by David Collier*
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, recently cast fresh doubt on the possibility of a nuclear deal by the July 20 deadline for the ongoing talks between Iran and world powers in Vienna. This came after Iranian foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed the West was suffering from [...]]]>
by David Collier*
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, recently cast fresh doubt on the possibility of a nuclear deal by the July 20 deadline for the ongoing talks between Iran and world powers in Vienna. This came after Iranian foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed the West was suffering from illusions regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
Should the talks fail to reach agreement, what happens next? More sanctions, more enrichment, and more talk of military action are the most likely outcomes. What has been missing from the debate, and what could save the long-term relationship between Iran and the West, is more talk of enhancing “linkage” with Iran.
In a 2005 article in The Journal of Democracy, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way defined linkage as the density of ties between two countries or regions. It forms a web of back and forth interaction on economic, geopolitical, social, and communication matters as well as amongst civil society. This interaction enhances mutual cooperation, trust, and understanding.
The current Western approach to Iran has centered on leverage, the use of overt tools for changing a country’s behavior through the use of sanctions, threats of military action, and attempts to isolate Iran from the international community. Linkage however, is more ethereal and subtle with a focus on deep connections and long-term relations. It can be understood as the soft power to the hard power of international leverage.
While some analysts and officials credit Western leverage with bringing Iran back to the negotiating table, others don’t regard this as a long-term solution. Patrick Clawson and Gary Samore have both cautioned that while sanctions may have helped kick-start negotiations, they do not guarantee their successful conclusion, or that Iran will stand by any agreement in the months and years ahead. It is to this end that the concept of linkage must join the debate.
Past Mistakes
The United States has historically enjoyed and abused the benefits of linkage with Iran, as well as suffered the consequences of its absence. In the 1940s and early 1950s, Iran was awash with American financial, military, and intelligence missions, as well as an active and influential embassy that maintained contacts with Iranians across the political spectrum.
It was this depth and scope of linkage, coupled with the leverage of the US’ position as a main source of financial aid to Iran, that allowed successive US administrations to greatly influence Iranian governmental policies, laws, cabinet position appointments, and even who should be prime minister. The success of the coup in 1953 against Iran’s only democratically elected prime minister would not have been possible without deep levels of linkage with Iranian society. While these policies proved ultimately disastrous for both the US and Iran in the long-term, Washington’s ability to achieve its aims, however misguided, was only possible thanks to the high level of linkage it maintained with Iran.
By the time the revolution began in 1978, however, this linkage had evaporated. Trust in the permanency of the Shah’s regime led to a decrease in contact and surveillance over Iranian society. As a result, the revolution came as a surprise to which Washington was unable to adequately comprehend or respond until it was too late.
This absence of linkage continued in the post-revolution era, with Iranian and American leaders refusing direct contact for close to 35 years. The tradition was not broken until late in 2013 when President Hassan Rouhani spoke briefly with his American counterpart by phone on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. This was a remarkable break from no presidential contact following the revolution and functions as an example of linkage that must be maintained and consolidated.
However, amid Tehran’s wariness of American desires to overthrow the regime, and the ongoing attempts by Iranian hardliners to scuttle the talks, establishing additional links will be difficult. Persistence will be necessary but is not a quality so far associated with Obama’s Iran policy. His engagement with Iran has instead been likened to a single roll of the dice with efforts made to reach out ending at the first sign of obstruction.
Engaging Iran
Instead, the US must be persistent and take every opportunity to engage Iran and Iranians on all levels. Influential American actors could take their lead from the scientific community, which has had numerous American-Iranian collaborations in recent years. Norman Neureiter, acting director for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, states that as a result of these efforts “Iranian and US scientists get along quite well.” More than that, one US Laureate invited to Iran was so feted by his hosts that he was measured for a sculptured bust, which now rests in the garden of the Pardis Technology Park outside of Tehran.
Another example of perhaps unexpected linkage was a meeting between the US Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Supreme Council of the Seminary Teachers of Qom in March of this year. Their dialogue led to a joint statement declaring opposition to violations of human life and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Sport has also transcended political obstacles; the US Wrestling Team was cheered on enthusiastically during the Greco-Roman World Cup in Tehran in May. American coach Steven Fraser was so moved that he gushed: “they love us Americans, and we love them!” Although the USMNT and Team Melli will not meet at the Estádio do Maracanã on July 13 to decide the 2014 World Cup, soccer diplomacy through friendly matches and tours could also be used to build relationships and understanding.
Collaboration in any form establishes linkages, both at the grass-roots level and between governments; Americans must seek every opportunity to reach out and create contacts with their Iranian counterparts. Recent reports of discussion between Iranian and American officials over Iraq is a perfect example of an unexpected window of opportunity that will hopefully be seized upon and lead to greater lines of communication on a wider range of issues in the future.
Such contact and collaboration, if taken, will help consolidate and institutionalize trust and cooperation. The primary goal of these endeavors should be the reestablishment of an embassy or interests section in Iran. Such a permanent and direct point of contact is the essential core of any linkage regime. Washington will hopefully be watching with interest when the United Kingdom reopens its own embassy in Iran that closed in 2011 following its ransacking by protestors.
If a deal is reached on July 20, establishing linkage with Iran will increase the probability of it being adhered to by both sides, even if future obstacles and disagreements present themselves. If no agreement is made, linkages must be established to prevent US-Iranian relations returning to the brink of conflict.
Creating this web of linkages between the United States and Iran will take time and can easily be destroyed by political rhetoric and grandstanding. However, through persistence and positivity, the two countries can rebuild trust and build peaceful relations in the long-term.
*David Collier holds a PhD in political science from Boston University and is currently working on a book on US-Iranian relations during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. He has studied Persian at Boston University and Ohio State University and is now based in Washington, DC.
]]>Jeffrey Goldberg’s report on a meeting of National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC), in which Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s intransigence on the peace process and the fact that “the U.S. has received nothing in return” for [...]]]>
Jeffrey Goldberg’s report on a meeting of National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC), in which Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed frustration with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s intransigence on the peace process and the fact that “the U.S. has received nothing in return” for its security guarantees, might raise more questions than it answers.
What Goldberg didn’t mention is the historical and conceptual context for Gates’ remarks. Indeed, Gates is not the first senior American official to express concern that the protraction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — and the perception of U.S. favoritism toward Israel on this issue — was offering few, if any, dividends for U.S. security or its own regional interests.
Back in March, 2010, Gen. David Petraeus made waves when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had immediate implications for the U.S.’s ability to pursue its interests in the Middle East. He named some of these problems:
Israel hawks quickly denounced Petraeus’ comments and have continued to attack a straw man argument that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict wouldn’t solve all challenges facing the U.S. in the Middle East.
But Petraeus wasn’t the only senior U.S. official to endorse the concept of “linkage” between resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the longer-term strategic interests of the U.S. in the Middle East. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, CENTCOM commander Gen. James Mattis, and Adm. Michael Mullen — via a WikiLeaks cable — have voiced endorsements of this concept.
While Jeffrey Goldberg — who has a history of rejecting linkage — carefully reports on Gates’ anger with Netanyahu for delivering “nothing in return” for security guarantees, access to weapons, and intelligence sharing, he is careful to sidestep the obvious next question. Why does Gates feel strongly about Netanyahu refusing to “grapple with Israel’s growing isolation and with the demographic challenges it faces if it keeps control of the West Bank”?
Goldberg doesn’t engage that topic. It might be because Gates shares the emerging consensus of the U.S.’s top military and political leadership that Israel’s continued settlement expansion and intransigence at the negotiating table is doing real damage to the Obama administration’s attempts to pursue a wide range of military and political interests in the Middle East.
]]>The notion of linkage contends that a festering Arab-Israeli conflict takes a strategic toll on the U.S. in the Middle East.
In an Congressional testimony, CENTCOM head Gen. James Mattis [...]]]>
The notion of linkage contends that a festering Arab-Israeli conflict takes a strategic toll on the U.S. in the Middle East.
In an Congressional testimony, CENTCOM head Gen. James Mattis said that while Israel and the Occupied Territories are outside of his purview, they affect “U.S. security interests in the region.” He described a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “the only reliable path to lasting peace in this region.”
The CENTCOM Area of Responsibility includes nearly all countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Here’s the relevant bit from Mattis’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, via the American Forces Press Service:
Mattis said while Israel and Palestine aren’t in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, lack of progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace affects U.S. security interests in the region.
“I believe the only reliable path to lasting peace in this region is a viable two-state solution between Israel and Palestine,” he said. “This issue is one of many that is exploited by our adversaries in the region, and is used as a recruiting tool for extremist groups.”
By contrast, Mattis said, substantive progress in the peace process would improve CENTCOM’s opportunities to work with regional partners and support multilateral security efforts.
UPDATE: An earlier version of this said Mattis was interviewed by AFPS. Instead, the comments were made in Congressional testimony, which the article now reflects. A more broad quote of Mattis’s comments, as well as video of his testimony, can be found at the website of Americans for Peace Now.
]]>The two main problems with Ayalon’s analysis is that he seems not to have actually read the WikiLeaks cables—which offer ample evidence confirming the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the minds of Arab leaders—or bothered to understand how promoters of linkage define the concept.
(Matt Duss has an excellent post up on the Wonk Room that covers many of the same problems with Ayalon’s rather selective (when not downright misleading) interpretation of WikiLeaks and linkage.)
Linkage, as defined by Gen. David Petraeus last March, is [my emphasis]:
The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.
Rather conveniently, Ayalon’s definition of linkage misinterprets the concept and fails to address the concerns raised by Petraeus and members of the Obama administration who have endorsed the idea. Matt Duss accurately describes Ayalon’s description as “an obvious strawman.”
While right-wing blogs, political pundits, and columnists quickly embraced the talking point that WikiLeaks showed an Arab world that is deathly afraid of Iran’s nuclear program — but didn’t have much to say about the Arab-Israeli conflict — an actual reading of the cables suggests a very different message.
Here are a set of excerpts from WikiLeaks that show Arab leaders endorsing the concept of linkage (the Petraeus definition, not the Ayalon one) in the most blunt way possible.
The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, in a December 9, 2009 meeting with the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman:
Emphasized the strategic importance of creating a Palestinian State (i.e., resolving the Israeli- Palestinian conflict) as the way to create genuine Middle Eastern unity on the question of Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions.
A cable from the U.S. embassy in Amman, written shortly after the end of the Gaza War in January 2009, reads:
Speaking to PolOffs [political officers] in early February 2009, immediately after the Gaza War, Director of the Jordanian Prime Minister’s Political Office Khaled Al-Qadi noted that the Gaza crisis had allowed Iranian interference in inter-Arab relations to reach unprecedented levels.
An April 2, 2009 cable from Amman repeated the Jordanian position:
Jordanian leaders have argued that the only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah – and by extension their Iranian patrons – would be for Israel to hand over the disputed Sheba’a Farms to Lebanon.
It went on:
With Hizballah lacking the ‘resistance to occupation’ rationale for continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison d’etre and probably domestic support.
And a February 22, 2010, cable describes UAE foreign minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nayan as he warns a Congressional delegation against a military attack on Iran, led by Nita Lowey:
The cable remarks that bin Zayed:
Concluded the meeting with a soliloquy on the importance of a successful peace process between Israel and its neighbors as perhaps the best way of reducing Iran’s regional influence.
During a February 14, 2010, meeting with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, Qatar Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-thani suggested one reason that Israel might be hyping the threat of a nuclear Iran.
The cable summarizes bin Khalifa as saying:
[The Israelis] are using Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons as a diversion from settling matters with the Palestinians.
Ayalon twisting the definition of linkage and misstating the messages contained in the WikiLeaks cables is indicative of the increasing desperation that the Israeli right-wing must be experiencing as authoritarian Middle Eastern governments, that have helped Israel maintain the status quo, are under increasing pressure to make democratic reforms. There’s no guarantee that the governments in Middle Eastern capitals will be as cooperative in helping Israel maintain its occupation of the West Bank or its siege on Gaza in the future. The time for Israeli hardliners to face their nation’s political realities and make difficult but necessary concessions may be drawing closer. Danny Ayalon is choosing to ignore the shifting political winds.
]]>Friedman takes on Harris’s attempt to debunk ‘linkage,’ the concept that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a burden on U.S. policy-making in the Middle East. [...]]]>
Friedman takes on Harris’s attempt to debunk ‘linkage,’ the concept that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a burden on U.S. policy-making in the Middle East. This has been a neoconservative effort of late, which has been mostly absurd, and sometimes from Israel itself, on the dime of a pretty far right-wing Israel lobby group.
Harris takes this tack, too. And Friedman takes him apart:
]]>Harris argues that some people have said that “without progress on the Palestinian front, it would be impossible to mobilize Arab countries to face the Iranian nuclear threat,” but that the cables released by WikiLeaks, which reveal great concern among many Arab governments regarding Iran, have “blown [this argument] out of the water.”
What Harris is implying, more broadly, is that there is no linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the ability of the U.S. to mobilize support for its policies in the Middle East and beyond — an argument that simply does not stand up to logic or facts.
Like this fact: a full (rather than selective) reading of the WikiLeaks cables shows that Arab leaders are deeply concerned both about Iran and about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — something Middle East experts have long argued to be the case. And the reality is that while the U.S., Israel and many Arab countries share concerns about Iran, it is undeniable that the failure of the U.S. to put forth a successful policy on the Israeli-Palestinian track, and the absence of progress toward peace (and continued provocative Israeli actions in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem), complicate virtually every aspect of U.S. relations with these same Arab countries, including mobilizing support for America’s Iran policy.
Zakheim, a foreign policy hawk, talked to The Jerusalem Post at the Herzliya Conference.
Zakheim said in an interview that in his opinion, Israel did not have to attack Iran to stop its [...]]]>
Zakheim, a foreign policy hawk, talked to The Jerusalem Post at the Herzliya Conference.
Zakheim said in an interview that in his opinion, Israel did not have to attack Iran to stop its nuclear program. Israel, he said, has developed the Arrow 2 ballistic missile defense system, which, together with US Navy Aegis missile defense ships in the Mediterranean, would likely succeed in intercepting an Iranian missile fired at Israel.
“There is less than a 1-percent chance that an Iranian missile will get through these defenses,” Zakheim said. “Iran, however, is worried about Israel’s alleged nuclear program, and their fear is 100%, so why would they want to take a 1% chance if there is a 100% chance that they will be destroyed?” Zakheim also warned about the potential fallout Israel would face from such an attack. He said that on the one hand, Israel would turn the Iranian people into its “permanent enemy,” and on the other hand, an attack could lead to “terrible relations” with the US.
Zakheim’s suggestion that the Iranian leadership might be behaving in a rational manner goes against what Iran hawks such as Reuel Marc Gerecht, Jennifer Rubin, and Cliff May argue. More importantly, an assumption of rationality permits a realistic analysis of an Iranian cost-benefit situation. Given Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” it would seem highly unlikely that an Iranian leadership that values self-preservation would engage in a first-strike nuclear attack.
The former Reagan and George W. Bush administration official went on to deliver comments that must have sent chills up the spines of “linkage” deniers.
“The US will be attacked in Afghanistan and Iraq, and this could turn the administration against Israel like never before,” he said.
This can’t have gone over well with The Washington Post’s Jennifer Rubin, who lashed out at James Jones, President Obama’s former national security adviser. Jones told reporters at Herzliya that “The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the core problem in the Middle East, and solving it will go a long way toward securing regional and even global peace.”
Rubin wrote:
One suspects that the upper echelons of the military are steeped in the brew of “Israel is the key to the region’s problems” conventional wisdom. In that regard, one is tempted to advise a great many generals and admirals to hush up and fight.
In panels and interviews at the Herzliya Conference, respected foreign policy realists, a former Mossad chief, and a former U.S. national security adviser have all echoed the message that the “military option” is an extremely dangerous and counterproductive policy choice for Israel and the U.S. But these statements don’t seem to slow down those Iran hawks who are committed to the narrative that Iran is an “existential threat” and can only be defeated through direct confrontation.
]]>