by Mark N. Katz
What a difference a few months make. During much of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin was riding high. Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine quickly and relatively bloodlessly. Putin was also able to help pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine effectively secede from the rest of the country and prevent the Ukrainian government from retaking these areas. Western governments howled in protest and even imposed economic sanctions on Russia, but were unable to force Putin to back down. Putin’s unsettling actions also seemed to help keep the price of oil high, which Russia benefited from as a leading petroleum exporter. And while the West was highly critical of him, many governments elsewhere—most notably in Asia—seemed indifferent or even sympathetic toward Putin’s actions in Ukraine.
At present, though, things look very different for the Russian president. Western sanctions, which initially seemed quite weak, now appear to be having an increasingly negative effect on the Russian economy. More importantly, the dramatic decrease in the price of oil over the past few months has contributed to a sharp drop in Russia’s export income as well as to the value of the ruble. Eastern Ukraine has meanwhile become an increasingly costly venture for Moscow—not least because of the mounting deaths of Russian soldiers engaged in the fighting there. Absorbing Crimea is also proving costly for an increasingly cash-strapped Moscow. As Western disapproval and even fear of Russia have grown, the ranks of European political and economic leaders calling for accommodating Moscow and cooperating with Putin have thinned. Finally, those non-Western governments that earlier seemed indifferent or sympathetic to Putin’s policy toward Ukraine now seem either indifferent or eager to take advantage of Russia’s increasing economic difficulties.
Putin, in short, now seems to be facing something of a dilemma. Continuing his current policies toward eastern Ukraine will probably not bring about an end to what is becoming a quagmire there for Moscow, and will mean that Western economic sanctions on Russia remain in place or even worsen. Yet withdrawing from Ukraine could weaken Putin domestically since the Russian public has supported his forward policy on Ukraine and would not be happy to see it reversed.
So what will Putin do now? Many fear that he will lash out at the West by supporting Russian secessionists in the Baltics or elsewhere. Putin himself has contributed to this fear by talking about how a cornered rat will attack its pursuers. But despite the deteriorating situation that he now faces, the Russian president need not become that rat in the corner. Indeed, he can be expected to ensure that he does not.
This is because Putin is basically a pragmatist. While he can support Russian secessionists in the Baltics, Belarus, northern Kazakhstan, or elsewhere in Ukraine—as he did with those in Crimea and eastern Ukraine—Putin cannot now be certain that he can gain control over these territories quickly and easily like he did with Crimea. Instead, supporting such groups or intervening directly may only result in more drawn-out conflicts such as the one now taking place in eastern Ukraine. If it is increasingly costly for Russia to be involved in just one such conflict, it will be even costlier still for it to become involved in more of them. If he thought he could replicate what happened in Crimea, Putin might be tempted to do this. Indeed, his quick victory in Crimea may have persuaded him that he could also win in eastern Ukraine. But now that eastern Ukraine has proven to be so problematic, Putin must be aware that similar adventures elsewhere could prove similarly risky—and that Russian forces could only get more thinly spread if they become involved in more such conflicts.
Some fear that Putin might lash out in some other manner by, for example, ending Russian support for the ongoing negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. But this also seems unlikely because: 1) Russia does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, either and 2) the United States and its Western allies could still reach an agreement with Tehran on this matter without Russian help—which would only serve to demonstrate Russian impotence.
Russia stepping up its support for the Assad regime in Syria is another possibility. Doing so, though, would make Russia more of a target for Islamic State (ISIS or IS). Nor does it seem plausible that Putin would want Russia to become more involved in Syria when Moscow is far more concerned about what is happening in Ukraine and other former Soviet states.
Some fear, though, that reported Russian submarine deployments in Swedish waters, military overflights over several countries, and claims in the Arctic are all signs that Putin is preparing something even worse. However, while hardly reassuring, these moves seem aimed more at showing the Russian public how strong Putin is than as precursors to Russian initiation of conflict.
What all this suggests is that while Putin is aggressive, he is not reckless, and he demonstrated this during a Dec. 18 press conference. Indeed, while insisting that any Russian troops in eastern Ukraine are “volunteers,” he seemed also to hold open the door to cooperation with Kiev—and with Georgia, too (which Russia won a brief war against in 2008).
Returning to the rodentine analogy that Putin himself has used: if a cornered rat lashes out, one that is not cornered is more likely to find a safe place to run to instead. What this means for the West is that while it should assist Ukraine in resisting Russian incursions, it should reassure Putin that if he compromises on Ukraine, the West will not use this as an opportunity to rout him altogether. By continuing to cooperate with Russia on problems of common concern (such as Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear issue, and terrorism) and by reiterating how Western sanctions would be lifted if Russia modifies its policy toward Ukraine, we can help Putin achieve his own goal of not ending up in a corner.
]]>The leading Bolshevik historian Mikhail Pokrovsky famously defined history as “politics projected into the past.” Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, is taking that concept, and running with it.
The importance of history to the Kremlin was on full display at Putin’s recent meeting with young scholars and teachers of history at Moscow’s Museum of Contemporary History of Russia. Putin made it clear that he believes control of Russia’s past will enable him to command the future. Referring to Russia’s culture wars being fought against both external and internal foes, Putin stated; “We see attempts being made … to recode our society,” adding that these malicious actions aimed at change “always go hand-in-hand with attempts to rewrite history and shape it to particular geopolitical interests.”
In earlier meetings with Russian academics, Putin has advanced a two-pronged message on the significance of shaping and controlling historical narratives: “Past events should be portrayed in a way that fuels national pride” and “We cannot allow anyone to impose a sense of guilt on us.”
The Kremlin’s overriding concerns in the Putin era when it comes to history have been to assert Russia’s status as a great power and not allow Moscow’s detractors to chip away at its political and moral capital, which rests largely on Russia’s victory over Nazism in the Second World War. It is within this context that Putin has argued there was nothing particularly “bad” in concluding a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939. “These were the foreign policy methods at the time,” he contended. To help justify the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, he noted that Western leaders cut a notorious agreement of their own, the 1938 Munich Agreement, with Hitler.
In the last few years, a new, third priority has emerged for Kremlin historiography, one prompted by the popular uprisings that swept away dictators and authoritarian-minded leaders in the Middle East and Ukraine. This new tenet of Kremlin historiography preaches social cohesion and damns the idea of loyal opposition to the ruling line.
During his exchange with young historians, Putin raised the theme of societal consolidation at least twice. Perhaps the most significant point in Putin’s talk came when he touched on the leadership style of Yaroslav the Wise, who ruled Kievan Rus in the 11th century. While Yaroslav presided over a cultural flowering and established his kingdom as a military power, Putin noted with veiled criticism that the grand prince failed to institute the type of clear-cut system of succession that had already been adopted by a number of early feudal Western societies. By contrast, “the procedure for succession to the throne in Russia was very complicated and tangled, and created fragmentation.” Ultimately, internecine strife among princes after Yaroslav’s death weakened the Russian state and endangered its very existence. “This is exceedingly important,” Putin said. “This history lesson about periods of fragmentation must trigger a danger signal. We must treat this very carefully, and not allow such things under any circumstances.”
Putin returned to this theme when he discussed the reasons behind Russia’s defeat in the First World War. By the end of 1917, Putin argued, Russia had found itself in “an entirely unique situation.” It “declared itself a loser” in the war and “lost enormous territories,” although “we were not beaten in battles on the front.” So why did this disaster occur? Putin gave a blunt answer; “We were torn apart from within, that’s what happened,” referring to internal disorder that ultimately enabled the relatively small Bolshevik faction to seize power in a coup.
Two interconnected factors underlie the governing elite’s approach to history writing. The first is connected with a deep-rooted authoritarian political culture in Russia. Scholars have long noted the close correlation between regime type and the degree of a regime’s reliance on historical myths. True, all regimes resort to and rely on myth-making. But political legitimacy in liberal democracies is much less dependent than in authoritarian regimes on a unifying historical narrative that fosters compliance with government policies. Genuine democracies are thus much more tolerant of dissent, controversy and competing ideas. Ultimately, democracies can afford the luxury of treating with relative equanimity a tradition of historiography that challenges habitual assumptions.
The second factor in Putin’s approach deals with how the Russian public has tended to view history as immutable: once written, it should not change. “History is a science and if you are serious about it, it cannot be rewritten,” Putin asserted at one point during his meeting with young historians.
Sociological data supports the view that Russians in the post-Soviet era do not see the writing of history as a constantly evolving process, in which what is received as “historical truth” in one era can (and should) be challenged and debunked when new evidence comes to light, or new interpretations are advanced. According to the recent data provided by VTsIOM, a Russian pollster, 60 percent of respondents believed past events should be studied in such a way that would exclude “repeat research” leading to new approaches and interpretations. Only 31 percent of those polled believed that the study of history is a continuous and open-ended process. Furthermore, 79 percent spoke in favor of using a single history textbook in schools so as not to confuse young minds with competing interpretations. Symptomatically, 60 percent said the passing of a “memory law” criminalizing the “revision of WWII results” would be a good thing.
Such polling results suggest that, in more ways than one, the prevailing attitudes toward history and memory demonstrate a meeting of minds between the rulers and the ruled in contemporary Russia.
Igor Torbakov is Senior Fellow at Uppsala University and at Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden. This article was first published by EurasiaNet and was reprinted here with permission.
]]>Readers who recall that four years ago a new US President seemed eager to defuse the West’s quarrel with Iran over its nuclear activities may wonder why we are all still waiting for white smoke. I am not sure I know the answer, but I have a hunch it has something to [...]]]>
Readers who recall that four years ago a new US President seemed eager to defuse the West’s quarrel with Iran over its nuclear activities may wonder why we are all still waiting for white smoke. I am not sure I know the answer, but I have a hunch it has something to do with a lack of realism on one side and a profound mistrust on the other.
The lack of realism is a Western failing. The US and the two European states, France and the UK, that still have the most influence on the EU’s Iran policy, ten years after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first reported certain Iranian failures (long since corrected) to comply with nuclear safeguards obligations, are still reluctant to concede Iran’s right to possess a capacity to enrich uranium.
These Western powers know that the treaty which governs the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), does not prohibit the acquisition of uranium enrichment technology by the treaty’s Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS).
They know that several NNWS (Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa) already possess this technology.
They know that the framers of the treaty envisaged that the monitoring of enrichment plants by IAEA inspectors would provide the UN Security Council with timely notice of any move by an NNWS to divert enriched uranium to the production of nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, they cannot bring themselves to tell Iran they accept that Iran, as a NNWS party to the NPT, is entitled to enrich uranium, provided it does so for peaceful purposes, under IAEA supervision, and does not seek to divert any of the material produced.
One of the reasons for this goes back a long way. When India, a non-party to the NPT, detonated a nuclear device in 1974, US officials decided that it had been a mistake to produce a treaty, the NPT, which did not prohibit the acquisition of two dual-use technologies (so-called because they can be used either for peaceful or for military purposes) by NNWS.
The existence of a non-sequitur in their reasoning, since India was not a party to the NPT, seems not to have occurred to them. They set about persuading other states that were capable of supplying these technologies (uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel) to withhold them from NNWS.
This could be defended, of course, on prudential grounds. However, it caused resentment among the NNWS who felt that their side of the NPT bargain was being eroded surreptitiously; ultimately, like all forms of prohibition, it was short-sighted, because it encouraged the development of a black market and enhanced the risk of clandestine programmes, unsupervised by the IAEA.
Denying Iran the right to enrich uranium, and trying to deprive Iran of technology that it had developed indigenously, (albeit with help from the black market), seemed more than prudential in 2003. It seemed a necessity, because at the time there were good reasons to think that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme.
Nevertheless, by 2008, the US intelligence community had concluded that Iran abandoned that programme in late 2003 and would only resume it if the benefits of doing so outweighed the costs.
Despite that and subsequent similar findings, this prohibitionist mind-set is still prevalent in Washington, Paris and London. It is one explanation for a lack of progress since President Obama first stretched out the hand of friendship four years ago.
Another explanation is Israel. Israel shares with North Korea, Pakistan and India the distinction of being one of only four states that do not adhere to the NPT. It nonetheless enjoys considerable influence over US, French and British nuclear non-proliferation policies. Israeli ministers are deeply opposed to Iran possessing a uranium enrichment capability.
They may or may not believe what they frequently claim: that Iran will use its enrichment plants to produce fissile material and will use that fissile material to attack Israel with nuclear weapons, directly or through Hezbollah. In reality, few outside Israel believe this, and many inside are sceptical. However, they do not want Israel’s room for military manoeuvre to be reduced by the existence of a south-west Asian state that could choose to withdraw from the NPT and seek to deter certain Israeli actions by threatening a nuclear response.
A third explanation is Saudi Arabia. Leading Saudis are as opposed as Israeli ministers to Iran retaining an enrichment capability. They are less inclined than Israelis to talk of this capability as posing an “existential” threat; but they share the Israeli fear that it will erode their options in the region. They also fear that it will enhance the regional prestige of their main political rival, an intolerable prospect – all the more so now that Iran and Saudi-Arabia are engaged in a proxy war in Syria that seems increasingly likely to re-ignite sectarian conflict in Iraq.
Finally, there remains strong hostility to Iran in some US quarters, notably Congress. This makes it difficult for any US administration to adopt a realistic policy of accepting Iran’s right to enrich uranium, relying on IAEA safeguards for timely detection of any Iranian violation of its NPT obligations, and minimising through intelligent diplomacy the risk of Iran’s leaders deciding to abuse their enrichment capability.
On the Iranian side, the lack of trust in the US’ good faith has become increasingly apparent. It is in fact a hall-mark of Iran’s supreme decision-taker, Ayatollah Khamenei. One hears of it from Iranian diplomats. The Ayatollah himself barely conceals it in some of his public statements.
As recently as March 20, marking the Persian New Year, he said: “I am not optimistic about talks [with the US]. Why? Because our past experiences show that talks for the American officials do not mean for us to sit down and reach a logical solution [...] What they mean by talks is that we sit down and talk until Iran accepts their viewpoint.”
This distrust has militated against progress in nuclear talks by making Iran’s negotiators ultra-cautious. They have been looking for signs of a change in US attitudes – a readiness to engage sincerely in a genuine give-and-take – and have held back when, to their minds, those signs have not been apparent.
Instead of volunteering measures that might lead the West to have more confidence in the findings of Western intelligence agencies (that Iran is not currently intent on acquiring nuclear weapons), the Iranian side has camped on demanding that its rights be recognised and nuclear-related sanctions lifted.
Unfortunately, this distrust has been fuelled by the Western tactic of relying on sanctions to coerce Iran into negotiating. Ironically, sanctions have had the opposite effect. They have sowed doubts in Ayatollah Khamenei’s mind about the West’s real intentions, and they have augmented his reluctance to take any risks to achieve a deal.
Compounding that counter-productive effect, Western negotiators have been reluctant to offer any serious sanctions relief in return for the concessions they have asked of Iran, whenever talks have taken place. One Iranian diplomat put it this way: “They ask for the moon, and offer peanuts.”
Here part of the problem is a continuing Western hope, despite all experience to date, that unbearable pressure will induce Iran to cut a deal on the West’s unrealistic (and unbalanced) terms.
Another part is ministerial pride in having persuaded the UN Security Council, the EU Council of Ministers, and several Asian states to accept a sanctions regime that is causing hardship among ordinary Iranians (but from which Iran’s elites are benefitting because of their privileged access to foreign exchange and their control of smuggling networks). It sometimes seems as though causing hardship has ceased to be a means to an end; it has become an achievement to be paraded, a mark of ministerial success.
Many of the factors listed in the preceding paragraphs have been visible during the latest round of talks between the US and EU (plus Russia and China), which took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on April 5 and 6, 2013.
According to a draft of the proposal to be presented to Iran which Scott Peterson described in The Christian Science Monitor on April 4, the US and EU demanded:
- the suspension of all enrichment above the level needed to produce fuel for power reactors [5% or less];
- the conversion of Iran’s stock of 20% U235 into fuel for research reactors, or its export, or its dilution;
- the transformation of the well-protected Fordow enrichment plant to a state of reduced readiness [for operations] without dismantlement;
- the acceptance of enhanced monitoring of Iranian facilities by the IAEA, including the installation of cameras at Fordow to provide continuous real-time surveillance of the plant.
In exchange, the US and EU offered to suspend sanctions on gold and precious metals, and the export of petrochemicals, once the IAEA confirmed implementation of all the above measures. They also offered civilian nuclear cooperation, and IAEA technical help with the acquisition of a modern research reactor, safety measures and the supply of isotopes for nuclear medicine. In addition, the US would approve the export of parts for the safety-related repair of Iran’s aging fleet of US-made commercial aircraft.
Finally, the proposal stressed that additional confidence-building steps taken by Iran would yield corresponding steps from the P5+1, including proportionate
relief of oil sanctions.
The initial Iranian response on April 5 seems to have been less than wholeheartedly enthusiastic. On the first day of the talks they irritated the US and EU negotiators by failing to react directly to the US/EU proposals. Instead they reiterated their demand for the recognition of Iran’s rights and the lifting of sanctions as preconditions for any short-term confidence building curbs on their 20% enrichment activities.
On the second day, however, according to Laura Rozen, writing for Al Monitor on April 6, and quoting Western participants in the talks, Iran “pivoted to arguing for a better deal.” The Iranian team started to make clear what they would require in return for curbing Iran’s 20% activities, notably the lifting of “all unilateral sanctions.” These mainly comprise the oil and financial sanctions imposed in 2012.
“I’ve never seen anything quite like it,” a US diplomat said. “There was intensive dialogue on key issues at the core of [the proposed confidence building measures].”
Will that pivot be a turning-point? The latest proposal clearly falls far short of what Iran seeks by way of clarity that ultimately the US and EU can accept Iran retaining a dual-use enrichment capability, and by way of relief from oil and financial sanctions. There has been no sign that the US and EU can bring themselves to offer significant movement on either of these points.
Yet, a scintilla of hope can be drawn from the fact that on April 6 there may have been the beginnings of a haggle. If both sides can resume their talks in that haggling mode, progress may finally be achievable. Haggling is central to any good negotiation. Until now it has been sorely lacking in dealings with Iran under President Obama.
This article was originally published by the Fair Observer on April 10th, 2013.
]]>When Iranian officials sit down at the negotiating table in Almaty with representatives from six international powers, Kazakhstan will gain kudos that will burnish its international diplomatic image and raise the prestige of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The event may also encourage the United States and European Union members to restrain criticism of [...]]]>
When Iranian officials sit down at the negotiating table in Almaty with representatives from six international powers, Kazakhstan will gain kudos that will burnish its international diplomatic image and raise the prestige of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The event may also encourage the United States and European Union members to restrain criticism of Kazakhstan’s democratization shortcomings. “Kazakhstan has long tried to shape the state’s image as an intermediary in various conflicts and offer a platform for discussion of regional problems,” said political analyst Dosym Satpayev, director of the Kazakhstan Risks Assessment Group think-tank.
Catherine Ashton, the European Union foreign policy chief who heads the six-nation group negotiating with Iran, confirmed in an e-mailed statement on February 5 that talks would take place in Almaty on February 26. She said the negotiations were agreed on between Helga Schmid, the European External Action Service’s deputy secretary general, and Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Ashton also thanked Kazakhstan’s government “for its generous offer to host the talks.”
The confirmation came after Tehran had signaled two days earlier that it was ready to talk to the six-nation group – comprised of Russia, the United States, China, Britain, France and Germany — after an eight-month hiatus. Speaking in Munich on February 3, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi first disclosed the “good news” that Kazakhstan would be hosting a meeting in late February.
Nazarbayev’s administration has on several occasions offered to act as host for talks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. On February 4, Altay Abibullayev, a spokesperson for the Kazakhstani president’s Central Communications Service, reiterated the administration’s eagerness to lend a helping hand. “We as the receiving side will make all efforts to create the most favorable conditions for successfully holding these talks in Kazakhstan,” he said.
Hosting the Iran nuclear talks dovetails with Kazakhstan’s long-standing efforts to become a global diplomatic player. In connection with those endeavors, Kazakhstan chaired the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2010 and is current lobbying for a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2016.
When it comes to agreement on the Iranian nuclear question, Astana’s influence over the negotiations will be limited, Satpayev pointed out. “There is Kazakhstan’s desire to present itself as an intermediary, and then there are the [real] possibilities [of what the talks can achieve],” he said. “It all depends on Iran’s political will.”
The discussions on Iran’s nuclear program have been deadlocked since negotiations in Moscow last June. The six-nation group is pressing Iran to comply with UN Security Council resolutions to end uranium enrichment and close an underground enrichment facility. The international community also wants Iran to hand over stockpiles of uranium already enriched to the level of 20 percent (a critical stage in the nuclear bomb-making process) for international safe-keeping. Tehran insists its program is for peaceful purposes, and wants international sanctions lifted.
Kazakhstan is a fitting host for the Iranian nuclear discussions, given its own history. The country voluntarily gave up the nuclear weapons arsenal it inherited following the 1991 Soviet collapse. It is also home to the mothballed Soviet nuclear testing site at Semipalatinsk that has left a devastating environmental and health legacy on the country.
Nazarbayev has sought to play a leading international role in anti-proliferation efforts. In an opinion piece published by the New York Times in March 2012, Nazarbayev asserted that Kazakhstani authorities “have worked tirelessly to encourage other countries to follow our lead and build a world in which the threat of nuclear weapons belongs to history.”
Nazarbayev went on to address the Iranian nuclear question directly, urging Tehran “to learn from our [Kazakhstan’s] example” and opt for “building peaceful alliances and prosperity over fear and suspicion.”
In a bid to reduce proliferation risks, Kazakhstan has offered to host an international nuclear fuel bank under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency that would give states access to low-enriched uranium for peaceful purposes. And the fuel bank offer has won plaudits from Washington: last fall former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised it, noting that “few countries can be compared to Kazakhstan in terms of its experience in non-proliferation.”
This suggests Washington sees Kazakhstan as an honest broker in nuclear talks involving Iran. Kazakhstan cultivates good relations with all the big powers, including the United States, Russia and China, and is viewed as a “more or less neutral state” to offer a platform for dialogue, Satpayev said.
Photo: A monument in to those who suffered during nuclear testing at Semipalitinsk serves as a reminder of Kazakhstan’s nuclear past. The country, which gave up its nuclear arsenal after the break-up of the Soviet Union, will host sensitive talks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions later this month. (Photo: David Trilling)
The UN High Commission for Human Rights now believes 60,000 Syrians have been killed since March 2011 (far more than claimed by the Syrian opposition) and that death rates have been rising more sharply of late. Given the situation on the ground and the continuing failure of diplomacy, the bloody human [...]]]>
The UN High Commission for Human Rights now believes 60,000 Syrians have been killed since March 2011 (far more than claimed by the Syrian opposition) and that death rates have been rising more sharply of late. Given the situation on the ground and the continuing failure of diplomacy, the bloody human toll in Syria — along with far broader suffering and privation – will probably increase before the grueling tug of war between the regime and the opposition draws to a conclusion in one way or another.
The last weekend of 2012 saw an especially severe spike in casualties with government forces counterattacking in the Damascus area, Homs/Hama in central Syria, and Aleppo in the north. Even heavier regime airpower was brought to bear. This contrasted with vigorous opposition advances in recent weeks. It appears that after weeks of sustained offensive operations, some important rebel units ran short of munitions, despite earlier captures of improved weapons and ammunition from government military facilities. Sensing a slackening of pressure, the regime evidently sought to take advantage of the situation by launching a desperate effort to reclaim a few pieces of lost ground and perhaps even wrest some of the initiative from the rebels.
Yet, given the continuing toll on the regime’s own military assets and its inability to replenish its troop losses as readily as those of the rebels, any government gains are likely to be short-lived, especially as rebel forces regroup and resupply themselves once again. Indeed, even as airstrikes have been pounding rebel positions around Damascus in particular, opposition fighters have been closing in on two Syrian air bases farther north. The regime’s growing international isolation and shortages of basic supplies to satisfy the needs of the population (even within the government’s shrunken holdings) suggests it remains at an overall disadvantage regardless.
It should come as no surprise for backers of UN and Arab League representative Lahkdar Brahimi’s most recent initiative that his truce offer has been spurned by the opposition (and not unexpectedly encouraged by an increasingly beleaguered Assad regime). In fact, the choice of Moscow as a venue for talks was especially off-putting for the rebels because, as has been seen, the opposition views Russia as one of the two premier supporters of the Assad regime.
The bottom line is that a sort of Catch-22 situation is continuing on the diplomatic front: the side that believes it has the upper hand and will eventually prevail militarily (currently the opposition) is unlikely to accept a truce because a ceasefire would interfere with its ability to sustain intense military pressure on the other side. Only a prolonged, costly stalemate — not seen in quite a while — might interest both sides in calling at least a temporary halt to the bloodletting.
Meanwhile, failing the defection of substantial army units to the rebels, the fighting is likely to remain fierce — even desperate. From time to time, the rebels capture government caches of better weapons, and that will continue, giving them a somewhat more even playing field against regime forces. Those Syrians (most Alawites, many Christians, as well as a minority of Sunni Arabs who have benefited from the regime) will fight bitterly, fearing a rebel (or even militant Islamic) victory would overturn their world as they know it, perhaps even endangering their own families or entire sectarian communities. And, the longer the bloodletting continues in terms of time, sheer violence, atrocities, and total casualties, the more the amount of retribution — both authorized and spontaneous — will mount for those who have chosen, essentially, to fight for the regime right up, or close, to the bitter end.
Photo: Wojtek Ogrodowczyk/Flickr
]]>It was exactly 50 years ago when then-President John F. Kennedy took to the airwaves to inform the world that the Soviet Union was introducing nuclear-armed missiles into Cuba and that he had ordered a blockade of the island – and would consider stronger action – to force their removal.
[...]]]>
It was exactly 50 years ago when then-President John F. Kennedy took to the airwaves to inform the world that the Soviet Union was introducing nuclear-armed missiles into Cuba and that he had ordered a blockade of the island – and would consider stronger action – to force their removal.
“It was the most chilling speech in the history of the U.S. presidency,” according to Peter Kornbluh of the National Security Archive, who has spent several decades working to declassify key documents and other material that would shed light on the 13-day crisis that most historians believe brought the world closer to nuclear war than at any other moment.
Indeed, Kennedy’s military advisers were urging a pre-emptive strike against the missile installations on the island, unaware that some of them were already armed.
Several days later, the crisis was resolved when Soviet President Nikita Krushchev appeared to capitulate by agreeing to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.
“We’ve been eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked,” exulted Secretary of State Dean Rusk in what became the accepted interpretation of the crisis’ resolution.
“Kennedy’s victory in the messy and inconclusive Cold War naturally came to dominate the politics of U.S. foreign policy,” write Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations in a recent foreignpolicy.com article entitled “The Myth That Screwed Up 50 Years of U.S. Foreign Policy.”
“It deified military power and willpower and denigrated the give-and-take of diplomacy,” he wrote. “It set a standard for toughness and risky dueling with bad guys that could not be matched – because it never happened in the first place.”
What the U.S. public didn’t know was that Krushchev’s concession was matched by another on Washington’s part as a result of secret diplomacy, conducted mainly by Kennedy’s brother, Robert, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.
Indeed, in exchange for removing the missiles from Cuba, Moscow obtained an additional concession by Washington: to remove its own force of nuclear-tipped Jupiter missiles from Turkey within six months – a concession that Washington insisted should remain secret.
“The myth (of the Cuban missile crisis), not the reality, became the measure for how to bargain with adversaries,” according to Gelb, who interviewed many of the principals.
Writing in a New York Times op-ed last week, Michael Dobbs, a former Washington Post reporter and Cold War historian, noted that the “eyeball to eyeball” image “has contributed to some of our most disastrous foreign policy decisions, from the escalation of the Vietnam War under (Lyndon) Johnson to the invasion of Iraq under George W. Bush.”
Dobbs also says Bush made a “fateful error, in a 2002 speech in Cincinnati when he depicted Kennedy as the father of his pre-emptive war doctrine. In fact, Kennedy went out of his way to avoid such a war.”
To Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, whose research into those fateful “13 days in October” has brought much of the back-and-forth to light, “the lessons of the crisis for current policy have never been greater.”
In a Foreign Affairs article published last summer, he described the current confrontation between the U.S. and Iran as “a Cuban missile crisis in slow motion”.
Kennedy, he wrote, was given two options by his advisers: “attack or accept Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.” But the president rejected both and instead was determined to forge a mutually acceptable compromise backed up by a threat to attack Cuba within 24 hours unless Krushchev accepted the deal.
Today, President Barack Obama is being faced with a similar binary choice, according to Allison: to acquiesce in Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb or carry out a preventive air strike that, at best, could delay Iran’s nuclear programme by some years.
A “Kennedyesque third option,” he wrote, would be an agreement that verifiably constrains Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for a pledge not to attack Iran so long as it complied with those constraints.
“I would hope that immediately after the election, the U.S. government will also turn intensely to the search for something that’s not very good – because it won’t be very good – but that is significantly better than attacking on the one hand or acquiescing on the other,” Allison told the Voice of America last week.
This very much appears to be what the Obama administration prefers, particularly in light of as-yet unconfirmed reports over the weekend that both Washington and Tehran have agreed in principle to direct bilateral talks, possibly within the framework of the P5+1 negotiations that also involve Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany, after the Nov. 6 election.
Allison also noted a parallel between the Cuban crisis and today’s stand-off between the U.S. and Iran – the existence of possible third-party spoilers.
Fifty years ago, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro had favoured facing down the U.S. threat and even launching the missiles in the event of a U.S. attack.
But because the Cubans lacked direct control over the missiles, which were under Soviet command, they could be ignored. Moreover, Kennedy warned the Kremlin that it “would be held accountable for any attack against the United States emanating from Cuba, however it started,” according to Allison.
The fact that Israel, which has repeatedly threatened to attack Iran’s nuclear sites unilaterally, actually has the assets to act on those threats makes the situation today more complicated than that faced by Kennedy.
“Due to the secrecy surrounding the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, the lesson that became ingrained in U.S. foreign policy-making was the importance of a show of force to make your opponent back down,” Kornbluh told IPS.
“But the real lesson is one of commitment to diplomacy, negotiation and compromise, and that was made possible by Kennedy’s determination to avoid a pre-emptive strike, which he knew would open a Pandora’s box in a nuclear age.”
]]>In numerous op-eds and in testimonies before congressional audiences Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), has called for “crippling sanctions” against the Islamic Republic and its controversial nuclear program. Only days prior to the official commencement [...]]]>
In numerous op-eds and in testimonies before congressional audiences Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), has called for “crippling sanctions” against the Islamic Republic and its controversial nuclear program. Only days prior to the official commencement of the European Union embargo on Iranian oil, Mr. Dubowitz penned one such op-ed in Foreign Policy titled “Battle Rial” wherein he called upon the United States to step up “economic warfare” against the Islamic Republic and by extension its over 75 million inhabitants. Due to the many dubious assertions and conclusions presented in this article we feel a rebuttal is in order. But let us first examine the FDD and the type of democracy and freedom that it claims to defend and promote.
History repeating?
The FDD’s leadership council includes three people who played a role in advocating policies that resulted directly or indirectly in much of the destruction and carnage that has swept across the Middle East in the last decade. Namely former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, neoconservative pundit William Kristol and Senator Joseph Lieberman, a longtime proponent of some of the most aggressive policies against Iran in Congress. Woolsey and Kristol persistently spread falsehoods regarding Saddam Hussein’s non-existent weapons of mass destruction in the run up to the American-led invasion. Ironically, the results of invading Iraq—aside from destroyed infrastructure and civilian deaths which by some estimates number in the hundreds of thousands—include the rise of a Shi’ite dominated regime now closely allied with the one in Tehran that the FDD is intent on destroying. The FDD’s advisory board also lists prominent neoconservative Richard Perle whose resume includes the advising of a firm that worked to “burnish Libya’s image and grow its economy” during Muammar Qaddafi’s brutal rule.
While the FDD is heavily focused on Iran, it is Mr. Dubowitz who has spearheaded its sanctions campaign against the country. In his article he contradicts statements by senior Obama administration officials including Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and CIA Director David Petraeus when he asserts that the Iranians are pursuing nuclear weapons. By implying that the clock is rapidly ticking until Iran obtains the bomb, he is also recycling what has become an infamous metaphor associated with the US’s legacy in the Middle East. His unsubstantiated claims even conflict with assessments from IDF chief Benny Gantz and the former heads of both Mossad and Shin Bet. Indeed, despite questions regarding the possibility of past weapons research, the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found no evidence of the diversion of fissile material from Iranian nuclear sites for non-peaceful purposes. Apparently Mr. Dubowitz knows something others do not.
To lay the foundation for his arguments Mr. Dubowitz states that recent rounds of negotiations in Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow did not result in tangible progress. But he does not bother to address a fundamental question: how can the United States and its allies expect Iran to seriously engage while they wage what is by Mr. Dubowtiz’s own admission “economic warfare?” This is not to absolve the Islamic Republic of its own contributions to the impasse, but balanced diplomacy must include give and take; it cannot be all stick and no carrot.
What have the US and its allies offered to Iran that can induce it to compromise? Besides fabricated fuel in exchange for the shipment of Iran’s approximately 150kg stockpile of 19.75% uranium, along with spare aviation parts and support in beefing up safety at the Bushehr power plant, not much else was offered. If President Obama’s dual-track policy is to prove effective, it needs to be recalibrated during the course of negotiations so that Iran has a reason to stay invested in the process.
Though perhaps better than the US-Russia deal offered to Iran in October 2009, the precipitous increase in economic sanctions—particularly those against Iran’s Central Bank and its energy sector—have made acceptance of a comparable deal or even a relatively more advantageous one incompatible with Iran’s domestic decision-making calculus. Too much pain has already been inflicted upon a long-suffering economy. The P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) also continue to resist recognizing Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. While by no means unconditional, uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes is a basic right guaranteed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Rather than addressing the differences that impede the diplomatic process Mr. Dubowitz rings sensationalist alarm bells and pushes draconian economic measures which, while impacting Tehran’s cost-benefit analysis, can also devastate the lives of ordinary Iranians and result in a military conflict. Recall the effect of other extreme sanctions that were imposed on Iraq in the 1990s including the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children, the depredation of the Iraqi economy and the dilapidation of all sources of resistance to the Baathist regime. Needless to say, those sanctions were only interrupted by the 2003 US-led invasion.
Questionable recommendations
Mr. Dubwoitz argues that “[f]or sanctions to work, Khamenei must be forced to make a fundamental decision between his nukes and his regime.” Apart from repeating the baseless assertion that Iran has nuclear weapons, Mr. Dubowitz’s main point is that the sanctions imposed thus far have not been sufficiently harsh. He accordingly calls upon the Obama administration to support legislation introduced by Reps. Ted Deutch (D-Fla.), Robert Dold (R-Ill.) and Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) that would blacklist the entire Iranian energy sector as a “zone of primary proliferation concern”. This legislation attempts to link Iran’s entire energy sector to its non-existent nuclear weapon program, an unprecedented move that seeks to deliver a knockout blow by further eroding revenues obtained through oil sales. Iran’s oil revenues account for 80% of its export earnings and allow it to purchase basic foodstuffs such as wheat and grain to feed the population, as well as prevent millions of households from being plunged into deprivation and hunger through government subsidies. In recent weeks the price of bread, the basic foodstuff of poorer Iranians, has increased by as much as a third, in large part as a result of the sanctions that Mr. Dubowitz so enthusiastically promotes.
The effort to blacklist any industry that facilitates the preponderance of the Iranian nuclear program, even if indirectly, can only be described as a concerted perversion of international law. Mr. Dubowtiz’s rationale can also be used to justify the embargo of foodstuffs or medicine that sustain Iran’s nuclear scientists and personnel so that they become incapable of furthering the technical development of Iran’s nuclear program. One might even make the case that this logic lies behind the assassination of a number of Iranian nuclear scientists, the culprits for whom are widely believed to be the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) working in coordination with Israel. The MEK is a mortal enemy of the regime in Tehran, and currently on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. The attacks it has coordinated against the regime and the Iranian lives it has endangered have not only resulted in their unpopularity among the vast majority of Iran’s population, they have also given the regime the perfect excuse to crack down on legitimate dissenters.
While sanctions at least initially directly targeted Iran’s nuclear program and later the Islamic Revolution Guards Corp (IRGC) and related organizations, they have turned out to be an all-encompassing iron fist hell-bent on destroying Iran’s most vital source of revenue which is not only important for Iran, but also the world economy. In this way Mr. Dubowitz’s key arguments also demonstrate the many dangers associated with so-called “smart sanctions”.
But Mr. Dubowitz even advocates targeting Iran’s automotive industry, which provides jobs to thousands of Iranians:
Economic warfare should not be limited to the energy sector. The United States and its allies should also target other areas of the Iranian economy, including the automotive sector, which is the largest part of Iran’s economy outside the energy industry.
The mind boggles at what connection he might contrive between Iran’s automotive sector and its nuclear program. What rationale can he offer other than pummeling Iran’s economy and thereby inflicting collective punishment on its people?
Goals and benefits
If Mr. Dubowitz’s aim is not a diplomatic solution but rather to drive an already angry and restive population to the point of despair so that it rises up and overthrows the ruling theocracy, he should state so. But is that achievable? The aftermath of Iran’s hotly contested and by many accounts fraudulent 2009 presidential election saw unprecedented protests and the rise of the Green Movement which was not a foreign induced uprising but one that had been in the making for some 20 years. It has not succeeded because the opposition is inadequately organized, does not have a comprehensive program or plan for realizing its goals and its leadership and advisers have been rounded up, jailed and silenced. The disorganized and divided opposition, both inside and outside the country, is now in an even weaker state than before. But the Green Movement has still rejected foreign intervention and sanctions as a form of collective punishment, and their enfeebled position certainly isn’t helped by the constant threat of foreign invasion. If Iran’s economy declines further and major budgetary shortfalls arise and inflationary pressures persist, bread riots of the kind witnessed during the Rafsanjani era can indeed result. But aside from the ethics associated with inducing a population to revolt by bringing them to the brink of starvation, such riots, without a political program or set of objectives, that uprising will also be quickly repressed and controlled by the security forces. What then can be gained from this approach other than inflicting pain upon an innocent population?
While there is little doubt that hardliners around Ayatollah Ali Ali Khamenei’s office along with authoritarian elements of the radical clergy have and will continue to repress opposition to their grip on power, the constant threat of war and a state of emergency can only benefit the security forces and legitimize their raison d’être in the face of an external enemy. Meanwhile oil revenues which mainly flow into the country from China, Japan and India will remain firmly in the hands of the authorities and the repressive organs of the state. Youth unemployment, which accounts for 70% of the unemployment in Iran, will increase and the state of the underprivileged and retirees reliant on state handouts will decline further under the brunt of such policies. One should also point to the clear failure of comparable sanctions regimes in the case of Cuba and also Iraq, which ultimately resulted in a military invasion to impose regime change at great human cost. While states under such sanctions regimes might be weakened in relative terms to other states in the international system, vis-à-vis their respective populations and civil societies they actually become more powerful.
What exactly is Mr. Dubowitz’s desired endgame for US policy on Iran and the “democracy” that the FDD supposedly supports for the Iranian people? The answer is in a piece published by the Los Angeles Times where Mr. Dubowitz is paraphrased as saying, “[the sanctions] could take until the end of 2013 to bring Iran’s economy to wholesale collapse.” In other words, spurring chaos in a geopolitically important middle eastern country by destroying its economic infrastructure is fair game.
Under such conditions Iran’s dwindling middle class, already under great pressure, finds itself between a rock and a hard place: a theocracy that denies its basic political and civil liberties at home and economic desolation exacerbated by unparalleled and crippling sanctions. Though the Iranian government’s own incompetence and endemic corruption in managing the economy has had a major hand in accelerating chronic inflation, it is undeniable that a decline in oil revenues will further harm what’s arguably the most pro-American population in the Middle East.
Will Mr. Dubowitz’s recommendations result in more US-friendly concessions from the Iranian government? Khamenei has heavily invested in the development of Iran’s nuclear program. Many other regime officialdom including former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani have also praised Iran’s technical achievements over the years and emphasized the importance of the program to Iran’s role as a regional player. Due to the regime’s shortcomings elsewhere and growing legitimacy deficit, the program’s “technological prowess” and importance to Iran’s future energy needs have also been overstated and oversold to the general public, many of whom are no doubt skeptical of the expediency of current state nuclear policy. That being said, because of the extent of political capital invested in the programme it is highly unlikely that Khamenei will make major concessions without a deal that offers a face-saving formula.
But instead of reconsidering the paradigm of engagement with Iran, Mr. Dubowitz pushes for even more “crippling sanctions” and ultimately a military attack by writing that Obama “needs to unite the country in moving beyond sanctions and preparing for U.S. military strikes against Iran’s nuclear weapons program.”
Through the course of a single article we witness a slide from the call for intensifying already crippling sanctions to preparation for military conflict which, in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing military force, would be a clear violation of international law. But flying in the face of any call to arms is the fact that the nuclear knowledge already acquired by the Iranians cannot be destroyed simply because some installations are razed to the ground. A military attack could also compel the Iranians to withdraw from the NPT, kick out IAEA inspectors and begin hurried weapons research underground. This point has been widely noted by many experts and analysts including former Mideast Pentagon advisor to the Obama administration, Colin Kahl.
But since the IAEA has not been able to identify any facility in which Iran is verifiably working on nuclear weapons, where does Mr. Dubowitz suggest either the US or Israel attack if the further ramping up of “crippling sanctions” fails to convince Iran to acquiesce to his demands? Moreover, there is no such thing as an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure only, as the infrastructure in question sprawls across much of the country and is in many cases close to major population centers. Therefore any attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could result in tens of thousands deaths or more that will in all likelihood prompt the population to rally around the government and provide a perfect excuse for Tehran’s hardliners to further suppress all dissenting voices and prolong its rule. Not to mention the fact that while attacks on Iran can be initiated by others, the termination of hostilities will not lie solely with them. Tehran will likely retaliate and could spread the conflict further into Middle East, if not beyond.
Before writing op-eds that advocate policies which increase the likelihood of a military conflict that both the US and Iran claim they want to avoid, perhaps Mr. Dubowitz should also consider the devastation, calamity and human cost that would likely follow.
–Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi is Iran researcher at the Oxford Research Group, and a third year doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford and has published widely on Iran. His latest with Paul Ingram and Gabrielle Rifkind is “Iran’s Nuclear Impasse: Breaking the Deadlock”. He tweets at www.twitter.com/essikhan
–Muhammad Sahimi, a professor at the University of Southern California, is a columnist for Tehran Bureau and contributes regularly to other Internet and print media.
*A version of this article appeared on July 5 on www.foreignpolicy.com
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Song: “Stranger in Moscow” by the late and great, Michael Jackson
Julian Borger, Laura Rozen and Scott Peterson report on the “wide gap” and the “nitty gritty” details of the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of [...]]]>
Song: “Stranger in Moscow” by the late and great, Michael Jackson
Julian Borger, Laura Rozen and Scott Peterson report on the “wide gap” and the “nitty gritty” details of the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) in Moscow. Long story short: Iran is arguing that the West–though primarily the U.S. egged on by the “Zionist regime” and a like-minded Congress–are asking for too much while offering too little. The Iranians are accordingly at least posturing like they won’t move on a major point of interest unless something gives. (Recall that prior to the disappointment of Baghdad, Iran indicated that it could budge on 20% enrichment and offer increased and “permanent” monitoring of their nuclear program in return for real incentives.) Iranian hyperbolic paranoia notwithstanding, when it comes to Congress, Tehran’s argument is hard to deny. For its part the West seems unwilling to go big as some have suggested or reconsider its recent offering which was received by the Iranians like a bunch of sticks and a half-eaten, moldy carrot. While the lack of real progress gives the usual suspects reason to be gleeful since the prospect of a military confrontation will seem more likely, people with real-world policy expertise remind us that diplomacy is a marathon, not a sprint.
Meanwhile Jonathan Bernstein injects some sense into the opinion pages of the Washington Post regarding Mitt Romney’s latest ridiculisums on Iran, Kenneth Waltz pens a taboo opinion on Iran nuclear weapons, the U.S. continues its dangerous bargaining game with the terrorist-designated Mujahideen-e-khalq (MEK), and George Perkovich explains why “A Nuclear Deal Helps Human Rights in Iran“.
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Last month in a barely noticed op-ed prominent voices Lee H. Hamilton, Gary Hart and Matthew Hodes strongly recommended focusing on “shared interests” and the “broader issues” that have marred U.S.-Iran relations since the Iranian revolution during renewed talks with Tehran. They reference missed windows of opportunity and expert analysis that we’ve highlighted here before from diplomatic cold war veterans Thomas Pickering and William Luers and the national security-focused Stimson Center before concluding that hawkish rhetoric should be resisted in favor of serious diplomacy:
As we approach the next round of negotiations, we must beware of extreme voices that will want to limit the conversation to an expansion of threats — a structure of confrontation or capitulation. Bellicose words can box us in just as they can box in the Iranians, making a military confrontation more likely. We would be better served by quiet, frank discussions about our respective interests and our potentially shared interests. We should never forget that during the Cold War, we faced an adversary that was equipped and prepared to destroy us and our allies. But while we never let our guard down, we nevertheless looked for opportunities to cooperate. Eventually, we found areas of mutual interest that helped build confidence in our ability to manage that complicated relationship. That policy worked for us during the Cold War; it should work for us with a regional actor today.
The authors’ bottom line is that any deal will require moving beyond the confines of the nuclear issue and working to realign Iran’s behavior and relationship with the international community without increasing the probability of military confrontation. Their words are all the more weighty because of their impressive credentials. Rep. Hamilton represented Indiana for 34 years and was the ranking Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He previously headed the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, co-chaired the Iraq Study Group Report and was the vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission. Sen. Hart was the former frontrunner for the Democratic nomination in 1988 and has been heavily involved in national security consulting since leaving politics. For his part, international relations expert Matthew Hodes is the Executive Director of the bipartisan Partnership for a Secure America where Hamilton and Hart are advisory board members. (Interestingly, an IPS News investigation revealed that Hamilton had been paid a “substantial amount” in 2011 to appear at panel for the U.S.-terrorist designated Mujahideen-e-khalq (MEK). Hamilton told reporter Barbara Slavin that he was not aware of the group’s true nature at the time.)
Their article’s title, “Enlarging the Frame”, sums up what some analysts are arguing needs to be done as expectations for the next round of talks flip flop between periods of optimism and pessimism almost daily based on each and every development that is reported. Writes Lobe Log’s own Peter Jenkins who previously served as the United Kingdom’s former permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA):
]]>US frustration over Iranian refusal to meet bilaterally is understandable. But Iran’s position is not incomprehensible. The Supreme Leader has made very clear that he has no confidence in the US. “[Americans] break their promises very easily. they feel no shame…they simply utter lies.” The trust deficit is not one-sided. Mutual confidence-building is required.
Surely the right call at this point is not to tear up the script and start afresh, but to try to come up with a better package of incentives and to set up a mechanism that permits intensive negotiation?