Chuck Hagel is not exactly my kind of guy. Hagel is an old-school Conservative Republican and his voting record in the Senate lines up pretty well with that image. He was poor on civil rights, favored the rich in economic matters, generally opposed abortion, voted against campaign finance reform, and, despite [...]]]>
Chuck Hagel is not exactly my kind of guy. Hagel is an old-school Conservative Republican and his voting record in the Senate lines up pretty well with that image. He was poor on civil rights, favored the rich in economic matters, generally opposed abortion, voted against campaign finance reform, and, despite later opposition, he voted for the Iraq War. Yet the dominant question around his still-only-rumored nomination for Secretary of Defense is how pro-Israel he is.
Hagel is a Realist who would have been quite comfortable on the foreign policy teams of Dwight Eisenhower or George H.W. Bush. Ironically for liberals and leftists, that conservative-Republican school is often much closer in practice to our foreign policy ideals than so-called liberal Democrats tend to be. But in 2012’s version of conservatism, that stance makes him adangerous character. This is especially true with regard to the issue of US policy toward Israel, where Hagel, while certainly being far from a peace activist, advocates an interest-based, non-ideological approach.
And that is really the nub of the issue. Even for many defenders of Hagel’s nomination, the question of what is best for Israel is a central one. It seems obvious that when considering a Cabinet position in the US government, the questions should be confined to what is best for US interests, whatever each individual thinks those interests might be. But in the bizarre world of Washington around this issue, somehow that is not the case.
President Obama’s potential nomination of Hagel as his next Secretary of Defense can be a complicated question for advocates of Palestinian rights and a resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Hagel represents, on this one issue, something close to the best attitude we could realistically hope for in the upper levels of Washington. He advocated that the US call for an immediate cease-fire in the 2006 war on Lebanon; he supports the US talking with Hamas; he opposed listing Hezbollah as a terrorist group so they could be spoken with openly; and he opposes military action against Iran. As far as they go, these are certainly positions most of us can agree with.
But they are also the positions that have brought sharp attacks on Hagel, and that’s not surprising; they are positions with which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vehemently disagrees. And what Bibi disagrees with, his friends in the so-called “Israel Lobby” in Washington will zealously attack. Thus, Hagel is anti-Israel, maybe even anti-Semitic.
The tactic is tried and true. AIPAC has remained notably silent on Hagel, allowing the attacks to come from the neoconservative circles, represented by Bill Kristol, Elliot Abrams and others of their ilk. It is a sad comment on the state of political discourse in the United States that, despite their monumental foreign policy failures during the George W. Bush administration, the neocons’ views are still given considerable weight in Washington. And against that weight is Barack Obama, who showed himself in his first term to be a weak leader who tries to avoid confrontation. A December 23 report in the National Journal indicated that Obama may be caving in to the pressure on Hagel.
This is distressingly familiar. In Obama’s first term, he nominated Chas Freeman to chair the National Intelligence Council. Freeman, a critic of Israeli policies but, like Hagel, a supporter of Israeli security and the alliance (although not the “special relationship) between Israel and the United States, came under fierce attack and eventually withdrew from consideration for the post. The attacks on Freeman were initially based on his views on Israel, but later were organized as well around his “close relationship” with the Saudi government and a comment he made about the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in China, which was made in a private e-mail and, according to Freeman, taken out of context.
Hagel, too, has come under fire for other reasons, most notably a remark he made about the 1998 appointment of James Hormel as ambassador to Luxembourg, the first openly gay ambassador in US history. Hagel questioned the appointment, calling Hormel “openly and aggressively gay,” a remark which, as it should, angered LGBT folks everywhere. But Hagel has had fourteen years to reconsider his views, and in that time a lot of education has happened with many people. Hagel issued an apology and it is worth noting that James Hormel’s initial skepticism of the apology has received a great deal more media coverage than his subsequent statement that the apology was “significant.” Hormel, in a post on his Facebook page, said “I can’t remember a time when a potential presidential nominee apologized for anything. While the timing appears self-serving, the words themselves are unequivocal — they are a clear apology. Since 1998, fourteen years have passed, and public attitudes have shifted — perhaps Sen. Hagel has progressed with the times, too…Sen. Hagel stated in his remarks that he was willing to support open military service and LGBT military families. If that is a commitment to treat LGBT service members and their families like everybody else, I would support his nomination.”
The Human Rights Campaign also recognized Hagel’s apology as significant and closed the book on the issue, but that has not made it go away. No one in Washington, whatever they might say in public, believes the controversy over Hagel has anything to do with his beliefs on LGBT rights any more than anyone here believed that the controversy over Freeman had anything to do with China. This is all about Israel, and, more to the point, the far-right Likud agenda which drives not only the majority in the Knesset but virtually the entirety of the Israel Lobby in the United States.
It is worth noting that the tiny Log Cabin Republican organization suddenly came up withenough funding to take out a full page ad in the New York Times of December 27, denouncing Hagel as “wrong on gay rights, wrong on Israel, wrong on Iran.” It’s not much of a mystery where they got the money to do this.
The Wrong Response
Some have chosen to defend Hagel by arguing that “No, no, no. he really is pro-Israel.” There is some reason for optimism on this point, as one of the leading “liberal hawk” voices on Israel, The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg defended Hagel on this basis. But voices that are expected to be more liberal on this issue have also used Hagel’s pro-Israel record as the basis for their defense of him. The Center for American Progress, which has, in the past couple of years, been purged of most of its most critical voices on this issue, came up with a list of pro-Israel statements by Hagel, and J Street, naturally, based its entire defense of Hagel on this point.
While there is certainly some merit to exposing the neocons’ distortions of Hagel’s record, in opposing their efforts by claiming Hagel is really pro-Israel only reinforces the idea that Israeli approval of top US officials is a worthy litmus test for such appointments. Of course, even the neocons won’t explicitly claim that US officials should meet Israeli/Israel Lobby approval, but in practice this is not only what they believe, in practice, it may not be absolute, but the Lobby’s voice on such appointments carries a great deal of weight.
This is not a left or right, peace or war issue. Peace and Palestine solidarity activists have no illusions about the potential for individuals who share our views to be appointed to Cabinet positions in the US government. But that hardly means we need to continue to tolerate an environment, which has persisted in Washington for too many years now, where a neoconservative view of the US-Israel relationship can, if not actually exercise a veto, make appointments to Cabinet posts very difficult if they don’t approve of the candidates.
This time, the Lobby’s actions have stirred some significant responses. Americans for Peace Now managed to oppose the smear campaign against Hagel without pleading his “pro-Israel” bona fides, but on the merits of his qualifications. So did a list of retired US diplomats, including several former Ambassadors to Israel. Andrew Sullivan launched a spirited attack on the neocons’ tactics here in the Daily Beast.
In the New York Times, Tom Friedman split the difference, both defending Hagel as being good for Israel and arguing that this is not the proper basis for deciding on a Secretary of Defense. Long-time Jewish affairs DC correspondent James Besser points to the cliff the Lobby is heading towards by taking shots at people like Hagel. On the other hand, the conservative Cato Institute also blasts the Lobby’s campaign against Hagel.
All of this adds up to a strong case for Obama to stand up and pick Hagel. Several Senators, most notably Republican Lindsey Graham (R-SC), have implied that Hagel would have a difficult road to confirmation. But the reality is that there is a great deal of backing for Hagel, he is well-respected in the Senate, Republicans would look very silly if they vote en masse against one of their own and Democrats will have a tough time opposing Obama on this. In other words, the reason the Lobby is going at this so hard now is that this is when Hagel is much more vulnerable.
This is a real opportunity to deal the Lobby a big loss. One doesn’t have to like Chuck Hagel to see the value in that.
]]>Speaking with Mitchell Plitnick, Rosen, co-chair of the Rabbinical Council of Jewish Voice for Peace, stressed that the views both in his book and [...]]]>
Rabbi Brant Rosen leads a congregation in Evanston, Illinois and is author of the new book, Wrestling in the Daylight: A Rabbi’s Path to Palestinian Solidarity.Speaking with Mitchell Plitnick, Rosen, co-chair of the Rabbinical Council of Jewish Voice for Peace, stressed that the views both in his book and in this interview are his own and do not represent his congregation. Excerpts follow.
Q: How has your personal view of Israel changed in the past four years?
A: I had seen the conflict as two peoples having two legitimate claims to the land of Israel-Palestine and the only way out of the morass is two states for two peoples. I had identified with Israel as a Jew; that was my narrative growing up. I have deep familial relationships there, visited Israel many times, and even considered moving there.
The shift in my views was a gradual thing, but the breaking point was Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 (this was the name Israel gave to its assault on the Gaza Strip at that time). I came to realise this was not a conflict between two equal parties but an essential injustice that began with the birth of the state of Israel and has continued since that time. It is a situation of one very powerful party bending the other to its will.
Once I spoke out about Israel’s outrages in Cast Lead, the dominoes really started to fall for me. As a congregational rabbi I was in a difficult place and people looked to me for guidance. About a year after that, I reassessed my relationship as a Jew to Israel, to the entire issue, not just Gaza, but about Zionism in general.
I become more involved in Palestine Solidarity work, reaching out to Palestinians, some of whom were friends and others who were activists in this area. So many of them reached out to me when I spoke out on Gaza, and I wanted to learn from them what their experience of this issue was.
Today, I know where I stand, very much a rabbi in the Jewish community, still serving my congregation, still motivated by Jewish values, but also someone who stands in solidarity with Palestinians in their struggle for human rights, equal rights and dignity in the land they either live in or seek to return to.
Q: Jewish Voice for Peace is one of the leading groups involved in targeted divestment from Israel’s occupation, a part of the Boycott/Divestment/Sanctions (BDS) movement that seeks to bring public economic and political pressure on Israel. How do you see the future of this movement?
A: I think the movement is growing by leaps and bounds, attracting more and more people. When the U.N. vote on Palestine’s non-member status hit, it drowned out another story I thought was actually more important: Stevie Wonder backed out of a fundraising concert for a U.S. group called the Friends of the Israel Defense Forces.
He is the latest celebrity to express his support for the Palestinian cause by cancelling such concerts following a long list of artists and entertainers who have cancelled shows in Israel. Whether they did it because of public pressure or because they believed it to be right, it shows the power of the boycott movement.
To create political change, leveraging people power is the best method; historically, this has consistently been the case. The fact that Israel reacts so harshly against it shows its potential. When Hillary Clinton says 3,000 new settlement units are “not helpful”, that doesn’t get Israel’s attention.
On the other hand, when Jewish Voice for Peace, Students for Justice in Palestine and a wide range of church groups succeed in getting a large holding company to divest from the occupation, that’s front page news in Israel. That is a sign that this has a great impact, when used in a smart and concerted way.
Contrary to the frequent accusations, BDS is not anti-Semitic. I think the argument that it unfairly singles out Israel from other human rights abusers is disingenuous… The question is not whether Israel is legitimate; it exists and is part of the international community. But if Israel acts in an illegitimate way, citizens around the world have the right and responsibility to leverage what power they can to get them to cease.
Q: Do you think the recent call by 15 mainstream Protestant leaders of many different denominations for an inquiry into whether U.S. aid to Israel is in compliance with existing U.S. law is a significant new development?
A: Yes. I think the most important thing is that the leaders are standing firm and are not backing down despite being excoriated and being called everything up to and including anti-Semites. That is important because up until now the covenant on religious relations has been that you can talk about anything BUT Israel, and this time they’ve broken with that.
They have until now been bullied by the Jewish establishment. This can usher in a new relationship where we can talk about anything, not only the things we have in common, but also these issues, like Israeli policy, where we don’t always agree. I’m proud that JVP stood behind the statement.
Jewish leaders said they would walk out of a planned interfaith summit, and demanded a separate summit to discuss these issues. I thought this was very damaging, this is not something resembling dialogue.
The Church leaders have issued a second statement saying they would be happy to meet with Jewish leaders about this, that we’re happy to talk, but we are not going back on what we said. This is very healthy; this is real dialogue, which occurs when you focus on the painful issues you don’t agree on.
It’s very important that Christians see that many Jews do stand with them when they make statements like this. The Jewish establishment does not represent the Jewish community. The Jewish community is much larger and more complex than these unaccountable representatives whose names most Jews don’t even know.
*Rabbi Brant Rosen blogs at Shalom Rav
]]>Only 1% of the world stood by US-Israeli rejection of President Mahmoud Abbas’ request for non-member state status, which puts Palestine on par with the Vatican and allows Palestinian claims to be filed in the International Criminal Court. Lobe Log’s Mitchell Plitnick reported at the time on the politics [...]]]>
Only 1% of the world stood by US-Israeli rejection of President Mahmoud Abbas’ request for non-member state status, which puts Palestine on par with the Vatican and allows Palestinian claims to be filed in the International Criminal Court. Lobe Log’s Mitchell Plitnick reported at the time on the politics behind the resolution and Israel’s strategy (featured in the London Review of Books) and on the Israel lobby’s response in the US. But the path to Palestinian statehood (if it’s not destroyed beyond repair) will be a long and bumpy one, especially if the recent Egyptian-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hamas fails to hold. So where to go from here? Al Jazeera English chief political analyst Marwan Bishara discusses with Peter Beinart, Ethan Bronner, Tony Karon, and Rashid Khalidi.
]]>The US government has swept into action in the aftermath of the Palestinians’ overwhelming victory at the United Nations on Thursday. No less than three amendments were brought in the Senate, to be attached to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) — a bill which has nothing to do [...]]]>
The US government has swept into action in the aftermath of the Palestinians’ overwhelming victory at the United Nations on Thursday. No less than three amendments were brought in the Senate, to be attached to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) — a bill which has nothing to do with Israel and the Palestinians, but is a high-priority bill that the Senate must pass, and as such is a perfect target for frivolous amendments).
Two of the amendments are purely partisan and with a Republican minority in the Senate, they are unlikely to pass. The third, however, is bipartisan and the leading Democrat sponsoring it is Charles Schumer (D-NY) whose position as the Democrats’ lead fundraiser means he gets his senate colleagues’ attention. The partisan amendments are somewhat more draconian than the bipartisan one, which will make the bipartisan amendment look relatively moderate, thereby increasing the chances of its passage.
Along with Schumer, the amendment is sponsored by Lindsey Graham (R-SC), John Barrasso (R-WY) and Bob Menendez (D-NJ). It calls for the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) office in the US unless the Palestinians return to talks with Israel. No timeframe is given for the return to talks, nor is there any mention of anything Israel must do to make that return politically feasible for the Palestinians. This amounts to an attempt to force the Palestinians back into talks on Bibi Netanyahu’s terms, which, as I explain here, would be political suicide for the Palestinian Authority (PA).
The more important clause, however, would end all aid — with no provision for a presidential national security waiver — to the Palestinian Authority if it or any entity “that purports to represent the interests of the Palestinian people” should ever bring a case, or even support one brought by someone else, that the International Criminal Court (ICC) adjudicates. Access to the ICC is the biggest tangible gain the Palestinians got from their upgraded UN status, and this amendment is an attempt to ensure that it is useless. Significantly, according to the way the amendment is written, the aid cutoff would be automatically triggered even if the Palestinians support another case or if some other entity brings a case on the Palestinians’ behalf.
This may be only the beginning of legislative activism aimed at punishing the Palestinians for their UN move. The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) also issued a memo that echoed the condemnation of the Palestinian action from US officials starting with President Obama; painted an extremely distorted picture of the circumstances around and meaning behind the PLO’s move; and made a list of “recommendations” for the US government to follow. These include pressuring Mahmoud Abbas to refrain from similar actions in the future, “…demonstrate to the PLO that unconstructive unilateral actions have consequences;” close the PLO office in DC; and threaten aid to the Palestinians.
It’s standard procedure for such bills that AIPAC be at least consulted on its contents and this certainly would have been the case for a response to the UN vote. The presence of AIPAC talking points in the bill leaves little doubt about its influence; the fact that AIPAC’s own statement is much broader implies this is not the end of such legislation. In announcing their memo, Ron Kampeas at the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reports that AIPAC in fact called for a “full review” of the U.S. relationship with the PLO.
AIPAC tries to push a point frequently made in the run-up to the UN vote — that Congress will cut off all aid to the PA if the PLO pursues gains at the UN. In fact, Congress has only mandated such cut-off if Palestine becomes a full member state of the UN, something the US can easily prevent because it requires Security Council certification. Still, it is clear that AIPAC is determined to punish the Palestinians in some way. Whether or not they are willing to risk the PA’s collapse — something the Obama Administration certainly wants to avoid, as does, quite likely, the Netanyahu government (at least currently) – remains to be seen.
Even granting that there was a good deal of lead time before the UN vote, it’s still worth noting how quickly Congress jumped to respond. It would be nice if they were so quick to respond to matters that are far more pertinent to US citizens, like, oh, the “fiscal cliff” for example. Maybe we can get AIPAC to push them on that.
- Mitchell Plitnick is the former Co-Director of Jewish Voice for Peace and former Director of the US Office of B’Tselem. You can follow him on Twitter at @MitchellPlit or at his blog, The Third Way.
]]>It’s a most unwelcome feeling of déjà vu which must settle over any observer of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the US role in it. An escalation is seen in the woefully asymmetric exchange of fire between Israel and the Gaza Strip, Israel claims the escalation was entirely initiated by Hamas, when [...]]]>
It’s a most unwelcome feeling of déjà vu which must settle over any observer of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the US role in it. An escalation is seen in the woefully asymmetric exchange of fire between Israel and the Gaza Strip, Israel claims the escalation was entirely initiated by Hamas, when in fact Israel had provoked it, and it begins air strikes in Gaza. Thus began Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09 and so has begun Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012. Hopefully this episode will not end with nearly 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead, as Cast Lead did.
That hope is dimmed even further by the fact that once again Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has won the upper hand in the first move of the second round of his chess match with the US President, Barack Obama. By launching this offensive now, Netanyahu knows full well that Obama, who has to try to bring a lame duck Congress together to deal with a looming economic crash US media have taken to calling the “fiscal cliff”, cannot afford to do anything less than fully support Israel’s actions at this time. If he does, he will have the additional weight of criticism from the Israel lobby, something he simply cannot afford to contend with during a time of domestic crisis, which he needs Congress to resolve.
Primarily, though, Netanyahu’s timetable for this attack was based on Israeli politics, not US. With early elections called for January, Netanyahu’s gambit of forming a joint ticket with the fascist Yisrael Beiteinu party has not yielded anything close to the sort of polling results he had hoped for. His old rivals, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni are both considering entering the race and Netanyahu has reason to believe they would take more votes from him. Opening a wider operation against the Gaza Strip strengthens Netanyahu, whose candidacy depends on the insecurity of Israeli citizens; it makes it less tempting for Olmert and Livni to enter the race; and it takes the issues of the economy, the failed budget talks which led to the collapse of the current Israeli government and widespread concern over various social issues, all of which are major areas of weakness for Netanyahu, away from the electoral spotlight.
Gaza was the obvious choice for military action. Despite some warnings about Syria, Israel does not want to be anywhere near that conflict. And Obama’s electoral victory clearly meant that an attack on Iran was not going to materialize, at least not in time for it to do any good for Netanyahu’s re-election bid. So, Gaza it was.
Israel set up the narrative earlier this month. Most US and Israeli media recaps of the events leading up to the launching of Operation Pillar of Defense begin with an attack on Israeli soldiers on November 8. What is generally not mentioned is that the soldiers were operating inside of Gaza at the time. Given Israel’s claim that it is no longer occupying the Strip, the soldiers were thus a legitimate target. But this is viewed as the “terrorist attack” which led to Israeli retaliation, then to increasing numbers of rockets launched at Israeli civilians, and, eventually, to this broad military operation.
Whether or not the White House is aware of this chronology is irrelevant as this is the narrative that is dominating not only the media but the politics around the Israeli assault on Gaza. Obama would face a herculean task if he tried to stop Israel from acting in what most will see as legitimate self-defense. And, indeed, international law does dictate that the targeting of civilians, as the rockets from Gaza almost always do, is unequivocally illegal, and any country has the right and duty to protect its civilians. Trying to get past that very real point would require a great deal of effort from Obama, which Netanyahu knows full well. So Obama’s not trying; the State Department quickly issued a statement fully backing Israel’s attack and putting all of the blame for the escalation on Hamas.
Yet this could prove to be a grave complication for Obama going forward in his second term. As I have argued, Obama needs to use his second term to repair the damage he did in his first to the US’ standing in the Arab and larger Muslim world. There are many things he can do, but everything comes back to Israel-Palestine and the US’ destructive role in that conflict, as it always does. But how can he move toward a resolution amidst the despair, the failure of Oslo and the lack of any negotiations for years?
Mending ties with Egypt and Turkey, the two countries that have both increased democracy in their systems in recent years (albeit in different ways) and have also increased participation of openly religious parties, could go a long way to reassuring the Muslim world that we will respect their popular choices. It would also send a chilling message to the Israeli government, and could, possibly, provide the spark needed to move toward productive diplomacy around the Arab-Israeli conflict.
That proposal I made, or any other, is going to be undermined by Obama’s support for Israel in Gaza, especially if a ground operation ensues and we see hundreds of civilian casualties, as we did in Operation Cast Lead four years ago. Surely Obama knows this, and despite the political constraints he faces at the moment, his failure to adopt at least a slightly more conciliatory stance here does not bode well for his handling of the Middle East for the next four years.
Egypt has already recalled its ambassador to Israel. At this writing, the UN Security Council is holding an emergency session on the Israeli attack on Gaza. The Arab League has issued strong statements condemning the Israeli action and called for the UNSC to call for an immediate cease-fire. If past behavior holds, the US will prevent any such statement until it deems that Israel has had enough time to carry out its operational objectives. And, just moments ago, reports came in of three Israeli civilians having been killed by a rocket from Gaza, which makes a wider operation even more likely. Eight Gazans have been reported killed so far.
Given the stranglehold the Israel Lobby (and, I’ll note, this is further proof that the Lobby is far from pro-Israel, but in fact works to support the Israeli right to the detriment of Israel’s best interests and the security of most Israelis) has over Congress, there is little hope that Obama’s second term will be an improvement over his first in regard to his Middle East policies. The US reaction to the assault on Gaza reduces even that small hope.
But it does not reduce it to zero. There is real impetus for Obama to try to leave office with a better relationship between the US and the Arab world than there is now. In order to do so, he would have to also at least begin to steer the US relationship with Israel toward one of a more normal alliance, dictated by the relative interests and geo-strategic positions and needs of each country, rather than the current “special relationship” where US policy is predicated on Israeli desires. It is inconceivable that Obama would even try to fully accomplish that, but, especially given his tense relationship with Netanyahu and the continuing Israeli tilt rightward, it is possible he may be willing to take small steps in that direction once the looming fiscal cliff crisis is resolved.
Not a lot of hope, but there remains a slim possibility that could come about.
]]>Mitchell Plitnick discusses the implications of Netanyahu’s decision to repeat his call for early elections in Israel after his decision earlier this year to first call for, and then call off, such elections:
Early elections are appealing to Netanyahu in other ways. If his position is secure upon the re-election of [...]]]>
Mitchell Plitnick discusses the implications of Netanyahu’s decision to repeat his call for early elections in Israel after his decision earlier this year to first call for, and then call off, such elections:
Early elections are appealing to Netanyahu in other ways. If his position is secure upon the re-election of Barack Obama, this will put him in a stronger position to withstand the US President’s anger at Bibi’s efforts to dislodge him from office. It will also help him stand up to international resistance should he decide to again ramp up his calls for an attack on Iran, and in his ongoing stalemate with the Palestinians. Early elections will also not give Netanyahu’s rivals – former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, ex-Foreign Minister and Kadima leader, Tzipi Livni and former Shas leader Aryeh Deri – enough time to mount a serious threat to Bibi’s position.
Though the Israeli media has been filled with reports of a “rift” between Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Likud insiders have remarked that the matter is more one of electoral posturing for the sake of the settler movement than a looming break between the two Iran hawks:
If the defense minister was not functioning according to Netanyahu’s expectations, he would be fired. The truth is that there is professional harmony between them. It became important for Barak to recruit center-left votes to pass the electoral threshold, after he realized that he had no chance of getting a guaranteed place on the Likud Knesset list. To Netanyahu, on the other hand, it’s important to put some distance between himself and Barak, who is seen as the settlers’ enemy.
Plitnick asserts that Netanyahu and Likud’s domination of the government is unlikely to be seriously contested by the other Knesset parties, and believes that this is indicative of how Israeli politics will play out for years to come following the upsurge of rightist sentiment in Israeli political life:
]]>It [early elections] would make Bibi very secure in his position, even more so than he is now.
That’s what Netanyahu is seeing as his potential endgame, and that is why he is willing to risk a major economic crisis in Israel by playing games with the new budget. Even if new elections happen in February , that would mean a new budget wouldn’t be in place until late spring or summer. In the meantime, the Israeli economy will be vulnerable and ministries will be underfunded. That’s a high price for a country to pay for its Prime Minister’s political ambitions.
Two points emerge from this assessment. One is that there is no reason to question the expectation that Netanyahu and Likud would win a new election. That is true despite the fact that Bibi’s approval ratings are quite low, generally between 30% and 40%. Many Israelis simply don’t see a better option.
The second, perhaps more disturbing, point is how little the issues of the Occupation and relations with the Arab world figure into this political calculus. Leaders of Labor or Kadima occasionally lob some minor criticism at Netanyahu for the comatose state of the “peace process,” but it is clearly not the place they want to stand against Bibi most strongly. Yet the ease with which Israel currently sees not only relations with the Palestinians, but with the entire Arab world (through the prism of the tensions with Iran,) is not going to last.
