From beginning to end (including questions) this “Engaging Iran” discussion at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is worth watching. Chaired by Mark Fitzpatrick, the panel featured the Rt Hon Lord Lamont of Lerwick, Sir Richard Dalton and Mahan Abedin. You can read IISS’s summary of the event here, but [...]]]>
From beginning to end (including questions) this “Engaging Iran” discussion at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is worth watching. Chaired by Mark Fitzpatrick, the panel featured the Rt Hon Lord Lamont of Lerwick, Sir Richard Dalton and Mahan Abedin. You can read IISS’s summary of the event here, but a few quick notes of my own:
- Lamont, the former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and now chairman of the British-Iranian Chamber, argues that while U.S. sanctions on Iran make life harder for business people, they are not changing the government’s behavior or bringing down the regime (he uses Cuba as an example of how sanctions have been unsuccessful, noting that the government would have likely fallen a long time ago had sanctions been removed). Lamont also notes that sanctions have forced Iranian businessmen to deal with the revolutionary guard in order to bypass them. In this way sanctions are bringing the people closer to the regime, rather than distancing them from it.
- Lamont argues that the best way to deal with Iran is through a “combination of pressure with incentives”, adding that Iran’s security needs should also be considered. “Ttalking about Iran today without remembering the Iran-Iraq war is rather like talking about Britain in the late 1930s without remembering WWI,” he said. Lamont reminds us that while Iran’s recent history informs its antagonism towards the occupying forces around its borders, it still cooperated with the U.S. during the invasion of Afghanistan.
- British-Iranian journalist, Mahan Abedin, made some interesting comments about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which he believes are geared towards nuclear latency, or know-how, rather than weaponization. He notes that Iran’s use of proxies has greatly benefited it security-wise as a deterrent, adding that if not for them, Israel would have attacked it. Isolated diplomatically and geopolitically, Iran’s resulting lack of self-confidence, notes Abedin, is the main reason why it is pursuing nuclear latency and security through proxies. If it can achieve nuclear latency, its relationship to the region and the U.S. may change, says Abedin, since it would no longer be solely focused on safeguarding its security.
- Former British ambassador to Iran and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, Sir Richard Dalton, notes that while both parties are on narrow and confined diplomatic “tramlines”, there is still time to negotiate a deal that will satisfy the requirements of the U.S. and Iran. This deal would begin with acceptance of Iran’s nuclear programme within operational limits and with the export of enriched uranium and later imports of materials to be allowed when Iran has a genuine need for them for its civil nuclear energy industry.
- All panelists agreed that while sanctions produce social consequences, they will not achieve the political aim of ending Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions.
]]>Abedin writes:
]]>A top priority for the IRGC high command is to respond so harshly and decisively so as to deter the Americans from a second set of strikes at a future point. The idea here is to avoid what happened to Iraq in the period , when the former Baathist regime was so weakened by sanctions and repeated small-scale military attacks that it quickly collapsed in the face of American and British invading armies.
The range of predictable responses available to the IRGC high command include dramatic hit ad run attacks against military and commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, the use of mid-range ballistic missiles against American bases in the region and Israel and a direct assault on American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. All these options are likely to be used within 48 hours of the start of hostilities.
What is less predictable is the response of the IRGC Qods Force, which is likely to be at the forefront of the Pasdaran’s counter-attack. One possible response by the Qods force is spectacular terrorist-style attacks against American intelligence bases and assets throughout the region. The IRGC Qods Force is believed to have identified every key component of the American intelligence apparatus in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are likely to put this information to good use, especially since the Qods Force suspects that the CIA had a hand in last October’s Jundullah-organised suicide bombing targeting IRGC commanders in Iran’s volatile Sistan va Baluchistan province.
The IRGC navy will also play a key asymmetrical role in the conflict by organising maritime suicide bombings on an industrial scale. By manning its fleet of speedboats with suicide bombers and ramming them into American warships and even neutral commercial shipping, the Pasdaran will hope to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 40 percent of world crude oil supplies pass.
The combination of these asymmetrical forms of warfare with more conventional style missile and even ground force attacks on American bases in the region will likely result in thousands of American military casualties in the space of a few weeks. The IRGC has both the will and wherewithal to inflict a level of casualties on American armed forces not seen since the Second World War.
Even if the United States manages to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and much of the country’s military assets, the IRGC can still claim victory by claiming to have given the Americans a bloody nose and producing an outcome not dissimilar from the Israeli-Hezbollah military engagement in the summer of 2006.
The political effect of this will likely be even more explosive than the actual fighting. Not only will it awaken the sleeping giant of Iranian nationalism, thus aligning the broad mass of the people with the regime, it will also shore up Iran’s image in the region and prove once and for all that the Islamic Republic is prepared to fight to the death to uphold its principles. Suddenly Iran’s allies in the region – particularly non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas – would stand ten feet tall.