by Peter Jenkins
There has been good news out of Israel this week – all the more welcome for being relatively infrequent where Iran is concerned.
Sheera Frenkel, a McClatchy correspondent, reported on Monday that Israeli intelligence officials had told the news service over the last two months that they [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
There has been good news out of Israel this week – all the more welcome for being relatively infrequent where Iran is concerned.
Sheera Frenkel, a McClatchy correspondent, reported on Monday that Israeli intelligence officials had told the news service over the last two months that they now estimate that Iran will be unable to build a nuclear weapon before 2015 or 2016.
This estimate will have come as no surprise to those who monitor official US statements for insights into related US judgements. Back in August 2012, a National Security Council spokesman stated: “We continue to assess that Iran is not on the verge of achieving a nuclear weapon.” And since late 2007, US National Intelligence Estimates have been pushing the date at which Iran would reach the nuclear threshold (an ability to make nuclear weapons) towards 2015.
Nor is the latest Israeli estimate unprecedented. On 9 January 2011 the Washington Post reported that outgoing Mossad chief Meir Dagan had told Israeli reporters that Iran could not build a bomb before 2015 at the earliest.
However, the estimate raises questions about the performance of Israel’s Prime Minister during last autumn’s UN General Assembly. Mr. Netanyahu seemed to want listeners to believe that Iran could make a nuclear device as soon as mid-2013.
For those of us who are outside government, and without access to intelligence reports, reconciling such contradictions is all but impossible. If, though, I had to hazard a speculative guess, I would say that Mr. Netanyahu was focusing solely on Iran’s ability to produce sufficient highly enriched uranium for one device, and that Israeli intelligence officers are looking beyond the production of fissile material to Iran’s ability to produce a deliverable nuclear weapon.
Anyway, what really matters is that this latest Israeli estimate will make it much harder for the Israeli government to convince the US government that the “window of opportunity” for diplomacy is closing and will have closed before 2013 is out.
That is a godsend — all the more helpful as the days and weeks pass, confusion and uncertainty mount, and the prospect of Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) getting into a serious nuclear negotiation recede towards the second half of 2013, after the installation of a new Iranian president (early August). Helpful, too, in quelling the concern some will feel when they read a Reuters report that Iran is at last about to install more efficient centrifuges at the Natanz plant, to produce low enriched uranium (under 5%).
Suggesting that good news, and not just Shakespearian sorrows, come “not as single spies”, a 25 January Daily Beast report from Davos quoted outgoing Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak stating that: “What we basically say is that if worse comes to worst, there should be a readiness and an ability to launch a surgical operation that will delay [Iran] by a significant time frame and probably convince them that it won’t work because the world is determined to block them.”
This sentence seems to imply that the Israeli government is now aligned with its US counterpart in drawing a line at a point where there is evidence that Iran has decided to cross the threshold and embark on the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
This would be a significant development. For years Israeli politicians have been saying that Iran cannot be allowed to retain a dual-use uranium enrichment capability, and that Iran’s enrichment plants should be destroyed by force unless Iran agrees to their dismantlement. Now Mr. Barak is saying that the use of force should only be contemplated “if worse comes to worst”. I suppose that could mean: “If Iran refuses to capitulate to Israeli demands”. But “if Iran embarks on nuclear weapon production” seems like a more natural interpretation.
If that is so, it is a second boost in a matter of days to nuclear negotiation prospects. There has never been much likelihood that Iran would agree to surrender its dual-use enrichment capability — and EU insistence on it doing so was the prime cause of the breakdown of the promising negotiation between three EU members and Iran that was launched in October 2003. But Iranians have often alluded to their readiness to back up their word with practical measures when it comes to respecting their non-nuclear-weapon state treaty commitments.
Of course, Mr. Netanyahu has just been re-elected, and, on past form, he may not be deterred from raising a hue and cry by anything as dull as evidence-based logic. Still, the odds on him being taken seriously in Washington seem to have lengthened since last Friday.
]]>McClatchy reports that even though the Obama Administration has not publicly reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to the Afghan War, a necessary announcement to justify both military and non-military aid to Islamabad, it has nonetheless waived the requirement to released US$2 billion:
The Obama administration has refused for the first time to [...]]]>
McClatchy reports that even though the Obama Administration has not publicly reiterated Pakistan’s commitment to the Afghan War, a necessary announcement to justify both military and non-military aid to Islamabad, it has nonetheless waived the requirement to released US$2 billion:
The Obama administration has refused for the first time to declare that Pakistan is making progress toward ending alleged military support for Islamic militant groups or preventing al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban or other extremists from staging attacks in Afghanistan.
Even so, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has quietly informed Congress that she’s waived the legal restrictions that would have blocked $2 billion in U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan. Disbursing the funds, she said in an official notice, is “important to the national security interests of the United States.
The Congressional Research Service released a report last week outlining the timeline the Administration pursued to reauthorize the aid over the summer:
]]>By mid-2012, however, conditions were such that a second certification under the EPPA [the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act] appeared extremely difficult to justify. The November 2011 Salala border incident had spurred an angry Islamabad to close vital supply lines used by NATO forces in Afghanistan, and these remained closed for more than seven months until difficult negotiations finally resulted in their reopening in early July 2012 (in an apparent quid pro quo, Washington days later released nearly $1.2 billion in pending CSF payments). Despite this breakthrough, U.S.-Pakistan relations remained uneasy and, with the fiscal year in its final quarter, the Administration faced having to make a decision on if and how to free planned FY2012 aid to Pakistan, given congressional conditions.
In mid-August 2012, the State Department quietly notified Congress of its intent, “consistent with U.S. national security interests,” to waive the certification requirements of the EPPA. The stated justification was that proceeding with “cooperation and joint action in areas of mutual interest with Pakistan” requires the Administration to have available all foreign policy tools, including foreign assistance. One month later, on September 14, the relevant congressional committees received formal notification from Secretary Clinton that she found it important to the national security interests of the United States to waive the limitations on security aid to Pakistan found in Section 203 of P.L. 111-73. The Secretary’s accompanying justification for the waiver was delivered in classified form. Also on September 14, Secretary Clinton notified the House and Senate Appropriations Committees that she was waiving the Pakistan-related certification requirements in Section 7046(c) of P.L. 112-74. This waiver was similarly made under the law’s national security provision.
McClatchy reports that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is warning the Syrian government that “we are not only not enthusiastic about war, we are also not far from war”:
One day after winning blanket authority [from the Turkish Parliament] to send forces into Syria, Turkey’s prime minister warned Friday that [...]]]>
McClatchy reports that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is warning the Syrian government that “we are not only not enthusiastic about war, we are also not far from war”:
One day after winning blanket authority [from the Turkish Parliament] to send forces into Syria, Turkey’s prime minister warned Friday that his country is “not far from war” and said that it would be a “deadly mistake” for the Syrian government to test Turkey’s will.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the comments as the Turkish military fired shells into Syria for the third straight day – retaliation for a mortar shell that landed just inside Turkish territory in Hatay province, according to the provincial governor.
Though Turkey has allowed the “Free Syrian Army” — an umbrella command for dozens of militias — and other anti-regime groups to operate out of the country and has given shelter to tens of thousands of refugees, its government has been reluctant to take a more proactive role in the crisis.
As a NATO member, an attack on Turkey by Syria would be construed as an attack on NATO, and necessitate discussion of military operations, operations that NATO has so far said it does not envision itself undertaking in Syria as it did over Libya last year.
A White House spokesman recently stated that “[the] US stands behind Turkey as they take action because we believe that action is appropriate.” The UN and NATO have convened special sessions to discuss Turkey’s proposed course of action here on out.
The shelling is the most serious incident that has occurred between the two countries since a Turkish reconnaissance aircraft was apparently downed by Syrian AA fire. Turkish media reports that Assad has, in the wake of the shelling, ordered his forces to observe a demarcation line for themselves to avoid antagonizing the Turks further by violating the border.
Though the Turkish Parliament has approved the dispatch of Turkish forces into Syria, “thousands” of demonstrations marched in Istanbul in protest over the vote.
McClatchy also noted that developments with respect to Syria and Turkey’s Kurdish populations — namely, the paramilitary organizations among them seeking an autonomous Kurdistan — may further antagonize Ankara. These developments come as the Turkish Army undertakes a renewed campaign against anti-government PKK forces:
Mona Yacoubian of the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank, said the Kurdish dimension of the Syrian uprising “is going to gain in prominence” as Assad’s military loses control of territory. She said the assertion of control by Kurdish nationalists tied to the PKK, if it leads to more attacks against Turkish targets, would cross a Turkish “red line.”
With Erdogan’s new war powers, Turkey will “feel compelled to respond,” she said.