Foreign Affairs

by Wayne White

The main objective of the Russian chemical weapons (CW) initiative this week was to steer the US away from military action in Syria that might weaken the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Although Moscow also is concerned about CW falling into the hands of rebel extremists, it has less incentive [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

The main objective of the Russian chemical weapons (CW) initiative this week was to steer the US away from military action in Syria that might weaken the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Although Moscow also is concerned about CW falling into the hands of rebel extremists, it has less incentive than Washington to pressure its Syrian ally amidst the latter’s war against the Syrian opposition. While much of the world looks to Russia and the US to chart a way to achieve international goals on Syrian CW peacefully, the Russians will be working closely with Damascus in parallel to fashion the disarmament mission to the Syrian regime’s advantage. In addition to stretching out the timeline, another Russian-Syrian objective could be to use the process to create a measure of external dependence and perhaps lend some badly needed legitimacy to Syria’s discredited dictatorship.

President Vladimir Putin’s bottom line in his New York Times editorial on Thursday is highly misleading: “We are not protecting the Syrian government, but international law.” Whatever emerges concerning the issue of Syrian CW, one must bear in mind that Syria is Russia’s only remaining Middle East ally, a major market for Russian weapons, and plays host to Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base.

Although claiming to defend international law against “ineffective and pointless” American style “brute force,” Putin has done most everything to assist the Assad regime’s widespread, often indiscriminate use of just that (reducing much of Syria to rubble) to suppress what was initially a reform movement, while opposing any use of force to punish the regime for what increasingly appears to have been a major violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical warfare. Finally, much of Putin’s rhetoric revolves around the extremist threat posed by the rebels, while skirting references to the Syrian regime’s own extensive barbarity. In fact, the regime’s ruthless repression since 2011 played a key role in driving many rebels toward greater radicalization.

The complex process of accessing, accounting for, seizing, and eliminating Syria’s huge CW arsenal might well be exploited by Damascus to assist its own cause against the rebels. The work at various CW sites, the sequencing of such access, as well as the inspectors’ need to move around other areas of the country to make sure CW has not been hidden elsewhere could be used to demand that the rebels cease fighting across broad stretches of territory (potentially providing any regime personnel accompanying the inspectors opportunities to collect information on rebel deployments). A telling signal of Putin’s desire to give the regime as much maneuvering room as possible in all this was Moscow’s immediate rejection of France’s proposal to include in the relevant UN Security Council resolution a tough enforcement clause.

Just the amount of time required to catalogue, transport and dispose of Syria’s CW arsenal (possibly years) is likely to provide the regime with respites it could exploit to revive its battered military. Meanwhile, to weaken the rebels, Assad might argue, for example, that all lethal aid to them (on the part of the US, reportedly just getting under way) cease, or demand certain local rebel withdrawals to supposedly facilitate the work of the inspectors. During this lengthy process, Assad could at times halt cooperation unless his demands are met (such as his latest: the US must renounce any potential use of force against his regime). Absent a tough enforcement mechanism, the international community would have little clout with which to push back via the UN.

Furthermore, Assad’s agreement to sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol is no guarantee–just an opening formality. Egypt signed the protocol, but later used Mustard Gas against the side it opposed in the 1960s Yemen Civil War. Italy’s Benito Mussolini accepted the protocol during his early years in power, only to turn round abruptly in the mid-1930s and use Mustard Gas in his war against Ethiopia. Japan, also a signatory, attacked Chinese forces amidst hostilities in the 1930s with both chemical and biological weapons.

It is not surprising that even the relatively moderate Free Syrian Army (FSA) working with the West has reacted negatively to the emerging arrangement. They know all too well that Moscow has stood by the brutally repressive regime against which they have fought and are shocked to find Russia now at the head of the diplomatic table. Also, with the UN inspection report on the August 21 Damascus CW attack reportedly set for release on Monday (amidst rising evidence the regime carried out the attack), the opposition was stunned as focus abruptly shifted from punishing the Assad regime to cooperating with it on a CW arsenal the same regime previously denied it possessed. Nevertheless, any lack of cooperation on the part of the opposition would make Assad & Co. appear reasonable by comparison.

The Russian proposal, however, should be explored fully. That said, while a peaceful way out of this aspect of the Syrian conflict is preferable, all concerned must also proceed cautiously given Moscow’s stake in the Assad regime. An additional great advantage to most everyone would be to remove Syria’s CW arsenal from the battlefield so no party to the conflict could gain further access to it–neither the regime nor rebel extremists. Yet, although the current approach stems from a likely regime atrocity, if Assad agrees, for the most part, to cooperate in dismantling his CW arsenal in a timely manner, the international community could become vested in an otherwise loathsome regime for a long time as the sole guarantor of that process.

by Mitchell Plitnick

Syria’s declaration that it would accept a Russian proposal to hand over its chemical weapons to an international body was the latest in a string of surprises around international concern over the ongoing, horrific civil war in that country. It is extremely premature, at this point, to declare the [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

Syria’s declaration that it would accept a Russian proposal to hand over its chemical weapons to an international body was the latest in a string of surprises around international concern over the ongoing, horrific civil war in that country. It is extremely premature, at this point, to declare the threat of a US escalation over, but the delay this proposal produced does go a long way toward lowering the heat on the crisis and, at minimum, stretching the timetable.

President Obama’s willingness to bring this idea to the U.N. Security Council opens the door to averting a U.S. strike and pushes back the likely strike date and a congressional vote on Obama’s decision. That has led to a collective sigh of relief, at least for the moment, throughout the country. And nowhere has that sound been louder than in the offices of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

The debate has been a difficult one in Washington. A hawkish minority see striking Syria as a necessary deterrent, both to Bashar al-Assad reusing chemical weapons and emboldening Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, a decision hawks think will be influenced by a perception that the U.S. is so reluctant to get involved in another military escapade that it will not back up threats of using force. That’s what is meant by “protecting U.S. credibility.” But the majority of the U.S. public and, at least for the time being, the House of Representatives seems to be opposed to Obama’s idea of hitting Syria.

In one of a series of surprises around this issue, AIPAC publicly dove in to the Syria debate in DC, and faced the most daunting challenge they had in many years. One of the things that gives AIPAC its air of invincibility is their astounding record of success on Capitol Hill. One of the reasons they have that record is that they rarely get into fights they are not sure they are going to win. This one was far from that.

A vote held immediately after the president announced he was going to request authorization from Congress would have likely been unsuccessful. Some, myself included, believed that a full court press by the president combined with hard lobbying by AIPAC and the Saudis would, over the course of time, sway enough votes to give the president what he wanted. I’m pretty sure the Senate, in any case, will support Obama. The House is certainly more questionable.

If the vote in either chamber went against the president, it would mean an unprecedented loss for AIPAC. They’ve lost before, but never when they were working with, rather than against, the president of the United States. That they got involved with such an iffy proposition can only be explained by an Israeli desire to see Obama win this one, but also for the Israeli government itself — which, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced unprecedented criticism for interfering in U.S. politics — to remain distant from the debate. In a most unusual development, it is Obama who keeps talking about Israel being a factor in his decision. AIPAC has adamantly refused to name Israeli concerns as a reason for their support of an attack on Syria.

Chemi Shalev, the very sharp Washington correspondent for the Israeli daily Ha’aretz wrote:

If AIPAC goes ‘all out,’ as Politico reported on Thursday, and ‘250 Jewish leaders and AIPAC activists will storm the halls on Capitol Hill beginning next week,’ but the House of Representatives nonetheless votes against the President, then the lobby’s image of invincibility, to which it owes much of its influence, will inevitably be jeopardized.

I’m not sure AIPAC’s air of invincibility would be jeopardized so much as it might be slightly diminished, another step on the unfortunately long road to normalizing the U.S. discussion of Middle East policy.

The other, younger and more moderate side of the Israel Lobby, J Street, had its own problems with the Syria issue. Internal debate in the organization had a stymying effect and left them without a position. While some were content with no stance from the “Pro-Israel, Pro-Peace” lobbying group, their silence can hurt them in the long term on the Hill.

Long-time DC observer Ron Kampeas has it just right when he says:

One of the most effective ways for lobbyists to accrue influence on the Hill is to convey to overwhelmed congresspersons and their staffers that the lobby has the expertise to help them arrive at an informed opinion. And if in addition to expertise, your lobby has a cadre of seasoned staffers who are able to shape a lawmaker’s concerns into legislative language that is likely to attract cosponsors and even achieve passage (the golden ring for a body that passes less than five percent of its proposed legislation), then you have influence.

J Street has been able to make some headway in recent years in campaign fundraising. But they have not been able to establish themselves as a reliable source of expertise on Capitol Hill. AIPAC remains a source for expert analysis, and that has a great effect on how members of Congress and their staffers, except for those few who actually have their own expertise on the Middle East, end up voting on Middle East matters. As Kampeas says, J Street wants influence, “…and answering ‘We dunno’ on Syria is not the way to go about earning it.”

J Street bills itself as the group that “has Obama’s back.” That involves giving him political cover to exert some moderate pressure on Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians, which, to date, they really have not been able to deliver (but they’re young — AIPAC also took a good number of years to build the sort of gravitas it has). J Street can also recover from the Syria crisis, as long as it doesn’t have more incidents where its own membership and leadership are so divided on an issue that they can’t take a stance.

But AIPAC has already taken a hit by openly lobbying, and declaring that it will flex serious muscle, in support of a military action that, for better or worse, is opposed by the majority of US citizens. If the issue does come to a vote, which still seems likely, and they lose one or both congressional chambers (which I don’t think will happen, but I hold a minority view), it will be a more serious blow. That’s reinforced by the fact that not only AIPAC, but also a lot of the more mainstream Jewish groups that tend to follow it, like the American Jewish Committee and World Jewish Congress, have come out forcefully behind a strike on Syria, and continued to press the point, even after the Russian proposal.

But I don’t think this will be as damaging as either Shalev or MJ Rosenberg think it will be. There is still no significant opposition to AIPAC’s lobbying power; this question was not directly connected to Israeli policy; and the most powerful tool in AIPAC’s arsenal — the public US misunderstanding of the Middle East, the Arab world and Israel, and especially the history of the Israel-Palestine conflict — is still in place, as is the perception that AIPAC speaks for, not the Jewish community as is often argued, but Jewish donors. US Jews make up a wildly disproportionate fraction of individual political gift givers, but while some large donors like Sheldon Adelson or Haim Saban are very clear about the decisive role Israel plays in where their money goes, it is far less clear how important Israel is in broader Jewish donations, and it’s virtually certain that the issue is not as prominent as is commonly argued.

Still, just by going so public with the Syria issue, AIPAC has suffered a setback, and this has not been lost on Israelis. Leaders and opinion makers in Israel from the liberal Ha’aretz to veteran Israeli diplomats are criticizing AIPAC for their actions on Syria. It’s not a huge hit, but AIPAC will feel it. If only someone, be it J Street or another group, would just take advantage of this opportunity…

Yesterday we charted the way Secretary of State John Kerry’s seemingly off-handed answer to a question about how Syria could deter a US strike morphed into what’s now being referred to as the “Lavrov Proposal“. As far as I can [...]]]> by Jasmin Ramsey

*This post has been updated

Yesterday we charted the way Secretary of State John Kerry’s seemingly off-handed answer to a question about how Syria could deter a US strike morphed into what’s now being referred to as the “Lavrov Proposal“. As far as I can tell, it was Kerry’s predecessor Hillary Clinton who first publicly described the proposal for Syria to turn in its chemical weapons to international monitors as a US-Russian initiative (before she talked about endangered wildlife), rather than Russia seizing upon a US slip of the tongue, which is what it really looked liked. Well, while the proposal was actually first brought up by then-Senator Richard G. Lugar a little over a year ago, more people are now pushing the notion that Kerry’s gaffe wasn’t one at all, including the Secretary of State himself. Kerry provided his description of what went down on Monday during his remarks at the House Armed Services Committee today (emphasis mine):

Yesterday, we challenged the regime to turn them over to the secure control of the international community so that they could be destroyed. And that, of course, would be the ultimate way to degrade and deter Assad’s arsenal, and it is the ideal weapon – ideal way to take this weapon away from him.

This is how Kerry “challenged” Bashar al-Assad to hand over his chemical weapons:

Kerry continued that Russia “responded” to his challenge by saying they would come up with a proposal and that President Barack Obama would take a “hard look” at it if it was produced within a limited time. (Interestingly, the President hasn’t ruled it out.) Kerry also argued something we’re hearing over and over again now: this potentially good outcome would not have been possible without a credible threat of US military force.

After Kerry announced this US “challenge” in London during the question/answer period of a press briefing and Russia announced it had a proposal within a few hours, former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Philip J. Crowley tweeted why this could be a life preserver for Obama:

#Putin just offered #Obama a lifeboat, a diplomatic solution that allows the postponement of a vote on military action he may well lose.

— Philip J. Crowley (@PJCrowley) September 9, 2013

#Obama gains from the #Russian offer. If #Assad gives up the weapons, problem solved. If not, it strengthens the case for military action.

— Philip J. Crowley (@PJCrowley) September 9, 2013

Today, former New York Times executive editor Bill Keller repeated some of Crowley’s arguments while arguing that Kerry did not act as a “careless pawn”:

I’m told by a senior administration official that Kerry’s comment was not as offhanded as it seemed. According to this official, Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, first discussed the idea back in the spring. They returned to it more seriously last week, and Putin and Obama talked about it in at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg. The official said the administration sees the danger that the Russians or the U.N. will make it a delaying tactic, but that “in Kerry’s mind and in the President’s mind, it can be a win-win:” either you disarm Syria of its chemical weapons quickly and verifiably, or by exhausting a credible diplomatic option you win support for tougher measures against the Assad regime.

Of course, that still doesn’t explain why this alleged US challenge was presented only after Kerry was prompted with a question from a CBS reporter and why the State Department initially categorically denied that Kerry had made a proposal. Here’s a reminder of yesterday’s Daily Press Briefing with Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf (emphasis mine):

QUESTION: — did not make this statement until after he found about what the Secretary had said.

MS. HARF: Mm-hmm. But the Secretary was not making a proposal. The Secretary was making a –

QUESTION: How is that? Go ahead.

MS. HARF: Thank you. The Secretary was making a rhetorical statement and you read the whole quote, which I actually appreciate you doing. Look, he’s not about to do this. That was – that’s what the –

*Update: Al-Monitor also reports that this proposal was in the making before Kerry’s comments on Monday. It still seems like Kerry at least jumped the gun, which is understandable, considering that he’s probably been going on less than 3 hours of sleep. In any case, here’s why all of this could unfortunately be going nowhere.

by Mark N. Katz

Why has Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made his dramatic proposal for the Syrian government to not only put its chemical weapons under international control, but also destroy them? There are two possibilities.

This could be a Russian attempt to avert the US military strike on Syria that [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mark N. Katz

Why has Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made his dramatic proposal for the Syrian government to not only put its chemical weapons under international control, but also destroy them? There are two possibilities.

This could be a Russian attempt to avert the US military strike on Syria that President Obama called for in response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons against so many of its own citizens on Aug. 21. Fully understanding that support for such a move is weak within Congress, among America’s allies, and in Western public opinion, Moscow hopes that its diplomatic initiative will prevent a strike that would weaken the Assad regime’s ability to defeat its opponents with conventional weapons.

In light of both Soviet and post-Soviet Russian diplomatic efforts, the chance that such cynical motives underlie Lavrov’s initiative cannot be ruled out. But there is another possibility. Considering that Moscow has heretofore denied that Damascus has or ever would use chemical weapons, Lavrov’s proposal could be seen as a stark warning to Assad: either surrender your chemical weapons to international control and destruction, or Moscow will do nothing to defend you against an American strike.

The truth is that these two possible motives are not mutually exclusive. Russia could be simultaneously trying to rally forces in the West wishing to prevent a strike and warning Damascus that its use of chemical weapons last month went too far — even for Moscow.

One thing, though, is certain: Lavrov only made this proposal because Obama has issued a credible threat to strike Syria.

Bashar al-Assad may have accepted the Lavrov proposal because he understands that Saddam Hussein’s non-compliance with the UN Security Council’s weapons of mass destruction inspection program in 2002-03 was seized upon by the Bush administration as justification for a US-led invasion. It is doubtful, though, that Assad will give up his chemical weapons even at Moscow’s behest if he does not feel the threat of a debilitating American attack (even if it’s not an outright invasion).

The immediate reaction of both the Senate and President Obama to the Lavrov proposal has been talk of delaying any such attack — which is exactly what Moscow and Damascus wanted. For the US to incentivize Assad to actually surrender his chemical weapons Washington must maintain the threat of a large-scale attack against him unless Assad complies immediately.