I’ve been upset the whole week with the narrative of many mainstream international media. More disturbing was [...]]]> Maybe it is a subject of debate in newsrooms around the world, as it has been within IPS: were the latest events in Egypt a coup d’état or a dramatic but legitimate move to regain the elusive democracy? 

DIana Cariboni. Credit: Courtesy of the author

I’ve been upset the whole week with the narrative of many mainstream international media. More disturbing was the people shot dead in the street by security forces two days ago, as this video shows. But this Friday, we could see bloody repression and people shot dead all across the board.

The main argument to present this week’s developments as the last chapter of the 2012 Egyptian revolution is the earlier massive protests against the ousted democratic regime of Mohamed Morsi – followed by the swearing in of a chief justice as interim president — and the support the military action has received from a number of opposition parties and religious groups, like the Christian Copts.

“Civilian role” has been repeated once and again. But is this enough to avoid the authoritarian tag?

Those who have lived under military regimes should have no doubts. And the examples are spread all over the world.

Just a reference to my closest examples: civilians, even political parties, supported dictators or became dictators themselves in a number of Latin American countries in the 60s, 70s and 80s.

As recently as 2009, the region got lost in the same fog about Honduras, prompting me to write a story explaining the nature of a coup d’état.

This year we remember two of those civic-military rules, which began exactly four decades ago: the Uruguayan, led by the civilian and elected president Juan María Bordaberry (June 27, 1973) and the Chilean (September 11, 1973) under the cruel leadership of general Augusto Pinochet.

People still remember the deaths, disappearances and tortures. We still suffer the consequences of assailed generations growing up in the shadows.

The latest events in Egypt resemble the emergence of the same nightmare, just when Egyptians were starting to dream about democracy. Definitely, media should expose that reality, not obscure it.

The Nation’s Jeremy Scahill injects some badly needed context into the media frenzy over David Petraeus’s CIA resignation by examining the four-star General’s legacy against the backdrop of an increasingly militarized intelligence agency:

As head of US Central Command in 2009, Petraeus issued execute orders that significantly broadened the ability [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The Nation’s Jeremy Scahill injects some badly needed context into the media frenzy over David Petraeus’s CIA resignation by examining the four-star General’s legacy against the backdrop of an increasingly militarized intelligence agency:

As head of US Central Command in 2009, Petraeus issued execute orders that significantly broadened the ability of US forces to operate in a variety of countries, including Yemen, where US forces began conducting missile strikes later that year. During Petraeus’s short tenure at the CIA, drone strikes conducted by the agency, sometimes in conjunction with JSOC, escalated dramatically in Yemen; in his first month in office, he oversaw a series of strikes that killed three US citizens, including 16-year-old Abdulrahman Awlaki. In some cases, such as the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, commandos from the elite JSOC operated under the auspices of the CIA, so that the mission could be kept secret if it went wrong.

Israel tops the list of the world’s most militarised nations, according to the latest Global Militarisation Index released Tuesday by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC).

At number 34, Israel’s main regional rival, Iran, is far behind. Indeed, every other Near Eastern country, with the exceptions of Yemen (37) [...]]]> via IPS News

Israel tops the list of the world’s most militarised nations, according to the latest Global Militarisation Index released Tuesday by the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC).

At number 34, Israel’s main regional rival, Iran, is far behind. Indeed, every other Near Eastern country, with the exceptions of Yemen (37) and Qatar (43), is more heavily militarised than the Islamic Republic, according to the Index, whose research is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Singapore ranks second, followed by Syria, Russia, Jordan, and Cyprus, according to the Index, which is based on a number of weighted variables, such as the comparison of a country’s military budget with its gross domestic product (GDP), and the percentage of the GDP it spends on health care.

The former Soviet Caucasian state has used its vast oil wealth, which has placed it among the fastest growing economies in the world, to buy expensive weapons systems in recent years, apparently as leverage to press Armenia (23) into returning the disputed Nagorno-Kharabovsk enclave which Baku lost in a brief but bloody war after the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Bahrain’s placement in the top 10 was also a first for the Sunni-dominated kingdom which has been backed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in an increasingly violent effort to suppress demands by the Shi’ite majority for democratic reform.

While the Middle East is far more militarised than any other region – all of its countries rank within the top 40 – Southeast Asia, led by Singapore, appears ascendant, according to Jan Grebe, the Index’s head researcher who directs BICC’s work in the field of arms export control.

In addition to Singapore, China (82) and India (71) are increasing their defence budgets at a relatively rapid rate, while the recent flaring of territorial conflicts between Beijing and its neighbours across the South and East China Seas will likely amplify voices within those countries for defence build-ups.

“It remains to be seen how this development will affect the degree of militarisation of individual states and the entire region,” Grebe said.

In contrast, both sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are relatively low on the Index, which covers statistics for 2011 and ranked 135 countries altogether.

At number 30, Angola was a notable African exception, while Chile (31), Ecuador (36), and Colombia (38) topped the Latin American list. By contrast, Brazil, which has by far the largest defence budget in the region, ranked 76.

Among those excluded from the Index was North Korea, whose defence budget has proved impervious to independent analysts and which is widely thought to be one of the world’s most militarised states, if not the most. Eritrea, another state that has made it into the top 10 in the past, also was not included this year.

Created in 1996, the GMI, which has been updated each year, tries to assess the balance between militarisation and human development, particularly related to health.

In addition to BICC’s own research, data published by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the Institute for Strategic Studies are used to compile the Index, whose rankings go back to 1990 at the end of the Cold War.

In addition to the comparison of military budgets, GDP, and health expenditures, the Index uses several other variables, including the total personnel in the paramilitary and military forces – albeit not the police – and total number of physicians vis-à-vis the overall population, and the ratio of the number of heavy weapons to the total population.

Each variable is given a certain score which is then “weighted” according to a set formula to determine a total quantitative score. The more militarised a country, the higher the score. South Korea which, for many years, ranked in the top 10, fell to 18 this year.

Eritrea, which fought a bitter war with Ethiopia and repeatedly cracked down hard against internal dissent, gained a “perfect” 1,000 score in 2004, the first of a three-year reign atop the list.

But Israel, which has carried out a 45-year occupation of Palestinian lands and Syrian territory, has topped the list for almost all of the last 20 years. On the latest Index, its score came to 877, 70 points ahead of Singapore, which has been number two for every year this century, except for the three in which Eritrea was number one.

Significantly, Greece ranked 14 on the list, the highest of any NATO country, far ahead of its regional rival, Turkey, which took the 24th slot, and Bulgaria (25).

The two countries with the world’s largest defence budgets, the United States and China, ranked 29 (591) and 82 (414), respectively.

In addition to the six Middle Eastern states in the top, Oman (11), the UAE (13), Lebanon (17), Iraq (26), and Egypt (28) were all found to be more militarised than Iran, which is currently subject to unprecedented economic sanctions imposed primarily by the West which accuses it of pursuing a nuclear programme that may have military applications.

The concentration of so many Middle Eastern states at the top underscores the degree to which the region has become a powder keg.

If the Middle East dominates the top ranks, sub-Saharan African states, with just a few exceptions, lie at the low end of scale. The region’s biggest economy, South Africa, ranks 98, while its most populous nation, Nigeria, stands at 117.

Too little militarisation carries its own risks, according to
Grebe, because states may not be able to guarantee order or even territorial integrity.

“This situation points to the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that some state security apparatuses are incapable of preventing violence and conflict simply because the country concerned shows a degree of militarisation which is too low,” he said.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pulled an “October surprise” out of his hat when he announced his Likud party would form a joint list in the upcoming election with Avigdor Lieberman’s fascist Yisrael Beiteinu party. This is more of a partnership than a merger, but it has profound implications.

In [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pulled an “October surprise” out of his hat when he announced his Likud party would form a joint list in the upcoming election with Avigdor Lieberman’s fascist Yisrael Beiteinu party. This is more of a partnership than a merger, but it has profound implications.

In partnering with Lieberman, Netanyahu is likely chasing moderate voices out of his cabinet, his coalition and his own party. The outcome will surely mean an even harder line stance against the international community, especially the European Union.

Netanyahu obviously believes that increasing Israel’s already significant isolation is worth what he thinks will be increased impunity in dealing with the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states. He hopes that the merger will better equip him in defending against any potential comeuppance from Barack Obama if he wins re-election. If Romney wins, Bibi believes he will have a government ready and willing to take full advantage of a neoconservatives return to foreign policy power in the US. He is certain that his lobby in the US will keep Israel kosher enough, even though this move is going to alienate large numbers of US Jews and will likely increase growing tensions between the US Jewish and Protestant communities.

The effects will be even more profound within Israel. The expanding racism and xenophobia will kick into overdrive and, unless Labor or some new centrist party can truly capture an anti-racist spirit — which seems unlikely — the Israeli public will shift even farther right, and more liberals will be leaving.

But one thing this move will not affect is Iran, at least in the short run. Ha’aretz editor Aluf Benn believes that Netanyahu just created a war cabinet, one which will hasten an Israeli attack, and possibly even frighten the United States into attacking Iran itself before Israel does. I doubt it.

To start with, Benn does make some important points. He writes:

…Netanyahu has finally renounced his attempt to portray himself as a centrist, as a statesmanlike and moderate leader. The mask that he put on before the previous election has finally been tossed into the trash. With Lieberman as second in command and heir to the throne, and his supporters in prominent spots on the joint ticket, Likud will become a radical right-wing party, aggressive and xenophobic, that revels in Israel’s isolation and sees the Arab community as a domestic enemy and a danger to the state.

Quite true, and he later points out that the level of western-style democracy that was defended even by hawks like Benny Begin and others in Likud like Dan Meridor was just put in the crosshairs. What is left of that idealism in centrist Israel won’t survive.

But if, as Benn frames it (correctly, I think), Lieberman essentially replaces Ehud Barak as Bibi’s right hand man, this hardly shifts hard toward war. The final makeup of the next cabinet is still unclear. This joint list idea is going to narrow support for Netanyahu, not broaden it. The influential Shas party is no longer a realistic partner for Bibi, as they are strongly opposed to Yisrael Beiteinu. That’s a big loss. The joint list is almost certain to secure fewer seats than the parties would have separately, but this was a price Netanyahu was willing to pay to lead the biggest party in the Knesset next time (Kadima has the most seats in the current Knesset). But Bibi will have to offer someone, perhaps Yair Lapid’s new Yesh Atid party, some serious carrots to form a majority coalition without Shas. So the makeup of the cabinet and whether it will really be myopic enough to ignore what could become a growing movement against a unilateral strike in the public sphere remains to be seen.

But Benn’s calculation misses important points. First, Barak was a pro-attack force, and a powerful one, until the last few weeks, when he seemed to break with Netanyahu and strike a more moderate tone. Many analysts, as well as several people I’ve spoken to with some inside knowledge, believe this was pure theater to make Barak more electable. If that was the idea, it failed, and few expect Barak’s Atzmaut party to get enough votes in January to gain any seats at all in the Knesset. In any case, Barak is not the voice of moderation Benn makes him out to be.

More importantly, while cabinet opposition to a unilateral Israeli strike was certainly important, the major impediment remains: the military and intelligence establishment. Much like in the United States, where an AIPAC-influenced Congress has been beating the drums for war, the actual soldiers and commanders recognize the ramifications and difficulties of an attack on Iran. That’s not to say in either case that these military leaders would refuse an explicit order from their respective commanders-in-chief. But in both countries, the opposition has been much more important in preventing an attack to date than political forces.

Benn is correct in one sense: having Lieberman as deputy to Bibi’s sheriff is a war time configuration. It’s meant to strengthen the central government, to enable a greater degree of martial law in the event of war and to continue more of it when the war ends. It’s meant to diminish the influence of the military and intelligence leaders who have had the temerity to raise concerns about a war Netanyahu desperately wants.

But at this moment, it does not bring a war with Iran any closer than it was before. We can be thankful for that, at least. And, in a number of other ways, this move may backfire on Bibi in both the short and long terms. That would be more hopeful if there were a viable alternative in Israel or a president in the United States who was willing to take advantage of Israel’s radicalized image to exert real pressure (like that suggested by Protestant leaders earlier this month) for a regional peace agreement. Maybe that’s a second-term Obama, but I’m not holding my breath for that one. In an era of grim outlooks, I’ll content myself with knowing that this move by Netanyahu will not bring war with Iran any closer.

Back in January, academic Matthew Kroenig claimed the United States could militarily strike Iran without causing havoc and catastrophe in the region. His arguments were widely criticized and supported by the usual suspects. Jamie Fly, the neoconservative executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, disagreed with Kroenig, but only because [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Back in January, academic Matthew Kroenig claimed the United States could militarily strike Iran without causing havoc and catastrophe in the region. His arguments were widely criticized and supported by the usual suspects. Jamie Fly, the neoconservative executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, disagreed with Kroenig, but only because Kroenig did not go far enough. Then in May the two penned an op-ed arguing that President Obama had offered Iran too many carrots. This was just days before the talks almost collapsed after the only “relief” the Western-led negotiating team offered Iran was spare parts for aircraft that have suffered tremendously under sanctions. What would assist the negotiation process, according to Fly and Kroenig? More threats of military force, of course.

Although using the military option on Iran hasn’t exactly taken off as a preferred choice here in Washington, Kroenig and like-minded folks working at prominent platforms like the Wall Street Journal continue to beat their drums. That’s likely one reason why the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a debate moderated by Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose between Kroenig and Trita Parsi, a prominent US-Iran relations analyst and president of the National Iranian American Council. The entire debate is worth listening to, but in a nutshell, Kroenig reiterates the arguments from his article: out of the 3 potential outcomes with Iran — successful diplomacy, nuclear containment and military conflict, the third is most likely and planning should begin even while the US continues its diplomatic track with Iran. Israel isn’t equipped to do the job, so the US should carry out “limited” strikes and only respond devastatingly if Iran retaliates with more than wimper by, for example, closing the Strait of Hormuz.

Parsi accordingly points out several flaws in Kroenig’s argument: an Iranian nuclear weapon is neither inevitable nor imminent, diplomacy has neither failed nor been whole-heartedly utilized and the experience of the Iraq War, which took the lives of 5,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, shows that a war with Iran is hardly going to be quick and relatively painless as Kroenig suggests. Parsi adds that as with the lead-up to the Iraq War, proponents of the military option with Iran are not from the military or intelligence communities. In fact, neoconservative hawks regularly contest the validity of intelligence and military assessments, which is ironic to say the least. Parsi also notes that as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly emphasized, bombing a country is the best way to convince it that it needs a nuclear deterrent to ward of future attacks…

The economy is clearly the most important problem facing Egypt today. Unemployment and underemployment are vast. Tourism has been shattered by recent events and may take a long time to get back on track. Foreign investments have dropped and have even turned to a net outflow from the country rather than [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The economy is clearly the most important problem facing Egypt today. Unemployment and underemployment are vast. Tourism has been shattered by recent events and may take a long time to get back on track. Foreign investments have dropped and have even turned to a net outflow from the country rather than a net inflow into the country. Many domestic investors have also become quite wary and are considering leaving Egypt. This is especially true of some of the major Coptic Egyptian and conservative Muslim investors who are anxious about what the future may hold with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. The liberal and “secular” investors are about as wary and anxious as some of the Copts. There are some younger investors who see this as an opportunity. Some of the Muslim Brotherhood people are considerable business people and view the anxiety of some as an opportunity.

Even so, foreign exchange reserves are hemorrhaging from the treasury. Most of the government run factories and firms are in dire need of reform, refitting or even shutting down. The economy in general is in need of great reform toward more international competitiveness. If this is not done, Egypt will be in even worse shape in the future. The privatization and structural adjustment programs of the 1990s are looked down upon by many in Egypt due to the massive corruption that was brought along with these programs. However, the last thing Egypt needs now is to go back to the time of Nasser, nationalizations, 95 percent tax rates and the destruction of the business and landowning classes.

Egypt has to find its way to a more prosperous future and the United States and others could be of some help if they become more practical partners for this change. The focus should be on jobs, investment, education, technological change, and the practicalities of getting things done – not on the misty and often unproductive goals of “good governance”.  This term has a bad reputation amongst many Egyptians I met during my recent 6 week trip because, they say, the US talked about helping with good governance and really did nothing as Hosni Mubarak and company robbed and oppressed the country. Many Egyptians are also quite suspicious of non-governmental organization (NGOs) in general and governance NGOs in particular.

The US will need to try to develop some sort of relations with the new leadership of the country. In the past, there was little real contact at the strategic or any other level with the Brotherhood. Now the president of Egypt is from the Muslim Brotherhood, even if he said that he quit after he was elected. The new parliament and some of the new cabinet members – and even some of the future military leaders – could be Muslim Brotherhood or at least sensitive to the Brotherhood’s ideas and goals. Improving relations with the Brotherhood should be seen as a practical calculation, not as an acceptance of their principals. Egypt is an important country. We need to keep our relations going. President Mohamed Morsi is an example of the changes that are occurring in Egypt.

Building relations with the Salafists is another story altogether. I would be very careful with this. Their views of the US are dangerous, radical and extremist. Building relations with them should be geared more toward keeping potential enemies close to understand them better. I see very little hope in any real improvement in our relations with the Salafists.

The liberals, “secularists”, Nasserists and many others think we dropped them. Many also blame us for bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power. Why, they ask, did we not help them more during the most difficult times? This is a tough question that our diplomats and others need to work on to develop future relations with these groups. They are splintered and weak compared to the much better organized Brotherhood, Salafis and others. However, they will be involved with Egyptian politics for some time and should not be discounted as potential future leaders.

The Egyptian revolution and the political churn from it are far from over.

The US has had very good relations with the Egyptian military. Friendships and long term understandings have been developed. The strongest relations we have with Egypt are still with the military even after the changes that lead to the retiring of many senior officers. The military needs to be handled in a more nuanced manner now given the power of the Brotherhood overall. However, the tensions and chess game between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military are not over. Those who think that President Mohamed Morsi checkmated the military with the recent retirements are clearly and plainly wrong. There will be a lot more to this story.

The most important relation that the US needs to develop in Egypt is with ordinary Egyptian people. Our diplomats, business people, professors and others need to reach out more to the regular folks. We need to understand them better and they could understand us a lot better. The farmers in the countryside, the tea people in Cairo and Alexandria, and the TukTuk drivers from all over are Egypt’s backbone.

Regular Egyptians could become very important arbiters for the future of Egypt, especially if a potential “Revolution of the Hungry and Poor” breaks out. If the economy is not fixed quickly, there is a good chance for this. There is another important reason to reach out more to the regular folks: they are mostly decent, good people. The US could help them and help itself at the same time by building more small clinics in the poor areas, building school houses, helping with infrastructure repairs, giving scholarships to poor Egyptians to US schools and colleges, developing cultural exchanges and more. We cannot distance ourselves from average Egyptians anymore.

Egypt is likely going to take on new roles for regional and global issues. Egypt’s relations with Israel are likely to change. This will depend on how the politics of the revolution and bread work out. Egypt’s relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Sudan, and many other places and groups that the US considers problematic could also change. We need to understand these changes as they happen and respond in more nuanced and strategic ways than how I think we will.

Egypt will also likely reach out more to China, India, Russia, Brazil, the Gulf Cooperation Council and others to diversify its support. It will likely rely much less on the US than at any time since Anwar Sadat if the Muslim Brotherhood acquires even greater power. President Morsi’s visits to China, Saudi Arabia and more are not just to get frequent flier points and to meet and greet. Morsi’s trips are mostly about diversifying Egypt’s international relations and its sources of economic and political support. The Chinese seem quite happy to oblige and I expect that the Chinese military’s relations with the Egyptian military will also change.

We need to be very careful as changes in the international relations of Egypt develop.

Egypt is an important country in overall US-Islamic and US-Arab relations. We need to move with great care and consideration of not just the first, but also the second, third and fourth order effects of any new moves Egypt makes – and what moves we might make in response. The building of Sunni-Shia tensions may also work into this situation.

Egypt is a relatively poor country with big ambitions. Maybe it is time for the US to rethink its posture towards Egypt as well. Many Egyptians in leadership and others I have met during the 20 years I have been associated with the country have told me about the condescension they have sometimes felt from visiting Americans. The perception becomes the reality no matter what may actually be occurring. Building relations is complex. Rebuilding them during a time of great political and revolutionary flux is even more complex and fraught with risks. We need to send the best, brightest and most intelligent people to represent us.

It is hard to tell where Egypt’s new path is going. What US relations with Egypt will be like in the years to come is anyone’s guess. There will be lots of internal changes in Egypt. There will be many changes across the region as the inherent instabilities and tensions work themselves out or get worse while US politics also evolve.

Fluid and complex situations require nuanced strategic thinking. This is an area where Americans can stand to improve with respect to the Middle East. It is time to develop these skills and understanding in our people or pay the much heavier prices that could be coming our way if we don’t.

By Michael T. Klare

America and Oil.  It’s like bacon and eggs, Batman and Robin.  As the old song lyric went, you can’t have one without the other.  Once upon a time, it was also a surefire formula for national greatness and global [...]]]> Reposted by arrangement with Tom Dispatch

By Michael T. Klare

America and Oil.  It’s like bacon and eggs, Batman and Robin.  As the old song lyric went, you can’t have one without the other.  Once upon a time, it was also a surefire formula for national greatness and global preeminence.  Now, it’s a guarantee of a trip to hell in a hand basket.  The Chinese know it.  Does Washington?

America’s rise to economic and military supremacy was fueled in no small measure by its control over the world’s supply of oil.  Oil powered the country’s first giant corporations, ensured success in World War II, and underlay the great economic boom of the postwar period.  Even in an era of nuclear weapons, it was the global deployment of oil-powered ships, helicopters, planes, tanks, and missiles that sustained America’s superpower status during and after the Cold War.  It should come as no surprise, then, that the country’s current economic and military decline coincides with the relative decline of oil as a major source of energy.

If you want proof of that economic decline, just check out the way America’s share of the world’s gross domestic product has been steadily dropping, while its once-powerhouse economy now appears incapable of generating forward momentum.  In its place, robust upstarts like China and India are posting annual growth rates of 8% to 10%.  When combined with the growing technological prowess of those countries, the present figures are surely just precursors to a continuing erosion of America’s global economic clout.

Militarily, the picture appears remarkably similar.  Yes, a crack team of SEAL commandos did kill Osama bin Laden, but that single operation — greeted in the United States with a jubilation more appropriate to the ending of a major war — hardly made up for the military’s lackluster performance in two recent wars against ragtag insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.  If anything, almost a decade after the Taliban was overthrown, it has experienced a remarkable resurgence even facing the full might of the U.S., while the assorted insurgent forces in Iraq appear to be holding their own.  Meanwhile, Iran — that bête noire of American power in the Middle East — seem as powerful as ever.  Al Qaeda may be on the run, but as recent developments in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and unstable Pakistan suggest, the United States wields far less clout and influence in the region now than it did before it invaded Iraq in 2003.

If American power is in decline, so is the relative status of oil in the global energy equation.  In the 2000 edition of its International Energy Outlook, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy confidently foresaw ever-expanding oil production in Africa, Alaska, the Persian Gulf area, and the Gulf of Mexico, among other areas.  It predicted, in fact, that world oil output would reach 97 million barrels per day in 2010 and a staggering 115 million barrels in 2020.  EIA number-crunchers concluded as well that oil would long retain its position as the world’s leading source of energy.  Its 38% share of the global energy supply, they said, would remain unchanged.

What a difference a decade makes. By 2010, a new understanding about the natural limits of oil production had sunk in at the EIA and its experts were predicting a disappointingly modest petroleum future.  In that year, world oil output had reached just 82 million barrels per day, a stunning 15 million less than expected.  Moreover, in the 2010 edition of its International Energy Outlook, the EIA was now projecting 2020 output at 85 million barrels per day, hardly more than the 2010 level and 30 million barrels below its projections of just a decade earlier, which were relegated to the dustbin of history.  (Such projections, by the way, are for conventional, liquid petroleum and exclude “tough” and “dirty” sources that imply energy desperation — like Canadian tar sands, shale oil, and other “unconventional” fuels.)

The most recent EIA projections also show oil’s share of the world total energy supply — far from remaining constant at 38% — had already dropped to 35% in 2010 and was projected to continue declining to 32% in 2020 and 30% in 2035.  In its place, natural gas and renewable sources of energy are expected to assume ever more prominent roles.

So here’s the question all of us should consider, in part because until now no one has: Are the decline of the United States and the decline of oil connected?  Careful analysis suggests that there are good reasons to believe they are.

From Standard Oil to the Carter Doctrine

More than 100 years ago, America’s first great economic expansion abroad was spearheaded by its giant oil companies, notably John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company — a saga told with great panache in Daniel Yergin’s classic book The Prize. These companies established powerful beachheads in Mexico and Venezuela, and later in parts of Asia, North Africa, and of course the Middle East. As they became ever more dependent on the extraction of oil in distant lands, American foreign policy began to be reorganized around acquiring and protecting U.S. oil concessions in major producing areas.

With World War II and the Cold War, oil and U.S. national security became thoroughly intertwined.  After all, the United States had prevailed over the Axis powers in significant part because it possessed vast reserves of domestic petroleum while Germany and Japan lacked them, depriving their forces of vital fuel supplies in the final years of the war.  As it happened, though, the United States was using up its domestic reserves so rapidly that, even before World War II was over, Washington turned its attention to finding new overseas sources of crude that could be brought under American control.  As a result, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and a host of other Middle Eastern producers would become key U.S. oil suppliers under American military protection.

There can be little question that, for a time, American domination of world oil production would prove a potent source of economic and military power.  After World War II, an abundance of cheap U.S. oil spurred the development of vast new industries, including civilian air travel, highway construction, a flood of suburban housing and commerce, mechanized agriculture, and plastics.

Abundant oil also underlay the global expansion of the country’s military power, as the Pentagon garrisoned the world while becoming one of the planet’s great oil guzzlers.  Its global dominion came to rest on an ever-expanding array of oil-powered ships, planes, tanks, and missiles.  As long as the Middle East — and especially Saudi Arabia — served essentially as an American gas station and oil remained a cheap commodity, all this was relatively painless.

In addition, thanks to its control of Middle Eastern oil, Washington had its hand on the economic jugular of Europe and Japan, both of which remain highly dependent on imports from the region.  Not surprisingly, then, one president after another insisted Washington would not permit any rival to challenge American control of that oil jugular — a principle enshrined in the Carter Doctrine of January 1980, which stated that the United States would go to war if any hostile power threatened the flow of Persian Gulf oil.

The use of military force, in accordance with that doctrine, has been a staple of American foreign policy since 1987, when President Ronald Reagan first applied the “principle” by authorizing U.S. warships to escort Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq War.  George H. W. Bush invoked the same principle when he authorized American military intervention during the first Gulf War of 1990-1991, as did Bill Clinton when he ordered missile attacks on Iraq in the late 1990s and George W. Bush when he launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

At that moment, the United States and oil seemed at the pinnacle of their power.  As the victor in the Cold War and then the first Gulf War, the American military was ranked supreme, with no conceivable challenger on the horizon.  And nowhere were there more fervent believers in “unilateralist” America’s ability to “shock and awe” the planet than in Washington.  The nation’s economy still appeared relatively robust as a major housing bubble was just beginning to form.  China’s economy was then a paltry 15% as big as ours.  Only seven years later, it would be approximately 40% as large.  By invading Iraq, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld planned to demonstrate the crushing superiority of America’s new high-tech weaponry, while setting the stage for further military exploits in the region, including a possible attack on Iran.  (A neocon quip caught the mood of the moment: “Everyone wants to go to Baghdad.  Real men want to go to Tehran.”)

The future of oil seemed no less robust in 2003: demand was brisk, crude prices ranged from about $25 to $30 per barrel, and the concept of “peak oil” — the notion that planetary supplies were more limited than imagined, that in the near future production would reach its peak and subsequently contract — was still considered laughable by most industry experts.  By invading Iraq and setting up permanent military bases at the very heart of the global oil heartlands, the White House expected to ensure continued control over the flow of Persian Gulf oil and gain access to Iraq’s voluminous reserves, the largest in the world after those of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

From an imperial point of view, it was a beautiful dream from which Americans were destined to awaken abruptly.  As a start, it quickly became apparent that American technological prowess was no panacea for urban guerrilla warfare, and so a vast occupation army was soon needed to “pacify” Iraq — and then pacify it again, and again, and again.  A similar dilemma arose in Afghanistan, where a tribal-based religious insurgency proved remarkably immune to superior American firepower.  To sustain hundreds of thousands of American soldiers in those distant, often inaccessible areas, the Department of Defense became the world’s single biggest consumer of oil, burning more on a daily basis than the entire nation of Sweden — this, at a time when the price of crude rose to $50, then $80, and finally soared over the $100 mark.  Procuring and delivering ever-increasing amounts of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel to American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan may not be the principal reason for the wars’ spiraling costs, but it certainly ranks among the major causes.  (Just the price of providing air conditioning to American troops in those two countries is now estimated at approximately $20 billion a year.)

With oil likely to prove increasingly scarce and costly, the Department of Defense is being forced to reexamine its fundamental operating principles when it comes to energy.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s notion that troops could be replaced by growing numbers of oil-powered super-weapons no longer appears viable, even for a power already garrisoning much of the planet for which “unending” war has become the new norm.

Yes, the Pentagon is looking into the use of biofuels, solar arrays, and other green alternatives to petroleum to power its planes and tanks, but any such future still seems an almost inconceivably long way off.  And yet the thought of more wars involving the commitment of vast numbers of ground troops to protracted counterinsurgency operations in distant parts of the Greater Middle East at $400 or more for every gallon of gas used appears increasingly unpalatable for the globe’s former “sole superpower.”  (Hence, the sudden burst of enthusiasm over drone wars.)  Seen from this perspective, the decline of America and the decline of oil appear closely connected indeed.

Don’t Bet on Washington

And this is hardly the only apparent connection.  Because the American economy is so closely tied to oil, it is especially vulnerable to oil’s growing scarcity, price volatility, and the relative paucity of its suppliers.  Consider this: at present, the United States obtains about 40% of its total energy supply from oil, far more than any other major economic power.  This means that when prices rise or oil supplies are disrupted for any reason — hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, war in the Middle East, environmental disasters of any sort — the economy is at particular risk. While a burst housing bubble and financial shenanigans lay behind the Great Recession that began in 2008, it’s worth remembering that it also coincided with the beginning of a stratospheric rise in oil prices.  As anyone who has pulled into a gas station knows, at an average price of nearly $3.70 a gallon for regular gas, the staying power of high-priced oil has crippled what, until recently, was being called a “weak recovery.”

Despite the great debt debate in Washington, oil is a factor seldom mentioned when American indebtedness comes up.  And yet the United States imports 50% to 60% of its oil supply, and with prices averaging at least $80 to $90 per barrel, we’re sending approximately $1 billion every day to foreign oil providers.  These payments constitute the single biggest contribution to the country’s balance-of-payments deficit and so is a major source of the nation’s economic weakness.

Consider for comparison our leading economic rival: China.  That country relies on oil for only about 20% of its total energy supply, about half as much as we do.  Instead, the Chinese have turned to coal, which they possess in great abundance and can produce at a relatively low cost.  (China, of course, pays a heavy environmental price for its coal dependency.)  The Chinese do import some petroleum, but considerably less than the U.S., so their import expenses are considerably smaller.  Nor do its oil-import costs have the same enfeebling effect, since China enjoys a positive balance of trade (in part, at America’s expense).  As a result, when oil prices soared to record heights in 2008 and again in 2011, Beijing experienced none of the trauma felt in Washington.

No doubt many factors explain the startling rise of the Chinese economy, including lower costs of production and weaker environmental regulations.  It is hard, however, to avoid the conclusion that our greater reliance on oil as it begins its decline has played a significant role in the changing balance of economic power between the two countries.

All this leads to a critical question:  How should America respond to these developments in the years ahead?

As a start, there can be no question that the United States needs to move quickly to reduce its reliance on oil and increase the availability of other energy sources, especially renewable ones that pose no threat to the environment.  This is not merely a matter of reducing our reliance on imported oil, as some have suggested.  As long as oil remains our preeminent source of energy, we will be painfully vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the global oil market, wherever problems may arise.  Only by embracing forms of energy immune to international disruption and capable of promoting investment at home can the foundations be laid for future economic progress.  Of course, this is easy enough to write, but with Washington in the grip of near-total political paralysis, it appears that continuing American decline, possibly of a precipitous sort, could be in the cards.

And don’t think that China will get away scot-free either.  If it doesn’t quickly embrace the new energy technologies, the environmental costs of its excessive reliance on coal will, sooner or later, cripple its development as well.  Unlike Washington, however, the Chinese leadership not only recognizes this, but is acting on it by making colossal investments in green energy technologies.  If China succeeds in dominating this field — as has already begun to happen — it could leave the United States in the dust when it comes to economic growth.  Ditching oil for the new energy technologies should be America’s top economic priority, but if you’re in a betting mood, you probably shouldn’t put your money on Washington.

Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, a TomDispatch regular, and the author, most recently, of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet. A documentary movie version of his previous book, Blood and Oil, is available from the Media Education Foundation.

The role of labor was crucial in Egyptians’ popular efforts to oust Hosni Mubarak, perhaps the bale of straw that broke the U.S.-supported dictator’s back. Naturally, organizers and activists are glowing. But will [...]]]> Our colleague Emad Mekay has a piece on Egyptian labor in today’s International Herald Tribune, the global edition of the New York Times.

The role of labor was crucial in Egyptians’ popular efforts to oust Hosni Mubarak, perhaps the bale of straw that broke the U.S.-supported dictator’s back. Naturally, organizers and activists are glowing. But will it last?

With continued military rule in Egypt, at least until elections in the fall, the recent kingbreakers find themselves at odds with the newly-elevated junta, who have asked them to calm things down.

Here’s an excerpt of Mekay’s report from Egypt’s textile hub El Mahalla, home to a long-oppressed labor movement:

[Organizer Hamdi] Hussein was all smiles as he announced that he was heading to Cairo to attend a meeting to chart out future labor demands after the stunning success of the Egyptian revolution.

“Yesterday, this meeting would have been secret and I would have been forced to sneak in and out of El Mahalla,” Mr. Hussein said during an interview.

“Now, the labor movement that helped topple Mubarak will take its rightful place in protecting the revolution.”

But will it? This newfound labor empowerment has startled the interim government, which was originally appointed by Mr. Mubarak, and challenges the efforts by the military, which is effectively in charge, to protect Egypt’s existing institutions and return the country to a more normal life.

“All ministers here are displeased with the strikes,” Magdy Radi, the cabinet’s spokesman, said by telephone. “It is hampering our work as a caretaker government. But it is an issue for the supreme council to take care of, not us.”

The military council, despite initial reports that it would move to ban strikes altogether, has so far taken a more measured approach. On Tuesday, it issued a communiqué urging Egyptians to tone down their labor protests, citing the consequences for the economy and the supply of everyday needs.

The new government and the military may have a more profound reason to be worried about a new wave of strikes, which played a critical role in bringing down the Mubarak regime.

Earlier this month, as the world was riveted by the young “Internet generation” demonstrating in huge numbers in Tahrir Square, Mr. Hussein and 20 other labor leaders were busy using their mobile phones to plan a nationwide series of strikes and sit-ins.