George Washington Political Science Professor Mark Lynch in Foreign Policy:
With military action in the background but not imminent, and sanctions taking a real political and economic toll inside of Iran, now seems to be the right time to begin a serious effort at real talks with Iran over [...]]]>
George Washington Political Science Professor Mark Lynch in Foreign Policy:
With military action in the background but not imminent, and sanctions taking a real political and economic toll inside of Iran, now seems to be the right time to begin a serious effort at real talks with Iran over its nuclear program — and to be prepared to take yes for an answer.
Roya Boroumand, the executive director of the Iranian human rights-focused Abdorrahman Boroumand Foundation, for the Huffington Post:
But there is still hope. Today, unlike the immediate post-revolutionary years, the Iranian leaders are concerned about their image abroad. They also respond to their critics and deny the routine violation of their obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Since 1975, Iran is bound by the ICCPR, which set forth the rights and freedoms essential to an open, safe and pluralistic political system where citizens can be heard and determine their own destiny.
For too many years, the international community, including the United States, has dealt with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its use of violence in foreign policy independently from the abysmal human rights situation inside the country. It is time for a long-term strategy that would seriously challenge the leadership by shifting the focus to their human rights record, the non-representative nature of Iran’s political system and on the rights of citizens to organize and express themselves.
Former senior State Department intelligence analyst, Greg Thielmann, in Arms Control Now:
Any successful solution to the Iran nuclear crisis will have to include Iran’s agreement to again abide by the terms of the Additional Protocol, if not to grant even wider access to IAEA inspectors. As former IAEA Deputy Director General Olli Heinonen stated in an October 31 email exchange with the author, “[the Additional Protocol] will be indispensable in understanding [Iran’s] enrichment and heavy water programs…”
Various Iranian officials have suggested a willingness to accept the Additional Protocol if Iran’s right to enrichment is made clear. Endorsement of the Additional Protocol by Iraq, one of Iran’s few friendly neighbors, should help to increase pressure on Iran to do likewise.
Iran scholar and Lobe Log contributor, Farideh Farhi:
Unless Khamenei and company are given a way out of the mess they have taken Iran into (with some help from the US and company), chances are that we are heading into a war in the same way we headed to war in Iraq. A recent Foreign Affairs article by Ralf Ekeus, the former executive chairman of the UN special Commission on Iraq, and Malfrid-Braut hegghammer, is a good primer on how this could happen.
The reality is that the current sanctions regime does not constitute a stable situation. First, the instability (and instability is different from regime change as we are sadly learning in Syria) it might beget is a constant force for policy re-evaluation on all sides (other members of the P5+1 included). Second, maintaining sanctions require vigilance while egging on the sanctioned regime to become more risk-taking in trying to get around them. This is a formula for war and it will happen if a real effort at compromise is not made. Inflexibility will beget inflexibility.
Former chief analyst of the CIA’s Counter-terrorism Center, Paul Pillar, in the National Interest:
On that all-preoccupying matter involving Iran’s nuclear program, the Iranians have given ample indication of flexibility on restricting their enrichment of uranium and on much else. But they would be foolish to make unilateral concessions with no prospect of getting anything in return on matters of importance to them.
When someone seems to be adhering to a position that ought not to be a vital interest to them, we should not make the mistake of interpreting this as a mark of obduracy and unreasonableness. More likely it means they are willing to bargain.
Also for the Huffington Post, Reza Marashi and Trita Parsi of the National Iranian American Council:
]]>Both Tehran and Washington have realized that their opening offers this past summer were non-starters. Iran wanted all sanctions lifted before it would begin limiting its enrichment program. American sought Iranian concessions upfront only to offer sanctions relief at the very end of the step-by-step process. Moreover, “going small” — that is, demanding less of Iran in order to justify the absence of sanctions relief — was politically unfeasibly.
This gave birth to the idea of ‘Going Big’ — circumventing the politically tricky sequencing and instead putting everything on the table. But somehow, ‘Going Big’ was mysteriously linked to an ultimatum. If the Iranians did not agree to our last (and first) big offer, there would be war.
This would be a serious mistake that would guarantee war. While going bigger may be necessary to reach an agreement, we can’t get a big offer right through a single attempt. If the Iranians presented a big offer to the P5+1 — “or else,” the world would rightly reject it and see it as an attempt to justify Iranian intransigence.
Similarly, Tehran — and the world — will view any US ultimatum as an attempt to create a path towards war. Diplomacy should help avoid war, not lay the groundwork for it.
News and views relevant to US Foreign policy for Sept. 14
“Moments of Truth in Libya and Egypt”: Marc Lynch, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, discusses the significance of the protests in Egypt and Libya for US relations. Although the events in Libya – [...]]]>
News and views relevant to US Foreign policy for Sept. 14
“Moments of Truth in Libya and Egypt”: Marc Lynch, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, discusses the significance of the protests in Egypt and Libya for US relations. Although the events in Libya – where terrorists apparently used the fortuitously-timed public demonstrations as cover for a preplanned operation targeting US diplomats – have seen the Pentagon dispatch drones and warships to the country, Lynch notes that the difference in official and public responses in Egypt and Libya says much about how leaders in these places view US influence over them:
In short, the response from Libya suggests a broad national rejection at both the governmental and societal level of the anti-American agitation. The leaders have said the right things and have done their part to quickly pre-empt a spiral of conflict and recrimination between Americans and Libyans.
…. In Egypt, on the other hand, President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood has been notably invisible. To this point, we have heard no statements from Egyptian government officials condemning the assault on the embassy, no expressions of concern or sympathy, no suggestion of any fault on their own side. The Muslim Brotherhood had previously been planning rallies against the notorious film, and at the time of this writing has not canceled them. Even when they finally issued a statement condemning the violence in Libya, they were not forthcoming on Cairo.
An exchange between the Muslim Brotherhood’s public relations people and the US embassy in Cairo highlighted the differences with respect to Egypt. Though the Brotherhood condemned the attack on the Cairo compound in English, the US Embassy noted that on its Arabic-language social media feeds, the Brothers were praising the men who stormed the Cairo compound and had called for further protests outside of the embassy on Friday.
As Foreign Affairs commented:
The Muslim Brotherhood’s sponsorship of the film protests might be an ill-advised attempt at the diversionary politics Mubarak was a master of, but the costs are high. . If Egypt’s ultra-Salafists take a harder line on the film or manage to co-opt the protests, Morsi could easily lose ground to them.
More protests have since taken place outside US embassies in Tunisia, Sudan and Yemen and have resulted in the breach of the facilities by the protestors. The Obama Administration is now facing further criticism that it had advance warning of threats made against US facilities abroad on 9/11 this year but did not raise alert levels, and over remarks Obama made in a television interview following the Cairo protests stating that while the US did not consider Egypt an ally, it also did not consider Egypt an enemy.
Officially, Egypt is classified as a “major non-NATO ally” and receives US$1.5 billion in military assistance annually. The State Department has since walked back the president’s remark.
“Egypt trying to persuade Iran to drop Assad”: The Associated Press reports that the Egyptian government is seeking to work out an exit for the Assads from Syria with Iran’s support, in exchange for normalizing relations with the Islamic Republic:
Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi made the offer when he met last month with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran, officials close to the Egyptian presidency said. Morsi’s visit to Iran, to attend a summit of the 120-nation Nonaligned Movement, was the first by an Egyptian president since the 1979 Islamic Revolution there, when diplomatic ties between the countries were cut.
….
Cairo would agree to restore full diplomatic ties, a significant diplomatic prize for Iran given that Egypt is the most populous Arab nation and a regional powerhouse. Morsi would also mediate to improve relations between Iran and conservative Gulf Arab nations that have long viewed Shiite Iran with suspicion and whose fears of the Persian nation have deepened because of Iran’s disputed nuclear program. …. Morsi’s argument is that neither Assad nor the rebels fighting his regime appear to be capable of winning the civil war, creating a stalemate that could eventually break up the Arab nation with serious repercussions for the entire region, the officials said.
“Israel’s window for action against Iran ‘is getting much smaller,’ says Ambassador Oren”: The Times of Israel carries an interview with Israel’s US ambassador, Michael Oren. Questioned by his interviewers as to what isn’t “well between the US and Israel,” Oren downplays the significance of public disputes between the two countries and accusations of partisanship, responding that “in the strategic issues, the spectrum of our common interests and communications is vast”:
When we talk about Iran, we proceed on the assumption that we have a structural difference. The structural difference is that Israel is a small country, living in Iran’s backyard, with certain capabilities. And Israel is threatened almost daily with national annihilation. And of course the United States is a big country, far away from Iran, with much greater capabilities, and not threatened with national annihilation.
…. Clearly, things have been said which might not have been helpful for the situation. But at the same time in the last few weeks the prime minister had telephone conversations with American officials — he had an hour-long conversation with the president the other night — and things are also said not for public consumption. And they are part of this very intimate, candid and continuous dialogue that we have with the United States.
When asked, Oren denied that Netanyahu has been using the elections to push the US further towards Israel’s “red lines.” His boss, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, recently gave a rare interview to The Jerusalem Post – stating much the same – in an apparent effort to deflect criticism that he is rooting for a Republican victory in November.
“Boxer Expresses Disappointment Over Israeli Prime Minister’s Remarks”: Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a widely-reported letter this Wednesday criticizing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for politicizing debate over the Iranian nuclear program. Boxer emphasizes the increased sanctions on Iran and military aid the US has provided to Israel since Obama took office, and asks that he clarify his views of the US-Israel relationship:
In light of this, I am stunned by the remarks that you made this week regarding U.S. support for Israel. Are you suggesting that the United States is not Israel’s closest ally and does not stand by Israel? Are you saying that Israel, under President Obama, has not received more in annual security assistance from the United States than at any time in its history, including for the Iron Dome Missile Defense System?
As other Israelis have said, it appears that you have injected politics into one of the most profound security challenges of our time – Iran’s illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons.
I urge you to step back and clarify your remarks so that the world sees that there is no daylight between the United States and Israel. As you personally stated during an appearance with President Obama in March, “We are you, and you are us. We’re together. So if there’s one thing that stands out clearly in the Middle East today, it’s that Israel and America stand together.”
“Romney’s foreign policy: An ideology that dare not speak its name”: The Washington Post carries an interview with Alex Wong, the foreign policy director for Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign, in which Wong parries questions over whether or not Romney is a neoconservative himself:
Q: Does he embrace neoconservatism?
A: “You know,” said Wong, “throughout this campaign Governor Romney has indicated that his view on the world is peace through strength, American leadership, in guaranteeing an American century, that this new century continues to be an American century. And that’s the governing philosophy of Governor Romney on peace through strength.”
Q: So does he consider himself a neoconservative?
A: “What I’m saying is,” said Wong, “Governor Romney’s embrace of American values and interests and his call for American leadership is a philosophy of peace through strength.”
The interviewer, Jason Horowitz, later commented on the exchange in a separate article:
]]>His [Romney’s] reaction this week [to the violence in Libya and Egypt] made it clear that when it comes to Republican foreign policy, the neocons are still the only game in town.
…. Romney and his advisers — Wong declined to say whether they were consulted before the candidate weighed in on the the embassy chaos — are tripling down on the clear contrasts offered by neoconservatism’s trumpeting of values, which lends itself nicely to campaign seasons but is more complicated in actual governance (see the war in Iraq).