsorship of and attendance and training at conferences in Iran related to human rights projects, democracy building, efforts to increase access to information and freedom of expression, and public advocacy, public policy advice, polling, or surveys relating to human rights and democracy building. U.S. NGOs that wish to take advantage of this general license are required to file quarterly reports with OFAC, and the transfers of funds by a single U.S. NGO may not exceed $500,000 in aggregate over a 12-month period.
The new license could make it far easier for U.S. NGOs to conduct activities directly benefiting the Iranian people. In particular, the inclusion of “efforts to increase access to information and freedom of expression” builds upon General License D, which authorized the sale of certain goods and services related to personal communications. By opening the doors for NGOs working in Iran to expand awareness of and access to software designed to defeat restrictions on internet access, the new general license has the potential to be a boon to those seeking to defeat government filters and internet censorship. Realizing the full impact of these provisions, however, depends upon U.S. NGOs actively taking advantage of the general license, as well as on Iranian NGOs’ ability to operate without provoking a crackdown by the government.
As noted by Collin Anderson, an independent researcher who works on Iran’s internet censorship, the Treasury’s recent action caps a summer in which OFAC has made a conspicuous effort to dispel perceptions that its coercive actions are targeted at the Iranian people, as well as to lower tensions with Iran. On May 30, OFAC released the above mentioned General License D, while July 25 saw the release of guidance designated to clarify OFAC’s policy regarding payments for humanitarian goods, amid allegations that sanctions have resulted in shortages of these goods, particularly medicine. Furthermore, OFAC has considerably slowed the pace of its Iran-related designations following the June 14 election of Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. A full 94 days have passed between the designations of June 4 and the recent action targeting oil sanctions evaders, making this one of, if not the longest quiet periods in the last 5 years.
Taken together, these actions may signal a change both in how OFAC views its role in administering Iran sanctions and how the U.S. government addresses the tension between preventing certain economic activities while promoting others. During a February symposium at the Georgetown University Law Center, an OFAC attorney-adviser stated that “Generally OFAC’s job is preventing economic activity and even when there is a strong policy favoring certain types of activity, it’s not part of their nature to go out and sort of drum up business for pharmaceutical companies to send medicine to Iran. Maybe it should be.” Setting aside the highly contested issue of pharmaceutical exports, the point holds that OFAC has traditionally viewed enforcement as a far more important priority than promoting activities that support U.S. policy goals. While OFAC is not the only, or even the primary driver of Iran sanctions policy within the U.S. government, these actions are a positive indication that the United States is doing a better job of recognizing the importance of balancing pressure with outreach to the Iranian people.
– Samuel Cutler is a policy adviser at Ferrari & Associates, a Washington, DC boutique law firm specializing in US economic sanctions matters.
- Photo Credit: Reza Saiedipour
]]>by Marsha B. Cohen
Mitch McConnell did it, Harry Reid didn’t. Elizabeth Warren did it, Bernie Sanders didn’t. Al Franken did it, Tom Coburn didn’t.
I’m referring to the signing of the latest letter, crafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and proffered by Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
Mitch McConnell did it, Harry Reid didn’t. Elizabeth Warren did it, Bernie Sanders didn’t. Al Franken did it, Tom Coburn didn’t.
I’m referring to the signing of the latest letter, crafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and proffered by Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), urging President Barak Obama to turn a cold shoulder to newly elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani while pursuing a more confrontational and aggressive Iran policy. The Arms Control Association’s Greg Thielmann has already penned an important discussion of why this measure complicates efforts to reach a peaceful solution with Iran, which I highly recommend.
It is worth recalling that another Iranian president-elect, Mohammad Khatami — a reformist whose surprise election shocked the Iranian political establishment — was also greeted by sanctions pushed through Congress. On August 19, 1997, weeks after Khatami took office, President Bill Clinton confirmed that virtually all trade and investment activities by US persons with Iran were prohibited. Those sanctions not only boosted Iranian hardliners who oppose a detente with the US, they also helped ensure that Khatami and his supporters would be unsuccessful in making many of the economic improvements and political changes needed to improve the lives of the Iranian people. His crippled victory was followed by the election of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Since then, dozens of letters, resolutions and sanctions bills have emanated from Congress, which of late seems incapable of accomplishing anything else.
According to the “76 senators” who signed the letter:
We believe there are four strategic elements necessary to achieve resolution of this issue: an explicit and continuing message that we will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, a sincere demonstration of openness to negotiations, the maintenance and toughening of sanctions, and a convincing threat of the use of force that Iran will believe. We must be prepared to act, and Iran must see that we are prepared.
So the US must somehow demonstrate an “openness to negotiations” while maintaining and toughening sanctions and convincingly threatening to “use force”, even as it remains mired in Iraq and Afghanistan and utterly bewildered about Syria and Egypt?
Saxby Chamblis did it, Richard Shelby didn’t. Sheldon Whitehouse did it, Ron Wyden didn’t. Chuck Schumer did it, Barbara Boxer didn’t.
Signing and not signing such letters may be of limited practical consequence — though AIPAC and other lobbying groups are certainly keeping tabs — but the political fallout of abstaining can be deafening. When Chuck Hagel was nominated for Secretary of Defense, his detractors screamed about the anti-Iran “letters” he hadn’t signed, according them equal status with his actual votes.
Tammy Baldwin, who was mercilessly hammered by her 2012 opponent Tommy Thompson for wavering on Iran sanctions, didn’t sign onto this letter.
Al Franken (D-MN), who did, won his seat in 2008 after a recount that lasted for months, unseating incumbent Norm Coleman by a mere 312 votes. Coleman, a stalwart of the Republican Jewish Coalition, is salivating at the prospect of Franken making a single false move on the pro-Israel/anti-Iran front that would enable Republicans to pounce. While Franken seems to be in a strong position for reelection in 2014, he can take nothing for granted in the current political environment.
The last listed co-signer, newbie Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), is currently focused on the economy and particularly on who will be running the Fed. But she has been quick to climb aboard the bandwagon that’s torpedoing the prospect of improved relations with Iran, as has Angus King, the Maine Independent who replaced Republican Olympia Snowe.
Of course, the 24 who, for one reason or another, chose not to sign the letter are hardly “profiles in courage”. Some aren’t seeking reelection when their current Senate term is up and can run free of the AIPAC leash, among them Max Baucus, Tom Coburn, Jay Rockefeller and Carl Levin. Perhaps the most curious non-signers are the AIPAC-endorsed, staunchly pro-Israel senators who have consistently voted in favor of increasingly crippling Iran sanctions but also recently abstained from signing a similar letter last December, urging the President to stiffen them. This group includes Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK).
Inferring that any senator not signing an AIPAC-crafted letter has opposed crippling sanctions or will oppose the next round of them would be a major mistake. Most of the two dozen non-signers of the latest letter, including Rand Paul (R-KY), who opposes a military attack on Iran, have voted in favor of sanctions in the past and will probably do so in the future unless some political incentive convinces them otherwise. The absent Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) were among the original cosponsors of S. 65 – the AIPAC-promoted “Back Door to Iran War” resolution that expressed support of an Israeli attack on Iran. It garnered 91 cosponsors and passed the Senate 99-0 on May 22. Kirk’s website is meanwhile applauding the House’s passage of the latest Iran sanctions in the House (as is AIPAC; the accompanying photo to this post is the lead image on its website’s front page) and urges the Senate to act as well, which will likely happen in September.
Just about every resolution and vote ratcheting up sanctions against Iran has passed the Senate with a hefty majority. Murkowski, Wyden, and Jon Tester (D-MT) were among the 44 senators who signed an AIPAC letter in June 2012 opposing negotiations with Iran although they didn’t sign this one.
President Obama has defined insanity as “doing the same thing over and over again, and expecting a different result”. How ironic it would be if he were to heed this latest letter and, yielding to Congress, sign off on more and stricter sanctions, just as a new Iranian president offers at least an opening for a better era in US-Iran relations.
That said, Rouhani, who stated the other day that “we need to have negotiations without threats” needs to move quickly — while Congress is on its five week summer break — in making some headlines of his own, by, for example, establishing direct contact with the United States.
]]>by Jim Lobe
I guess that’s one of the things that occurred to me when I received this Press Release and the letter to the president (reproduced below my post) from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) yesterday. All but one of the 47 members of the Committee signed on.
The [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
I guess that’s one of the things that occurred to me when I received this Press Release and the letter to the president (reproduced below my post) from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) yesterday. All but one of the 47 members of the Committee signed on.
The letter, which, normally reliable sources tell me, was initially drafted in the offices of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) calls for a whole new round of sanctions to be imposed against companies and countries doing business with Iran, notably in its mining, engineering and construction-based sectors, as well as other measures that will “increase the pressure on Iran in the days ahead.” While noting that president-elect Hassan Rouhani was “widely perceived as the most moderate of the candidates” running in last month’s election and that its outcome “reflected considerable dissatisfaction by the Iranian people with an autocratic and repressive government that has internationally isolated Iran,” it stressed that the election “unfortunately has done nothing to suggest a reversal of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capacity.” “[T]here appears nothing ‘moderate’ about [Rouhani's] nuclear policies…”
“Our diplomatic goal,” it continues, “must be to reach a negotiated settlement in which Iran agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program.”
Now that last phrase is particularly provocative because, as everyone who has paid the slightest attention to intelligence community (IC) estimates and statements over the last five-and-a-half years knows, Iran suspended what the IC had previously believed was a nuclear-weapons program in 2003 and the country’s leadership, including Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has not made a decision to produce a weapon. So what we see in this letter is deliberate disregard by 46 of the 47 HFAC members — both Democrats and Republicans — of the conclusions of the 17 agencies that make up Washington’s Intelligence Community. This is the same IC for which Congress last year approved nearly 54 billion dollars (not counting some $18 billion dollars more for military intelligence). Do you hear any echoes from Iraq here?
I’m prepared to believe that Iran is seeking a capability to build and deploy weapons relatively quickly; that is the same kind of capability as, say, Japan or Brazil has. Indeed, given the threats (and the pressure) to which it has been subject, seeking such a capability is hardly an unreasonable thing to do. In fact, it may even be possible that the expansion of its nuclear infrastructure, as cited by the letter, is a direct response to that pressure. If so, it would follow rather logically that reducing the pressure just might induce a reciprocal gesture on the part of Tehran. Conversely, ratcheting up pressure, as AIPAC and the HFAC members appear determined to achieve, may result in a further expansion and acceleration of the nuclear program, a result that would obviously be counter-productive to their professed goal of reaching a “negotiated settlement in which Iran agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program [which the $54-billion-a-year IC says does not exist].”
But let’s return for a moment to AIPAC’s and HFAC’s analysis of the meaning — or lack thereof — of Rouhani’s election last month. The letter points out that Rouhani “indicated his support for Iran’s nuclear ambitions [implying he wants nuclear weapons although he has explicitly disclaimed that goal -- please note the vagueness of "ambitions"] in his first post-election press conference” and contends that there “appears nothing ‘moderate’ about his nuclear policies…” But that’s a rather tendentious interpretation of what Rouhani said at that press conference. Here’s what he said when asked about the nuclear program:
By God’s grace, we will have more active negotiations with the P5+1. This is the main point. And we are of the opinion that the nuclear issue can only and only be resolved through negotiations. Neither threats, nor sanctions are effective. The solution lies in holding negotiations and reaching a mutual trust. The solution of reaching a mutual trust is possible. This was done before. We will benefit from previous experiences. The fact is that the Iranian nation’s undeniable rights will always be considered by the future government. And it [future government] will constantly make efforts to save the people from the cruel sanctions step by step, and to be able to build better relations with the countries of the world, particularly the neighboring states, as I emphasized before.
And this is a quote about the nuclear program from his last televised debate with the other presidential candidates — the same debate in which Ali Akbar Velayati quite publicly ripped hard-line nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili for the latter’s inflexibility in negotiations with the P5+1 over Iran’s nuclear program:
It’s nice for the centrifuges to run, but people’s livelihoods have to also run, our factories have to also run.
And here’s what he said about relations with the U.S. in his post-election press conference:
The issue of relations between Iran and the United States is a complicated and difficult issue. It’s not a simple issue. After all, there is an old scar. Prudence has to be adopted to cure this scar. Of course, we will not pursue continuing or expanding tensions. We will not pursue adding to tensions. It would be wise for the two nations and countries to think more of the future. They should find a solution to the past issues and resolve them. They should think of the future. But any talks with the United States have to take place based on mutual respect, mutual interests, and mutual stances. It definitely depends on certain conditions. And those conditions have to be fulfilled. First, as stated in the Algiers Accord [brokered by the Algerian government between the United States and Iran to resolve the Iran hostage crisis in 1981], the Americans have to confirm that they will not interfere in Iran’s internal issues ever. Second, they have to officially recognize the Iranian nation’s rights, including the nuclear right. Third, they should avoid unilateral or bullying policies against Iran. And of course, under such circumstances, the grounds [for holding talks] would be ready. If we feel there is goodwill involved, then the grounds [for talks] would be different. But everyone should know that the future government will not ignore the rightful rights of the Iranian nation under any circumstances. And on this basis, we would be ready for the tension to become less, and even if we see goodwill, it would be possible to take steps toward building trust within a framework that the Islamic Republic of Iran has. And I have pointed out the framework.
Rouhani also actually referred to “Israel” by its chosen name, forgoing the traditional aversion to pronouncing the name of the “Little Satan.”
These statements may, of course, disguise much more sinister and radical designs, but they sound pretty “moderate”, at least by Iran’s standards of the last eight years or so. And it’s worth remembering that they were made publicly in front of a large domestic audience whose votes appear to have actually been counted and who probably formed certain expectations that his words could translate into policy. That the AIPAC/Royce/Engel letter takes absolutely no account of any of this demonstrates the extent to which the 46 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee are actually paying the slightest attention.
Of course, in the event that any attention was paid to Rouhani’s words and the circumstances in which he offered them, the letter falls back on the familiar old chestnut that, of course, it is Khamenei, not Rouhani, who will decide the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, so the president-elect doesn’t really count (despite the fact that (a) Khamenei supposedly “allowed” Rouhani to win, and (b) he’s served on the Supreme National Security Council for some 15 years, many of them as Khamenei’s representative). And here we are reminded that Khamenei “has recently reiterated his view that Iran has no reason to normalize relations with the United States.” Well, he may indeed have said that recently (although I can’t find a recent quote to that effect, but it should be pointed out that Iran doesn’t have to normalize relations with the U.S. in order to reach an agreement over its nuclear program with the P5+1. Indeed, the whole issue of normalization in the context of the nuclear program is pretty much a non sequitur.
But let’s look more closely at what Khamenei has been saying. Here’s what he said on June 26, according to a Reuters dispatch:
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday the dispute over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme could easily be resolved if the West were to stop being so stubborn.
While accusing the West of being more interested in regime change than ending the dispute, Khamenei did express a desire to resolve an issue which has led to ever tighter sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and the wider economy.
“Some countries have organised a united front against Iran and are misguiding the international community and with stubbornness do not want to see the nuclear issue resolved,” Khamenei’s official web site quoted him as saying.
“But if they put aside their stubbornness, resolving the nuclear issue would be simple,” he said, without setting out what specific concessions he wanted Western nations to make.
…”The Islamic Republic has acted legally and transparently in the nuclear debate and offers logic in its arguments, but the aim of the enemies is through constant pressure, to tire Iran and change the regime and they will not allow the issue to be resolved,” Khamenei said.
…”Of course the enemies say in their words and letters than they do not want to change the regime, but their approaches are contrary to these words,” he said.
Again, this may all be deception, or “taqiyya”, as neo-cons who fancy themselves expert in matters Shi’a love to invoke when insisting that you can’t trust anything a Shiite tells you. But it certainly doesn’t preclude the possibility of reaching a deal based on such unimperial concepts like “mutual respect,” reciprocity, and international law.
As to relations with the U.S., there’s this other Reuters report that may be of interest to the 45 congressmen and women from June 12:
NEW YORK/ANKARA (Reuters) – Five months ago Iran’s foreign minister sent an unusual letter to the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It was time, Ali Akbar Salehi wrote according to two sources who read the letter, to reach out to Tehran’s arch foe by entering into “broad discussions with the United States.”
The supreme leader, though cautious about the prospect, sent a reply to Salehi and the rest of the Cabinet: he was not optimistic but would not oppose them if they pursued the initiative.
The fact is, public debate about direct negotiations with the U.S. was more or less a taboo in Iran as recently as 18 months ago. But it is now openly talked about, even in public debates by candidates close to Khamenei, and it appears that the Supreme Leader himself is not necessarily averse. In light of the results of last month’s elections and Rouhani’s own words on this question, why are those 46 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee so certain that nothing has changed in Iran and that more pressure is the only solution, particularly when so many actual Iran experts agree that the election has created a major opportunity that Washington would be foolish to squander. Maybe it’s time for the Committee to consult with the IC’s analysts to see what they think. And maybe it’s time for members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to stop reflexively signing onto letters because they’re told AIPAC drafted them. It’s almost as embarrassing as giving Bibi Netanyahu 29 standing ovations.
Meanwhile, here’s a letter that has begun circulating in the House that offers a different approach (compare it to the one that follows):
Dear Colleague:
On June 14, the Iranian people elected Hassan Rouhani president, overcoming repression and intimidation by the Iranian government to cast their ballots in favor of reform.
This is not the first time that Iran has elected a president on a platform of moderation and reform, and history advises us to be cautious about the prospects for meaningful change. The Iranian government’s actions in the months ahead will certainly speak louder than Dr. Rouhani’s words.
Even so, given the stakes involved for the United States, Israel, and the international community, it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani’s election represents a genuine opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We must also be careful not to foreclose the possibility of such progress by taking provocative actions that could weaken the newly elected president’s standing relative to Iran’s hardliners, who oppose his professed “policy of reconciliation and peace.”
We invite you to join us in sending the attached letter to President Obama urging him to reinvigorate U.S. diplomatic efforts to ensure Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The letter does not take a position on whether current sanctions should be strengthened or relaxed, nor does it take a position on the potential use of military force by the United States or its allies. We know our colleagues hold different views on these sensitive issues, but we should all be able to agree on the need for a renewed diplomatic push as part of our broader strategy toward Iran.
If you would like to sign or have questions about this letter, do not hesitate to contact George McElwee with Rep. Dent (5-6411) or Asher Hildebrand with Rep. Price (5-1784).
Sincerely,
CHARLES DENT
Member of CongressDAVID PRICE
Member of Congress
[gview file="http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf"]
]]>by Peter Jenkins
In 1729, two years after the publication of Gulliver’s Travels, Jonathan Swift, Dean of St. Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin, wrote a scathing satire on the English elite’s indifference to the plight of Ireland’s rural poor.
The “modest proposal” that he put forward was that each year 120,000 Irish [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
In 1729, two years after the publication of Gulliver’s Travels, Jonathan Swift, Dean of St. Patrick’s Cathedral in Dublin, wrote a scathing satire on the English elite’s indifference to the plight of Ireland’s rural poor.
The “modest proposal” that he put forward was that each year 120,000 Irish infants should be slaughtered upon reaching their first birthday and offered as a delicacy for the nourishment of Ireland’s Anglo-Irish land-owners and administrators as well as for export to England.
“I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance that a young healthy child well nursed is at a year old a most delicious, nourishing and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled, and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a fricassee, or a ragout,” Swift wrote.
If Swift were alive today, what, I wonder, would he make of the indifference of US Congressmen and women to the hardship that Iran’s poorer classes are experiencing as a result of US-inspired commercial and financial sanctions, and the loss of income those sanctions have inflicted on commercial and financial enterprises in countries that have been trading partners of Iran but also think of themselves as allies of the US?
Perhaps Swift would be tempted to offer the good members of Congress an updated modest proposal, along the following lines.
]]>I am deeply impressed by the honest desire of the noble members of the Congress of the United States of America to secure respect for the rights of the benighted inhabitants of Persia, as demonstrated in a Bill (H.R. 850) “to impose additional human rights and economic and financial sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes”.
I humbly suggest to their Honours that the sanctions proposed in this Bill are too mild to admit the probability that they will achieve improvement in the conduct of the rulers of Persia which is thereby sought.
I therefore venture to propose that the measures contemplated in this Bill be complemented in the following ways.
Congress shall require the President of the United States of America to take advantage of the manifest truth that Persia constitutes a threat to the peace and safety of the entire globe and to secure the passage of a United Nations resolution which will require members of that institution to surrender to the United States jurisdiction over any offspring of Persian parents below the age of 12 years who are resident in their land.
These children shall be despatched to the United States where they will be interned at the expense of those members of the North Atlantic Alliance which have failed to make an adequate contribution to the wars fought by the United States to bring freedom and democracy to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Afghanistan.
The internment of these children will serve to induce the inhabitants of Persia, whose rights are so generously cherished by the honourable Congressmen, to expel their rulers and introduce a government that is ready to respect the wishes of Congress in all regards.
Should any member of the United Nations refuse to comply with the aforesaid resolution, the President is to be required to execute the confiscation of such monies as that state may have deposited in the vaults of American banks, by way of retribution. Confiscated monies shall be transferred to Congress to defray the expense of enacting this measure and to ensure that members of Congress have the wherewithal to achieve re-election.
The offspring of Persian parents resident in the United States shall be exempt from this measure except insofar as one of the Persian parents, or both, is a vendor of used motor conveyances. Experience has shown that vendors of used motor conveyances who are of Persian origin constitute a mortal threat to the survival of a great nation. Their good conduct must be obtained by holding their children as guarantors.
I submit that this measure will bring upon the noble representatives of the American people renown more lasting than bronze.
by Marsha B. Cohen
Today hundreds of buses packed with what organizers claim are about a thousand citizen advocates departed from various pick-up points in and around New York and New Jersey for Washington, DC. They represent NORPAC (not an acronym for anything), a much smaller, localized grassroots [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
Today hundreds of buses packed with what organizers claim are about a thousand citizen advocates departed from various pick-up points in and around New York and New Jersey for Washington, DC. They represent NORPAC (not an acronym for anything), a much smaller, localized grassroots version of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), whose annual policy conference brought an estimated 10,000 activists and students to the nation’s capital to lobby for pro-Israel legislation in March.
NORPAC’s annual Mission to Washington, DC lasts just one day, modeled on the climactic conclusion on the third day of AIPAC’s confabulation that dispatches busloads of attendees to their respective Senate and House members to thank them for their support for Israel and ask for more. Attracting little or no attention outside the regional Jewish media, NORPAC markets its annual pilgrimage to the nation’s capital as a fun day of family togetherness where kids (minimum age is 12) can join their parents and grandparents in coming face-to-face with members of Congress (“MoCs”), armed with NORPAC Talking Points, and demanding to know — in unequivocal and uncompromising “yes” or “no” terms — whether they will co-sponsor and vote for pending legislation supportive of Israel and detrimental to Iran.
The NORPAC annual Mission is also a bargain. The non-discounted registration fee for AIPAC’s three day policy conference in 2013 was $599 per person, not including transportation from the participants’ home city and a 2-3 night hotel stay in pricey Washington, DC. NORPAC on the other hand charges $175 for adults and $125 for students and this fee includes bus transportation from pick-up points throughout New York and New Jersey, breakfast, lunch, dinner and a plenary meeting upon arrival. Since the Mission is accomplished in a single day, there’s no need for any hotel expense. Advocacy training prior to the Mission is also included.
NORPAC differs from its big brother AIPAC not only in size, but in actually being a PAC (political action committee), aggregating and disbursing financial contributions to members of Congress. Throughout the course of each election cycle, NORPAC members host both Democratic and Republican political candidates and office holders — Sen. Susan Collins of Maine was the guest of honor in Teaneck, NJ at a NORPAC event on April 28 – establishing personal relationships even with out of area members of Congress who receive the lion’s share of NORPAC’s largesse. Political donors contributing through NORPAC can earmark their political contributions to any candidate they choose, even if he or she is not officially endorsed. NORPAC never endorses a candidate who challenges an incumbent with a pro-Israel record, as Shmuley Boteach discovered. Nevertheless financial contributions to challengers are accepted and contributed in NORPAC’s name.
Contributions channeled through NORPAC are not huge, but, as the organization enjoys pointing out, the impact of relatively small contributions is magnified when they are aggregated. More importantly, pooling campaign contributions through NORPAC exaggerates the pro-Israel lobby’s unity, strength and influence.
The top donor through NORPAC in the 2012 election cycle contributed $7,500, with the rest of the top 25 donors contributing $4,000-$5,000. In that cycle, NORPAC disbursed $10,603 to House Democrats, $6,350 to House Republicans, $62,330 to Senate Democrats and $54,741 to Senate Republicans. Political donations to individual candidates are generally in the $2,500-$5,000 range for House members and typically in the $5,000-$10,000 range for Senators, according to Open Secrets’ database – not huge in the Super PAC era, but significant insofar as these sums, pooled and presented to politicians by NORPAC, have a greater impact than smaller ones by individual donors.
What do NORPAC’s Mission minions, rolling into the nation’s capital on their chartered buses, want? According to NORPAC’s website:
Each year NORPAC selects different issues to present to Members of Congress related to legislation in the U.S. House and Senate. Previously we have advocated for stronger Iran sanctions, continued foreign aid, increased military and strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Israel, and additional funding for the Iron Dome anti-missile defensive system. A talking points handout is supplied to all Mission attendees before the event to bring them up to speed on the latest, most pressing issues.
How are NORPAC’s Talking Points for 2013 ”different” from all other years? They aren’t. Senate and House members are being asked whether or not they support the $3.1 billion earmarked for US military assistance to Israel plus $221 million more to fund Israel’s Iron Dome program in the 2014 federal budget, the details of which are currently being negotiated. The busloads of Israel supporters on NORPAC’s Mission and at the conclusion of the AIPAC Policy Conference are there to persuade members of Congress that the political price of even nipping, let alone slashing, military aid to Israel is not one that they will want to pay.
Meanwhile, Defense News reports that Israel is slashing its own military budget, violating a 2007 understanding with Washington that incremental hikes in US annual military aid would not be used to compensate for proportionate cuts in Israel’s defense spending. While US House Speaker John Boehner has declared that repayment of loans to China should be a higher budget priority than paying active duty US troops, members of the Israeli Defense Forces will be receiving a 21% raise. Of course, NORPAC’s Talking Points won’t be mentioning that.
Besides preserving military assistance to Israel in the 2014 budget, NORPAC is asking House members to sign on as co-sponsors of House Resolution 850, which, as a New York Times editorial points out, “would pile on tougher sanctions [on Iran] just as the two sides are trying to create trust after decades of hostility.” Senators are meanwhile being asked to co-sponsor Senate Resolution 65, which makes it increasingly likely that the US will be dragged into a war with Iran if Israel initiates one, despite the disclaimer that the Resolution does not actually authorize military action. The language of the original bill, introduced in the Senate in late February by Democrat Robert Menendez and Republican Lindsey Graham, initially granted Israel full US support if it chose to attack Iran in “self-defense,” which some Senate staffers viewed with alarm as “a back door to war”, according to Ori Nir of Americans for Peace Now. But it now includes the phrase “legitimate self-defense.” Even with the APN-approved language, concerns remain that the passage of S. 65 increases the likelihood that the US would not only support an Israeli initiated war with Iran but also be dragged into it.
The last item on NORPAC’s wish list is the demand that members from both houses of Congress sponsor and support H.R. 938 and S. 462 – The United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act — two parallel bills in the House and Senate that upgrade Israel to the unique status of a “strategic partner” of the U.S. Ironically, the authors of NORPAC’s Talking Points seem unaware that the hold-up in the passage of these bills comes from the Israeli side, not Congress.
One provision of the “strategic partnership” is the mutual waiving of visa requirements for Israelis entering the US and Americans entering Israel. Israel’s problem with this provision in what Lara Friedman calls the Best Ally with Benefits bills is that Israel wants the right to impose restrictions on Americans of Arab or Muslim descent or on anyone whose political views it deems questionable or undesirable.
Currently, the rate of rejection of Americans seeking to enter Israel exceeds 3%, the maximum allowing threshold for reciprocal visa-free agreements between the US and other countries. US senators are bending over backwards to accommodate the pro-Israel lobby’s efforts to help Israel evade the requirements of visa reciprocity in exchange for the “strategic partnership” proposed by AIPAC and advocated for by NORPAC.
The Senate bill sponsored by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) proposes that Israel be granted visa waiver status if the Secretary of State determines that Israel “has made every reasonable effort, without jeopardizing the security of the State of Israel, to ensure that reciprocal travel privileges are extended to all United States citizens.” According to Mike Coogan,“Attorneys for both individual members and committees privately advised that complying…would be a flagrant violation of certain U.S. laws barring discrimination, and would undermine the U.S. government’s call for the equal protection of all its citizens traveling abroad.”
Promoting the upcoming Mission in the New Jersey Jewish News last week, NORPAC President Ben Chouake called May 8 “a day to play an oversized role for Israel.”
The oversized role that a few determined and committed people can play in our nation is astounding. Going down to Washington with NORPAC is a leveraged way of making oneself heard. Our members have made compelling cases and been key players in promoting legislative initiatives. This year we will have about 475 meetings planned for small NORPAC groups. A sincere citizen advocate in Washington is far more compelling than the most sophisticated lobbyist. Each of you that attend the mission has more influence than the 10,000 that stay at home.
Chouake’s article elicited a reader comment by Sherry Rosen, which reads in part:
…my take-away is that the most important issue facing Israel today is the need to encourage Israeli leaders to the negotiating table for peace talks. In the last few days alone, the Arab League has endorsed the idea of a two-state solution based on “comparable” and “minor” land swaps. and the re-endorsement of the official Arab Peace Initiative by non-Palestinian Arab countries is remarkably similar to the American framework that has been put forth for these negotiations.
As a “determined and committed” American Jew myself, I believe that the “oversized role” we can best play in ensuring “the survival of the Jewish homeland and the Jewish people” is to seize the opportunity that this window of hope offers. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if thousands of similarly passionate American Zionists were to meet with Congressional leaders, on May 8 or any other day, and express our abiding desire for a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than confine our powerful voices to perpetuating concerns couched in the language of threats, defense, and funding sophisticated weaponry? Who knows? It might actually work.
NORPAC wants to make sure that their members of Congress never find out.
]]>If an international agreement is violated and no one makes a sound, did it really happen?
by Samuel Cutler
A few weeks ago, the State Department imposed sanctions on Greek businessman Dimitris Cambis and his company, Impire Shipping Ltd., pursuant to the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), for his [...]]]>
If an international agreement is violated and no one makes a sound, did it really happen?
by Samuel Cutler
A few weeks ago, the State Department imposed sanctions on Greek businessman Dimitris Cambis and his company, Impire Shipping Ltd., pursuant to the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA), for his role in operating what Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen described as an “intricate Iranian scheme that was designed to evade international oil sanctions.” While OFAC’s designation has been covered at length, less noticed is the fact that the sanctions on Cambis and his companies seem to violate a Clinton-era pact between the US and EU, in which the US pledged to waive sanctions against EU persons under the ISA, known at the time as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.
According to OFAC and an earlier story by Reuters, Cambis used a web of front companies to purchase eight aging oil tankers, worth little more than their weight in scrap metal, in order to facilitate the sale of Iranian crude to China. An example provided by Reuters illustrates how the scheme worked: In early December, the Leycothea, one of Cambis’ ships, anchored alongside the Iranian tanker Marigold off the coast of the UAE Emirate of Sharjah, just across the Persian Gulf, from the Iranian shipping hub of Bandar Abbas. Once anchored, a ship-to-ship transfer took place, concealing the origin of the crude and allowing it to be traded on the global market as non-Iranian oil. About a month later the Leycothea made a port call to China’s Zhanjiang oil terminal. Each of these tankers is capable of carrying approximately $200 million worth of oil per shipment.
In the recent past, the EU has reacted strongly to attempts by the US to impose secondary sanctions on its citizens and companies. Following the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act, the EU filed a World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge alleging that secondary sanctions violated US commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While the WTO challenge refers only to the Helms-Burton Act, the EU concurrently voiced serious concerns about the ISA. The EU also passed European Council Regulation 2271/96, which contains legal countermeasures against the extraterritorial application of US sanctions and forbids EU persons “actively or by deliberate omission” from complying with the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Helms-Burton Act, and the ISA. In order to settle the dispute, the Clinton administration entered into an agreement with the EU known as the “Understanding with Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection.” In exchange for the withdrawal of the WTO challenge, the United States, among other measures, committed to waiving future ISA sanctions against EU persons.
The SDN designation of Cambis and Impire Shipping represent the first sanctions against an EU person under the ISA. Despite the apparent violation of the Investment Understanding, a response by the EU has been nonexistent so far. This reflects a broader acceptance by the EU of US secondary sanctions, at least when it comes to Iran, over the past two years. Since the passage of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) in 2010, US and EU Iran sanctions policies have largely come into alignment. The fact that Cambis is a minor player engaged in activities that are sanctionable under both US and EU law likely dampens any enthusiasm for challenging an infringement on EU or Greek sovereignty. In this case, the action might even be tacitly supported by the EU because it allows for the US to do the “dirty work” of imposing sanctions against an EU citizen without granting them the right to present a legal challenge in an EU court, which has recently caused EU policymakers major headaches. What is clear is that at least when it comes to Iran, there are few nations interested in challenging US secondary measures, regardless of past agreements.
– Samuel Cutler is a policy adviser at Ferrari & Associates, P.C., a Washington, DC boutique law firm specializing in US economic sanctions matters.
Photo Credit: U.S. Navy/ Richard J. Brunson
]]>The following quote from this Washington Post article on last week’s nuclear talks with Iran stood out despite it being a regurgitation of past statements:
“I don’t want to overpromise, but we’re encouraged,” said the official, speaking to reporters accompanying Secretary of State John [...]]]>
The following quote from this Washington Post article on last week’s nuclear talks with Iran stood out despite it being a regurgitation of past statements:
“I don’t want to overpromise, but we’re encouraged,” said the official, speaking to reporters accompanying Secretary of State John F. Kerry during a visit to Europe. “Our people who were there felt the sanctions have gotten Iran’s attention,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe diplomatically sensitive negotiations.
Sanctions are working, says the Obama administration, repeatedly, for one reason or another. Yet practically everyone else — including those who initially pushed for and/or continue to tout sanctions on Iran — appear to disagree, while Iran hasn’t budged from its previous negotiating stance.
Sanctions probably won’t work, argues Clifford May, president of the neoconservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies — possibly the most effective DC-based advocate of “crippling sanctions” on Iran — while pushing for ongoing sanctions. (This is also a great example of the supporting logic used by hardline sanctions advocates):
[Sanctions on Iran] are unlikely to succeed — if success is defined as stopping the regime’s rulers from developing nuclear weapons — yet they are an essential component of any serious and strategic policy mix.
And why are sanctions on Iran “essential”, according to May?
Sanctions may be most useful after a strike against Iran’s nuclear-weapons facilities. At that point, American and other Western diplomats will need all the leverage they can get. Their job will be to insist that Iran’s rulers verifiably end the nuclear-weapons program, halt terrorism sponsorship, and ease domestic oppression. In return: no further damage and the sanctions lifted. If such an agreement can be reached, the conflict will be over, cooperation can begin, and the people of Iran will soon be more free and prosperous, while Iran’s neighbors will sleep more soundly. If such an agreement cannot be reached, continuing and even tightening sanctions will make it more difficult for Iran to replace facilities destroyed after a military option has been exercised.
Now on to Israel’s former foreign minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, who notes that the kind of sanctions that Iran is currently enduring will likely only harden its leaders’ alleged nuclear drive:
Yes, a harsh sanctions regime might still gain additional supporters, but an Iran with its back against the wall would probably be even more obstinate in its nuclear drive. After all, Iraq was an easy target in the first Gulf War precisely because it had abandoned its nuclear program, and possessed no weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi exposed himself to a NATO onslaught by relinquishing his WMDs.
Virginia tech economist and Lobe Log contributor Djavad Salehi-Isfahani argued in October 2012 that the current sanctions regime — and the Ahmadinejad government’s response to it — could harm Iran’s middle/upper classes (otherwise natural allies of the West), and judging by recent reports, he’s probably right.
The counterproductive effects of sanctions have compelled several experts to point out that the so-called “tool” can only be effective if it’s accompanied with the very real possibility of significant relief. Paul Pillar’s thoughts on Congress’ apparently unquenchable thirst for sanctioning Iran back in December 2012 still apply today, a week after members of the Senate and House introduced more legislation that’s unlikely to positively impact the diplomatic process with Iran:
It should be clear from the history of the past couple of years, as well as a little thought about incentives for Iranian policymakers, that simply piling on still more sanctions without more Western flexibility at the negotiating table will not attain the U.S. objective. The sanctions are hurting Iran and are a major reason Iran wants to negotiate a deal. But the Iranians have dismissed the only sanctions relief that has been offered so far as peanuts, which it is. They have no reason to make significant concessions if they don’t think they will be getting anything significant in return. If members of Congress were really interested in inducing changes in Iran’s policy and behavior, they would be devoting as much time and energy to asking why the powers negotiating with Iran evidently do not intend to depart much from their failed negotiating formulas of the past as they would in trying to find some new sanction to impose.
(On Friday Pillar elaborated on how elements of the Israel lobby in the US and Congress are sustaining Iran’s alleged nuclear drive.)
An here’s the essence of a major report on the effects and results of sanctions on Iran released by the International Crisis Group last week:
…rather than adjusting its nuclear policy to remove the sanctions, the [Iranian] regime likely will continue to adjust its economic policy to adapt to them. While important regime constituencies have been harmed by international penalties, not all of them have been harmed equally, and some not at all. Evidence suggests that groups with superior contacts to the state have been able to circumvent sanctions and minimise damage to their interests. Average citizens, by contrast, suffer the effects: reports of widespread shortages, notably of specialised medicines, abound.
Moreover, sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy are only as effective as the prospect of relieving them in exchange for policy shifts is real. Yet, sanctions on Iran have become so extensive and so intricately woven that it will be hard to offer significant, concrete relief short of a major – and improbable – turnaround in major aspects of the Islamic Republic’s domestic and foreign policies. That, in addition to considerable mutual mistrust, leaves as the best case outcome for now a time-limited (albeit renewable) suspension or waiver of some sanctions by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) in exchange for time-limited (albeit renewable) Iranian steps providing reassurance as to the program’s peaceful intent.
All this seems to suggest that a) sanctions aren’t working if the goal is to persuade Iran to agree to Western demands on its nuclear program; and b) the Obama administration’s Iran policy is incoherent.
Not necessarily, argued Iran scholar Farideh Farhi, here on Lobe Log last year:
The US’ Iran policy cannot be considered incoherent if the policy objectives and the instruments have become the same. It can still be considered immoral for trying to add to the economic woes of a good part of the Iranian population – irrespective of the fact that the Iranian government is most responsible for those economic woes – particularly at a time when so many people in the world are already suffering from unemployment and economic downturn. But it is not incoherent. It is intended to harass and it is doing so in a calculated and now rather routine, bureaucratic way. Weaning from routines and habits will be hard.
Iranian and Western officials expressed cautious optimism after talks with Iran concluded in Almaty, Kazakhstan last week with reports of moderate sanctions relief being offered by the 6 world-powers P5+1 negotiating team. But only moderate sanctions relief is unlikely to get the Iranians — who will reportedly respond to the offer during the next two months — to budge significantly. Mohammad Ali Shabani, an Oxford University PhD student with a solid understanding of the Iranian perspective, explained why in Al-Monitor on February 28. His conclusion is pertinent ahead of the March/April meetings:
Considering the lack of reciprocity, the upcoming Iranian presidential elections and the mere fact that Jalili’s team only listened in Kazakhstan, it would be wise to refrain from expecting a breakthrough in the near future. What would be wise is to appreciate the consensual desire to turn the talks from events into a real diplomatic process, as well as the time needed to bridge the wide gulf between Iran and the P5+1’s positions. Most importantly, it is crucial that all sides show the political will to move forward — and recognize that more than one party may be pursuing a dual-track policy.
Photo: The 19 September 2012 meeting of EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Dr. Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in Istanbul, Turkey. (Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS)
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
The annual Israel-Congress orgy dubbed as the AIPAC Policy Conference kicked off today. It might just as well be called the War on Iran conference — that’s sure to be the issue that dominates the proceedings. The US-Israel relationship is taking the second spot. And the Palestinians? More [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
The annual Israel-Congress orgy dubbed as the AIPAC Policy Conference kicked off today. It might just as well be called the War on Iran conference — that’s sure to be the issue that dominates the proceedings. The US-Israel relationship is taking the second spot. And the Palestinians? More than ever before, they will be invisible.
There are a few sessions at the conference that deal with Israel’s occupation of the West Bank in very general terms. But Iran will be the focus, as evidenced by related bills which AIPAC had some of its most loyal members of Congress introduce in advance of their lobbying day. Those bills work to give Israel a green light to attack Iran if it feels the need to and puts the “special relationship” between the US and Israel on paper.
Last week a Senate resolution was introduced by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ). The two senators are widely known as AIPAC favorites and have led bipartisan actions like this in the past, working with AIPAC quite closely to develop legislation favorable to the lobbying organization. The resolution states that if Israel decides to launch a pre-emptive strike on Iran to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon, this would be considered an act of self-defense and that “…the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel…”
The bill is a “sense of Congress” resolution, so it is not binding; hence the word “should” rather than “will” is used. Still, it is a very clear expression that the Senate expects and desires that President Obama provide a full range of support to Israel in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran. It certainly sends a signal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he will have Congress behind him if Obama tries to restrain Israel from taking such a step. While the bill’s wording clarifies that it should not be understood as a declaration of war in the event of an Israeli attack, a commitment to military support of Israel in the event of a purely Israeli decision to attack Iran could well amount to the same thing.
The timing of the bill should not be ignored. AIPAC consistently tries to get its most important legislation to the congressional floor ahead of its conference and especially its “lobbying day,” when thousands of AIPAC activists descend upon Capitol Hill, armed with its marching orders. The timing demonstrates AIPAC’s priorities, and it’s not coincidental that this bill comes on the heels of a rare moment of small hope in negotiations between the P5+1 (the US, France, England, Russia, China and Germany) and Iran.
In their recent meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, the P5+1 reduced some of their demands and offered some relief from sanctions in exchange for Iranian compliance. This was met with a positive response from Iran. Trita Parsi, prominent expert on Iran and the head of the National Iranian American Council, offered cautious optimism: “Though the gap between the two sides is still wide, the fact that two additional meetings were scheduled without any Iranian foot-dragging – in the midst of the Iranian holiday season mind you – may also signal increased seriousness.”
AIPAC would be unlikely to view the P5+1′s reported offer favorably, as it allows Iran to keep a certain amount of its 20% enriched uranium to fuel a research reactor and backs off a demand to close the nuclear plant at Fordow, demanding only that work there be suspended. AIPAC would surely view these moderations as risky for Israel. So, a provocative resolution was introduced in Congress. AIPAC is likely even more aware than many of its congressional allies that probably at least some in Tehran will not pick up on the nuance that this resolution is non-binding. If the resolution is interpreted by Iran as demonstrating that the US is not serious about finding a negotiated resolution to the nuclear standoff, it will surely serve as further incentive for Iran to redouble its nuclear efforts.
But AIPAC has never favored negotiations, always leaning toward militant stances, military threats and ever more devastating sanctions. More of the same can be expected at their conference, with the many members of Congress, from both parties, who will be speaking, attending and parroting the AIPAC line.
In the House of Representatives, another AIPAC-backed bill would impose still tighter sanctions on Iran. Both the Senate and House resolutions also include language that seeks to change US policy from being dedicated to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon to preventing Iran from acquiring the capability to build such a weapon. The two thresholds are very different, and the latter is a point that Iran has probably already passed. Such a policy would provide the justification for war at any time.
AIPAC’s legislative agenda is not limited to Iran. The agenda regarding Israel strongly reflects the current situation, both in what it says and what it does not.
The entire Palestinian issue is being buried, and this fits well with the direction Israel itself is taking. As I explained elsewhere, whatever governing coalition Benjamin Netanyahu assembles, both it and the opposition will be dominated by parties that either outright oppose a Palestinian state or are in favor of returning to endless and fruitless negotiations. Thus AIPAC completely mutes the issue. But they are pushing legislation regarding the US-Israel relationship, an emphasis that at least partially reflects the recent battle over Chuck Hagel’s confirmation as Secretary of Defense.
AIPAC knew early on that Hagel’s confirmation was inevitable, so it dropped out of the fight almost as soon as it began. One of their great strengths is their keen ability to pick their battles. Instead they allowed the partisan Republican and extremist groups, like the Emergency Committee for Israel, to take on the Hagel nomination. Both Elliott Abrams and ECI’s founder Bill Kristol said that Hagel was “weakened” by the whole affair.
AIPAC was less than keen on Hagel because he is comparatively reluctant to go to war with Iran and because he has been outspoken about the pressure AIPAC exerts on the Hill. He also considers it his duty to serve the United States before Israel. The bills discussed above are intended to narrow the political options on Iran for the President and his new cabinet. Others are intended to legislatively solidify the special relationship between Israel and the United States which AIPAC fears might have been weakened in recent years by the attention they brought to their Israel-first advocacy.
Another bill introduced to the House would designate Israel as a “major strategic ally.” That designation is unprecedented and could mean just about anything, but it would allow Israel to enjoy some unique status in its relationship with the US. Of course, it already does, but there has never been a formal, legislative statement to that effect. The bipartisan bill is sponsored by two good friends of AIPAC, Ed Royce (R-CA) and Eliot Engel (D-NY). It broadens sanctions on Iran and designates Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization.
Much of the impetus for this bill comes from the sequester and is intended to help ensure that funding for Israel is not threatened by the automatic budget cuts (and never mind that aid to US citizens might be considered by most in the US as a higher priority than aid to Israel). It also includes wording that works to separate aid to Israel from all other foreign aid, so that going forward, threats to general foreign aid would not include Israel, which is the largest recipient of such aid.
But there is also what I’d call the Hagel Factor. Knowing that they were not going to be able to stop the President from appointing the Defense Secretary he wanted, AIPAC has worked to ensure that ideas concerning them about Hagel on Iran and on the special US-Israel relationship will be blunted. Accordingly, the next three days will evolve around the imminent threat Iran poses (including at least the insinuation of a nuclear attack intended to wipe out the Jews), the importance of safeguarding the shared values between the US and Israel, and all the wonderful things Israel provides for the US. Though don’t expect too many specifics on that last point.
]]>by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
Four months after the collapse of the rial earlier this fall, Iran’s economy is still reeling from its effects. The rial lost 40% of its value in one week late last September, succumbing to accumulating pressures from free spending by the Ahmadinejad government, overvaluation caused by years of [...]]]>
by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
Four months after the collapse of the rial earlier this fall, Iran’s economy is still reeling from its effects. The rial lost 40% of its value in one week late last September, succumbing to accumulating pressures from free spending by the Ahmadinejad government, overvaluation caused by years of booming oil revenues, and international sanctions.
Financial sanctions imposed by the United States against third-party countries that trade with Iran have seriously disrupted Iran’s international trade, reducing its ability to sell its oil or spend the revenues from what it can sell. Sanctions have inflicted enormous pain on millions of Iranians, who have watched the boom of the last decade deteriorate into stagnation, inflation triple and critical items such as medicine disappear from stores. Iranians are meanwhile unsure who to blame, those who have imposed the collective punishment or their own government.
For the moment, there is no sign that what the West was hoping sanctions would do — soften the position of Iran’s leaders as a result of rising dissatisfaction — is actually happening. There are three reasons for this. First, the government has so far skillfully protected the poor from the worst aspects of the economic crisis. It has done so by offering cash payments (amounting to half the minimum wage for a family of four), and by keeping the price of basic necessities like food and fuel from rising as fast as inflation.
Second, those who suffer most — the salaried middle class — are least likely to pour into the streets in protest. And third, even those who believe that sanctions are the root cause of the current economic mess are not likely to ask their government to capitulate to Western demands.
Bringing inflation down and reviving investment are the two biggest challenges that the Iranian government currently faces. There are signs that inflation, after jumping to 4.5% per month (equal to an annual rate of 70%) during October and November, is coming down. Monthly inflation was 2.5% in December and fell to 1.7% in January 2013.
The moderation in inflation is no thanks to Iran’s free-spending president, whose two most important programs — cash subsidies and an expensive low-cost housing program — have been largely financed by printing money. The parliament has been trying to rein him in, and even tried to fire his Central Banker last month on a charge that he had raided the reserves of member banks, a move that had ironically helped reduce inflation.
But success in harnessing inflation will not shield the population from the worst effects of the sanctions. The government has done well in fighting them by finding alternative sources of supply for basic imports, and has successfully engaged in bilateral trade with several countries that are willing to withstand the wrath of Washington such as China, India, Turkey and Argentina, but it will have a very hard time getting private investment back on track with cumbersome arrangements for international trade.
Iran’s private sector is the main source of jobs for the country’s 20 million youth, and the only hope for its 4 million unemployed. The more realistic value of the rial after devaluation has done much to bring the productivity of these youth closer to their wages, which should boost their employment. But uncertainty surrounding the future of the dispute with the West will keep private money on the sideline and in liquid assets, waiting for a sign that normal times are about to return.
Remarks by US Vice President Joe Biden and Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi this past weekend that raised the prospects of direct talks between the US and Iran was perhaps a sign, for it immediately sent the rial up against the dollar by nearly 5% in the free market for foreign exchange. If this means that Iran’s private investors have not given up on the country’s future, it should serve as an inducement for Iranian leaders to do their best to reduce tensions with the West — even better, to resolve the nuclear standoff once and for all.
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