by Farideh Farhi
Iranian news agencies are reporting that a “knowledgeable source” is suggesting Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif cancelled his dinner meeting with EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton on the eve of nuclear talks in Vienna to protest her meeting with civil and women’s rights activists, including the [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
Iranian news agencies are reporting that a “knowledgeable source” is suggesting Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif cancelled his dinner meeting with EU Foreign Policy chief Catherine Ashton on the eve of nuclear talks in Vienna to protest her meeting with civil and women’s rights activists, including the mother of Sattar Beheshti, a blogger who was tortured and died while in custody, during her recent visit to Iran.
I do not know if the reason given for the dinner cancellation is true. There are indications that Ashton may have been occupied in Brussels with discussions on EU sanctions against Russia, and her spokesperson said there were no plans for dinner in the first place. At some level, it is irrelevant whether this is true or not. It is now a “fact” and other reports that the respective deputies of these chiefs did have dinner together are irrelevant since this particular public dance and drama over human rights in Iran is not about policy but about appearances and posturing.
The released photo of Ashton’s meeting with the activists tells it all. Although there were other women in the room, Ashton is presented with only two (besides her translator) — Narges Mohammadi and Gohar Eshghi. The first is a human rights advocate whose inhumane treatment in prison while she was ill, and her quiet dignity in the midst of it all, became a legend; the second is an aggrieved mother from a working class neighborhood who carries a framed picture of Beheshti (her son) everywhere. I would like to know who released the photo and with what intent. But that may also be irrelevant because when it comes to Iranian politics, like elsewhere, what something turns into usually overtakes intent, many times even undermining it.
Ashton is gone and the political storm she ignited has been left behind. She has no EU parliamentarians asking questions about what she did in Iran. The symbolic photo is of good use for placating the constituencies who worry the EU will abandon human rights for the sake of a nuclear deal. She reportedly showed compassion. She told Eshghi that she sympathized because she is also a mother and that she would talk to authorities regarding her desire for a public trial on charges of first degree murder (a trial has been set for the accused in early April for second-degree murder). There is no evidence that Ashton actually carried out her promise of talking to an official before she flew out of Tehran. But the photo is for keeps.
In Tehran, though, pandemonium and controversy combined with quite a bit of comedic relief have been the order of the day. As was the case when a European Parliament delegation met with Sakharov Prize winners Nasrin Sotudeh and Jafar Panahi, no government official is taking responsibility for Ashton’s itinerary. Everyone is feigning aghast at what happened, but on the question of who allowed it to happen, the official response is more like mystification.
Meanwhile Iranian hard-liners could have limited themselves to making a big fuss and hurling insults at the appearance and age of the female leader, as they usually do in response to US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman’s statements. Additionally, the 40 or so hard-line MPs, generally close to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s Steadfastness Front, could yell at the foreign and intelligence ministers for either permitting the meeting or not preventing it; drag them in for questioning and explanations that would not be satisfactory in any case; warn against the rise of sedition yet again; and then move on to another controversy.
But for the opponents of Hassan Rouhani’s government, Ashton’s meeting was both an opportunity and challenge. An opportunity because Ashton’s sudden turn towards human rights, after so many years of being known solely as someone leading negotiations with Iran, was a timely confirmation of the point made again last week by Leader Ali Khamenei: Western pressure will not end even if the nuclear issue is resolved. He has repeatedly stated that they will come after us for other stuff including human rights. (One colorful cleric took this further during a Friday Prayer by saying that after human rights it’ll probably be animal rights).
Ashton’s photo gave hard-liners an opportunity for a twofer: questioning Western motives in nuclear talks and screaming sedition at domestic opponents. One MP announced thunderously that Iran is not Ukraine! But the photo also provided them a winning point regarding Western hypocrisy. A poster that showed up in Tehran, collating Ashton’s half-face with Saddam’s — highlighting the human costs of the chemical weapons supplied to Iraq by Europeans during the Iran-Iraq War — was intended to remind everyone that the humanitarian impulse is applied very selectively when state interests are involved.
The photo is nevertheless also a challenge since it exhibits what the defenders of doctrine fear most: a collusion of dissidents and the usually devoted, working-class poor against doctrine and injustice. So threatening is the photo that the Javan daily decided to do its own reframing. It simply used Photoshop to delete Eshghi’s image (state TV did the same a few days later) and then, when Javan was ridiculed (since the photo with Eshghi in it had already been published by a reformist paper) said it did not want to offend the aggrieved mother by placing her next to a “seditioner.” (The seditioner in question, Mohammadi, was even called a terrorist by a female MP, a charge Mohammadi responded to with her pen).
According to Javan’s explanation, the deletion had nothing to do with the discomfort caused by Eshghi’s appearance, which so resembles that of thousands of other mothers who saw their sons “martyred” in the Iran-Iraq War. Even more discomforting is that the photo of her son she carries everywhere brings to mind the images displayed throughout Iran of the many young Iranian “martyrs” who died in the Iran-Iraq War. The Islamic Republic has celebrated the courage, endurance, patience, and piety of these mothers and sons unremittingly. Separating Eshghi from the mothers who sent their sons to the war front, who suffered quietly and longingly when their boys died but still took pride in what they died for, makes the digital elimination of her image the only possible solution to a very uneasy predicament.
In the words of the young and very funny Iranian satirist, Aydin Sayar, writing for the Qanun daily, all this explains why Photoshop is the greatest of human inventions: it allows us to visualize every desire. But Javan’s editorial staff should really be faulted for not using Photoshop to its full potential. In Sayar’s vision, they could have, for instance, transposed Eshghi to a photo of Ashton meeting with former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Eshghi and Jalili, meeting Ashton together, confirm doctrine and assure continued political clout.
My bet is that with the reported creation of a “truth commission” in the Parliament to examine the “issue of Ashton’s meeting with an element of sedition” this round of loud criticism directed at the foreign and intelligence ministries will likely last longer than the previous round involving members of the European Parliament. But it will also eventually pass, probably when a better opportunity arises. (It should be pointed out that Zarif is getting it from the other side as well. Mohammadi wrote a public letter criticizing him for calling her a seditioner in an interview; never mind that the reporting of Zarif’s statement was in Mashreq, a hard-line news site that’s not usually a reliable source for exact wording.)
Zarif, like other cabinet members in general, is in the process of perfecting the art of lying low and not reacting much. But he did increase the drama when he stated on his Facebook page that for the sake of the “national interest” he will remain silent for now. He also called on all to avoid hasty judgments and instead focus on the joy of the World Cup victory of the Iranian wrestling team in Los Angeles as the Iranian New Year approaches. Expressions of humility and positivity in the face of an aggressive opponent’s charge are as good as the foreign minister is going to give for now.
Beyond the immediate situation, though, the loud noise surrounding Ashton’s visit does reveal a point regarding the effectiveness of external pressure in relation to human rights. Her visit has been used by hard-liners to yell sedition ad nauseam but it has also stirred a conversation regarding whether foreign officials (including ambassadors) should be allowed — or are entitled — to meet with the opposition without controversy. After all, it is said that Iranian officials meet with opposition figures in other countries all the time. So the reality of Iran’s polity being contested, and its civil society alert, opens up the possibility of using external concerns for Iranian human rights to push for some sort of change.
But loudness may also undercut efficacy. For instance, in the past couple of months, several prominent Iranians, including former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and MP Ali Mottahari, have made the point that negotiations for the release of former presidential candidates Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi (and his spouse Zahra Rahnavard) were getting somewhere but came to a halt when there was too much noise. According to Motthari, who has repeatedly called for the release or trial of these political leaders, the lifting of limitations on them was in the works in October but was derailed by discussions of the issue in the press and “the reformist claims of victory.” He went on to say that the intent is “to remove the limitations gradually in a way that is not really noticed.”
It is hard to see how such politically charged issues can be managed in an unnoticed way but the appeal for quiet diplomacy inside Iran as well as gradual and incremental (mini-steps, really) is nevertheless offered as a better alternative to making more drastic demands or moves that carry the potential of turning the hard-liners’ screams into reactionary policy. With the experience of the reformist era in everyone’s mind, the worry is that drastic moves or bold and unattainable demands at this point will end up frightening and again pushing the more middle of the road conservatives into the hard-liners’ arms.
Not surprisingly, there is evidence of the government’s preference for — and perhaps a degree of effectiveness in — quiet and incremental change. Last week the charismatic student leader Abdollah Momeni was released one day before his 5-year term was over. According to an interview his wife gave to the Europe-based Rooz Online, he was taken out of prison quietly and left in the middle of the street to find someone to take him to his home and spouse. She suggested that this was done to prevent a noisy greeting party the day he was supposed to be released. This was certainly not a decent thing to do, but the fact that no new charges to prevent the release of this political prisoner were made up could also be considered a quiet step.
Another tiny step was taken yesterday when Mousavi and his wife were allowed to visit Rahnavard’s old and ailing mother. When they encountered a dozen other visitors by chance, the guards, after some resistance, ultimately allowed the family to briefly talk to each other. This surprising event was seen as a sign of opening up made possible by Rouhani; minimal, but nevertheless a change.
The debate over how fast or how loudly to challenge the issue of political prisoners is also happening among the reformists. Even some reformist political prisoners who have in the past written public letters criticizing the conduct of the highest officials have gone quiet in the past couple of months, perhaps persuaded that quiet diplomacy will work better for now. Others have not.
Even if the government manages to persuade most of Iran’s citizens that this is the time for patience and tiny, step-by-step incremental change, it cannot convince everyone. Nor can it control the impatience of many networks outside of Iran that monitor Iran’s human rights situation on a daily basis with its slow pace of change and even occasional reversals. Any opening energizes them to call for more. This is just the way human rights activism works throughout the world.
This leaves the Rouhani government with a delicate balancing act between taking mini-steps for change and defending itself against pressures and charges that will come from forces on both sides of the political spectrum. So far, Rouhani is more or less managing the situation; Zarif met with Ashton this morning and it was all nuclear talk.
]]>by Farideh Farhi
After more than a month of intense speculation in Iran, Hassan Rouhani’s nominees for 18 cabinet posts were announced on the day of the new president’s inauguration. By law, Iran’s presidents have two weeks after taking office to offer their nominees to the parliament for confirmation hearings. However, as [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
After more than a month of intense speculation in Iran, Hassan Rouhani’s nominees for 18 cabinet posts were announced on the day of the new president’s inauguration. By law, Iran’s presidents have two weeks after taking office to offer their nominees to the parliament for confirmation hearings. However, as an indication of the task-oriented “competent” government to come, Rouhani followed through on his promise to announce his picks on Aug. 4.
The parliament will begin the confirmation process, which should not take long, next week. There is no guarantee that all the ministers will be approved (several of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s ministers who were nominated in his first term were not). But as of today, the bet is that they will all pass, even if a couple face a few hurdles.
Cabinet appointments are watched closely in Iran, not only because ministers are key actors in guiding the direction and management of their ministries, but also because they say something about how the newly elected president will run the country and the compromises he is willing to or must make. In any contested political terrain, including Iran, compromises result from negotiations with other centers of power.
I will get to Rouhani’s compromises shortly but let me first say a little about the power of Iranian ministers.
Traditionally, ministers mostly have substantial control over the operation and appointment of their ministerial team. They are hence vulnerable to individual parliamentary interpellation and impeachment if deemed of insufficiently fulfilling their duties.
I say mostly because this tradition of ministerial independence was severely violated during the Ahmadinejad era, when he and members of his office routinely intervened in the internal matters of various ministries, underwriting many expulsions of top-level appointees as well as the ministers themselves.
Other presidents have also intervened in the appointment process of various ministries. Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani appointed a conservative minister of interior but then intervened in the appointment of many provincial governors, which is the prerogative of the interior minister. Driven by his interests, Ahmadinejad went much further and in effect became a meddling president at every level. Rouhani has promised to change that dynamic and the list of his cabinet nominees suggests he has mostly chosen individuals who will be agenda-setters in their own ministries and not agenda-takers. But he did make compromises and in the areas where he made major compromises, such as the Interior Ministry, he will likely act like Hashemi Rafsanjani and influence the gubernatorial appointments.
Hard Choices
The choice for the Interior Ministry is Abdulreza Rahmani Fazli, who is currently the director of the Supreme Audit Court, which is connected to the parliament. This body’s most important task is to issue yearly assessments of the financial operations of all government institutions and the extent to which their financial operations have been keeping in line with the budget as passed by the legislature.
Rahmani Fazli has been in the news for the past couple of years because of his office’s reports on missing funds that were discovered during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. But he is also a traditional conservative and a very close ally of parliament speaker Ali Larijani. His appointment was therefore a disappointment for Rouhani’s reformist backers who had hoped for someone with a clear record of support for citizens’ political and civil rights. (The interior minister also appoints the chief of police and licenses political parties and civil society organizations).
Rouhani also caved in at the last minute by nominating Mostafa Pourmohammadi, currently the head of Iran’s Inspectorate Office and Ahmadinejad’s minister of interior before he was fired at the end of the previous president’s first term. More importantly, Pourmohammadi was a prosecutor of the revolutionary courts and then deputy intelligence minister in the 1980s. He was implicated in some of the most horrific acts, including mass executions, against political prisoners.
Pourmohammadi is not a hardliner and in fact ran for president as a traditional conservative. But appointing him as justice minister does pose a question, to say the least, for a president who campaigned with the slogan of moderation and descuritization of the political environment — even if the justice minister is effectively the least powerful cabinet position.
It is true that the minister of justice is chosen among the four nominees offered by the head of the Judiciary and has no power in the selection of judges or its internal workings. It is also true that there is a saying in Iran that the justice minister is essentially the mailman between the Judiciary and the other two branches. Still, the appointment is a cave-in, likely to protect other ministerial nominees considered more important to Rouhani and effectively more essential in terms of influence.
In the arenas of foreign policy and economy, Rouhani did not make compromises and nominated individuals who are very close to him and his views. In foreign policy, Rouhani’s dilemma seemed to have been not about compromise but choice. He ultimately chose Javad Zarif over his deputy at the Center for Strategic Research, Mahmoud Vaezi, who was also considered a very strong choice. Others have written about Zarif’s appointment as an “olive branch” to the US. But it is a more important signal to the rank and file of the Foreign Ministry as well as the country as a whole.
Zarif represents the best and the brightest that the post-revolution Foreign Ministry has produced. He climbed the ranks without the help of religiously or politically important familial relations. Zarif’s important appointment is therefore a confirmation of Rouhani’s promise of a competent government. Yet to come, of course, are other foreign policy related appointments, in which Zarif will have quite a bit of say, including on Iran’s representative at the UN and a couple of deputy ministers. The latter becomes particularly important if the decision is made to return the handling of the nuclear file to the Foreign Ministry and send someone in the rank of US Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman to talks with the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team.
Vaezi, meanwhile, went to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, where he was director general many years ago. I am not sure if Vaezi is happy with this appointment. There are even rumors — and rumors in Iran should never be trusted — that at the end of the day, Vaezi had to be convinced to take up the position at the prodding of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. He does however have Rouhani’s strong backing and personality to lead the effort if the decision is made to reduce the influence the Islamic Revolutionary Guards has wielded in this ministry (an IRGC commander was leading it during the past couple of years).
This ministry’s revenues from cellular service usage is enormous. Last year it was the third highest depositor of money into the Treasury after the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (which is in charge of taxation).
The question of the IRGC being engaged in too many economic activities is now front-and-center in Iranian politics. Prominent MP Ahmad Tavkoli even went as far as suggesting that the country’s leadership has to be decisive in limiting the IRGC’s and security forces’ role in the economy. Vaezi will be at the center of this fight should it take place.
Tackling Iran’s economy
In general, the desire to get state organs out of the economy seems to be the glue that holds together a largely neo-liberal economic team. It is one of the strange ironies of Iranian politics that the leftists of the 1980s were turned politically reformist and economically mostly neo-liberal in the late 1990s and continue to be so. It is true that the reaction Mohammad Khatami’s neoliberal policies elicited in the form of Ahmadinejad’s justice-oriented populism — at least rhetorically — has now been acknowledged and the economic policies pursued will try to strike a balance between “development” and “justice” and not simply assume that development will lead to the downward trickling of wealth. But the thrust of Rouhani’s center-reformist economic appointments indicates more concern with production and productivity in both the industrial and agricultural sectors.
Almost all of the economy-related ministers — with the exception of the minister of energy, Hamid Chitchian, whose political affiliation is not clear to me and seems to be a bureaucrat who has climbed the ranks of that ministry — are of a center-reformist mold. Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, who was Khatami’s petroleum minister, is nominated to return. Mohammadreza Nematzadeh, who was the co-chair of Rouhani’s campaign, will lead the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Commerce. Abbas Ahmad Akhundi will lead the Ministry of Road and Transportation, Ali Rabii will lead the Ministry of Labor, Cooperatives, and Welfare and Mahmoud Hojjati, who was Khatami’s minister of road and transportation, will return as minister of agriculture.
The only odd appointment in this list of like-minded and highly experienced officials is the minister of economy and finance, Ali Tayebnia, who comes in with little known experience and a mostly academic background. He was reformist candidate Mohammadreza Aref’s economic advisor during the presidential campaign and reportedly has academic expertise in monetary and taxation policies. It’s an odd appointment because of his dearth of experience. But perhaps the idea is that he will be part of an economic team that will be led by two key Rouhani economic advisors: Ishaq Jahangiri, a founding member of the center-reformist Servants of Construction party, former governor and minister of industry, who will be the first vice president — and Ali Nobakht, who will likely head the resurrected Management and Planning Organization. Also involved in economic decision-making is Rouhani’s chief of staff, Mohammad Nahavandian, currently the head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Not yet known is the person who will be appointed as the head of the Central bank of Iran (CBI). This position, like the positions of the first vice president and head of the Management and Panning Organization, does not require parliamentary approval. So far, the heads of Iran’s two largest private banks have been mentioned as potential CBI appointees.
Political boldness
Irrespective of whether one approves of the neo-liberal tendencies of these individuals, one has to marvel at the fact that three of these nominees were former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi’s 2009 campaign advisors, and one is possibly former president Khatami’s closest political advisor. These appointments come in the midst of dire warnings by Hossein Shariatmadari of the hardline Kayhan Daily against appointments of “supporters of sedition” to key positions. Indeed, there is no doubt that Zangeneh will have a tough time getting by the parliament. But he is backed by his stellar record in both the ministries of energy and petroleum and the fact that his diehard opponents have so far failed to find any financial shenanigans on his part. He is “squeaky clean,” an academic who lives in Tehran told me.
Another minister who may have difficulty getting through is the nominee for the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, which supervises the university system. Jafar Milimonfared was not Rouhani’s first choice. His first choice was received as too reformist and elicited harsh reaction from hardline and conservative forces. Still, Milimonfared was deputy minister of the same ministry during the Khatami era and even became its caretaker for a short when it was between ministers. This position elicits sensitivity because the new minister may reverse the Islamicization trend that has been pursued in Iran’s universities and remove some of the appointed faculty in the past 8 years. So, the fight is over both ideology and pork.
Interestingly, the nominee for Irans’ Education Ministry, Mohammad Ali Najafi, is expected to pass through relatively easily. He is also a founding member of the centrist Servants of Construction party and was until recently a member of the Tehran city council. Many considered him to be a more appealing reformist candidate for president than Mohammadreza Aref, who withdrew his candidacy in order for the reformists to line-up behind Rouhani. Najafi was the director of the Planning and Budget Organization (later renamed as the Management and Planning Organization) under Khatami. He was also the minister of culture and higher education when Mousavi was prime minister,.
This leaves the three key ministries of Defense, Culture and Islamic Guidance, and Intelligence — all of which ended up with a compromise choice. Note how I say a compromise choice and not an imposed choice. If the reported names are valid, none of the three nominees – Hossein Dehghan for Defense, Ali Jannati for Culture and Islamic Guidance and Hojatoleslam Seyyed Mahmud Alavi for Intelligence — were among Rouhani’s first choices. But these individuals cannot be considered as anyone else’s imposed choice either.
All three have worked for Hashemi Rafsanjani or Khatami and all three have a good relationship with Rouhani. Dehghan is a member of Rouhani’s Moderation and Development party, and Alavi was his link to Qom during the presidential campaign. And Jannati, whose father Ahmad Jannati is the Secretary of the Guardian Council, is much closer ideologically to Hashemi Rafsanjani than his father. He was deputy minister for international affairs at the ministry of culture and Islamic guidance during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency and ambassador to Kuwait during Khatami’s presidency. He has the distinction of being removed from office by Ahmadinejad twice; once as deputy minister of the interior and once as Iran’s ambassador to Kuwait. Those working in the art, music and publishing world would have preferred a more reformist-minded nominee, but they are not complaining — at least not yet. This ministry has operated in such an erratic manner — for example by granting permission for movies to be made and then refusing to allow their release after much cost and effort — that anyone who brings consistency as well as lesser interference will be appreciated for now.
All in all the cabinet seems well-balanced with regard to Iran’s widely disparate political strands as well as the electorate that coalesced to make Rouhani’s victory possible. Expectedly, it features no hardliners since they were the clear losers of the presidential election. It does include a number of traditional conservatives but the cabinet mostly bends to the middle, as promised, while some individuals who are very close to former reformist president Khatami have been slated for key positions.
We’ll just have to wait and see if they will survive their confirmation hearings. The deputy-level appointments, which for many of those who deal with the various ministries are sometimes even more important than the ministerial heads, come next. It will take quite a few months before the depth of Rouhani’s efforts and commitment to instilling change will become clear.
Photo Credit: Roohollah Vahdati
]]>via IPS News
With the disqualification of former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by a vetting body, the Guardian Council, Iran’s presidential campaign is opening with many in the country in a state of shock.
Although the eight qualified candidates offer [...]]]>
via IPS News
With the disqualification of former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by a vetting body, the Guardian Council, Iran’s presidential campaign is opening with many in the country in a state of shock.
Although the eight qualified candidates offer somewhat of a choice given their different approaches to the economy and foreign policy, the disqualification of Rafsanjani has once again raised the spectre that the conservative establishment intends to manipulate the electoral process in such a way that only a conservative candidate will win when voters cast their ballots Jun. 14.
Rafsanjan’s candidacy, which received solid support from former reformist president Mohammad Khatami, had created hope among a section of the Iranian population — unhappy with the policies of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — that a real contest over the direction of the country was possible.
His stature and name recognition had immediately catapulted him as the most formidable candidate against the conservative establishment.
The possibility that the Guardian Council would disqualify a man who is the appointed chair of the Expediency Council and an elected member of the Clerical Council of Experts was deemed unfathomable by many.
In the words of conservative MP Ali Mottahari, who had pleaded with Rafsanjani to register as a candidate, “if Hashemi is disqualified, the foundations of the revolution and the whole system of the Islamic Republic will be questioned.”
Rafsanjani’s unexpected disqualification poses a challenge for his supporters, who include centrists, reformists and even some middle-of-the-road conservatives such as Mottahari: who, if anyone, will they now support in the election?
The slate of approved candidates includes two individuals — former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani and former first vice president Mohammadreza Aref — who hold mostly similar views to Rafsanjani.
In fact, both had said that they would withdraw if Rafsanjani’s candidacy was approved. But neither is as well known as the former president and they will now have to compete against each other in attracting likeminded voters.
Rowhani has chosen to run as an independent, while Aref is running as a reformist. While Rafsanjani’s candidacy had energised and unified the reformists and centrists, the campaign of these two lesser known candidates may be cause for disunity and/or voter apathy.
A third candidate, Mohammad Gharazi — who may also have centrist tendencies — is even less known throughout the country.
He served first as the minister of petroleum and then post, telegraph, and telephone in the cabinet of then-prime minister Mir Hossein Mussavi — now under house arrest after his 2009 presidential bid — and then in Rafsanjani’s cabinet when he served as president.
But since 1997, Ghazari has not held public office. Furthermore, no one really knows his views or why he was qualified when several other ministers with more recent experience were not.
Reformist supporters, already distraught over the previous contested election and continued incarceration of candidates they voted for in 2009, may see Rafsanjani’s disqualification as yet another sign that their vote will not count.
Apathy or abstention in protest among supporters is now a real issue for the centrists and reformists. This challenge may — and only may — be overcome if one of the candidates agrees to withdraw in favour of the other and the popular former reformist president Khatami throws his support behind the unified candidate in the same way he did with the candidacy of Rafsanjani.
But even this may not be enough. The reality is that the low name recognition of both candidates limits the impact of such political manoeuvring and coalition-building by the reformists, especially if the conservative-controlled security establishment makes campaigning and the spread of information difficult. Already Aftab News, a website affiliated with Rowhani, has been blocked.
This leaves the competition among the other five candidates who come from the conservative bloc. One, former presidential candidate, Mohsen Rezaee, is also running as an independent and is both the most likely to last until Election Day and the least likely to garner many votes.
It is the competition among the other four conservative candidates — Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, former Parliamentary Speaker Gholamali Haddad Adel, and current nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili — that will in all likelihood determine the fate of the election.
If Rafsanjani had been qualified, there would have been an urge for unity among these candidates since, without such unity, the former president could have received the 50 percent plus one necessary to win in the first round.
Now, however, the same forces that had prevented the conservative candidates from rallying behind one candidate remain in play.
Polls published by various Iranian news agencies, although not very reliable, uniformly suggest that Qalibaf is the most popular conservative candidate because of his management of the Tehran megapolis and the vast improvement in the delivery of services he has overseen there.
But Qalibaf’s relative popularity has not yet been sufficient to convince other candidates to unite behind him. This may eventually happen after televised presidential debates if he does well in them and if Velayati and Haddad Adel drop out in his favour since, from the beginning, the three of them had agreed that eventually the most popular should stand on Election Day.
But there is no guarantee that this will happen. Velayati in particular has ambitions of his own and has implied that Leader Ali Khameni’s preference should be given at least as much weight as polls, giving rise to speculation that he is the Leader’s preferred candidate despite clear signs that he has not been able to create much excitement even among conservative voters.
Convincing the hard-line candidate Jalili to drop out in favour of Qalibaf will be even harder.
In fact, from now until Election Day there will probably be as much pressure on Qalibaf to drop out in favour of Jalili as the other way around in the hope that a unified conservative candidate can win in the first round, avoiding the risk of either Rowhani or Aref making it to the second round where the top two candidates will have to compete on Jun. 21.
Jalili is the least experienced — and well known — of all the conservative candidates and, in a campaign in which economy is the number one issue by far, there are real concerns regarding whether he is experienced enough to manage Iran’s deep economic problems.
But his late entry in the presidential race, minutes after Rafsanjani entered it, has also given rise to speculation that he, instead of Velayati, may be the Leader’s preferred choice.
What is not a subject of speculation is the fact that Jalili takes the hardest line of all the candidates.
His campaign slogan of “hope, justice, and resistance” suggests that he is the most likely to continue current policies, although perhaps with less bombast and populist flair than the current president.
As such, Jalili stands apart from the other seven candidates who will campaign on the need for both change and competent leadership.
Jalili jumped into the race at the last minute as a hard-line counter to Rafsanjani’s call for moderation. Ironically, with the latter’s disqualification, he now stands alone as the candidate whom others will try to mobilise voters against.
]]>by Omid Memarian
Traditionally, a few months before a presidential election in Iran, the government opens the public sphere, giving more freedom to the press, more space for activists to speak out and even loosening social restrictions like the one on women’s clothing and hijab. But less than two months before [...]]]>
by Omid Memarian
Traditionally, a few months before a presidential election in Iran, the government opens the public sphere, giving more freedom to the press, more space for activists to speak out and even loosening social restrictions like the one on women’s clothing and hijab. But less than two months before Iran’s June 14 election, the situation feels very different in Tehran. In fact, the opposite is happening.
In mid-January, Iranian intelligence forces arrested more than 16 journalists and questioned many more. All of them were released after a few weeks. Iranian intelligence also summoned the managing editors of major publications and warned them against criticizing the government during the election season.
A number of political activists linked to the reformists’ camp, including former MP Hossein Loghmanian, have also been arrested in the last few weeks. And just months before the election, instead of experiencing more freedom, three major publications — Mehrnameh, Aseman and Panjareh — have shut down voluntarily to avoid likely censure and official closure. A reporter from one of these publications told me, “We all thought we were going to have a similar environment like in the past, and that the government would be more tolerant regarding the media’s performance, but the monitoring and censorship imposed by the intelligence is intensifying day by day.”
It’s not just about the media or activists anymore either. On April 30, Reuters reported that Bagher Asadi, a prominent Iranian diplomat — well-known and respected in UN diplomatic circles — had been arrested in mid-March. The government kept the arrest quiet for more than six weeks, but once the family leaked the news to the media, they confirmed it.
Former diplomat Mohammad Reza Heydari told me on Thursday that he believes the arrest occurred because Asadi was critical of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and challenged the government’s performance on a number of occasions — something Tehran does not tolerate, especially when it comes from Iranians.
These are just a few examples of how the Iranian government is getting ready for June. Remembering the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election, the widespread protests in the streets and the massive number of arrests, the government has chosen to preempt any possible challenge to the regime’s narrative on a wide range of issues, from the government’s policies, to the candidates’ qualifications, to the ongoing crackdown on dissidents.
By now, two presidential candidates in the last election, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, as well as Mousavi’s wife Zahra Rahnavard, have spent well over two years under house arrest. These two were beloved politicians in the eyes of Islamic Republic founder Ayatollah Khomeini. Even so, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei can’t tolerate them. Meanwhile, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whom Khamenei supported unconditionally in his first term, now won’t pass up any opportunity to criticize the establishment.
So if the regime can’t trust a former prime minister and a former head of parliament, or even it’s current president, then whom can they, or rather, the Supreme Leader, trust? The answer is basically no one. And if you don’t trust anyone, from veteran revolutionaries to the younger generation of political figures, then what do you do with a presidential election?
The regime’s extreme sense of suspicion and distrust, and the level of squabbling amongst the political parties, who, regardless of ideology or revolutionary ideals, are all greedy for a piece of the pie, point to an unsettling future for Iran’s political sphere in the months to come. The Supreme Leader will do whatever it takes to make sure one of his loyalists ends up in office.
As Khamenei strives to keep his stranglehold on power, we should expect intensifying censorship and control over the media, civil society and political activists in the coming months. No matter who is nominated for Iran’s presidential election in the coming days, the regime is ready to avoid any surprises, regardless of the cost.
]]>Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program are set to re-start in February, but Iran’s previous foot dragging in agreeing to a time and venue for the negotiations has been vexing for U.S. and allied diplomats. Iranian behavior is particularly puzzling given the urgency of resolving the nuclear crisis peacefully and alleviating pressure [...]]]>
Some analysts have suggested that Tehran is divided internally and cannot make a decision. This is unlikely. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has consolidated power since the 2009 presidential election and makes decisions for the entire country. If Khamenei wants negotiations to proceed, then Iran’s negotiators will respond accordingly. Rather, Khamenei is hesitant to engage the P5+1 (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) due to his ideological distrust of the United States. Specifically, he may view the P5+1 offer for Iran to stop uranium enrichment to 20 percent, ship out its highly enriched uranium, and close down the underground Fordo facility in return for a consideration of sanctions relief as not only a trap but also a prelude to defeat for himself and his regime. Khamenei may be reluctant to make a deal, but mounting pressures from a broad section of the political elite and Iranian society may ultimately force his hand and even loosen his grip on power.
The gridlock in negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran is a problem of sequencing. The P5+1 wants Iran to make the first move in order to build confidence, while Tehran is anxious for the P5+1 to recognize Iran’s right to enrichment and to lift sanctions before Iran takes any action. Tehran may be more willing to ship out its 20 percent enriched uranium than to give up its Fordo nuclear facility entirely. Fordo is viewed by Tehran as one of its greatest sources of leverage, especially because it is buried deep beneath a mountain and is less vulnerable to Israeli and possibly U.S. air strikes (although the United States has the military means to do much greater damage to Fordo).
Nevertheless, there is a much larger issue at stake: the historical and ideological rivalry between the United States and the Iranian regime. For the Islamic Republic, the nuclear program is a strategic card in its ongoing battle with America. And although the United States may claim it has no agenda other than solving the nuclear crisis, there is a great deal of hostility toward the Islamic Republic among influential American political constituencies. This is not surprising, given the Iranian regime’s history of supporting terrorism, its hostility toward Israel, and its widespread human rights abuses. Among the Iranian elite, there is deep resentment toward the United States for its support of the Shah and of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Hence, the nuclear crisis is not just about Iran’s pursuit of a potential nuclear weapon capability. Rather, it is a bitter struggle over the future of Iranian, Israeli, and U.S. power in the Middle East.
Can such obstacles be overcome? Yes, but only to the extent that the goals are limited to a diplomatic solution that is just enough to avert a costly military conflict over the nuclear program. The other issues will not go away as long as the Islamic Republic rules Iran. Regardless, although Khamenei may be reluctant to make a deal, mounting pressure may leave him little choice but to be more flexible.
Although he is Iran’s most powerful leader, Khamenei is nevertheless surrounded by rivals and enemies at home. The reformists who so brazenly challenged his regime in 2009 have been effectively pushed out from the corridors of power. But this does not mean they are inactive. The reformists want to contest the June 2013 presidential election, which they claim should be “fair and free.” (Khamenei has stated that the words “free election” are code for “sedition.”) More moderate conservatives, such as Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, are also keen to protect their interests and contain, or perhaps even reverse, Khamenei’s quest for absolute power. Both reformists and the Rafsanjani camp are anxious about Iran’s growing international isolation and its declining economy.
Followers of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also view the presidential election with deep concern. Ahmadinejad, who cannot run for the presidency again, has been politically marginalized and worries that his allies will not be able compete in the election. Recently, the powerful Guardian Council diluted the Interior Ministry’s authority to supervise the election. The Guardian Council is largely against Ahmadinejad, whereas the Interior Ministry is controlled by his allies. The Ahmadinejad camp’s total political isolation may embolden it to challenge Khamenei even more publicly—and even criticize his nuclear policy.
More importantly, Khamenei may come under greater pressure from his own conservative camp, especially the Revolutionary Guards. Khamenei’s conservative supporters are his most important constituency. He may be able to ignore the reformists, the Rafsanjani conservatives, and the pro-Ahmadinejad elite, but he has to keep the Revolutionary Guards and the merchant class happy. To date, neither appears to have publicly criticized him over Iran’s nuclear policy. Khamenei’s key foreign policy advisor, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, has resolutely declared that there is “complete agreement on the nuclear program” within the Islamic Republic.
It is true that some hardline Guards and conservatives may be wedded to Khamenei’s policy of resistance against the United States, but many also value money, luxury, and power. This group may become more critical of Khamenei as sanctions take their toll. For example, Habibollah Asgaroladi, a key conservative figure and one of Iran’s richest men, recently criticized the house arrest of reformist leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Mousavi, in particular, is considered to have been an effective manager as Iran’s former (and last) prime minister, steering the country through its economic crisis during its war with Iraq. Asgaroladi may recognize that Iran needs such guidance once again.
Finally, the Iranian people are becoming restless, as evidenced by recent demonstration in Tehran’s bazaar and numerous labor demonstrations throughout the country. The Iranian economy is in much worse shape than the Islamic Republic admits. The effect of sanctions has not been limited to the energy sector; other important export industries such as auto manufacturing, petrochemicals, and even Persian rug making have suffered. There have been reports of many factories shutting down and hundreds of thousands of workers losing their jobs. A Revolutionary Guards officer recently predicted that the next popular uprising will start in the provinces and smaller towns due to declining living conditions. The Iranian people may not be involved in the nuclear negotiations, but they are unlikely to stand idly by and see their once proud, productive, and ancient nation come to total ruin.
Khamenei may very well lose face in future negotiations, but a characteristic of a sensible leader is a willingness to accept some defeats along with the victories. After all, it is the Islamic Republic that is in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it must prove to the world that its activities are peaceful in nature. Khamenei’s mounting pressures may compel him to be more flexible on the nuclear program. Otherwise, he will face greater sanctions, more internal political opposition, and, possibly, the wrath of his own people.
This commentary is part of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ February 2013 Viewpoints issue no. 21, “The Nuclear Issue: Why is Iran Negotiating?”
Alireza Nader is a senior policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
]]>Sociologists sometimes get lucky. In June 2009 I arrived in Tehran for a routine research trip. Over the next several months I witnessed the largest political demonstrations in Iran since 1979. Arising from protests against the results of the June presidential election, which were perceived by many Iranians as fraudulent, these [...]]]>
Sociologists sometimes get lucky. In June 2009 I arrived in Tehran for a routine research trip. Over the next several months I witnessed the largest political demonstrations in Iran since 1979. Arising from protests against the results of the June presidential election, which were perceived by many Iranians as fraudulent, these marches and rallies quickly became known as the “Green movement.”
Social movements serve as a kind of natural laboratory for sociologists. We spend most of our time trying to explain why things don’t change; we study inequality, poverty, conflict, and discrimination. A social movement, however, is all about change — in demands, ideas, actions, and relationships between people. Living through one makes you feel like history is speeding up. Standing in the middle of it all makes you feel like your side will win. But not all, or even most, social movements win. Yet, even if the demands are not met and the momentum dissipates, social movements tend to have effects that extend beyond their brief existence. This was certainly the case for the 2009 Green movement; it continues to impact events in Iran today.
In a recently published journal article for Mobilization, I describe and explain some of the social and political dynamics that led to the Green movement’s rise and fall. Here I want to link my observations to Iran’s upcoming presidential election through the following three points.
1. Pre-election mobilization can lead to unpredictable outcomes
No one anticipated that Iran’s 2009 presidential election, regardless of its winner, would shake up the political scene. The stakes seemed pretty low, just as they do today. Mir-Hossein Mousavi was barely remembered from the 1980s, when he was a skinny prime minister overseeing an economy besieged by the Iran-Iraq war. Yet the few weeks leading up to the election witnessed a massive upsurge in emotional energy from all sides of the political spectrum. Many people made up their minds to vote for a particular candidate in the final few days. Rallies and street parties, which involved more than a bit of fun, pulled in curious onlookers and politicized them.
This escalation in emotional energy underpinned the surge in post-election protest. If you think emotion isn’t important for a social movement, then you’ve probably never been involved in one. Hope turned into anger among those who believed that Mousavi had won the election. But Mousavi’s shift from a mild-mannered retiree to a Gandhi-styled hero didn’t occur simply because he suddenly discovered an inner reserve of charisma. The pre-election mobilizations refashioned Mousavi’s tone on important social issues, and the post-election protests turned him into a symbol for stark political change. Elections matter in the Islamic Republic not because the best candidates are on the ballot — people are used to holding their nose and voting — but because they can sometimes reshape Iran’s social environment.
2. The internet does not equal civil society
The Green movement had little to do with civil society. This term is often used as a substitute for “the people,” but civil organizations such as trade unions, merchant guilds or sports clubs do not amount to a large blob of people that act in tandem outside of pre-existing political interests and networks. Post-election protests in 2009 were organized quite spontaneously and mostly outside of existing Iranian civil organizations.
The internet often confused — as much as it facilitated — events as website rumors about protest locations divided up momentum and online images of violence convinced many that going out was simply unsafe. The organizations that could have corralled and directed the protest upsurge were also the ones that were directly targeted in the first few days after the ballot by the Iranian government, including Mousavi’s electoral network of volunteers and strategists. Yet Mousavi’s network resembled a political body more than a civil one. As we saw in the 2012 re-election of President Barack Obama, bona-fide organizations usually matter more for elections than internet activists, such as those which operate mainly on Twitter; we will learn more about the candidates in 2013 from their organizational power than from their campaign ad promises.
3. The Iranian middle class is not going away
As I discussed in my Mobilization article, Green protesters were mostly middle class, as defined by education and occupation, but that doesn’t mean they were a small elite living in Tehran villas. Given the rapid expansion in universities around Iran, a large portion of young people with a college degree come from families with working class parents. Go to many neighborhoods in Tehran, or any public park, and you will see a mixed class setting. Many of these younger individuals felt deeply alienated from the Iranian government in the wake of the 2009 election, if not before.
Yet it’s a myth that conservatives in Iran solely rely on poor people for their political base. The right-wing put on a good show while being challenged on the street by Green protesters, but within a year, the coalition that had backed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was in tatters. Iran’s current president is now widely regarded as the Alfred E. Neuman of the Islamic Republic. As a result, there may be even more candidates running in 2013 than in 2009, unless the various wings of the conservative spectrum make nice with each other. That’s not likely to happen, however, and as the election draws nearer, some of these candidates will appeal to the middle class, especially after a disastrous economic year that saw so many families being hit by inflation and currency troubles. Even without a reformist candidate, Iran’s struggling economy sets the stage for more surprises.
Related to Iran’s economic dilemma is the gorilla in the Supreme Leader’s office: sanctions by the US and EU. More candidates could mean a less predicable election, but a hardline US stance on Iran could also lead to a situation where no single candidate would dare step out of line lest he be accused of being “soft on America.”
But during a trip to Iran late last year, it was easy to pick up any newspaper and read about conservatives ripping into each other. As I recently wrote in The London Review of Books, this means “alliances and enmities are being rearranged yet again.”
The experts will likely tell you that Iran’s 2013 elections are going to be a dog and pony show. While another huge social movement is unlikely, we may all end up, yet again, surprised by Iranian politics.
– Kevan Harris is a postdoctoral research fellow in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.
Photo: Mousavi supporters protesting against Iran’s 2009 election results gathered in Tehran on June 18. By Hamed Saber.
]]>For Iran, 2012 will go down as the year of economic woes. The mantra of the “enemy’s psychological war against Iran” will no longer be blamed more than internal mismanagement even by the most ardent supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Leader, Ali Khamenei. The “resistance economy” against the “economic war [...]]]>
For Iran, 2012 will go down as the year of economic woes. The mantra of the “enemy’s psychological war against Iran” will no longer be blamed more than internal mismanagement even by the most ardent supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Leader, Ali Khamenei. The “resistance economy” against the “economic war unleashed against Iran” has become the name of the game. Several years of expansionist fiscal and monetary policies — underwritten by high oil prices and government spending and accentuated by liberal import policies — clashed directly with the ferocious sanctions regime imposed by the United States and its allies. Highly contested politics continued to reign as well. A nationwide election — the first after the contested 2009 election — was held; domestic and international objections regarding the government’s treatment of Iranian citizens continued; the attempt to delineate the qualification and age limit of presidential candidates failed. I am not particularly good at ranking events based on importance, but upon Jasmin Ramsey’s request, here are my top 10 picks for Iran in 2012.
1. The Rial’s Freefall
The gradual drop in the value of Iranian currency, the rial, begun at the end of 2011 and continued until about September when the bottom literally fell off, registering a 50 percent drop in one month. The government eventually cracked down on the unofficial market, which as economist Djavad Salehi-Isfahani pointed out, is a limited currency market, and created a foreign exchange center for importers and exporters based on a managed floating system. It also continued to maintain a much lower fixed rate for the import of critical goods such as medicine and some foodstuff. By the end of the year, the foreign exchange rate stood a bit below 25,000 rials per dollar (in comparison to about 15,000 rials per dollar in the unofficial market in January 2012 and about 10,000 a year before).
The cause of the deprecation consumed much public commentary. Some accused the government of cynically manipulating the market in order to sell its dollars at a higher rate and using the generated money to cover its budget deficit. Others lamented the Central Bank’s incompetence while Ahmadinejad blamed unknown market manipulators as well as US-led measures despite his previous dismissal of sanctions as nothing but “torn paper.” But no matter who or what was at fault, the rial’s drastic drop was the most significant event of the year, not necessarily because of its economic impact, but because all the government’s talk about everything being dandy despite sanctions could no longer be listened to with a straight face. Of course, many outside observers’ predictions that the rial’s crash would lead to the collapse of the Iranian economy did not materialize either. Ultimately, the rial devaluation showed that the Islamic Republic is hurting, but far from dying.
2. Sanctions, Sanctions, and Even More Sanctions
Since its onset, the Islamic Republic of Iran has faced sanctions, including some imposed by the United Nations and unilaterally by various countries. However, 2012 should be marked as the year that the US-led and promoted sanctions regime went after the Iranian economy’s jugular. In January, US pressures led the EU to impose an oil embargo on Iran and the freezing of Iran’s Central Bank’s assets. In March 2012, all Iranian banks identified as institutions in breach of EU sanctions were disconnected from the world’s hub of electronic financial transactions, SWIFT. This was followed by the EU placing sanctions on Iran’s best technical university, Sharif, in December.
The EU seems determined to prove Ahmadinejad’s 2007 claim that “In addition to the closure of our country’s nuclear centers, they were after the closure of universities and research centers connected to peaceful nuclear research, including classes in physics and mathematics and they had announced this officially.” At present, both EU and US institutions look like bodies filled with what can only be described as sanctionholic politicians and bureaucrats desperately in need of a 12-step program. Unable or unwilling to offer Iran a nuclear package that it can accept, they act like people who cannot help themselves because they are addicted to just one thing.
In Iran, sanctions began to bite not only because oil exports dropped significantly (by about 40 percent) but more importantly because banking restrictions prevented the transfer of currency into the country. People are complaining that even vital drugs — not on the sanctions list — have become difficult to import because of payment restrictions. There is, meanwhile, little evidence that Tehran is reconsidering its position or that it’s willing to accept a nuclear deal that it previously rejected. Perhaps 2013 will be the year that the Iranian leadership will finally crack and cry uncle, but I wouldn’t bet on it.
3. The Parliamentary Elections
Elections for the 9th Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majlis were held on March 2 with a second round on May 4 in the 65 districts where candidates did not receive 25 percent or more of the votes cast. Stricter qualification criteria saw fewer candidates registering than in previous elections. Still, more than a third were disqualified by the Guardian Council, leaving about 3,400 candidates to run for the 290 seats that represent Iran’s 31 provinces. This was the first election held since the contested 2009 presidential election and much was made of it being an eventless event which nevertheless registered a respectable participation rate for the legitimacy of the Iranian state. Posters exhorted people to vote as a means to prevent military attacks and displayed emphatic declarations by Khamenei that in this “critical” election, high turnout would be a “slap” in the face of the enemy.
Official figures showed a 7 percent increase in voter turnout compared to the last parliamentary election in 2008 — from 57 to 64 percent – but many doubt the veracity of this figure. Participation rates in parliamentary elections have ranged from 51 to 71 percent and, given the disaffection of many voters after what happened in 2009, the likely turnout was probably on the lower end. Turnout in large cities such as Tehran has historically been much lower. Despite the failure of more than 65 percent of sitting MPs to return to the new session (the incumbency rate is historically low in Iran and only between 30 to 35 percent), the election was mostly a competition between conservatives and ultra-conservatives wherein the latter did not do as well as the more traditional conservatives. This outcome assured the re-election of Ali Larijani as Speaker along with deputy speakers who are also traditional conservatives. Historically, parliamentary elections held right before the president’s second term is over have been harbingers of trends for the next presidential election. So, although Iranian presidential elections have proven unpredictable the last few times, a lackluster election with slim pickings will likely be the name of the game for June 2013. Still, even disgruntled non-voters will probably be hoping for a move away from the radicalism and erratic conduct of the current president.
4. The Majles Questions, Ahmadinejad Mocks
After weeks of wrangling, in a first for the Islamic Republic, President Ahmadinejad was called to the Majles in March to answer questions regarding his refusal to implement legislation passed by the Parliament, controversial cabinet appointments, and a tense relationship with Khamenei. Ahmadinejad’s responses turned out to be both evasive and dismissive; they were performed by a man safe with the knowledge that he would not be impeached. Members of parliament complained that he insulted and mocked their questions but did nothing given the costs of bringing him down during the midst of all the external pressures Iran is under. A second attempt in November to question Ahmadinejad regarding the devaluation of the rial was suddenly halted by Khamenei, who once again expressed his wishes for the president to finish his term without too many disturbances. Still, nothing is over until it is over and Khamenei and the whole country will have to endure much more heartburn in 2013 before Ahmadinejad leaves his post by August. Given the support he has given to Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Khamenei deserves the stress, but the country doesn’t.
5. The Suspension of the “Great Economic Surgery”
The Parliament was manhandled by Ahmadinejad on many occasions but did manage to strike back at the heart of his economic program. Fearing greater inflation than the official 25 percent, and concerned about the unauthorized use of foreign exchange to cover the budget deficit, the Parliament suspended the second phase of the Targeted Subsidies Reform Act of 2010 — the center-piece of Ahmadinejad’s “Great Economic Surgery” — in November. This suspension halted more public utility price increases and further rises in monthly welfare cash payments to households, as was planned by the Ahmadinejad Administration. The parliament also voted in a new law which explicitly states that “all money received from the sales of oil and gas proceeds at new higher exchange rates is part of the government’s general revenue, and no part of it can be used to raise monthly cash payments.”
6. Death and Resistance in Iran’s Prisons
This year forcefully disproved the assumption that imprisoning political and civil society activists and critics silences them and fixes the Islamic Republic’s dissident problem. Former presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi remained incarcerated in their homes (the former along with spouse Zahra Rahnavard) without being charged and remained mostly without any kind of access to the outside world. But letters written by political prisoners about prison conditions and solidarity among prisoners — as well as the woeful state of the country’s politics — made it out of the prisons and were sufficiently covered by external news and activist outlets for many inside Iran to become aware of them.
Beyond letters, prisoners also staged hunger strikes. Of particular note was the 49-day hunger strike by Nasrin Sotoudeh, a human rights lawyer serving a sentence for “acting against national security.” She ended her strike after judicial authorities acceded to her demand to lift a travel ban imposed on her 12-year old daughter. Her mistreatment and courage was widely reported outside of Iran (Sotoudeh and filmmaker Jafar Panahi were awarded the EU’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought), but also received publicity inside Iran. The dynamic between prisoner resistance inside the country and the persistent coverage of government mistreatment by Iran-focused non-governmental organizations outside of Iran — such as the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran (ICHRI) — has proven effective in keeping civil rights at the center of the country’s political discourse. Sadly, this did not prevent the death of Sattar Beheshti, a working class blogger who reportedly died soon after he was beaten by members of the cyber police. His mistreatment was immediately reported in a letter written by 41 fellow prisoners that was smuggled out of prison and his death created an uproar leading to the dismissal of the chief of the cyber police and a parliamentary investigation. In the words of the ICHRI’s Hadi Ghaemi, the Beheshti case marked a milestone in showing that ordinary Iranians risk much harsher treatment by security services than those with name recognition. But the publicity also showed that “the culture of human rights is really taking root in Iran – that they can’t cover it up and run away like they did before.”
7. The UN and Human Rights in Iran
The year of 2012 was also a bad year for Iran’s human rights record at the United Nations. The UN Human Rights Council renewed the mandate of the special rapporteur on Iran that it had established in 2011 (it was the first country-specific rapporteur established by the Council since its inception in 2006). UN actions this year included two damning reports by the Special Rapporteur, Ahmad Shaheed, a rebuke of Iran’s rights record by the UN’s Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, and a call by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for Iran to release a prominent human rights activist from detention. The year ended with a rebuke at the General Assembly, which condemned human rights violations including arbitrary detentions, the persecutions of minorities, efforts to interfere with the freedom of expression, and inhumane conditions in Iran’s prison system where torture and cruel punishments have been used. Tehran charged that the GA resolution was politically motivated. Politically motivated or not, Iran’s troubles at international forums intensified with its leadership caught in the paradox of wanting to be a respected member of the international community while protesting the alleged manipulation and bullying of international institutions in the same community by bigger powers.
8. The NAM Showcase
It must be considered pure fortuity for the Islamic Republic of Iran that the decision to hold the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran was made three years ago in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. Although the previous summit took place shortly after Iran’s contested 2009 presidential election, it’s unlikely that anyone could have predicted the significance of the summit in light of systematic Western efforts to squeeze and isolate Iran. The extraordinary effort put into the event by the government was intended to showcase Iran’s global role and offer concrete evidence that the US-led initiative to isolate Iran has failed — but it did not go as smoothly as was hoped. The unpopularity of Iran’s support for the Syrian government became evident when the Iranian television mistranslated Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s denunciations of the tragedy in Syria.
The summit did, however, have some positive aspects for the Iranian leadership. For instance, the large economic contingent that accompanied Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit underscored the reality that while the opportunity costs of the sanctions regime are huge for Iran, the country’s location and resources are countervailing forces that cannot be ignored. Quite a few countries look at Iran’s economic strangulation as a prospect for positive gains. This dynamic is likely to continue as the US actively tries to impose new ways of restricting Iran’s trade while other countries collude with Iran in finding ways to get around them.
9. No More Birth Control Policy
In a major reversal in August, with what was considered one of the most successful post-revolutionary plans, the budget for the national birth control program was eliminated. The Health Ministry will instead get funding for “fertility health” with a focus on the health of mothers and children to come. According to Farzaneh Rouhi:
Iran has stood out for lowering its fertility in a short time without coercion or abortion. The fertility rate dropped from 6.6 births per woman in 1977 to 2 births per woman in 2000 and to 1.9 births per woman in 2006. The decline was particularly striking in rural areas, where the average number of births per woman dropped from 8.1 to 2.1 in a single generation. (European countries took about 300 years to experience a similar decline.)
But Iran’s population is now aging rapidly. The latest census figures show that only 23.4 percent of the country is under 14 (a steep drop from 44.5 in 1986) and the median age has increased from 17.4 in 1976 to 27. The policy reversal unofficially began a couple of years ago when the Ahmadinejad administration began to give financial incentives for child birth. But the official abandonment of birth control policies occurred without parliamentary action and upon the words of Khamenei, who said that he had made a mistake in supporting the policy for too long. Reversal may nevertheless be hard to implement in practice. In Rouhi’s words, “Iran may not be able to reverse public practices, in part because small family size is now enshrined in the psyche of both men and women. The public is now used to having control over reproductive rights and may continue to do so, whether through government-sponsored health services or the private sector.”
10. Threats of War and the Ongoing Nuclear Soap Opera
It would have been easy to place the continuing conflict over Iran’s nuclear program at the top of this list. It certainly was the most reported news regarding Iran. But “ongoing” is the operative word here. Yes, there were three rounds of talks in Istanbul, Baghdad and finally Moscow. Yes, these talks were described by Hillary Clinton as “perhaps a last chance to demonstrate a way forward” that can satisfy the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Yes, there was another report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) detailing how Iran used the summer to double the number of centrifuges installed deep under a mountain near the holy city of Qom, while allegedly cleansing another site — Parchin — where suspicions persist about past explosive experiments that could be relevant to the production of a nuclear weapon. And yes, there was a lot of war talk, underwritten by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to use the US presidential election to pressure the Obama administration to establish a red line of intolerance for Iran’s nuclear activities.
From Iran’s standpoint, though, what happened was business as usual: lots huffing and puffing in order to sell sanctions as an “alternative to war.” Indeed, the business of selling alternatives to war became so prolific that even the covert war of sabotage and cyber warfare was sold as a substitute without any hint of irony or discomfiture. In reality, all the discussions of red lines and deadlines revealed more about the state of politics in both Israel and the US than in Iran. Netanyahu’s speech at the UN — armed as he was with a Roadrunner cartoon of a nuclear bomb — matched Ahmadinejad’s past craziness and signaled the extent to which radicalism has become the norm in Israeli politics. Meanwhile, in the US the limited appetite or outright distaste for yet another attack on a Middle Eastern country was clearly revealed along with much harder to deny distortions from lobbies backed by Israeli hardliners which have been inserted into the US foreign policy making process. (This tale continues with the frenzy surrounding former senator Chuck Hagel’s possible nomination for Secretary of Defense, because, in the words of Elizabeth Drew, “Iran more than any other single issue is at the core of the opposition.”)
The year of 2012 began with hopes for change in the battle over Iran’s nuclear program. It ended with more of the same and would have remained so even if the pressure on Iran was substantially increased. We begin the coming year with a keen understanding that more of the same may not be sustainable for too long. But the question of when there will finally be a change in this trajectory — and if so, whether it will be for better or worse — remains elusive, with the answer residing in Washington as much as it does in Tehran.
Cartoon: Peter Schrank, the Economist
]]>Sadeq Zibakalam, University of Tehran professor and the closest the Islamic Republic has to an intra-systemic gadfly, has written an interesting commentary in the new daily Arman regarding the current state of Iranian politics. The article’s title, “End of the Deviation current,” refers to the excuse hardline conservatives in Iran have [...]]]>
Sadeq Zibakalam, University of Tehran professor and the closest the Islamic Republic has to an intra-systemic gadfly, has written an interesting commentary in the new daily Arman regarding the current state of Iranian politics. The article’s title, “End of the Deviation current,” refers to the excuse hardline conservatives in Iran have relied upon to maintain their support for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The “deviation current” was imaginatively concocted to blame a small clique of presidential appointees for leading Ahmadinejad astray.
Last week, Zibakalam states, proved that such a posture was no longer possible. The public interchange of letters between Ahmadinejad and the head of the Judiciary, Sadeq Amoli Larijani, ended the pretense that Ahmadinejad and his views are not the problem.
What happened last week was essentially this: Ahmadinejad’s sudden transformation into the defender of the “people’s rights”, through his public letter to the Judiciary head that in his capacity as the “implementer of the Constitution” he has the right and responsibility to visit Iranian prisons, was met with Amoli Larijani’s rather humiliating public lashing that a president’s visit is allowed only after the head of the judiciary’s permission. And, Amoli Larijani went on to say, the Judiciary does not think that it is in the “interest of the system” (maslehat) for the permission to be granted. End of conversation.
Zibakalam notes that after this exchange, even hardliners are no longer talking about the deviation current. In effect, Ahmadinejad has managed to lose every single constituency that coalesced to bring him to power in 2005 against the centrist former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The hardliners, who continue to call the 2005 election epic for heralding a discourse (goftoman-e sevom-e khordad) — at the heart and soul of which was Ahmadinejad who embodied simple living, justice-oriented policies, service to the poor, a challenge to the “aristocratic way of life,” a revolutionary stance against the West in the global arena, and the export of revolutionary values — can no longer avoid the reality that their hero is no longer one of them (or at least is acting as though he is no longer one of them).
The hardliners’ separation from Ahmadinejad does not merely lie in Ahmadinejad’s betrayal of their values and his new liberal fondness for “universal human values” and accommodation-oriented foreign policy. They are aghast at Ahmadinejad’s blatant effort to enhance his standing among the urban middle classes. To them, there is nothing wrong with Ahmadinejad trying to maintain popularity so that he can continue to play a role in Iranian politics after his term ends by August 2013. Conceivably, Ahmadinejad’s popularity can be a boon for the hardliners next presidential candidate. But Ahmadinejad’s assessment that it is the urban middle classes which need to be wooed through a liberal posture is hard to swallow. This is a problem for hardliners because it is a public abandonment of their cherished discourse, as well as a clear statement that the country’s mood is not hardline.
Ahmadinejad’s new posture is observed with quite a bit of amusement and ridicule by many who in 2009 voted for his reformist opponents, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, despite Ahmadinejad’s claim that he has been calling for their release from house arrest a couple of times. But this adds to the hardliners’ uncertainty in finding another carrier for their “discourse”, one who is both trustworthy and electable.
To be sure, so far the Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has stepped in to make sure that the “justice-centered and resistance” discourse does not vanish with Ahmadinjad’s troubles. The question of whether the Leader’s abode will try to manipulate the 2013 election in order to maintain his position as an effective executive officer (along with being the Leader) is also a real one (even if this is not as easy as many imagine it to be given the fact that the body in charge of elections is the Interior Ministry, which is still run by Ahmadinejad’s appointees, and that Iranian presidents have shown a tendency to eventually object to the office of the Leader’s interference regardless of their political orientation).
At this point, the hardliners in Iran are left with no other choice but to elevate the Leader into a God-like figure who knows everything about what is best for the country with the hope that by doing so, he may be even more likely to remain on their side. Just this week Khamenei’s chief of staff, Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani said, “if one day it becomes necessary and the commander in chief [khamenei] wills it, sacred defense will again be repeated.”
However, the fear that Khamenei will eventually be forced (or connived by centrist forces) to acknowledge the same societal forces that have pushed Ahmadinejad to feign liberalism, is also there. Whether he will do so is the million dollar question in Iran, and the answer remains to be seen. (In North Khorasan a couple of weeks ago, Khamenei gave a tiny nod to the popular mood by calling for a more flexible approach to the appearance of women who don’t wear their veil properly but “are still believers.”)
But showing flexibility towards certain social conducts along with continued political repression has been an old trick in the Islamic Republic and does not represent a turn. Unless something drastic happens — such as Ahmadinejad resignation or removal — we will have to wait for the June 2013 presidential election to see whether there is a move away from the hardline discourse and which part of the electorate will be given a better chance to have its say.
Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad himself is turning into an interesting figure to watch in terms of the fate that awaits him.
The Islamic Republic has treated its past three presidents differently. One past president is the current Leader due to behind-the-scene machinations that have now turned sour for its prime architect, former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Former president Khamenei continues to have a constituency, particularly in the provinces and among the lower ranks of the state and multiplicity of popular or militia-based welfare organizations and networks.
Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani has lost power but still holds a position as the chair of the Expediency Council and maintains quite a bit of clout, particularly in the business community and state-run technocracy through his advocacy of anti-hardline domestic and foreign policies.
Finally, former president Mohammad Khatami has been completely cut off from access to power, but despite all the complaints about his indecisiveness, he remains a popular man in Iran at least within a certain constituency. I have no way of knowing for sure, but there are people in Iran who insist that a real poll would show that he is still the most popular politician in the country.
In other words, Iran’s past three presidents, for all their faults, each have their own constituency. Ahmadinejad will be the first past president who will leave office with hardly any significant constituency and few political instruments to rely upon. His sudden shift toward some of the concerns of the urban middle classes suggests even he knows that once his access to state coffers is cut off, verbal populism will be of no use in maintaining a constituency that relies on state largesse.
Since the flight of Iran’s first president, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, from the country in the 1980s, all of Iran’s significant leaders have chosen to stay in Iran and precisely because of this continue to represent a voice even after they leave office because they have remained influential, each in their own way, even if purged from power and under house arrest.
Ahmadinejad stands alone, at least for now, because his confrontation with Khamenei has robbed him of support from the right of the political spectrum without any accrued benefits from the other side. In the next few months he will continue to try, as he has done in the past couple of years, to distribute as many resources among his friends as he can — even placing them in secure tenured university positions — in order to maintain some sort of political relevance after the election. But his options are limited.
Even if nuclear talks go somewhere after the US election, Ahmadinejad will not be the beneficiary of his pivot towards being a promoter of talks with the United States. He will continue to be framed as someone who, through mismanagement and bluster, brought about the enhanced sanctions regime, with Khamenei eventually taking charge and fixing the mess. He will have a hard time swallowing this reality and few believe that he will accept his checkmated predicament quietly.
But whatever Ahmadinejad does pales in comparison to what he has already done, which is to make clear, publicly, that even he is aware that public sentiments have drastically moved away from what they were in 2005 when his populist, justice-oriented platform won the day.
Ironically, this awareness was also the motivation behind the Mousavi and Karroubi campaigns in the 2009 election, and it must be quite disconcerting for those who put their reputation on the line to support Ahmadinejad’s reelection to watch him place value in public sectors that are disenchanted with his management of the economy and want a less confrontationist foreign policy.
]]>It must be considered pure fortuity for the Islamic Republic of Iran that the decision to hold the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran was made three years ago in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Although the previous NAM summit took place shortly after Iran’s contested 2009 presidential election, it’s unlikely that anyone [...]]]>
It must be considered pure fortuity for the Islamic Republic of Iran that the decision to hold the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran was made three years ago in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Although the previous NAM summit took place shortly after Iran’s contested 2009 presidential election, it’s unlikely that anyone could have predicted the significance that the next summit would have for Iran in light of the Obama’s administration’s systematic effort to tighten the sanctions regime and the changes in the region.
The extraordinary effort put into the summit – it will include 5 days of holiday for government workers in Tehran along with 30 extra liters of rationed gasoline, perhaps as an encouragement for people to take a vacation away from the capital city – is intended to showcase Iran’s global role and offer concrete evidence that the United States-led initiative to isolate Iran has failed.
This is not my interpretation. It is a point loudly made by various officials in Iran. For instance, Ezatollah Zarghami, the head of Iran’s radio and television, called the summit “a maneuver against arrogance… giving the message that the nation of Iran can play a role in global equations irrespective of the power of global arrogance.”
The summit is being used to make a visually forceful case that it is not the “global community” that has problems with the Islamic Republic, as repeatedly asserted by US officials, but only a US-led and pressured coalition of countries. And, ironically, the Obama administration is conceding that point by identifying Tehran as a “strange and inappropriate choice” for the summit while trying to dissuade various leaders from attending the meeting.
According to Ali Saeedlou, Iran’s vice president and chair of the secretariat for the summit, 150 delegations, including from 20 international organizations, will participate. Saeedlou said Tehran is prepared to host 7,000 delegates with plans for them to visit “industrial plans, and cultural and historical venues.” India’s delegation alone will include 250 people and will be led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
To be sure, whether this showcasing of Iran’s non-isolation will strengthen Iran’s hand and actually have an impact in denting the escalating US-imposed sanctions regime is an entirely different matter. NAM has already issued several statements in support of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and there is not much else that it can or will do in Tehran beyond confirming its past positions.
There is potential for a degree of unpleasantness regarding Syria, which will have representation in the summit. According to IRNA, a news agency close to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there is even debate in Iran about whether President Bashar al-Assad should attend. But Assad’s attendance is highly unlikely and chances are that a rather bland statement calling for regional cooperation on resolving the Syrian imbroglio will satisfy the attendees. IRNA has already conceded that inclusion of support for Syria’s sovereignty as a member of NAM in the Summit’s final statement is unlikely.
Probably the most important aspect of the summit is Egyptian president Mohammad Morsi’s decision to attend. But this decision is more about Egypt’s new foreign policy direction than Iran’s non-isolation. The Egyptian president is the current secretary general of the Nonaligned Movement and had he not gone to Iran to hand over NAM’s rotating leadership, his move would have been seen as an insult to NAM as well as a continuation of Egypt’s US-dependent foreign policy under the ousted Hosni Mubarak.
And, if Egypt and Iran do eventually decide to re-establish full diplomatic relations, that decision will not be based on what happens at the summit; it will result after the time and desire for resuming diplomatic ties has finally come in both countries. In Iran, the desire and concerted effort to elevate relations with Egypt has existed since Mohammad Khatami’s presidency and the last vestiges of opposition have vanished with the political change in Egypt. Meanwhile, the exchange of ambassadors between the two countries is effectively the least expensive way for Egypt to announce its new independent foreign policy. Not having ambassadorial relations with Iran when every other Arab country including Saudi Arabia does, simply doesn’t make sense anymore and even the US must understand this.
Ambassadorial-level relations do not necessarily mean friendly relations – as the current state of Iran-Saudi relations show. And the extent to which Cairo will be willing to deepen relations with Tehran will depend on, and in all likelihood be limited by, the balance of power in Egypt’s domestic politics as well as the country’s relations with the US and other regional powers.
Still, depending on how well organized the summit turns out to be, Tehran will try to garner as much publicity as possible for a show staged essentially for an audience that resides outside of Iran.
As to the audience inside Iran, once the summit is over, it will continue to be divided and weighed down with the reality of severe economic challenges and a broken and paranoid political system that still does not know what to do with a large number of disaffected citizens and cannot offer an explanation for why a former prime minister (and his spouse) and a former speaker of the Parliament continue to be incarcerated without charge.
The good news for this audience though is the persistence of its wry sense of humor. Making fun of the five-day holiday that the government is giving Tehranis, a joke is going around that during the past weekend 30 people have drowned in the Caspian Sea and 90 people died in car crashes. The punch line? “If Israel waits, a whole bunch of us will just pass away during the summit holidays.”
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