by Emile Nakhleh
The international media is currently mesmerized by the advance of Daesh (ISIS or ISIL) on the Syrian city of Kobani near the Turkish border, but Arab states and the US need to look beyond Kobani’s fate and Daesh’s territorial successes and defeats. The crumbling Levant poses a greater danger than Daesh and must be addressed—first and foremost by the states of the region.
The British colonial term, Levant, encompasses modern-day Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine, with a total population of over 70 million people. The population—mostly young, unemployed or underemployed, poor, and inadequately educated—has lost trust in its leaders and the governing elites.
The Levant has become a bloody playground for other states in the greater Middle East, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Iran, and Turkey. While dislocations in the Levant could be contained, the regional states’ involvement has transformed the area into an international nightmare. The resulting instability will impact the region for years to come regardless of Daesh’s short-term fortunes.
The Levantine state has become marginalized and ineffectual in charting a hopeful future for its people, who are drifting away from nationalist ideologies toward more divisive, localized, and often violent manifestations of identity politics. National political identity, with which citizens in the Levant have identified for decades, has devolved mostly into tribal, ethnic, geographic, and sectarian identities.
The crumbling state structure and authority gave rise to these identities, thereby fueling the current conflicts, which in turn are undermining the very existence of the Levantine state.
The three key non-state actors—Daesh, Hezbollah, and Hamas—have been the beneficiaries of the crumbling states, which were drawn up by colonial cartographer-politicians a century ago.
Although the so-called deep security state has been able to maintain a semblance of order around the national capital, the state’s control of territories beyond the capital is fading and is rapidly being contested by non-state actors.
This phenomenon is readily apparent in Baghdad, Damascus, Ramallah, and Gaza, partially so in Beirut, and less so in Amman. Salafi groups, however, are lurking in the background in Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine ready to challenge state authority whenever they sense a power vacuum.
Political systems in the Levant are often propped up by domestic ruling elites, regional states, and foreign powers for a variety of parochial and transnational interests. More and more, these ruling structures appear to be relics of the past. A key analytic question thus presents itself: How long would they survive if outside economic, military and political support dries up?
Levant regimes comprise a monarchy in Jordan; a perennially dysfunctional parliamentary/presidential system in Lebanon; a brutal, teetering dictatorship in Syria; an autocratic presidency in Palestine; and an erratic partisan democracy in Iraq. They have subsisted on so-called rentier or “rent” economies—oil in Iraq, with the rest dependent on foreign aid. Providers of such aid have included Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Iran, Turkey, the United States, the EU, Russia, and others.
Corruption is rampant across most state institutions in the Levant, including the military and the key financial and banking systems. For example, billions of dollars in US aid to Iraq following the 2003 invasion have not been accounted for. According to the New York Times, American investigators in the past decade have traced huge sums of this money to a bunker in Lebanon.
The collapse of the Levant states in the next decade is not unthinkable. Their borders are already becoming more blurred and porous. The decaying environment is allowing violent groups to operate more freely within states and across state boundaries. Daesh is causing havoc in Iraq and Syria and potentially could destabilize Jordan and Lebanon precisely because the Levantine state is on the verge of collapse.
As these states weaken, regional powers—especially Saudi Arabia plus some of its GCC junior partners, Iran, and Egypt—will find it convenient to engage in proxy sectarian and ethnic wars through jihadist and other vigilante mercenaries.
Equally disturbing is that US policy toward a post-Daesh Levant seems rudderless without a strategic compass to guide it. It’s as if US policymakers have no stomach to focus on the “morning after” despite the fact that the airstrikes are proving ineffective in halting Daesh’s territorial advances.
Kobani aside, what should the Arab states and the United States do about the future of the Levant?
1) Iraq. If the Sunnis and Kurds are to be represented across all state institutions in Iraq, regional states with Washington’s help should urge Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to complete the formation of his new government on the basis of equity and fairness. Government and semi-public institutions and agencies must be made accountable and transparent and subject to scrutiny by domestic and international regulatory bodies. Otherwise, Iraq would remain a breeding ground for terrorists and jihadists.
2) Syria. If Washington remains committed to President Bashar al-Assad’s removal, it should end its Russian roulette charade toward the Syrian dictator. Ankara’s view that Assad is more dangerous in the long run than Daesh is convincing and should be accepted and acted upon.
If removing Assad remains a serious policy objective, is the US-led coalition contemplating the implementation of a no-fly zone and a security zone on Syria’s northern border any time soon to facilitate Assad’s downfall?
3) Lebanon. If Hezbollah and other political parties do not play a constructive role in re-establishing political dialogue and stability in Lebanon, it won’t be long before the Daesh wars enter the country. Are there regional and international pressures being put on Hezbollah to end its support of Assad and disengage from fighting in Syria?
The upcoming presidential election would be a useful barometer to assess the key Lebanese stakeholders’ commitment to long-term stability. If no candidate wins a majority, does Washington, in conjunction with its Arab allies, have a clear plan to get the Lebanese parliament to vote for a president?
Unless Lebanon gets its political house in order, religious sectarianism could yet again rear its ugly head in that fragile state and tear the country apart.
4) Palestine. If the Obama administration urges Israel to facilitate a working environment for the Palestinian national unity government, to end its siege of Gaza, and dismantle its 47-year occupation, Palestine would no longer be an incubator of radical ideologies.
An occupied population living in poverty, unemployment, alienation, repression, daily humiliation and hopelessness, and ruled by a corrupt regime is rarely prone to moderation and peaceful dialogue. On the contrary, such a population offers fertile recruiting ground for extremism.
5) Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is in the United States’ interest to engage Iran and Saudi Arabia—the two countries that seem to meddle most in the Levant—in order to stop their proxy wars in the region. These sectarian wars could easily lead to an all-out military confrontation, which would surely suck in the US and other Western powers. Israel would not be able to escape such a conflict either.
The Saudi government claims that it opposes Daesh. Yet one would ask: Why hasn’t the Saudi clerical establishment denounced—forcefully and publicly—Daesh’s ideology and rejected the so-called Islamic State Caliphate? Why is it that thousands of Daesh-jihadists are from Saudi Arabia and neighboring Gulf countries?
6) Development. Since Levant countries face high unemployment, it’s imperative to pursue serious job creation initiatives. Arab states, with Washington’s support, should begin massive technical and vocational education programs and entrepreneurial initiatives in the Levant countries. Young men and women should be trained in vocational institutes, much like the two-year college concept in the United States.
Vocational fields that suffer from shortages in Levant countries include plumbing, carpentry, home construction, electricity, welding, mechanics, automotive services, truck driving, computers and electronics, health services, hotels and tourism, technology management, and TV and computer repairs. Services in these fields are badly needed. But thousands of young men and women have yet to be trained to fulfill these needs.
In addition to vocational training, wealthy Arab countries should help the Levant establish funds for entrepreneurial, job-creation initiatives, and start-ups. A partnership between government and the private sector, with support from the US and other developed countries, could be the engine that drives a new era of job creation and economic growth in the region where the Daesh cancer is metastasizing.
Let’s be clear, the United States has significant leverage to help implement these policies should American leaders decide to do so. Yet one could ask why the US should make such a commitment. If Daesh is primarily a threat to Levantine countries, why can’t they deal with it? These are fair questions but, as we have discovered with Ebola, what happens in Liberia doesn’t stay in Liberia. A crumbling Levant will have ramifications not just for the region but for the United States and the rest of the world as well.
]]>That Iran is deeply concerned with the civil war in Syria and is currently providing important assistance to President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is not in question. What remains to be determined, however, is the form that its intervention — which has grown significantly over the past decade — is taking, its extent, [...]]]>
That Iran is deeply concerned with the civil war in Syria and is currently providing important assistance to President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is not in question. What remains to be determined, however, is the form that its intervention — which has grown significantly over the past decade — is taking, its extent, impact, and, ultimately, its prospects for shaping developments in the Levant.
In its 43-page report released this month, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and its close collaborator, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), try to come up with some answers to these questions, arguing, predictably, that Tehran’s ability to project its power in the region – based on its strategic alliance with Syria, as well as those with its Iraqi and Lebanese proteges – would be sharply diminished in the event of Assad’s defeat. And while the authors of “Iranian Strategy in Syria” agree that Tehran is already pursuing a “hedging strategy” designed to maintain its Alawite and Shi’a allies in control of key parts of the country for as long as possible if indeed Assad should fall, they conclude that “over the long term, Iranian influence in the Levant is likely to continue waning as ground is lost.”
Iran is certainly well aware that the loss of Syria will significantly degrade its ability to project power in the Levant and will plan for such a contingency. In order to compensate for this loss and continue to present an effective deterrent, Iran may look to expand its activities in other countries and regions.
While a priori a reasonable conclusion, close scrutiny of the premises and evidence on which the study is based suggests a number of problems with its analysis.
First, while densely footnoted, the report depends far too heavily on uncertain data, unconfirmed facts, and interpretations of events that conveniently fit certain narratives that are based more on speculation than on reliable information. Though reliable information is indeed very difficult to come by under current circumstances, the authors could have strengthened their analysis by conducting more thorough research of local and regional media that have provided much serious and credible material on the subject. As it is, the authors’ over-reliance on U.S. Treasury reports and briefings, combined with the fact that the relatively few local sources cited in the study suffer either from well-known political bias or serious inaccuracies, stands out, as does the dearth of references to credible Iranian and Arab – particularly Lebanese, Iraqi, and Syrian – sources. Indeed, the relatively narrow range from which the study’s main sources are drawn, as well as the uncertainty of the “facts” on which it relies, effectively undercuts the rather sweeping conclusions it reaches and prevents the authors from considering alternative scenarios beyond those they assert with great confidence.
In some cases, the authors make assertions that cry out for rectification. For example, the report states that the Lebanese Hezbollah, at Tehran’s behest, is directly assisting the Syrian regime in different areas of the country. A battalion of al-Muqawama al-Islamiya fi Lubnan, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon (Hezbollah’s mother military organization) did indeed lend a hand in defending the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in February 2012 when the IRGC’s base at Zabadani came under attack by rebel forces. But this incident should be seen as a local, precise, and reactive intervention by Hezbollah that was limited to the purpose of protecting a strategic Iranian camp in distress and had nothing to do with supporting the Syrian regular army or the regime, as argued by the report.
Similarly, the report’s description of the situation at Maqam al-Sayyida Zeinab, the Shi’a holy shrine, in Damascus – specifically, that it is under the protection of an Iranian-led mixed battalion of Syrian Alawi fighters, Hezbollah members, and militants of Iraq’s ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq – conflicts with numerous local reports. The presence of the Abou al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade proves that Tehran is fighting with the regime in the Syrian capital, according to the report which cites the brigade’s Facebook page as its source for this “fact.” But it appears that the authors never examined the brigade’s FB page on their own, relying on the claims of a secondary source. Had they themselves studied the page, they would know that the purported Hezbollah members of the brigade in fact belong to AMAL, another Lebanese Shiite party which the United States has long considered a more moderate representative of the Lebanese Shi’a community with which Washington can do and has done business over the years.
Moreover, a review of the page’s content strongly suggests that the constitution of the brigade was more probably the result of personal initiatives by concerned Shiites around the region than it was a centrally organised recruitment effort by Iran. Indeed, the FB page offers no evidence of an Iranian hand at all. It does not appear to have occurred to the report’s authors that Arab Shiites would spontaneously volunteer to defend a holy shrine without any prompting from Tehran. Yet such a scenario is quite possible in light of the repeated threats by jihadist Sunni groups in the Syrian opposition to demolish it.
The report’s treatment of Hezbollah’s presence in northeastern Syria similarly fails to tell the whole story, accepting, as it appears to do, without providing critical context the opposition narrative that it amounts to a “military intervention [by Hezbollah] …in full coordination with the Assad regime.”
As noted by the report itself, the border in the region of al-Qusayr, the focus of the most recent fighting, has never been officially demarcated. As a result, about three dozen villages inhabited by some 30,000 mainly Shia Lebanese are located in Syrian territory. As early as last fall, both the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra began issuing threats — amply covered in Arab media — against these predominantly Shia villages for their alleged support of Hezbollah, which, in the increasingly sectarian language that has come to dominate the civil war, they referred to Hizb al-Shaytan, or the Party of the Devil. Skirmishes subsequently broke out within Lebanon between the Lebanese Army and Syrian rebel forces, including the FSA whose redoubts in Lebanese territory were also shelled occasionally by Syrian forces from the Syrian side of the border.
When the inhabitants of al-Qusayr – that is, Lebanese Shia living in Syria – came under repeated attack by groups of Sunni rebels, however, neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese armies came to their defense. As a result, they organized their own self-defense forces, called al-Lijan al-shaabiyya, or Popular Committees. Thus, the first Hezbollah fighters who died there did not belong to battalions sent by the central Hezbollah organization in Beirut to defend Assad’s regime as alleged in the report. They were members of local militias that had mobilized to defend their communities that had come under attack by the FSA and Sunni jihadist groups for being Shia and hence, presumably, pro-Assad.
In the wake of an intensification of attacks by the jihadist groups (including the now-infamous al-Farouq Brigade one of whose commanders was more recently video-taped cutting out the heart and lung of a dead regime soldier), the situation in the area has changed rather dramatically over the last few weeks, as Hezbollah in Lebanon decided to dispatch volunteers to fight alongside their Lebanese Shiite brothers in al-Qusayr. The Syrian army also joined the fight this month to help create a common secure area for both Shia and the regime’s Syrian supporters in the northwest. In any event, however, the creation of the Shiite self-defense forces in the area had nothing to do with the defense of Assad or, for that matter, the protection of Iranian strategic interests.
Of course, it is true, as the report claims, that controlling al-Qusayr and Homs now serves the strategic interests of both Iran and Hezbollah in securing a key arms-supply route from Iran through Syrian territory and thus helping maintain Tehran’s influence in the Levant, even if that was not original impetus for the fighting there.
But controlling that area is not the only way that Iran can achieve its stategic aims in the region, a key point that the report’s authors — who express great confidence that “the Syrian conflict has already constrained Iran’s influence in the Levant, and the fall of the Assad regime would further reduce Tehran’s ability to project power” — appear to miss entirely. Indeed, there are a variety of scenarios that would permit Iran to adjust to any new distribution of power in Syria in ways that could perpetuate its influence.
For example, the authors implicitly dismiss any possibility that Tehran could reach an understanding with future leaders of Syria. Likewise, they assume that any territory freed from the regime’s control will become subject to the authority of a strong, centralized state – one presumably capable of controlling air and land routes between Iran and Lebanon — rather than what appears increasingly likely at this point: that Bilad al-Sham will become a “(Dis-)United States of Syria” on the model of Iraq or Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. Indeed, will the future local “Islamic caliphates” or “free Syrian micro-Republics” have the means to prevent Iranian aircraft from using their skies? And, even more significantly, will it be in their interest to do so?
An implosion of Syria, its division into multiple power centers, and the probable competition for external support between them offer Iran – like other major regional players, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and perhaps even Israel – opportunities to recruit new local clients. And while Iran is generously hated by Syrian opposition groups for “having Syrian blood on its hands” and, as importantly, for being Shiite, it can still build useful relationships with at least some of the future masters of Syria, as it has done in Iraq in defiance of strong and persistent pressure from the U.S. Paradoxical understandings they may be, but that would not be the first time strategic pragmatism would triumph over ideology. History is full of such examples, even among radical jihadis.
Aurelie Daher is a Postdoctoral Research Associate at Princeton
University. She has earned a PhD in political science from
Sciences-Po, Paris, and has held a postdoctoral position at the
University of Oxford. Her research focuses on Hezbollah, Lebanese and Syrian politics, and Middle-Eastern Shiism.