by Wayne White
Secretary of State John Kerry’s June 23 meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent a risky symbolic message, albeit unintended: perhaps the US could work with Maliki after all. So it was no surprise today when Maliki came out swinging with his standard litany of accusations against his [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Secretary of State John Kerry’s June 23 meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent a risky symbolic message, albeit unintended: perhaps the US could work with Maliki after all. So it was no surprise today when Maliki came out swinging with his standard litany of accusations against his political enemies, clearly determined to exploit the crisis to secure another term. If he stays on, the inclusive Iraqi political solution the White House seeks will remain elusive. The same could be said about the hopes for more speedy and successful action toward driving the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL or ISIS) out from many of its holdings in Iraq, with or without strong US air support.
Excessive alarm, impatience
The Obama administration appears driven by worse case military scenarios that continue to dominate the US media. Much of ISIS’ recent acquisitions along the Iraqi-Syrian border, although troubling, have been against the relatively easy pickings of isolated garrisons. Even before these gains, ISIS had transited the border quite easily, and along the Jordanian border ISIS faces capable Jordanian military units.
In mixed areas along its battlefront, ISIS has run into some spirited resistance from not only Kurds, but even the Sunni Arab Naqshabandi Army (Baathists & former military cadres) southwest of Iraqi Kurdistan. The refinery complex in Baiji, its isolated garrison fiercely defending it for 2 weeks, appears to have been retaken. Likewise, although ISIS took Tal Afar near the Syrian border, this occurred after government security forces had again gamely taken it back from ISIS.
Iraq’s government forces are not without some obvious fighting power, and ISIS is unlikely to make substantial inroads into the predominantly Shia south or areas held by Kurds in the north.
Kerry raising the possibility that the US might begin air strikes against ISIS prior to the creation of a “transformative” government was another misstep: Washington seems too focused on the immediate situation on the ground at the expense of the basic political and military fundamentals. Due to the size of the ISIS challenge, the latter is more important. The US should have persisted with holding Baghdad’s feet to the fire over a credibly balanced new government (near impossible with Maliki as Prime Minister).
Kerry’s extraction from Maliki of a promise to speed up government formation in Baghdad already has been twisted to Maliki’s advantage; meeting with Maliki threw the beleaguered Iraqi leader a lifeline of sorts. Previously, the White House had said everything short of Maliki must go. The pressing need to peel Sunni Arab tribes and former pre-2003 regime cadres away from ISIS hinges on Maliki’s departure, which now seems less likely. Today Maliki exploited Kerry’s call for a new government within a week by promising to do so, lamely calling for unity, but lashing out again at other Iraqi politicians, Iraq’s Kurds, and foreign countries for conspiring to create the ISIS mess.
With Maliki’s history of broken promises and abuse concerning Iraq’s Sunni Arab community, Sunni demands that Maliki must go appear non-negotiable. In fact, ISIS has been using Maliki’s continued rule among Sunnis as a rallying cry for its military campaign: a struggle to punish Maliki for his anti-Sunni misbehavior.
Keeping the Kurds in hand
The President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), Masoud Barzani, told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour this week that Maliki’s “wrong policies” brought on the crisis, and Barzani could see little hope that Iraq could “stay together” with Maliki in office. Maliki has broken promises to the Kurds too, becoming deadlocked or sparring endlessly with them over oil export and territorial issues.
Amidst the present crisis, many Kurds have also revived their calls for Iraqi Kurdish independence. Barzani said as much in his interview with CNN. Kerry pushed back against this, and a senior State Department official warned that Kurdish separation would be very damaging at this time.
Despite Kurdish dreams of walling themselves off from the ugly challenges facing Arab Iraq, this is an illusion. Kurdish independence would render the effort to oust Maliki far more difficult by taking the Kurds out of the political fight in Baghdad, as well as leaving them with many of the same security concerns from which they want to walk away.
With mainly Sunni Arabs all along their western and southern borders, an independent Kurdish Iraq would still face a long battlefront. Over the past two weeks the KRG has moved its forces into disputed areas between it and both Sunni Arabs and Shia, including the contested oil center of Kirkuk. Under the present circumstances, this was prudent to prevent a possible ISIS takeover, but it is no secret that the Kurds would like to hold onto these areas for good — unacceptable to all Arab Iraqis. Such unilateral seizures further increase the likelihood of confrontation with either ISIS or a new government in Baghdad, be it united Arab or mainly Shia.
Governmental mess in Baghdad
Maliki’s State of Law coalition scored well in the April parliamentary elections. He and his cronies will fight hard to fend off all comers, fearing, among other things, possible retribution down the line for their abuses. By retaining the Defense, National Security, and Interior portfolios, Maliki also retains the power to intimidate.
Although a Maliki government could hold Baghdad and most of the south, such a government would not create the ethno-sectarian alliances needed to drive ISIS from the bulk of its vast acquisitions elsewhere. In fact, a narrowly based Maliki government could end up resorting to the same sort of destructive, bloody and inevitably indiscriminate slog in which the Assad regime has mired itself since 2011. Hopefully, today’s Syrian airstrikes are not an ominous harbinger of things to come.
Shia elements likely opposed to a new Maliki government also maintain an important role. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani all but declared at Friday prayers last week that Maliki and his policies are bankrupt, calling upon key parliamentary blocs to produce “an effective government that enjoys broad national support, avoids past mistakes, and opens new horizons toward a better future for all Iraqis.” If Maliki is indeed unacceptable to Sistani, that could make his bid to stay a lot tougher.
Meanwhile, Muqtada al-Sadr, repeatedly at odds with Maliki (who turned US forces loose on Sadr’s Madhi Army militia in 2008) commands the most powerful Shia force capable of aiding the Iraqi army against ISIS. Sadr knows Maliki cannot be trusted and might push back by making full support from his tens of thousands of armed, fanatical followers conditional on Maliki’s departure.
One major obstacle in dumping Maliki is the lack of an obvious alternative. No other Shia leaders in Baghdad enjoy any particularly strong political or popular support.
The notion that Iran could help the US forge a new government without Maliki is misplaced. The Iranians have supported Maliki’s hostile policies toward a Sunni Arab community known to harbor profoundly anti-Iranian views reminiscent of the Saddam Hussein era. Iran also values its close relationship with Maliki. In fact, elements of the Iranian leadership might well be counting (as is Maliki) on fears related to ISIS gains eroding US patience in holding back “intense and sustained” US military support pending a more promising political lineup in Baghdad.
With Maliki determined to exploit Kerry’s request for a new government merely to press ahead with his own candidacy, the prospects for a sustained, coordinated, ground, air and political effort against ISIS looks bleak. Since Maliki’s 2010 election campaign especially, he has been the main driver in turning Iraq into the writhing ethno-sectarian snake pit we see today. A well-grounded way out of this crisis remains far from clear.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry, a State Department translator, and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pose for a photograph before beginning a meeting in Baghdad on June 23, 2014. Credit: State Department
]]>by Wayne White
President Barack Obama’s news conference today showed some well-placed White House caution against acting in ways that would support more substantially Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian agenda in Iraq. Hopefully, Obama’s repeated implicit criticism of Maliki’s government and his expressed desire for key Iraqi players to form a new [...]]]>
by Wayne White
President Barack Obama’s news conference today showed some well-placed White House caution against acting in ways that would support more substantially Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian agenda in Iraq. Hopefully, Obama’s repeated implicit criticism of Maliki’s government and his expressed desire for key Iraqi players to form a new government will raise the chances of Maliki’s ouster. Yet the announced measures do carry risks — potentially for greater US involvement with Malki & Co, and to US personnel in Iraq, the US itself, and US diplomacy aimed at defusing Sunni Arab support for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The White House correctly views Maliki’s remarks yesterday as insufficiently reflective of a genuine desire for inclusiveness. Although Maliki briefly admitted “mistakes” and called upon Sunni Arabs to abandon the extremist ISIS, he offered no meaningful concessions with which to change their minds. Instead he railed against traitorous politicians and Iraqi officers, alleged conspiracies, as well as Saudi Arabia for generating the current crisis. In fact, the key figure in setting the stage for the stunning ISIS breakout in Iraq was Maliki.
Any hands on cooperation with Iraqi units that could collapse or be partnered with vicious Shia militias would expose US troops to possible violence and more direct association with inevitable retaliatory Shia atrocities against Sunni Arabs. However, the president’s proposal involves the very real possibility of so-called “mission creep” toward even closer military involvement at the unit level.
The deployment of up to 300 more US military advisors to Iraq with their mission unclear — but apparently not merely aimed at better securing our embassy — carries risks. According to the AP, US officials say they will be embedded in teams with Iraqi forces. Thus, there may be the distinct possibility that they will be tactically very close to the action, perhaps contradicting Obama’s claim that US troops will not be involved in combat roles. Likewise, placing military personnel in joint operations centers in Baghdad and the Kurdish north brings in the danger of the US becoming more associated with Maliki’s military effort and the atrocities that will surely result.
Both actions, part of a US effort to “increase support for Iraqi security forces,” also conflict with Obama’s statement that the US would not support “one side against another” amidst Iraq’s seething ethno-sectarian divide. Ideally, both measures would have been withheld until the behavior of political leaders in Baghdad became more consistent with Washington’s vision.
Moreover, such actions (as well as the statement about supporting government security forces) not only makes ISIS more likely to target the US or Americans, but also could undermine Secretary of State John Kerry’s diplomatic mission, presumably aimed at restoring a more “stable, inclusive society” in Iraq. Indeed, countries able to communicate with Iraq’s Sunni Arab tribes and former military officers (many of the latter supporting ISIS one way or another because of anger toward Maliki) will be unhappy with Obama’s less forward-leaning military package.
Another problem is Iran. Regardless of US advisors, Tehran will have a lot more clout with the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. Iranian military advisors are already on the scene. It is unlikely those advisors — or the Iranian leadership — will be nearly as concerned as their US counterparts with avoiding sectarianism and atrocities (and association with both). Obama himself underscored Iran’s differences with the US concerning Washington’s hope for a less inflamed sectarian environment in the region, suggesting Iran would not shift such positions when he said “Old habits die hard.”
The most refreshing aspects of Obama’s remarks today were his repeated statements implicitly calling for Maliki’s removal. His assertion that “we don’t have” an inclusive government that Sunni Arabs can trust to serve their interests and noting of doubts among other Iraqi leaders are revealing in that respect. Obama’s call for Iraq’s parliament to form a unity government at a time when the makeup of Iraq’s post-election political lineup is still pending, as well as deeming the need for change a “test” for Iraq’s leadership, also says everything short of: “Maliki needs to go.”
NBC’s leading Foreign Correspondent Richard Engel reported before Obama’s remarks that NBC had received word of ongoing consultations regarding the government in Najaf (where influential Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani resides). Obama also mentioned questions among some Iraqi leaders in Baghdad, suggesting the US has information of possible maneuvering against Maliki. It could be that Obama’s decision to withhold airstrikes and more lower-level US military guidance might embolden Iraqi leaders yearning for greater American involvement to attempt dumping Maliki.
All told, Obama’s decision is a mixed bag, but remains relatively cautious. Hewing to such a stance in the face of intense pressure from critics on Capitol Hill and those hyping the immediate ISIS threat to the US (the latter noted in my June 14 analysis) was difficult. Let us hope that in the coming days and weeks President Obama has the will to resist pressures that could significantly increase the US military role in Iraq (and likewise the risk to US interests and American personnel inside Iraq).
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook